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PETITIONER: NAGINDAS RAMDAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DALPATRAM ICHHARAM @ BRIJRAM AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1973

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH PALEKAR, D.G. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  471            1974 SCR  (2) 544  1974 SCC  (1) 242  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC 994  (103)  RF         1975 SC2130  (3,4)  R          1978 SC 952  (2,3,4)  F          1987 SC1986  (13,20)  E          1990 SC1725  (18)

ACT: Bombay  Rent Act, 1947, Ss. 12 and 13-Compromise decree  for eviction-When may be passed.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent-landlord instituted a suit under the  Bombay Rent Act for possession against the appellant-tenant on  two grounds,  namely, arrears in payment of rent and  bona  fide requirement of the premises for personal use and occupation. A compromise decree was passed.  When the appellant  applied for  execution of the decree, the appellant contended  inter alia that the compromise decree had been passed by the  Rent Court  without  satisfying  itself as to  the  existence  of grounds  of  eviction  under  the Act  and  hence,  being  a nullity,  was not executable.  The Executing Court  accepted the  contention.  In appeal, the appellate Court  set  aside the  dismissal  and remanded the matter holding  that  there were  admissions  in the compromise itself  from  which  the Court  could  be satisfied about the existence of  both  the statutory  grounds  for eviction alleged in the  plaint.   A revision to the High Court was dismissed. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  :  (1) The public policy permeating this  Act  is  the protection   of  tenants  against   unreasonable   eviction. Construing  the provisions of s.12,13 and 28 of the  Act  in the  light of this policy, it should be held that  the  Rent Court  under the Act is not competent to pass a  decree  for possession  either  in invitum or with the  consent  of  the parties  on a ground which is decors the Act or ultra  vires the  Act.   The existence of one of  the  statutory  grounds mentioned in s. 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the. exercise of  jurisdiction  by  the Rent  Court.   Parties,  by  their consent  cannot confer jurisdiction on the Rent Court to  do something  which, according to the legislative  mandate,  it could not do. [550C-E]

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Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand, 12  Guj. Law Reporter 1012, approved. Barton v. Fiacham, [1921] 2 K. B. 291 at 299, applied. (2)  The fact that 0. 23 r. 3, C.P.C., is applicable to  the proceedings does not remove. that fetter or empower the Rent Court  to  make a decree for eviction  dehors  the  statute. Even  under that provision the Court, before  ordering  that the  compromise be recorded, is required to  satisfy  itself about  the lawfulness of the agreement.  Such lawfulness  or otherwise  of  the  agreement is to be judged  also  on  the ground  whether terms of the compromise are consistent  with the provisions of the Rent Act. [551 A-C] (3)  But, if at the time of the passing of the decree  there was  some material be- fore the Court on the basis of  which the Court could prima facie be satisfied about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it win be presumed  that the  court  was so satisfied and the  decree  for  eviction, though passed on the basis of the compromise would be valid. Such  material  may  be  in form  of  evidence  recorded  or produced  or it may be partly or wholly be in the  shape  of express  or  implied  admissions  made  in  the   compromise agreement.  Admissions if true and clear are by far the best proof  of  the  facts  admitted  especially  when  they  are judicial  admissions admissible under s. 58,  Evidence  Act. [552F-H] In  the  present case, because of the admission to  pay  the arrears  of rent and mesne profits at the  contractual  rate and  the  withdrawing  of his application  for  fixation  of standard  rent,  there  was no dispute with  regard  to  the amount of standard rent, and there was an admission that the rent was in arrears.  The admission of these material  facts constitute a ground for eviction under s. 12 (3)(a).  [553B- D] Bahadur  Singh  v. Muni Subrat Dass, [1969]  2  S.C.R.  432, Kaushalya  Devi v. Shri K. L. Bansal, [1969] 2 S.C.R.  1048, and  Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, [1970]. 3 S.C.C. 181,  held inapplicable. 545 K.  K.  Chari  v.  B. M.  Seshadri,  [1973]  1  S.C.R.  761, followed. Jeshwant  Raj  Mulukchand v. Anandilal  Bapalal,  [1965]  2, S.C.R. 350, distinguished. (4)  Further  the  Executing Court is not  competent  to  go behind the decree if the decree on the face of it  discloses some material on the basis of which the rent court could  be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction.  If on the face of it the decree does not show the  existence of such material or jurisdictional fact,  the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court’s jurisdiction to pass  the decree.  The moment it finds that prima facie such  material existed its task is complete, and it was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. [553G-554B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION  Civil Appeal No. 2479 (N)  of 1972. Appeal  by Special Leave from the judgment and  order  dated the 26th October 1972 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Civil Revision Application No. 1254 of 1972. S.   K. Dholakia, for the appellant. P.   H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the respondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,  J.-Whether the decree dated September  23,  1964, passed  by  the Trial Judge in Regular Suit No. 6  of  1963, filed  under the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947  (for  short, called  Bombay  Rent  Act) directing  the  eviction  of  the appellant  is a nullity and, as such, in executable, is  the only  question  that falls for decision in  this  appeal  by special leave.  It arises out of these facts: Appellant was a tenant of the premises at Ward No. 3,  Nondh No.  1823/9  in  the Salabatpur area of Surat.   He  was  in arrears  of  rent  since  16-10-1961.   On  16-11-1962,  the landlords  (respondents  herein)  served  a  notice  on  the appellant terminating his tenancy and also requiring him  to pay  the  arrears  of  rent.   On  2-1-1964,  the  landlords instituted  the  suit in the Court at Surat  for  possession against the tenant on two grounds, namely :               (i)   non-payment  of  rent in arrears  for  a               period of more than one year,               (ii)  bona fide requirement of the premises by               the   landlords   for  their   own   use   and               occupation.               The rate of contractual rent was Rs. 151-  per               month.  On 23-9-1964 the parties arrived at  a               compromise, the terms of which, as  incorpora-               ted in the decree, were as under :               "(i)  The defendant do hand over possession of               the  suit  premises by 30-9-1968  without  any               objection.  The tenant to pay Rs. 532 50 P  as               arrears  of rent and mesne profits upto  30-9-               1964.   The plaintiff is to receive Rs.  380/-               deposited  by the defendant in court  and  the               remaining   amount  is  to  be  paid  by   the               defendant to the plaintiffs on or about 31-12-               1964.   The defendant is to pay Rs. 151-  p.m.               as mesne profits from 1-10-1964.               546               (ii)  The  relationship  of the  landlord  and               tenant between the parties has come to an  end               and  no such relationship is to be created  by               the compromise.  The defendant has been  given               time  to vacate the suit. premises by  way  of               grace.  If the defendant fails to comply  with               the   aforesaid  terms  of  the  decree,   the               plaintiffs  would be entitled to  execute  the               decree  both for the decretal amount’ as  well               as for possession of the suit premises.               (iii) If the plaintiffs get for the  defendant               the  lease of the premises bearing  Nondh  No.               1602  of Ward No. 3 on a monthly rent  of  Rs.               50/-  the  defendant  is  to  hand  over   the               possession of the suit premises immediately.               (v)  The parties are to bear their own costs." On  12-1-1968, the landlords filed a petition for  execution of  the decree.  It was dismissed as premature.  The  tenant having failed to pay Rs. 152/50 i.e. the balance of arrears. by  the agreed date, the decree-holders on 17-1-1968,  again took  out  execution for the recovery of  the  said  amount. Thereafter,  on  3-10-1968, the landlords filed  the  second petition  to-  recover possession of the  suit  premises  in execution of the decree. The   tenant  admitted  that  he  had,  according   to   the compromise,  agreed  to give possession  on  30-9-1968,  but added  that in 1968 A.D., the ground floor of  the  premises had  become  submerged in flood waters,  and  thereupon  the decree-holders  seeing his (tenant’s) plight, orally  agreed

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to  allow  him to continue in the premises on payment  of  a monthly  rent  of  Rs. 151-. and thus the  decree  had  been adjusted   and   satisfied.    Subsequently,   by    another application,  the judgment debtor raised an  objection  that since  the  decree  had been passed  by  the  Court  without satisfying  itself as to the existence of a ground of  evic- tion  under  the Bombay Rent Act, it was a nullity,  and  as such, not executable. The executing court (Joint Civil Judge, Surat) rejected  the story  of  adjustment and satisfaction of  the  decree,  but accepted  the  other objection holding that the  decree  was void  because  "the  Court  did not  apply  its  mind  while allowing it under s. 13 (1) (j), Rent Act".  With regard  to the  second ground it was said that it had ceased  to  exist because  "under  the  terms of  compromise  the  default  in payment of rent was waived and the defendant was given  time to  pay  up to 30-9-68".  In the result, the  execution  was dismissed. From  the order of the executing court,  the  decree-holders carried  an appeal to the Extra Assistant Judge, Surat,  who held  that  there  was  ample  material  in  the  shape   of admissions  in the compromise, itself, from which the  court could be satisfied about the existence of both the statutory grounds  or eviction alleged in the plaint.  He,  therefore, set  aside the dismissal of the execution and  remanded  the case to the executing court "to be dealt with in  accordance with  law".  Aggrieved by that order of the Extra  Assistant Judge, the tenant preferred a 547 revision  petition  in  the High  Court  of  Gujarat,.   The revision  was dismissed in limine by an order  dated  26-10- 1972,  against which this appeal by special leave  has  been filed. Mr.  Dholakia, learned Counsel for the  appellant,  contends that  in  view  of public policy which  underlies  all  Rent Control  Acts, including the Bombay Rent Act, no  decree  or order  of  eviction can be passed unless the Rent  Court  or Tribunal is satisfied, on the oasis of extrinsic material as to  the existence of all the essential facts constituting  a statutory  ground for eviction.  It is stressed that in  the instant  case the material, if any, preceding the decree  or even the so-called admission of the rent being in arrears in the compromise itself, was far too insufficient to make  out a ground for eviction under s. 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. Clause  (a)  of s. 12(3), proceeds the argument,  could  not cover the case because the tenant had deposited the rent due upto  the date of the suit and had also made an  application for  fixation of standard rent; and clause (b) of  the  same sub-section  did not apply because no interim standard  rent had been fixed by the Court.  As regards the ground of  bona fide  personal  requirement of the land-lords, it  is  urged that  there was not even a scintilla of material from  which the  satisfaction  of  the court as to the  existence  of  a ground  under  s.  13 could be  spelled  out.   The  decree, concludes the Counsel, being based solely on the consent  of the patties, was a nullity, and was directly hit by the rule laid  down  by this Court in Bahadur Singh  v.  Muni  Subrat Dass;(1)  Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K. L. Bansal(2) and  Ferozi Lal  fain  v.  Man Mal (3).   Learned  Counsel  has  further attempted  to  distinguish this Court’s decision  in  K.  K. Chari  v.  R. M. Seshadri (4) on the ground that  there  was documentary  and  oral evidence of the plaintiff  which  not been   challenged  in  cross-examination,  from  which   the statutory  ground  of  the premises being  required  by  the landlord  for bona fide personal occupation, had been  fully

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made  out.   Reference has also been made  to  Jeshwant  Rai Mulukchand   v.  Anandilal  Bapalal(5)  and  Shah   Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand(6). On  the  other  hand, Mr. Parekh, learned  Counsel  for  the respondents, has canvassed three principal contentions:  (i) The  appeal  should be dismissed on the  preliminary  ground that  there  is  no equity in this case  in  favour  of  the appellant who has, in spite of the ample time     granted to him, contumaciously  failed to comply  with  the decree  and surrender possession even five years after the expiry of the agreed  date fixed for this purpose in the decree.   Counsel has  cited in support of this contention, the  decisions  of this  Court  in  A. M. Allison V. R. L.  Sen  (7)  and  Shri Balwantrai Chimanlal Trivedi v. M. N. Nagreshna and ors. (8) (ii) The principle laid down by (1) [1969] 2. S.C.R. 432.(2) [1969] 2, S.C.R. 1048. (3) [1970] 3. S.C.C. 181.(4) [1973] 1, S.C.C. 761. (5) [1965] 2. S.C.R. 350.(6) 12, Guj. Law Reporter 1012. (7) [1957] S.C.R. 359.   (8) [1961] 1, S.C.R. 113. 548 this Court in the cases relied upon by Mr. Dholakia, is  not applicable  to a compromise decree passed under  the  Bombay Rent Act because: (a)  The  provisions  of s. 13 of the Delhi and  Ajmer  Rent (Control) Act, 1952 (for short, Delhi Rent Act) and s. 10 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short  Madras Rent Act), on the interpretation of which  the said decisions are based, are materially different from  ss. 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act; (b)  by  virtue of Rule 8 of the Bombay Rent Act Rules,  the provision  of the Code of Civil Procedure,  including  0.23, Rule 3, which gives a mandate to the court to pass a  decree in terms of a compromise, are applicable to suits under  the Bombay  Rent  Act,  but  the  application  of  the  Code  to proceedings  before the Rent Controller Tribunal  under  the Delhi  Rent  Act  or  Madras Rent  Act  has  been  expressly excluded’  In support of this contention reliance  has  been placed on Chandan Baj v. Surjan (1). (iii) Even if the ratio of the said Supreme Court decisions applies to decrees under the  Bombay Rent Act, then also both the  statutory  grounds for  eviction pleaded in the plaint, had been  expressly  or impliedly  admitted by the defendant in the compromise,  and it will be presumed that in passing the eviction decree  the court  was satisfied about the existence of  those  grounds. In  this  view, according to the Counsel, the  instant  case will fall within the ratio of Seshadri’s case (supra). At the stage of the final hearing of the appeal,  especially after the learned Counsel for the appellant had addressed us on  merits,  we do not propose to go  into  the  preliminary ground  urged by Mr. Parekh.  If the decree turns out to  be without  jurisdiction,  this equitable plea will  be  of  no avail; because equity cannot operate to annul a statute.  If the  decree is found to be in conformity with  the  statute, the  appeal will fail on that ground, alone, and it will  be wholly  unnecessary to consider the equitable aspect of  the matter. We,  therefore, come straight to the contention (ii)  raised by Mr. Parekh.  In order to find out whether or not a decree or   order   of  eviction  can  be  passed   by   the   Rent Court/Tribunal exercising special jurisdiction under any  of these  statutes Delhi Rent Act, Madras Rent Act  and  Bombay Rent  Act-on  a  ground which is not one  of  the  statutory grounds of eviction, it is necessary to have a peep into the historical background of the Rent Control laws, in  general, and  a  quick look at the broad scheme and language  of  the

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relevant statutory provisions of these Acts. The strain of the last World War, Industrial Revolution, the large scale exodus of the working people to urban areas  and the  social  and political changes brought  in  their.  wake social problems of considerable magnitude and complexity and their  concomitant  evils.   The  country  was  faced   with spiraling  inflation,  soaring cost  of  living,  increasing urban  population  and  scarcity  of  accommodation.    Rack renting and large scale eviction of tenants under the  guise of the ordinary law, exacerbated those conditions making the economic life (1)  A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 106. 549 of  the  community unstable and insecure.  To  tackle  these problems  and  curb  these evils, the  Legislatures  of  the States in India enacted Rent Control legislations. The  preamble of the Bombay Rent Act states that the  object of the Act is "to amend and consolidate the law relating  to the  control  of rents and repairs of certain  premises,  of rates  of hotels and lodging houses and of evictions".   The language  of the preambles of the Delhi Rent Act and  Madras Rent  Act  is  Strikingly similar.   The  broad  policy  and purpose  as indicated in their preambles is’,  substantially the same viz., to protect tenants against their landlords in respect of the rents, evictions and repairs.  With the  same beneficent  end in view, all the three Acts  interfere  with contractual  tenancies and make provisions for  fixation  of fair  and standard rents, or protection against eviction  of tenants not only during the continuance of their contractual tenure  but  also  after  its  determination.  indeed,   the neologism  "  statutory  tenant"  has  come  into  existence because  of  this protective policy which is common  to  all enactments of this kind.  Further, all the three Acts create Courts/Tribunals  of special and exclusive jurisdiction  for the enforcement of their provisions. Section  28 of the Bombay Rent Act which begins with a  non- obstante clause, specifies Courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction  to  entertain and try any suit  or  proceeding between  a landlord and a tenant inter alia relating to  (a) recovery of rent of any premises;(b) recovery of  possession of  any premises to which the provisions of Part  II  apply. The  words  "to which the provisions of Part II  apply"  are significant.  They indicate that the exclusive  jurisdiction for  recovery  of  possession is to be  exercised  when  the provisions of Part II, which include ss. 12 and 13, apply. All these three Acts lay down specific grounds more or  less similar,  on  which  a decree or order of  eviction  can  be passed  by  the  Rent  Court  or  the  Tribunal   exercising exclusive jurisdiction.  In the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated form under s. 13, while  the same  thing has been split up into two and provided  in  two sections (12 and 13) in the Bombay Rent Act which  represent the negative and positive parts of the same pattern.   Taken together,  they are exhaustive of the grounds on  which  the Rent  Court  is competent to pass a  decree  of  possession. Similarly,  in the Madras Rent Act, the grounds on  which  a tenant can be evicted, are given in ss. 10, 14 to 16. Section 13 of the Delhi Rent Act starts with a  non-obstante clause  viz.,  "Notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary contained  in  any other law or any contract, no  decree  or order  for the recovery of possession of any premises  shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant..........  Likewise, s. 10(1) of the Madras Rent  Act starts  with  the  clause, "a tenant shall  not  be  evicted whether  in  execution of a decree or  otherwise  except  in

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accordance  with the provisions of this section or  sections 14 to 16." 550 It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and the  Madras Rent  Act  expressly forbid the Rent Court or  the  Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant sections of those statutes.  Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to  the  Rent  Court that it shall  not  travel  beyond  the statutory  grounds  mentioned in ss. 12 and 13, and  to  the parties that they shall not contract out of those  statutory grounds,  is inherent, in the public policy built  into  the statute (Bombay Rent Act). In Rasiklal Chunilal’s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Gujarat  High Court has taken the view that in spite of  the fact that there is no express provisions in the Bombay  Rent Act  prohibiting contraction, out, such a prohibition  would have to be read by implication consistently with the  public policy  underlying this welfare measure.  If we may  say  so with respect, this is a correct approach to the problem. Construing the provisions of ss. 12,13 and 28 of the  Bombay Rent  Act in the light of the public policy which  permeates the  entire  scheme and structure of the Act,  there  is  no escape from the   conclusion that the Rent Court under  this Act is not competent to pass a decree for Possession  either in  invitum or with the consent of the parties on  a  ground which  is  de  hours the Act or ultra vires  the  Act.   The existence  of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in  ss. 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of  jurisdiction by  the  Rent Court under these  provisions.   Even  parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court  to do something which, according to  the  legislative mandate, it could not do. In  the view we take, we are fortified by the ratio  of  the decision  in  Barton v. Fincham(1).  Therein  the  Court  of Appeal  was considering the scheme of the Rent  Restrictions Act,  1920, the language of S. 5 of which was similar to  s. 13  of  the Delhi Rent Act.  In that context,  Atkin  L.  J. stated the law on the point thus :               "The section appears to me to limit definitely               the  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  in  making               ejectment  orders in the case of  premises  to               which  the  Act applies.   Parties  cannot  by               agreement  give the Courts jurisdiction  which               the  Legislature has enacted they are  not  to               have.               If the parties before the Court admit that one               of  the  events has happened  which  give  the               Court jurisdiction, and there is no reason  to               doubt  the  bona fides of the  admission,  the               Court  is under no obligation to make  further               inquiry as to the question of fact; but  apart               from  such an admission the Court cannot  give               effect  to-  an agreement, whether by  way  of               compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the               provisions of the Act." It is true that in Barton’s case just as in Seshadri’s  case (supra),   the   statute   under   consideration   expressly prohibited the Court from passing a decree on a ground which was not covered by the statute but (1)  (1921] 2, K.B. 291 at 299. 551 the  principle  equally applicable to cases  under  statutes which  place  such  ’a ’fetter on the  jurisdiction  of  the Court, by necessary implication.

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The  mere fact that Order 23, Rule 3. of the Code  of  Civil Procedures applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the Bombay  Rent  Act, does not remove that fetter on  the  Rent Court  or empower it to make a decree for eviction  de  hors the  statute.  Even under that.  Provision of the Code,  the Court,  before ordering that the compromise be recorded,  is required  to  satisfy  itself about the  lawfulness  of  the agreement.   Such lawfulness or otherwise of  the  agreement is.  to be judged, also on the ground whether the  terms  of the  compromise  are consistent with the provisions  of  the Rent Act. In  view of what has been said above, it is clear  that  the general  principles  enunciated  by  this  Court  in   cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant, are  a relevant guide for determining whether in a particular  case the consent decree for. possession passed by the Court under the Bombay Rent Act is or is not a nullity.  But the case in hand  is not in line with Bahadur Singh’s  case,  Kaushalaya Devi’s  case and Ferozi Lal Jain’s case (supra).  On  facts, they  are distinguishable from the instant case.   In  those cases,  there  was  absolutely  no  material,  extrinsic  or intrinsic  to the consent decree on the basis of  which  the Court could be satisfied as to the existence of a  statutory ground for eviction. The  case  before  us falls well nigh within  the  ratio  of Seshadri’s  case  (supra).  Therein, K. K.  Chari,  who  was under an eviction order,, purchased the suit premises in the same city for his occupation.  Seshadri was then the  tenant of  the  suit  premises  under the  vendor,  and  after  the purchase, he attuned in favour of the appellant and had been paying  rent to him.  Chari issued notices under s.  106  of the  Transfer  of Property Act, terminating the  tenancy  of Seshadri.   Since  Seshadri did  not  surrender  possession, Chari  filed a suit for eviction under s. 10 (3)  (a)(i)  of the  Madras  Act mainly on the ground that be  required  the premises  for  his bona fide use and  occupation.   Seshadri controverted  Chari’s  claim  At  the  commencement  of  the enquiry,   Chari   was  examined  before  the   Court.    He particularly  testified how he had purchased the  house  for his own occupation.  He also filed a number of documents  to establish  that  the  requirement of premises  for  his  own occupation  was  true.  Seshadri did not  prefer  to  cross- examine  Chari,  About  11/2  months  thereafter,  both  the parties entered into a compromise in these terms :               "(1)  The  respondent  hereby  withdraws   his               defence in the aforesaid petition and  submits               to a decree for eviction unconditionally.               (2)   The  respondent  prays  that  time   for               vacating  upto June 5, 1969, might  please  be               given and the petitioner agrees to the same.               (3)   The  respondent  agrees  to  vacate  the               petition premises and hand over possession  of               the entire petition premises to the petitioner               on or before the said date               552               viz.   June  5, 1969, without fail  under  any               circumstances and undertakes not to apply  for               extension of time.               (4)   It  is agreed by both the  parties  that               this  memo  of compromise-is executable  as  a               Decree of Court."               The Court, after referring to the petition  of               the  landlord being under s. 10 (3)(a)(i),  of               the  Act on the ground of his own  occupation,               passed the following order

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             "Compromise  memo  filed  and  recorded.    By               consent  eviction is ordered granting time  to               vacate till June 5, 1969.  No costs."               The  aforesaid  terms of the  compromise  were               also   incorporated  in  the   order.    After               distinguishing  the  former three  cases  viz.               Bahadur  Singh’s case, Kaushalaya Devi’s  case               and  Ferozi Lal Jain’s case,  Vaidialingam  J.               speaking  for himself and Dua  J.  (comprising               majority)  enunciated  the law on  the  point,               thus :               "The true position appears to be that an order               of eviction based on consent of the parties is               not  necessarily  void if  the  jurisdictional               fact viz., the existence of one or more of the               conditions mentioned in Section 10 were  shown               to have existed when the Court made the order.               Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a               prerequisite  for the order of eviction,  need               not  be  by the manifestation borne out  by  a               judicial finding.  If at some stage the  Court               was  called  upon  to apply its  mind  to  the               question  and  there was  sufficient  material               before  it, before the parties invited  it  to               pass an order in terms of their agreement,  it               is  possible to postulate that the  Court  was               satisfied about the grounds on which the order               of  eviction was based................ If  the               tenant  in  fact admits that the  landlord  is               entitled to possession on one or other of  the               statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it  is               open to the court to act on that admission and               make an order for possession in favour of  the               landlord without further enquiry." From  a  conspectus  of  the cases cited  at  the  bar,  the principle  that  emerges  is, that if at  the  time  of  the passing  of the decree, there was some material  before  the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied,  about  the existence of a statutory  ground  for eviction,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  Court  was  so satisfied  and  the decree for eviction,  though  apparently passed  on the basis of a compromise, would be valid.   Such material  may take the shape either of evidence recorded  or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in  the shape  of  an  express  or implied  admission  made  in  the compromise agreement, itself, Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted.  Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s.  58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents  at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.  The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and 553. constitute  a  waiver of proof.  They by themselves  can  be made  the.  foundation of the rights of the parties  On  the other  hand evidentiary admissions which are  receivable  at the  trial as evidence, are by themselves,  not  conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr.  Dholakia, that  the  facts  admitted in the  compromise,  itself  were insufficient  to  make  out even a prima  facie  ground  for eviction mentioned in s. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent  Act, merely  because  the  tenant had  made  an  application  for fixation  of standard rent, which was still pending  at  the time  of  passing of the decree.  By admitting  to  pay  the

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arrears  of rent and mesne profits at the rate of  Rs.  15/- per month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent.  The admission in the  compromise was thus an admission of the material  facts which constituted a ground for eviction under s. 12 (3) (a). Rent  was  admittedly  payable  by  the  month;  since   the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was  no dispute with regard to the amount of standard  rent. Further, the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period  of more  than six months; so much so that in the present  case, the  tenant  had neglected to pay the  balance  of  arrears, amounting to Rs. 152/50, even long after the decree and  the landlord was compelled to recover the same by execution. The  case of Jeshwant Rai Mulukchand (supra) , cited by  Mr. Dholakia, does not advance  his stand.  In that case,  there was  a  serious ,dispute regarding the  amount  of  standard rent.  Though the final order of standard rent was passed by the  Court  of Small Causes, neither the  landlord  nor  the tenant  accepted the determination and each side  questioned the  amount  by filing Revision Petitions.  In  the  present case,  however, no dispute regarding the standard rent  was, subsisting at the time of compromise.  That dispute was  Put an end to by the compromise itself. Be  that  as it may, in cases where an objection as  to  the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nubility,is  taken, the Executing Court is not competent  to go  behind  the  decree, if the decree on the  face  of  it, discloses  some  material on the basis of  which,  the  Rent Court  could be satisfied with regard to the existence of  a statutory  ground  for  eviction.  In such a  case  it  must accept and execute the decree as it stands.  If, on the face of  it,  the  decree does not show  the  existence  of  such material  or  jurisdictional fact, the Executing  Court  may look to the original record of the trial court to  ascertain whether  there was any material furnishing a foundation  for the  trial court’s. jurisdiction to pass the decree it  did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material  existed, its  task  is complete.  It is not necessary for  it  to  go further and question the presumed or expressed finding, 554 of the trial court on the basis of that material.  All  that it  has  to see is whether there was some  material  on  the basis  of which the Rent Court could  have-as  distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction.   To allow the Executing Court to go  beyond  that limit,  would be to exalt it to the status of a super  Court sitting  in  appeal  over the decision of  the  Rent  Court. Since  in the instant case, there was a clear  admission  in the   compromise,  incorporated  in  the  decree,   of   the fundamental  facts  that  could  constitute  a  ground   for eviction  under. s. 12 (3) (a), the Executing Court was  not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S.                           Appeal dismissed. 555