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PETITIONER: NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VITHAL RAO AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1972

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. DUA, I.D. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH DWIVEDI, S.N.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  689            1973 SCR  (3)  39  1973 SCC  (1) 500  CITATOR INFO :  F          1973 SC 696  (1,9)  F          1973 SC1383  (1,12)  RF         1973 SC1461  (1202)  F          1974 SC1202  (12,13,15)  RF         1980 SC1438  (18)  D          1986 SC 468  (34)  D          1989 SC1796  (6,7,8,9,11)

ACT: Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 and Land Requisition  Act 1894 Different terms of compensation for land acquired under the  two Acts-Where Government could acquire land under  one Act  or  the other at its choice  there  was  discrimination violative  of Art. 14 of Constitution-There can be no  valid classification as to payment of compensation with  reference to purpose for which land is acquired or of, Act under which it is acquired.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner  was tenant of some fields in a  village  in Patwari   Circle  10,  Nagpur.   He  had  applied   to   the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under a local Act for fixing the purchase price of the said fields.  The land in question was however  acquired  under the Nagpur Improvement  Trust  Act; 1936.   Dissatisfied  with  the  compensation  awarded   the petitioner  filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of  the Constitution.    In  this  petition  the  validity  of   the Improvement  Act was challenged on various grounds,  one  of the grounds being that the Improvement Act was in  violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it empowered  the acquisition of lands at prices lower than those which  would have  been payable if they had been acquired under the  Land Acquisition  Act 1894.  The High Court allowed the  petition and  set aside the award.  Appeal in this Court against  the High Court’s judgment was filed with certificate. Dismissing the appeal. HELD  : The effect of the modifications made by  Improvement

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Act  in  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  in  two  respects   is tremendous.   First the owner where land is  acquired  under the  Improvement Act is paid compensation not  according  to the market value of the I and but the market value according to  the  use  to which the land was put  at  the  date  with reference  to which the market value is to be determined  in that clause.  In other words, if the land is being used  for agricultural  purposes even though it has a potential  value as  a building site, the potential value is to  be  ignored. The second respect in which the owner suffers if the land is acquired under the Improvement Act is that he does not get a solatium of 15% which he would have got if the land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.  It is true that be has  some  minor advantage but they have  no  comparison  in value  to  the loss suffered by virtue of the  market  value being determined according to the use to which the land  was being  put  or the loss of 15% of the market  value  of  the land. [146D] It  is quite clear especially in View of s. 17A as  inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by para 6 of the Schedule to the Improvement  Act,  that  the  acquisition  will  be  by  the Government  and  it  is  only on  payment  of  the  cost  of acquisition  by  the Government that the  land-vest  in  the Trust.   It  is true that the acquisition is for  the  Trust and   may  be  at  its  instance,  but   nevertheless   the acquisition is by the Government.  If this is so, it enables the  State  Government to discriminate  between  one  owne’r equally situated from another owner. [45G] 40 It is now well-settled that the State can make a  reasonable classification  for the purpose of the legislation  provided it  is based on intelligible differentia having  a  rational relation  with  the  object sought to  be  achieved  by  the legislation in question. In this connection it must be  home in mind that the object itself should be lawful. [47D] The  legislature cannot lay down different principles  of  _ compensation  for  lands acquired say for a  hospital  or  a school  or  a  Government building.  An  three  objects  are public purposes and so far as the owner is concerned it does not  matter to him whether it is one public purpose  or  the other.  Art. 14 confers an individual right and in order  to justify  a  classification there should be  something  which justifies  a different treatment to this  individual  right. Ordinarily  a classification based on the public purpose  is not permissible under Art. 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. [48A] Similarly different principles cannot be laid if the land is acquired  for  or  by  an  Improvement  Trust  or  Municipal Corporation  or  Government because so far as the  owner  is concerned  it  does not matter to him whether  the  land  is acquired by one authority or the other. [48D] It  is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition  Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired; if  the existence of two Acts enables the State to give  one owner different treatment from another ,equally situated the owner who is discriminated against can claim the  protection of Art. 14. [48E] TO  accede  to  the  contention of  the  appellant  and  the intervening  states would be destructive of  the  protection afforded  by Art. 14 of the Constitution.  The States  would only  have to constitute separate acquiring bodies for  each city,  or Division or indeed to achieve one  special  public purpose  and lay down different principles of  compensation. [49D] Nandeshwar  Prasad v. U.P. Govt., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1217,  P.

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Vairavelu  mudaliar  v. Special  Deputy  Collector,  Madras, [1965]  1 S.C.R. 614; 619 and Balammal & Ors. v. State  of Madras, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 90,

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2139 of 1968. Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated July 16,  17, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 504  of 1967. V.   M.  Tarkunde, Y. R. Dandige and A. G. Ratnaparkhi,  for appellant No. 1. S.   V.  Natu, K. K. Khamberker, P. Kesava Pillai and M.  R. K. Pillai, for respondent No. 1. B.   D. Sharma, for respondent No. 2. Y.   S. Dharinadhjkari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and 1.   N.   Shroff,   for  Advocate-General   Madhya   Pradesh (InterVener) O. P, Rana, for Advocate-General U.P. (Intervener). 41 D.   Goburdhan, for Advocate-General, Bihar (Intervener). A.   V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for Advocate-General, Tamil Nadu (Intervener). K.   M. Nair, for Advocate-General, Kerala (Intervener). O.   N. Tikku and Vineet Kumar, for AdvocateGeneral, J. & K. (Intervener). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, C.J. This appeal by certificate of fitness granted by the  High  Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur  Bench,  is directed  against  the Judgment of the High  Court  in  Writ Petition  No. 504 of 1967 filed under arts. 226 and  227  of the  Constitution,  by  Vithal  Rao,  respondent  *fore  us, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. The  petitioner  was  a tenant of  some  fields  in  village Binakhi in Petwari Circle No. 10, Nagpur.  He had applied to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under a local act for fixing the  purchase price of the said fields.  On May 3,  1962,  a notice  was  issued under s. 39 of  the  Nagpur  Improvement Trust  Act, 1936-hereinafter referred to as the  Improvement Act.   Section  39 of this Act deals with  the  preparation, publication  and  transmission of notice as  to  improvement schemes and supply of documents to applicants. On  November  17,  1961 the Improvement  Trust  applied  for sanction of its scheme by the Government, and on January  9, 1965,  the Government sanctioned the scheme under s.  45  of the Improvement Act.  On February 28, 1966 proceedings  were started before the Land Acquisition Officer and on June  12, 1967  an  award was passed by the Land  Acquisition  Officer fixing  the compensation at Rs. 45,910/- for 44.19 acres  of land acquired. On  June,  15, 1967 the petitioner filed the  writ  petition under  arts.  226  and 227 of  the  Constitution.   In  this petition the validity of the Improvement Act was  challenged on  various  grounds,  one of the  grounds  being  that  the Improvement  Act  was  in  violation  of  Art.  14  of   the Constitution  inasmuch  as it empowered the  acquisition  of lands  at  prices  lower than those which  would  have  been payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The High Court held that as the acquisition is by the  State in  all cases where the property is required to be  acquired for  the purposes of a scheme framed by the Trust and  such being the position, it is not permissible without  violating the  guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution for  the

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State to acquire any property 42 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as  amended by the Improvement Trust Act in so far as they relate to the basis  of  determination and payment  of  compensation.   It must,  therefore, be held that the provisions of  paragraphs 10(2)  and 10(3) in so far as they add a new Clause (3)  (a) to Section 23 and a proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires as violating the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result the petition was allowed, the award set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Land Acquisition  Officer for  determination of compensation according to the law  and in the light of the decision by the High Court. As the case was important, the High Court granted a certifi- cate under art. 1 3 2 ( 1 ) and art. 1 3 1 ( 1 ) (c) of  the Constitution. Before, we deal with the contentions of the learned  counsel for  the  appellant  we may  briefly  examine  the  relevant provisions of the Improvement Act.  This Act came into force on  December 25, 1936.  It was passed before the  Government of India Act, 1935 came into force.  The Preamble states : "Whereas  it  is  expedient to make provision  for  the  im- provement and expansion of the Town of Nagpur in the  manner hereinafter provided......" Section 3 of the Act creates the Nagpur Improvement Trust as a  body  corporate.  Chapter IV of the Act  deals  with  the Improvement  schemes.  Section 26 provides for  the  matters which may be included in an improvement scheme.  One of the matters  is  "the  acquisition  by  purchase,  exchange,  or otherwise  of any property necessary for or affected by  the execution of the scheme." Section 27 describes various types of improvement schemes.  They are (a) a general  improvement scheme,  (b) a re-building scheme; (c) a re-housing  scheme; (d)  a  street scheme; (e) a deferred street  scheme  (f)  a development, scheme; (g) a housing accommodation scheme; (h) a future expansion or improvement scheme and (i) a  drainage or drainage including sewage disposal scheme. The  scheme in pursuance of which the lands in  the  present case  were  acquired  was a  housing  accommodation  scheme. Section  3,9, as stated above, provides for the issue of  a notice  after  an  improvement  scheme  has  been,   framed. Unders.  41, the Trust is obliged to serve a notice  of  the proposed acquisition of land on certain persons.  Section 43 enables  the  Improvement Trust to  abandon  an  improvement scheme  after considering any objection,  representation  or statement of dissent received and after hearing all persons, or to apply to the State Government for sanction to 43; the scheme with such modifications, if any, as the Trust may consider  necessary.   The  decision would be  that  of  the Improvement Trust. Section  44 gives wide powers to the Government to  sanction with  or without modification or to refuse a sanction or  to return  for, consideration any improvement scheme  submitted to  it  under s. 43.  Under s. 45 the  State  Government  is obliged  to  notify the sanction of an  improvement  scheme. Section 46 enables the Trust to alter an improvement  scheme ’before   it   has  been  completed,  subject   to   certain conditions. Chapter  V  deals with the powers and duties  of  the  Trust where  a scheme has been sanctioned.  Chapter VI deals  with acquisition and disposal of land.  Under s. 58 the Trust  is enabled’ to acquire by purchase, lease or exchange any  land within  the area comprised in a sanctioned scheme.   Section

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59 deals with, compulsory acquisition and may be set out  in full : It provides "59 The Trust may, with the previous sanction of the,  State Government,  acquire land under the provisions of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of this Act, for carrying out any of the purposes of this Act." Section  60 says that "a Tribunal shall be  constituted,  as provided  in section 62, for the purpose of  performing  the functions  of the Court in reference to the  acquisition  of land  for the Trust, under the Land Acquisition Act,  1894." Section  61  modifies  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  in   the following words: "For   the  purpose  of  acquiring  land  under   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the Trust- (a), the Tribunal  shall except for the purposes of  section               (54) of that Act, be deemed to ’he the  Court,               and  the  President of the Tribunal  shall  be               deemed to be the Judge thereunder; (b)  the Act shall  be subject to the further  modifications               as indicated in the Schedule; (c)  the President. of the Tribunal may summon witnesses and               enforce  their attendance and may  compel  the               production  of documents, by the  same  means,               and so far as may be, in the same, manner,  as               is provided in case of a Civil Court under the               Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and (d)  the award of  the  Tribunal shall be deemed to  be  the               award  of  the.  Court under the  Land  Acqui-               sition Act, 1894, and shall be final." 44 We  need  not  deal with the  provisions  dealing  with  the constitution  of the Tribunal, remuneration of its  members, etc. Section 68 enables an owner to apply to the Trust requesting that  the acquisition of land not required for the  purposes of  a scheme may be abandoned on his executing an  agreement to ,Observe conditions specified by the Trust in respect  of the  development of the property and to pay a charge  to  be calculated  in accordance with subsection (2) of section  69 of  the Act.  The Trust can abandon an  acquisition  without requiring sanction of the Government. The  Schedule modifies the Land Acquisition Act  in  various respects.  The relevant modifications are these : 1.   After  clause  (e) of section 3, the  following  clause shall be deemed to be inserted, namely,- "(ee)  the expression ’local authority’ includes  the  Trust constituted under the Nagpur improvement Trust Act, 1936." 2.   (1) The  first  publication of a  notice  of  an  im- provement scheme under section 39 of the Nagpur  Improvement Trust Act, 1936, shall be substituted for, and have the same effect  as publication in the official Gazette, and  in  the locality of, a notification under subsection (1) of  section 4,  except where a declaration under section 4 or section  6 has previously been made and is still in force. (2)  subject to the provisions of clauses IO and II of  this Schedule,  the  issue of a notice  under  sub-section  (4)of section 32 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, in the case  of  land acquired under that sub-section, and  in  any other  case the publication of a notification under  section 45  of  the  Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,  1936,  shall  be substituted  for, and have the same effect as a  declaration by   the  State  Government  under  section  6,   unless   a declaration under the last mentioned section has  previously been made and is in force. 3.The full-stop at the end of section II shall be  deemed

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             to  ’be  changed to a  semi-colon,  and  the               following shall be deemed to ’be added, namely "and (iv)the  costs which, in his opinion, should be allowed  to any person who is found to be entitled to compensation and who is not entitled to receive the additional,sum of fifteen               percentum mentioned in sub-section (2) 45 of  section 23 as having been actually and  reasonably  in-- curred  by such person in preparing his claim  and  putting, his case before the Collector. The collector may disallow wholly or in part costs, incurred               by any person, if he considers that the  claim               made  by  such  person  for  compensation               is extravagant." 4.......................... 5.(1)  In sub-section (3) of section 17 after the  figure "24"’ the words, figures, and letter "or section 24-A" shall be deemed to be inserted. (2)To section 17, the following shall be deemed to be added, namely.: "(5) When proceedings have been taken under this section for the acquisition of any land, and any person sustains damage in consequence of being suddenly dispossessed of such  land, compensation   shall  be  paid  to  such  person  for   such dispossession." Para 6 of the Schedule inserts section 17-A. It reads : "17-A.   In every case referred to in section 16 or  section 17,   Collector   shall,  upon  payment  of  the   cost   of acquisition,  make overcharge of the land to the  Trust  and the  land shall thereupon vest in the Trust, subject to  the liability of the Trust to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of its acquisition." Para 10 amends section 23 thus :- "10(i)................................ 10(2) The full-stop at the end of sub-section (2) of section 23  shall  be  deemed  to be changed to  a  colon,  and  the following proviso shall be deemed to be added :- "Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any  land acquired  under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936,  ex- cept- (a)  buildings  in  the actual occupation of  the  owner  or occupied  free of rent by a relative of the owner, and  land appurtenant thereto, and (b)  gardens not let to tenants but used by the owners as  a place of resort." 10 (3) For the purposes of clause first of sub-section (1)  of this section- (a)  the market value of the land shall be the market value               according to the use to which the land was 46 put at the date with reference to which the market-value  is to be determined under that clause;................" Another  advantage which is said to accrue to these  persons is provided by S. 48-A, as inserted by para 14.  It reads : "48-A. (1) If within a period of two years from the date  of the  publication  of  the declaration  under  section  6  in respect  of  any land, the Collector has not made  an  award under  section 1 1 with respect to such land, the  owner  of the  land  shall, unless he has been to  a  material  extent responsible   for   the  delay,  be  entitled   to   receive compensation  for the damage suffered by him in  consequence of the delay. (2)The  provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply  so

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far  as  may be, to the determination  of  the  compensation payable under this section." It would be seen that the effect of the modifications in two respe cts  is  tremendous.  First, the owner whose  land  is acquired under the Improvement Act is paid compensation not according  to  the market value of the land but  the  market value according to the use to which the land was put at  the date  with  reference  to which the market value  is  to  be determined  in that clause.  In other words, if the land  is being  used for agricultural purposes, even though it has  a potential value as a building site, the potential value  is to  be  ignored.   The second respect  in  which  the  owner suffers if the land is acquired under the Improvement Act is that  he  does not get a solatium of- 1 5 % which  he  would have  got  if  the land had been  acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act.   It  is  true  that  he  has  some  minor advantages  which  have  been pointed  out  by  the  learned counsel  but  they have no comparison in value to  the  loss suffered  by  virtue of the market  value  being  determined according to the use to which the land was being put or  the loss of 15% of the market value of the land. The  first  point which was raised was : whether it  is  the State  which  is  the  acquiring  authority  or  it  is  the Improvement  Trust which is the acquiring authority,  under the Improvement Act. it seems to us that it is quite  clear, especially  in view of. s. 17A as inserted by para 6 of  the Schedule, that the acquisition will be by the Government and it  is  only on payment of the cost of  acquisition  to  the Government  that  the lands vest in the Trust.  It  is  true that the  acquisition is for the Trust and may be  at  its instance,  but  nevertheless  the  acquisition  is  by   the Government. If  this is so, then it is quite clear that  the  Government can acquire for a housing accommodation scheme either under the ’Land Acquisition Act or under the Improvement Act.   If this is 47 so, it enables the State Government to discriminate  between one owner equally situated from another owner. This  Court held in Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt.(1)  that the fact that the lands could be acquired for a scheme under the Kanpur Urban Development Act. (U.P. Act VI of 1945)  did not preventthe  Government from acquiring the lands  for the same purposeunder  the  Land  Acquisition  Act   (as amended by the Kanpur    Act).   We  may  mention  that  the Kanpur  Act amended acquisition of land for the Board  in  a similar manner as in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. A  similar point was abandoned in P. Vaijravelu Mudaliar  v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras(2) by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri in view of the above decision of this Court in Kanpur case. The question then arises whether the High Court is right  in holding that the impugned provisions were hit by Art. 14  of the Constitution. It is now well-settled that the State can make a  reasonable classification  for  the  purpose  of  legislation.   It  is equally  wellsettled that the classification in order to  be reasonable  must  satisfy two tests (i)  the  classification must  be  founded on intelligible differentia and  (ii)  the differentia  must have a rational relation with  the  object sought  to be achieved by the legislation in  question.   In this  connection  it must be borne in mind that  the  object itself  should  be  lawful.  The  object  itself  cannot  be discriminatory,  for otherwise, for instance, if the  object is  to discriminate against one section of the minority  the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that  there

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is  a  reasonable  classification because  it  has  rational relation to the, object sought to be achieved. What  can  be reasonable classification for the  purpose  of determining  compensation, if the object of the  legislation is to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes ? It  would  not  be disputed  that  different  principles  of compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on  the basis that the owner is. old or-young, healthy or ill,  tall or  short, or whether the owner has inherited  the  property or built it With his own efforts, or whether the owner is ’a politician   or   an  advocate.   Why  is   this   sort   of classification not sustainable ? Because the object being to compulsorily  acquire  for a public purpose, the  object  is equally  achieved  whether the land belongs to one  type  or another type. Can  classification  be  made on the, basis  of  the  public purpose  for the purpose of compensation for which  land  is acquired ? In (1) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1217. (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614, 619. 48 other   words  can  the  legislature  lay   down   different principles  of  compensation for lands acquired  say  for  a hospital  or  a school or a Government building  ?  can  the legislature.  say that for a hosPital land will be  acquired at 50% of the market value for a school at 60% of the  value and for a Government building at 70% of the, market value  ? All  three  objects are Public Purposes and as far  as’  the owner  is concerned it does not matter to him whether it  is one   Public Purpose or other.  Art. 14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a classification there  should be  something which justifies a different treatment to  this individual  right.   It  seems  to  us  that  ordinarily   a classification   based   on  the  public  purpose   is   not permissible  under  Art. 14 for the purpose  of  determining Compensation.   The Position is different when the owner  of the  land  himself  is the, recipient of  benefits  from  an improvement  scheme,  and the benefit to him is  taken  into consideration  in- fixing compensation.  Can  classification be  made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land  ? In  other words can different-principles of compensation  be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement  Trust or Municipal Corporation or the Government ? It seems to  us that  the  answer is in the negative because as far  as  the owner  is  concerned it does not matter to him  whether  the land is acquired by one authority or the other. It  is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition  Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If  the existence of two Acts enables the State to give  one owner different treatment from another equally situated  the owner who is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Art. 14. It  was  said that if this is the true  position  the  State would find it impossible to clear slums, to do various other laudable  thing,.  If this argument were to be  accepted  it would be totally destructive of the protection given by Art. 14.   It  would  enable  the State  to  have,  one  law  for acquiring  lands for hospital, one law for  acquiring  lands for  schools,  one law acquiring lands for  clearing  slums, anoth er  for acquiring lands for Government buildings;  one for  acquiring lands in New Delhi and another for  acquiring lands  in  old Delhi.  It was said that in many  cases,  the value of the land has increased not because of any effort by the owner but because of the general development of the city in which the land is situated.  There is no doubt that  this

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is  so, but Art. 14 prohibits the expropriation of  the  un- earned  increment of one owner while leaving  his  neighbour untouched.   This  neighbour could sell his  land  reap  the unearned increment.. If the object of the legislation is  to tax  unearned  increment it should be  done  throughout  the State.   The State cannot achieve this object piece-meat  by compulsory acquisition of land of some owners leaving others alone.  If the object is to clear 49 slums  it cannot be done at the expense of the owners  whose lands  are  acquired, unless as we have said the  owner  are directly benefited by the scheme.  If the object is to build hospitals it cannot be done at the expense of the owners  of the land which is acquired.  The hospital, schools etc. must be built at the expense of the whole community. It will not be denied that a statute cannot tax some  owners of  land  leaving untaxed others equally situated.   If  the owners of the land cannot be taxed differently how can  some owners be indirectly taxed by way of compulsory  acquisition ?  It  is urged that if this were the, law it,will  tic  the hands of the State in undertaking social reforms.  We do not agree.   There is nothing in the Constitution  which  debars the  State  from  bettering  the  lot  of  millions  of  our citizens.   For instance there is nothing to bar  the  State from  taxing  unearned increment if the object  is  to  deny owners  the  full  benefit  of  increase  of  value  due  to development of a town.  It; seems to us, as we have  already said that to accede to the contentions of the appellant  and e States would be destructive of the protection afforded  by Art. 14 of the Constitution.  The States would only have  to constitute  separate  acquiring  bodies for  each  city,  or Division or indeed to achieve one special public purpose and lay down different principles of compensation. In  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar  v.  Special  Deputy  Collector, Madras(1)  there  were two Acts under which the land  of  an owner could be acquired.  The land could have been  acquired for various schemes under the Land Acquisition Act, referred to  as the Principal Act, in the judgment, and the  Amending Act (The Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961). Court observed : "The land could have been acquired for all the said purposes under the Principal Act after paying the market value of the land.   The Amending Act empowers the State to acquire  land for housing scheme at a price lower than that the State  has to pay if the same was acquired under the Principal Act." The  Court examined various justifications for  the  classi- fications  which were put forth by the State, and then  con- cluded:- "From  whatever aspect the matter is looked at, the  alleged differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.  It is said that the object of the  Amending Act  in  itself  may project the differences  in  the  lands sought  to be , acquired under the two Acts.  This  argument puts the cart before the horse.  It is one thing to say that the existing differ- (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. -L631 Supreme Court/73 50 ences  between  persons and properties  have  a  reasonable relation  to  the  object sought to be achieved  and  it  is totally a different thing to say that the object of the  Act itself  created  the differences.  Assuming  that  the  said proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences  in the people owning lands or in the lands on the basis of  the object.  The object is to acquire lands for housing  schemes

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at a low price.  For achieving that object, any land falling in  any  of the said categories can be  acquired  under  the Amending  Act.  So, too, for a public purpose any such  land can  be  acquired under the principal Act.   We,  therefore, hold  that discrimination is writ large on the Amending  Act and  it cannot be sustained on the principal  of  reasonable classification.   We, therefore, hold that the Amending  Act clearly infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void". In Balammal & Ors. v. State of Madras(1) in which the  facts are  substantially similar, the Board constituted under  the Madras  City Improvement Trust Act, (Madras Act 16 of  1945) was  authorised  by  virtue of sec. 71,  with  the  previous sanction  of  the  Government, to  acquire  land  under  the provisions  of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  for  carrying out  any  of  the purposes of the Act  which  included  Town Expansion  Scheme (This sec. 71 is equivalent to see. 59  of the Improvement Act).  For the purpose of acquiring land for the  Board  under  the Land Acquisition Act,  1894  sec.  73 provided  inter alia, that the, said Act shall be  subjected to the modifications specified in the Schedule (This section 73  corresponds  to sec. 61 of the  Improvement  Act).   The Schedule  to the Act provided for modification in  the  Land Acquisition  Act for certain specific purposes.  The  Madras Act of 1945 as replaced by the Madras City Improvement Trust Act  (Madras  Act  37  of 1950)  made  an  important  change inasmuch as the result was that by the change persons  whose lands were compulsorily acquired under the Madras Act 37  of 1950 were deprived of the right to the solatium which  would be  awardable  if  the lands were acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition Act.  In this connection this Court observed : "But,  in our judgment, counsel for the owners is  right  in contending that sub-cl. (2) of cl. 6 of the Schedule to  Act 37  of 1950, insofar as it deprived the owners of the  lands of  the statutory addition to the market value of the  lands under S. 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative  of the  equality  clause of the Constitution, and  is  on  that account void.  If the (1)  [1969] 1 S.C.R. 90. 51 State  had acquired  the lands for improvement of  the  town               under the Land Acquisition Act, the  acquiring               authority  was bound to award in  addition  to               the market value 15% statutory under s.  23(2)               of the Land Acquisition Act.  But by acquiring               the  lands under the Land acquisition  Act  as               modified  by the Schedule to the  Madras  City               Improvement  Trust  Act  37 of  1950  for  the               Improvement Trust which is also a public  pur-               pose  the owners are, it is claimed,  deprived               of  the right to that statutory addition.   An               owner  of  land  is  ordinarily  entitled   to               receive  the  solatium  in  addition  to   the               market-value for compulsory acquisition of his               land,  if  it  is  acquired  under  the   Land               Acquisition  Act,  but not if it  is  acquired               under  the Madras City Improvement Trust  Act.               A clear case of discrimination which infringes               the  guarantee of equal protection of the  law               arises, and the owners of the lands which  are               compulsorily  acquired must on  the  decisions               of, it his Court, be deemed invalid". After reviewing some earlier cases, the Court held: " We. therefore, hold that cl. 6 sub-cl. (2) of the Schedule read with s. 73 of Madras Act 37 of 1950 which deprives  the owners of the statutory right to solarium at the rate of 15%

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on the market-value of the lands, is invalid, and the owners of the lands are entitled to the statutory solatium under S. 23(2)  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  in  consideration  of compulsory acquisition of their land." The  learned  counsel  was not able to satisfy us that the above case  was distinguishable.  We are of the opinion  that  the case was rightly decided and must govern this case.  In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to all  the cases  referred to us at the Bar.  We may mention  that  Mr. Tarkunde also placed reliance on Art. 31 (A) (1) (a) of  the Constitution.   It is now well settled that Art. 3 1 (A)(  1 )(a) has relevance to agrarian reforms and development.   It has nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State. In the result the appeal, fails and is dismissed with costs. U.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 52