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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7519 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 14245 of 2004)

Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar …. Appellant(s)

              Versus

State of Gujarat ….Respondent(s) with

CIVIL APPEAL No.7520 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14182 of  2004), CIVIL APPEAL No.7521 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14248 of  2004), CIVIL APPEAL No.7522 of 2010 ((@ S.L.P. (C) No.14249 of  2004),   C.A. No.7523 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26879 of 2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7524 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14947 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7525 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26880 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7526 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26881 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7527 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14949 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7528 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26882 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7529 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.15022 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7530 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26883 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7531 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26884 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7532 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.15020 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7533 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26885 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7534 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14940 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7535 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.26886 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7536 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14946 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7537 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14950 of

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2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7538 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14965 of  2004),   CIVIL APPEAL No.7539 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.14993 of  2004),    CIVIL APPEAL No.7540 of 2010 (@ S.L.P. (C) No.15029 of  2004).

J U D G M E N T

S. H. KAPADIA, CJI

Leave granted.

2. A short question which arises for determination in  

this batch of cases is whether bid lands were required to  

be  taken  into  consideration  for  the  purpose  of  land  

ceiling under the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act,  

1960, as amended vide Act 2 of 1974, which came into force  

from 1.4.1976.  

3. At the outset, we may state that writ petitions were  

filed  in  the  High  Court  inter  alia  challenging  the  

provisions  of  the  Gujarat  Agricultural  Lands  Ceiling  

Amendment Act 2 of 1974 as violative of Articles 14 and 19  

of the Constitution. We may state that Amending Act 2 of  

1974  has  been  included  as  Item  No.  71  in  the  Ninth  

Schedule to the Constitution of India by the Constitution  

Thirty-fourth Amendment Act. That inclusion was challenged  

before the Constitution Bench of this Court on the ground  

that Thirty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution violated

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the basic structure of the Constitution which challenge  

has now been given up in view of the judgment of this  

Court in the case of  I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs.   v.  

State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007 (2) SCC 1.

4. As regards the question of includability of the bid  

lands in the lands ceiling is concerned, the case of the  

appellant(s) before us was, that bid lands held by the  

appellant(s) being uncultivable waste lands; being rocky  

and stony were not included in the definition of “land” in  

the 1960 Act as originally enacted; that “bid lands” held  

by  the  appellant(s)  were  sought  to  be  included  in  the  

total holding of the appellant(s) to determine the ceiling  

under the 1960 Act only by reason of Amendment Act 2 of  

1974.  At  this  stage,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  said  

Amendment  Act  2  of  1974,  which  came  into  force  from  

1.4.1976, was challenged only for the reason that under  

Section  5(1)(a)  of  Saurashtra  Estates  Acquisition  Act,  

1952  (“1952  Act”  for  short)  no  bid  lands  which  were  

uncultivable waste vested in the State Government, which  

bid lands are now sought to be covered by 1960 Act on  

account of the impugned Amendment Act 2 of 1974. According  

to the appellant(s), once such “bid lands” stood excluded  

from vesting under the 1952 Act, the same could not be

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included for calculating the total holding to determine  

the ceiling limit under the 1960 Act, as amended. It was  

contended  on  behalf  of  the  appellant(s)  that  bid  lands  

which  were  also  uncultivable  waste  lands  cannot  be  

included for computing the total holding under the 1960  

Act, as amended, as the object of the Ceiling Act was to  

impose  ceiling  on  lands  held  for  cultivation  or  

agricultural purposes. It was further submitted on behalf  

of the appellant(s) that bid lands cannot fall within the  

definition of dry crop land in clause (e) of Explanation I  

to  Section  2(6)  as  only  “grass  lands”  which  abound  in  

grass grown naturally and which are capable of being used  

for  agricultural  purposes  could  be  included  in  such  

definition of “dry crop” land and since the “bid lands”  

did not fall in any “class of land” under Section 2(6),  

such  land  could  not  be  included  for  calculating  the  

ceiling limit under Section 6 of the 1960 Act, as amended.  

In  this  connection,  Shri  R.F.  Nariman,  learned  senior  

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant(s), submitted  

that the Act of 1960 (Unamended) was a useful guide in  

interpreting the definition of “dry crop land” under the  

Act. According to the learned counsel, the simple meaning  

of the said definition made it clear that “dry crop land”

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has been defined to include “grass land”, that is to say,  

land which abounds in grass grown naturally and which is  

capable of being used for agricultural purposes. According  

to the learned counsel, unwittingly, the word “includes”  

occurring in the unamended definition of ‘dry crop land’  

was  left  out  of  the  amended  definition.  Such  omission,  

according to the learned counsel, can always be supplied  

by the Court. Since, the lands specified in paras (a) to  

(c),  to  wit,  perennially   irrigated  land,  seasonally  

irrigated land and superior dry crop land are all lands on  

which  agricultural  operations  are  capable  of  being  

performed the expression “other than the land specified in  

paras (a) to (c)” obviously refers to lands other than  

those stated in paras (a) to (c) but which are capable of  

being  used  for  agricultural  purposes.  According  to  the  

learned counsel, the appellant(s) had specifically pleaded  

that their lands were barren, rocky and uncultivable but  

the Authorities proceeded on the basis that the said fact  

was  irrelevant  in  view  of  the  definition  of  the  word  

“land” under Section 2(17) of the 1960 Act. According to  

the learned counsel, even as per the revenue records, the  

subject lands have been described as “Pot Kharaba” i.e.  

waste  lands,  barren  lands  or  uncultivable  lands  and,

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consequently, the same cannot fall within the definition  

of dry crop land under Section 2(6)(iv). According to the  

learned counsel, the said Act had to be interpreted in the  

context of agricultural land ceiling and in the context of  

the  said  1960  Act  being  part  of  agrarian  reforms  and  

unless lands were capable of being used for agricultural  

purposes, the bid lands which were also uncultivable waste  

lands  cannot  fall  within  the  ambit  of  the  1960  Act.  

According to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of  

the  High  Court  was  erroneous  as  it  has  placed  

interpretation on the proviso to Section 5(1) and so read  

the High Court has held that even desert and hilly areas  

where  no  cultivation  is  possible  can  be  subjected  to  

ceiling.  According  to  the  learned  counsel,  Section  5  

states that lands in deserts or hilly areas must first be  

dry  crop  lands  as  defined  under  Explanation  I(e)  after  

which  such  lands  falling  in  a  desert  or  hill  may  be  

accorded a larger ceiling area by the State Government. In  

any event, according to the learned counsel, Section 5(1)  

proviso has no bearing on the definition of dry crop land  

except to the extent that the dry crop land may also fall  

in hilly or desert areas; example, hilly or desert areas  

which abounds in grass and which are capable of being used

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for agricultural purposes. Consequently, hilly or desert  

areas which do not abound in grass or which are incapable  

of being used for agricultural purposes are not covered by  

the  Ceiling  Act,  1960.  Thus,  according  to  the  learned  

counsel, bid lands are excluded from the definition of dry  

crop  land  and  they  do  not  fall  within  any  of  the  

categories  of  classes  of  land  under  the  Act  and,  

therefore, cannot be subjected to ceiling under the 1960  

Act.

5. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of the State of Gujarat, submitted that it has been  

the  admitted  case  of  the  appellant(s)  all  through  the  

proceedings that the lands in question were in fact bid  

lands; that, only argument raised before the Tribunal as  

well  as  the  High  Court,  besides  the  constitutional  

challenge, was two-fold; (i) that the subject lands were  

not fit for “agriculture” and since the 1960 Act is an  

agricultural  ceiling  Act,  the  subject  lands  had  to  be  

excluded from the purview of the Act;        (ii) that,  

the  definition  of  “dry  crop  land”  did  not  specifically  

cover bid lands and must be construed to cover only such  

bid lands as “abound in grass”   and, therefore, the lands  

in question stood outside the Ceiling Act. According to

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the  learned  counsel,  the  definition  of  “land”  stood  

specifically amended by the Amendment Act (No. 2 of 1974)  

to include “bid lands” of Girasdars and Barkhalidars in  

Section  2(17)(ii)(c).  According  to  the  learned  counsel,  

the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  for  enacting  the  

Amending Act also made it clear that the Amendment Act  

stood enacted for including the bid lands of Girasdars and  

Barkhalidars within the definition of “land”. Therefore,  

according to the learned counsel once the definition of  

“land” stood specifically amended to include “bid lands”,  

without  limiting  the  same  to  cultivable  bid  lands,  the  

specific intention of the Legislature must be given its  

full meaning. By the said Amending Act No. 2 of 1974,  

according  to  the  learned  counsel,  a  proviso  was  also  

inserted after Section 5 which increased the ceiling limit  

in respect of “desert” and hilly areas by  12 ½ per cent  

which  indicates  that  even  deserts  and  hilly  areas  have  

been  sought  to  be  brought  within  the  ambit  of  the  

Agricultural  Ceiling  Act.  Therefore,  the  said  proviso  

negates the contentions of the appellant(s) that only such  

bid  lands  which  were  “capable  of  agriculture”  or  which  

abound in grass alone were meant to be covered under the  

Act. It was further submitted that the lands in question

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are  in  fact  “agricultural”  lands.  They  survived  

acquisition under the earlier three Acts only because they  

were “bid lands” which by definition under those Acts were  

lands “being used” by Girasdars/Barkhalidars for grazing  

cattle. That, under the Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines  

the use of land for the purposes of grazing cattle as  

agricultural purpose and thus, according to the learned  

counsel, by their very definition “bid lands” are capable  

of being used for agricultural purpose, namely, grazing  

cattle.  On  the  question  of  classification  of  lands,  

learned counsel submitted that Sections 4 and 5 of the  

1960 Act expressly made two-fold division by dividing the  

State into local areas as well as classes of lands. For  

the ceiling area in Schedule I, the land had to fall under  

one of the classes, namely, perennially irrigated land,  

seasonally irrigated land, superior dry crop land and dry  

crop  land  which  have  been  defined  in  Explanation  I  to  

Section 2(6) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that  

there is no merit in the argument of the appellant(s) that  

“bid land” is not specified in the class of lands under  

Section 2(6) and that even if bid lands were included in  

“dry  crop  land”  it  must  be  only  such  bid  lands  which  

“abound in grass” which would fall under the 1960 Act.

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According  to  the  learned  counsel  the  argument  of  the  

appellant(s) is fallacious as it overlooks the specific  

legislative  intent.  In  this  connection,  learned  counsel  

submitted that from a bare reading of the definition of  

“dry crop lands” in Explanation I(e) it was clear that the  

said  definition  stood  in  two  parts,  namely,  (i)  “land  

other than the land specified in paragraphs (a) to (c)  

and”  (ii)  “grass  land”.  Thus,  according  to  the  learned  

counsel,  the  first  part  of  the  definition  included  all  

lands other than those specified in paragraphs (a) to (c)  

provided  they  fall  under  the  definition  of  land  under  

Section  2(17).  According  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  

reason why “grass land” had to be separately defined in  

clause (e) was because under the proviso to Section 5 a  

further distinction was made between grass land included  

within  “dry  crop  land”  and  other  barren/desert/drought-

prone  areas  which  also  fell  within  “dry  crop  land”.  

Further, according to the learned counsel, under clause  

(f)  to  the  said  Explanation  under  Section  2(6),  “grass  

land” and not all “dry crop lands” were deemed to be rice  

lands  in  certain  situations  which  also  necessitated  a  

separate  definition  of  grass  lands.  Finally,  learned  

counsel  submitted  that  once  bid  lands  fall  within  the

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ambit of the Agricultural Ceiling Act by virtue of the  

specific inclusion of all bid lands in Section 2(17), the  

ambit of inclusion should not be read down by reference to  

the classification under Section 2(6) of the 1960 Act.

6. For  deciding  this  matter,  we  quote  hereinbelow  

Section 2(6) of 1960 Act (unamended) in juxtaposition with  

the 1960 Act (as amended by the Amending Act 2 of 1974):

“Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960   

Unamended Act (Pre – 1974)

2.  Definitions-  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  requires otherwise-

(6)  "class  of  land"  means  any  of  the  following  classes of land, that is to say :-

(i) perennially irrigated land; (ii) seasonally irrigated land; (iii) dry crop land; (iv) rice land;

Explanation—For the purpose of this Act-

(d) rice land means rice land situated in a local area  where the average rainfall is not less than 35 inches  a year, such average being calculated on the basis of  the  rainfall  in  that  area  during  the  five  years  immediately preceding the year 1959 but does not  include perennially or seasonally irrigated land used  for the cultivation of rice;

(e)  "dry  crop  land"  means  land  other  than  perennially or seasonally irrigated or rice land  and  includes grass  land,  that  is  to  say,  land  which  abounds  in  grass  grown  naturally  and  which  is  capable of being used for agricultural purposes;

(f)  grass  land  referred  to  in  paragraph  (e)  shall,  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  that  paragraph,  be  deemed  to  be  rice  land,  if,  is  it  situated in a local area referred to in clause (d) and  in the opinion of the State Government it is fit for  the cultivation of rice.”

Amended Act (Post – 1974) (Inserted by Guj. 2 of 1974)

2.  Definitions-  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  requires otherwise-

(6)“class of land” means any  of  the  following  classes  of  land, that is to say:-

(i) perennially irrigated  land; (ii) seasonally irrigated  land; (iii) superior dry crop land; (iv) dry crop land;

Explanation I–For the purpose  of this Act –  

(d)  “rice  land”  means  land  which is situated in a local  area  where  the  average  rainfall is not less than 89  centimeters  a  year  such  average  being  calculated  on  the basis of rainfall in that  area  during  the  five  years  immediately  preceding  the  year 1959 and  which is used  for  the  cultivation  of  rice  or which, in the opinion of  the State Government, is fit  for  the  cultivation  of rice  but  does  not  include  perennial  or  seasonally  irrigated  land  used  for  the

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cultivation of rice;

(e)  “dry  crop  land”  means  land  other  than  the  land  specified  in  paragraphs  (a)  to (c)  and grass land, that  is to say, land which abounds  in grass grown naturally and  which  is  capable  of  being  used  for  agricultural  purposes;

(f) “grass land” referred to  in  paragraph  (e)  shall,  notwithstanding  anything  contained in that paragraph,  be deemed to be rice land if  it  is  situated  in  a  local  area referred to in paragraph  (d) and in the opinion of the  State  Government  it  is  fit  for the cultivation of rice;”

7. We also quote hereinbelow the relevant provisions of  

Section 2(17) of the 1960 Act (Post-1974) which reads as  

follows:

“2(17) “land” means-

(i) in  relation  to  any  period  prior  to  the  specified date, land which is used or capable of  being used for agricultural purpose and includes  the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such  land;

(ii) in relation to any other period, land which  is used or capable of being used for agricultural  purposes, and includes –

(b) the  lands  on  which  grass  grows  naturally;

(c) the bid lands held by the Girasdars  or Barkhalidars under the Saurashtra Land

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Reforms Act, 1951 (Sau. Act XXV of 1951),  the  Saurashtra  Barkhali  Abolition  Act,  1951  (Sau.  Act  XXVI  of  1951),  or  the  Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952  (Sau. Act III of 1952), as the case may  be.”

8. We also quote hereinbelow Section 5 of the 1960 Act  

(Post-1974) with the proviso which was not there prior to  

the amendment:

“5. - Ceiling areas  

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), in relation to each  class  of  local  area  as  specified  in  Schedule  I,  the  ceiling  area  with  reference to each class of land shall be as specified in the said schedule  against the respective class of local area;

Provided  that  in  areas  which  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  Government are desert or hill areas of drought-prone areas and which  are  specified  by  the  State  Government  from  time  to  time,  by  notification in the Official Gazette, as such areas, the ceiling area with  reference to dry crop land shall be such area as is twelve and a half  percent more than the ceiling area as specified with reference to dry  crops land against the class of local area in which the said areas fall,  provided however that such ceiling area shall  in no case exceed an  area of 21.85 hectares (54 acres), and for the purpose of determining  whether any area is  a  desert  or hill  area or a drought-prone area,  regard shall be had to the soil classification of the land, the climate  and rainfall of the area, the extent of irrigation facilities in the area,  the average yield of crop and the agricultural resources of the area,  the  general  economic  conditions  prevalent  therein  and  such  other  factors.

(2) Where a person holds land consisting of different classes in the same  class of local area, then for determining the question whether the total land  held  by  him is  less  than,  equal  to,  or  more  than,  the  ceiling  area,  the  acreage of each class of land held by such person shall be converted into  the  acreage  of  dry  crop  land  on the  basis  of  the  proportion  which  the  ceiling area for the class of land to be so converted bears to the ceiling area  for dry crop land.

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(3) Where a person holds, lands, whether consisting of different classes of  land or not, in different classes of local areas, the question whether the  total land held by him is less than, equal to, or more than, the ceiling area,  shall be determined as follows, that is to say--

(i) the acreage of each class of land held by the person in each class  of local area shall be first converted into the acreage of dry crop land  in that local area in accordance with sub-section (2) and the total  acreage so arrived at shall be expressed in terms of a multiple or, as  the case may be, fraction of such ceiling area;

(ii) the multiple or fraction so expressed in the case of each of the  local areas shall be added together:

(iii) the person shall be deemed to hold land  less than equal to, or more than, the ceiling  area  according  as  the  sum  total  of  the  multiples and fractions under clause (ii) is  less than equal to, or more than one”    (emphasis supplied)

9. The short question which is inborn in this batch of  

cases concerns applicability of the Gujarat Agricultural  

Lands Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 which came into force  

w.e.f. 1.4.1976 to the “bid lands”.  It is the case of the  

appellants  before  us  that  the  “bid  lands”  of  the  

appellants do not fall within the definition of “dry crop  

land” under Explanation I(e) to Section 2(6) of the 1960  

Act  principally  because  the  said  definition  under  the  

unamended Act included grass lands, that is to say, lands  

which  “abounds  in  grass  grown  naturally  and  which  is  

capable  of  being  used  for  agricultural  purposes”.  

According to the appellants, in the amended Act, through

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over-sight, the word “includes” in Explanation I(e), which  

defines “dry crop land” stood omitted and, therefore, this  

Court could always fill in the omission by reading the  

word  “includes”  in  the  said  clause.   According  to  the  

appellants, the legislative intent behind enacting clause  

(e) of Explanation I was to include only cultivable lands  

in  the  definition  of  “dry  crop  lands”  as  the  ultimate  

object of the 1960 Act is to fix a ceiling on lands held  

for  agricultural  purpose  and  consequently  “bid  lands”  

which are uncultivable waste lands cannot be included in  

Explanation I(e).  We find no merit in this argument.  The  

definition  of  “land”  is  specifically  amended  by  the  

Amendment  Act  2  of  1974  to  include  “bid  lands”  of  

Girasdars or Barkhalidars in Section 2(17)(ii)(c).  The  

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act also  

makes  it  clear  that  there  was  a  specific  legislative  

intent  of  including  “bid  lands”  of  Girasdars  or  

Barkhalidars  within  the  definition  of  “land”.   This  

inclusion does not make any distinction between cultivable  

and uncultivable bid lands.  The insertion of bid lands in  

Section  2(17)  is  without  any  such  qualification.  

Therefore, this specific intent of the Legislature must be  

given its full meaning.  If the argument of the appellants

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is to be accepted, it would defeat the very purpose of the  

1960 Act because in that event a holder could hold lands  

to  an  unlimited  extent  by  including  waste  lands  in  

drought-prone  areas,  hill  areas  and  waste  lands  within  

their  holdings.   There  is  one  more  reason  for  not  

accepting  the  argument  of  the  appellants.   The  subject  

lands survived acquisition under the 1952 Act only because  

they were “bid lands” which by definition under those Acts  

were  treated  as  lands  being  used  by  the  Girasdars  for  

grazing cattle (see Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act).  Now,  

under the present Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the  

use  of  land  for  the  purpose  of  grazing  cattle  as  an  

agricultural  purpose.   Thus,  “bid  lands”  fall  under  

Section 2(1) of the Ceiling Act.  This is one more reason  

for  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Ceiling  Act  as  

amended applies to “bid lands”.  It is also important to  

note that under Section 5(1) of the 1952 Act all lands  

saved  from  acquisition  had  to  be  “bid  lands”  which  by  

definition under Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act were the  

lands  being  used  by  a  Girasdar  or  a  Barkhalidar  for  

grazing cattle or for cutting grass.  If the lands in  

question were put to any other use, they were liable to  

acquisition under Section 5(2).  Because the subject lands

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were used for grazing cattle, they got saved under the  

1952  Act  and,  therefore,  it  is  now  not  open  to  the  

appellants  to  contend  that  the  subject  lands  are  not  

capable of being used for agricultural purpose.   

10. Now, coming to the question of interpretation of the  

definition  of  the  words  “dry  crop  land”  in  Explanation  

I(e), one finds that the definition has two parts, namely,  

(i) “land other than the land specified in paragraphs (a)  

to  (c)”  and  (ii)  “grass  land”.   Thus,  the  first  part  

includes  all  lands  other  than  those  specified  in  

paragraphs (a) to (c).  Therefore, once the subject land  

falls in the first part of definition of the word “dry  

crop land” which land comes under Section 2(17) and which  

falls outside paragraphs (a) to (c) then such lands would  

fall within the definition of the words “dry crop land”.  

Further,  there  are  two  reasons  why  “grass  land”  stood  

separately defined in Explanation I(e).  Firstly, under  

the proviso to Section 5, which is also inserted by the  

Amending Act, a distinction is made between “grass lands”  

included within “dry crop land” and “grass lands” falling  

in the desert or hill areas of drought-prone areas for  

fixing  the  ceiling  of  dry  crop  land  in  those  areas.  

Secondly, under clause (f) to Explanation I, “grass land”

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and not all “dry crop land” is deemed to be rice land in  

certain situations.  The proviso to Section 5 itself makes  

it clear that by the Amending Act of 1974 the Legislature  

was placing a ceiling even on desert and hill areas.  The  

proviso  inter  alia  states  that  the  ceiling  limit  with  

reference to “dry crop land” shall be 12 ½ per cent more  

than that specified in the Schedule which makes it clear  

that the Legislature intended to include even desert and  

hills in drought-prone areas within the definition of “dry  

crop  land”.   Once  such  lands  are  used  for  grazing  of  

cattle, Section 2(1) of the Ceiling Act would kick in and  

consequently the “bid lands” would stand covered by the  

Ceiling  Act.   The  definition  of  “dry  crop  land”  under  

Section 2(6) is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining  

the  extent  of  ceiling  limit  under  Schedule  I.   It  is  

important to note that the subject lands got saved from  

acquisition under the 1952 Act only because the appellants  

were the holders of “bid lands” which were put to use for  

grazing of cattle or cutting of grass.  It is these very  

lands which are now sought to be covered by the 1960 Act,  

as amended.  

11. We  also  do  not  find  any  merit  in  the  argument  

advanced on behalf of the appellants that the Legislature

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unwittingly  through  over-sight  left  out  the  word  

“includes”  in  the  definition  of  “dry  crop  land”  in  

Explanation I(e).  If one looks at the Pre-1974 Act under  

Section  2(6)  which  defined  “class  of  land”,  it  covered  

four items, namely, perennially irrigated land, seasonally  

irrigated land, dry crop land and rice land, whereas under  

the Post-1974 Act, rice land has been deleted from the  

“class of land”.  Under the Pre-1974 Act, “dry crop land”  

was defined by clause (e) of Explanation to mean “land  

other than perennially or seasonally irrigated or dry crop  

land or rice land” and it included “grass land”, whereas  

under Post-1974 Act, not only the word “includes” but even  

the words “rice land” do not find place in the definition  

of “dry crop land” in clause (e) of Explanation I.  One of  

the reasons for this structural change is indicated by the  

judgment  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  the  case  of  

Krishnadas Vithaldas Sanjanwala v. The State of Gujarat  

and Ors. [(1966) 7 GLR 244] in which it has been laid down  

that ordinarily “grass lands” would be “dry crop lands”  

within the meaning of clause (e) of Explanation to Section  

2(6) of Pre-1974 Act as the definition of “dry crop land”  

included  “grass  land”,  however,  in  a  given  case  the  

Tribunal could promote the grass land by declaring it to

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be  a  rice  land  falling  under  Section  2(6)(iv)  (see  

Explanation  I(f)  to  Section  2(6)  of  the  Pre-1974  Act).  

According  to  the  said  decision,  which  has  been  

consistently followed thereafter, “grass land” of the kind  

mentioned in clause (e) could be promoted to the category  

of rice land if the Tribunal found that such grass land  

was situated in a local area referred to in clause (d) and  

if in the opinion of the State Government such land was  

found  fit  for  cultivation  of  rice.   Therefore,  the  

promotion of the grass land to the category of rice land,  

according  to  the  said  decision  of  the  High  Court,  was  

dependent upon an objective fact which was justiciable and  

the  determination  of  a  subjective  fact  by  the  State  

Government.  Consequently, clause (d) and clause (e) of  

the  Post-1974  Act  are  drastically  different  from  the  

structure of the said clauses in the Pre-1974 Act.  There  

is  no  merit,  therefore,  in  the  contention  advanced  on  

behalf of the appellants that the Legislature had through  

over-sight  omitted  the  word  “includes”  from  Explanation  

I(e).   

12. For the afore-stated reasons, we find no merit in  

this batch of cases.  Accordingly, the same are dismissed  

with no order as to costs.

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…………………….CJI    (S. H. Kapadia)

………………………..J.      (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

………………………..J. (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi;  September 9, 2010