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PETITIONER: N.   T. VELUSWAMI THEVAR,

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: G.   RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/11/1958

BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  422            1959 SCR  Supl. (1) 623  CITATOR INFO :  R          1960 SC 368  (9)  R          1975 SC1274  (5)  R          1976 SC1866  (36)

ACT: Election Dispute--Rejection of Nomination paper by Returning Officer-Validity   of  rejection  raised   before   Election Petition--Jurisdiction  of Tribunal to entertain grounds  of disqualification   not  raised  before  Returning   Officer- "Improperly  rejected ", meaning of--Representation  of  the People  Act,  1951  (43 Of 1951) ss.  7,  36(2),  100(1)(c), 100(1)(d)(i).

HEADNOTE: The nomination paper of the fourth respondent who was one of the  candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly  of the  State,  was rejected by the returning  officer  on  the ground  that as he was the Headmaster of a  Government-aided school  he  was disqualified under s. 7(d) and  (e)  of  the Representation  of  the People Act, 1951, to be  chosen  for election.   One  of the voters of the constituency  filed  a petition  praying  that  the election of  the  appellant  be declared  void under s. 100(1)(c) of the Act on  the  ground that  the  rejection of the nomination paper of  the  fourth respondent was improper because the latter had ceased to  be a  Headmaster  at  the  time of  his  nomination  and  that, further, the institution was a private one.  The  appellant, who  was  the second respondent in the  petition,  contended that  the  nomination  paper of the  fourth  respondent  was rightly  rejected not only on the-ground put forward  before the  returning officer but also for the reasons that he  was interested in Government contracts and that he had agreed to serve as a, teacher under the District Board.  The  question was whether in an election petition challenging the validity of the rejection of a nomination paper under s:   100(1)(c) of the Act, it was open to the parties to raise grounds 624 of disqualification other ’than those put forward before the returning officer.  It was contended for the respondent that the proceedings before the Election Tribunal were really  by way of appeal against the decision of the returning  officer

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and  that,  therefore,  the  scope of  the  enquiry  in  the election petition must be co-extensive with that before  the returning  officer and must be limited to the grounds  taken before him. Held,  that an election petition is an  original  proceeding instituted by the presentation of a petition under s. 81  of the  Representation  of the People Act, 1951, and  that  the jurisdiction  which  a  Tribunal  exercises  in  hearing  an election  petition even when it raises a question  under  s. 100(1)(c)  of  the  Act is not in the nature  of  an  appeal against the decision of the returning officer. Held,  further,  that in considering  whether  a  nomination paper  was improperly rejected under s. 100(1)(c), the  real question  for  decision would be whether the  candidate  was duly qualified and was not subject to any  disqualifications as  provided  in s. 36(2) of the Act.  The  Tribunal  would, consequently,   be   competent  to  entertain   grounds   of disqualification  other  than those put forward  before  the returning officer. The  expression " improperly rejected " in s.  100(1)(c)  of the Act, explained. Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas, (1952) 2 E. L. R. 301, Tej Singh  v. Election Tribunal, JaiPur, (1954) 9 E. L. R. 193 and Dhanraj Deshlehara  v.  Vishwanath Y. Tamaskar, (1958) 15 E.  L.  R. 260, approved.

JUDGMENT: Civil APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 231 and 232 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October 21, 1957, of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 675 and 676 of 1957. R.   Ganapathy  Iyer, S. B. Adityan and  G.  Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. A.   N. Sinha and P. K. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 1. 1958.  November 24.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA  AIYAR.,  J.-These appeals raise a  question  of considerable importance as to the scope of an enquiry in  an election  petition  wherein election is called  in  question under s. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People  Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), on the ground that a nomination paper had been improperly’ rejected.                     625 The  facts are that during the general elections which  were held   in  1957  six  persons  including  the,,   appellant, Veluswami Thevar, the second respondent’ Chellapandian,  and the  fourth  respondent,  Arunachalam,  were  nominated  for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of  Madras from  Alangulam Constituency in the District of  Tirunelveli At  the time of the scrutiny which was on February 1,  1957, Chellapandian  raised  an  objection to  the  nomination  of Arunachalam on the ground that he was the Head Master of the National   Training   School,  Tiruchendur,  which   was   a Government-aided   school,   and  that  he   was   therefore disqualified   under  s.  7,  cls.  (d)  and  (e)   of   the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to  as  the Act), as holding an office of profit  under  the Government.   In  upholding this  objection,  the  returning officer observed: " Sri S. Arunachalam is not present at the time of  scrutiny of  nominations nor any authorised agent of his  could  take notice  of the objection and file a reply.’ In view  of  the

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objection  which has not been cleared by Sri S.  Arunachalam by satisfying me that he is not holding an office of  profit in  a  concern in which the State Government  has  financial interest, the objection is upheld and Sri S. Arunachalam  is disqualified under Sections 7(d) and (e) of Act 43 of  1951. Accordingly his nomination is rejected." The  five  nomination  papers  were  accepted;  two  of  the candidates  subsequently  withdrew from  the  election;  the other  three went to the polls, and on March 10,  1957,  the appellant  who  secured  the largest  number  of  votes  was declared elected. On  April 18, 1957, Raja Nainar, the first  respondent,  who was not a candidate but a voter filed E. P. No. 109 of  1957 praying that the election of the appellant be declared  void on the ground that the rejection of the nomination paper  of Arunachalam was improper, because he had ceased to be a Head Master  at the time of his nomination, and that further  the institution  was  a  private one.   The  appellant  filed  a written statement in which he pleaded that Arunachalam was 79 626 not  qualified  to be chosen not merely on  the  ground  put forward  by Chellapandian before the returning  officer  but also  on the grounds that he was interested as a partner  in contracts for the execution of works for the Government, and that  further  he  had entered into an  agreement  with  the District  Board,  Chittoor, to serve as a  teacher  in  that Board,  and that his nomination paper was therefore  rightly rejected.   Raja Nainar then came out with the  application, 1.  A. No. 5 of 1957, out of which the  present  proceedings arise,  to  strike out the additional grounds  of  disquali- fication  raised  in the statement of the appellant  on  the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enquire into any  ground of disqualification which was not  taken  before the returning officer, and that accordingly the new  grounds put forward by the appellant should be struck out. By  its order dated August 17, 1957, the Tribunal held  that the  question  to be decided by it was whether there  was  a valid nomination paper, and that to decide that, it could go into grounds other than those which were put forward  before the  returning  officer, and, in that  view,  dismissed  the application.   The correctness of this order was  challenged by  Raja  Nainar in two Writ Petitions Nos. 675 and  676  of 1957,  preferred under Art. 226.  Therein, he  repeated  his contention  that  it was not competent to  the  Tribunal  to enquire into any but the grounds which had been put  forward before  the  returning officer, and prayed that  a  writ  of certiorari  be issued to quash the order in 1. A. No.  5  of 1957  and  a writ of prohibition, to restrain  the  Tribunal from enquiring into the new grounds raised by the appellant. These applications were heard by a Bench of the Madras  High Court  consisting  of Rajagopalan and  Rajagopals  Ayyangar, JJ., who upheld the contention of the petitioner, and stated their conclusion in these terms: "  We  are clearly of opinion that the  enquiry  before  the Tribunal  must  be restricted to the  objections  which  the returning  officer  had  to consider  and  decide,  but  not necessarily to the material placed 627 before  the  returning officer at the stage of  the  summary enquiry.   The Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate  upon the  truth  and  validity of those  objections  on  relevant material,  even if that material be other than  that  placed before   the  returning  officer.   The  Tribunal   has   no jurisdiction  to  investigate the truth or validity  of  the

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objections  which were not put forward before the  returning officer, and which he had therefore no occasion to consider. Once again we have to point out that we are discussing  only the  position of a candidate whose nomination was  rejected, and  not, for instance, that of a returned candidate." "  A  further objection was also taken  before  the  learned judges  that  as the decision of the Election  Tribunal  was open  to appeal under s. 116A of the Act, the court  should, in  exercise  of its discretion under Art. 226,  decline  to entertain writ petitions against interlocutory orders.   But the  learned  judge  held  that  as  the  Tribunal  had   no jurisdiction  to  entertain grounds other than  those  which were  put forward before the returning officer, writs  could issue under Art. 226.  In the result, they quashed the order of the Election Tribunal in 1. A. No. 5 of 1957, and  issued a   writ  of  Mandamus  directing  it  to  dispose  of   the application  afresh in accordance with law as laid  down  in the judgment.  It is against this judgment that the  present appeals  have been preferred on leave granted by this  Court under  Art. 136, and the point that arises for  decision  is whether in an election petition questioning the propriety of the  rejection of a nomination paper under s.  100(1)(c)  of the  Act,  it  is open to the parties to  raise  grounds  of disqualification  other  than those put forward  before  the returning officer. It  will  be  convenient  at this  stage  to  refer  to  the provisions of the Act hearing on this question.  Section  32 of the Act provides that, "Any  person maybe nominated as a candidate for election  to fill  a  seat if he is qualified to be chosen to  fill  that seat under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act." Under s. 33(1), the candidate is to deliver to the returning officer a nomination paper completed in the 628 prescribed  form  and  signed by the  candidate  and  by  an elector of the constituency as proposer.  Section 33 (4)  enacts that, "  On the presentation of a nomination paper, the  returning officer  shall satisfy himself that the names and  electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the  nomination paper are the same as those entered  in  the electoral rolls: Provided  that  the  returning  officer  shall  permit   any clerical  or  technical  error in the  nomination  paper  in regard to the said names or numbers to be corrected in order to bring them into conformity with the corresponding entries in the electoral rolls; and where necessary, direct that any clerical  or  printing error in the said  entries  shall  be overlooked." Section  35 provides inter alia that the  returning  officer shall  cause to be affixed in some conspicuous place in  his office  a notice of the nomination  containing  descriptions similar  to those contained in the nomination paper both  of the  candidate  and of the proposer.  Section  36,  omitting what is not material, is as follows: 36.  (1) " On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one proposer  of  each  candidate, and  one  other  person  duly authorized  in  writing  by each  candidate,  but  no  other person,  may attend at such time and place as the  returning officer  may appoint; and the returning officer  shall  give them all reasonable facilities for examining the  nomination papers  of all candidates which have been  delivered  within the time and in the manner laid down in section 33. (2)  The returning officer shall then examine the nomination

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papers and shall decide all objections which may be made  to any nomination, and may, either on such objection or on  his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary,  reject  any nomination on any of  the  following grounds:- (a)  that  the  candidate  either is  not  qualified  or  is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any  of the following provisions that may, be applicable, namely                     629 Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191, Part 11 of this Act,                      or (b)  that there has been a failure to comply With any of the provisions  of  section 33 or section 34; or  (c)  that  the signature  of  the  candidate  or  the  pro.  poser  on  the nomination paper is not genuine. .................................................... (5)  The  returning officer shall hold the scrutiny  on  the date appointed in this behalf under clause (b) of section 30 and  shall  not  allow any adjournment  of  the  proceedings except  when such proceedings are interrupted or  obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control: Provided  that  in case an objection is made  the  candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny,  and the returning officer shall record his decision on the  date to which the proceedings have been adjourned. (6)  The returning officer shall endorse on each  nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same ania,  if the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing  a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection." Then, we have s. 100(1)(c), the construction of which is the main point for determination.  It is as follows: 100. (1)  " Subject to the provisions of subsection (2),  if the Tribunal is of opinion- (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected ;...... the  Tribunal  shall declare the election  of  the  returned candidate to be void." Now, the whole controversy between the parties is as   to what the expression " improperly rejected " in s. 100(1)(c) means.   According  to the appellant,  when  the  nomination paper  of a candidate who is under no such  disqualification as  is  mentioned  in s. 36(2) has been  rejected,  that  is improper rejection within s.   100(1)(c).  Acoording to the -respondent, when the 630 nomination paper of a candidate is rejected by the returning officer  on  the ground that he is subject  to  a  specified disqualification, the rejection is improper, if it is  found that  that disqualification does not exist.  If  the  former view  is  correct, then the scope of an enquiry  before  the Tribunal  must extend to all matters which are mentioned  in s.  36(2),  and if the latter, then it must  be  limited  to determining  whether  the  ground  on  which  the  returning officer  has rejected the nomination is well-founded.   Now, to decide what the expression " improperly rejected " in  s. 100(1)(c) precisely imports, it is necessary to examine  the relevant  provisions of the Act bearing on the question  and the  setting of the above section therein.  Under s.  32  of the  Act,  any person may be nominated as  a  candidate  for election if he is duly qualified under the provisions of the Constitution  and  the Act.  Section  36(2)  authorises  the returning  officer  to reject any nomination  paper  on  the ground that he is either not qualified, that is, under ss. 3 to  7  of the Act, or is disqualified under  the  provisions

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referred to therein.  If there are no grounds for  rejecting a  nomination  paper  under  s. 36(2), then  it  has  to  be accepted, and the name of the candidate is to be included in a  list.  Vide s. 36(8).  Then, we come to s. 100(1)(c)  and s.  100(1)(d)(1), which provide a remedy to persons who  are aggrieved  by  an order improperly rejecting  or  improperly accepting any nomination.  In the context, it appears to  us that  the improper rejection or acceptance must have  refer- ence  to  s. 36(2), and that the rejection of  a  nomination paper  of  a  candidate who is qualified to  be  chosen  for election  and  who  does not suffer from  any  of  the  dis- qualifications  mentioned  in  s. 36(2)  would  be  improper within  s.  100(1)(c), and that, likewise, acceptance  of  a nomination paper of a candidate who is not qualified or  who is    disqualified   will   equally   be   improper    under s.100(1)(d)(1).Section  32 confers a substantive right on  a candidate  to be chosen to the legislature subject  only  to the limitations enacted in Arts. 84, 102, 173 and 191 of the Constitution  and ss. 3 to 7 of the Act, and ss. 36 and  100 provide  the machinery for the exercise and  enforcement  of that right.  It is a sound 631 rule  of construction that procedural enactments  should  be construed  liberally  and in such manner as  to  render  the enforcement  of substantive rights effective.   Readings  s. 100(1)(c)  in the context of the whole enactment,  we  think that  an  enquiry before the Tribunal must embrace  all  the matters  as to qualification and disqualification  mentioned in s. 36(2), and that it cannot be limited to the particular ground  of  disqualification  which  was  taken  before  the returning officer. It  was  contended for the respondent that  the  proceedings before the Tribunal are really by way of appeal against  the decision of the returning officer, and that, therefore,  the scope  of the enquiry in the election petition must  be  co- extensive  with that before the returning officer, and  must be  limited to the ground taken before him.  It  was  argued that  a  decision  could be said to be  improper  only  with reference to a ground which was put forward and decided in a particular  manner  by  the  returning  officer,  and   that therefore  the expression " improperly rejected " would,  in its  true  connotation, restrict the scope  of  the  enquiry before the Tribunal to the ground taken before the returning officer.  We are unable to agree with this contention.   The jurisdiction  which  a  Tribunal  exercises  in  hearing  an election  petition even when it raises a question  under  s. 100(1)(c)  is  not in the nature of an  appeal  against  the decision of the returning officer.  An election petition  is an  original proceeding instituted by the presentation of  a petition  under  s. 81 of the Act.  The respondents  have  a right  to  file written statements by way of  reply  to  it; issues  have to be framed, and subject to the provisions  of the  Act,  the  provisions of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure regulate  the trial of the petition.  All the  parties  have the right to adduce evidence, and that is of the essence  of an  original proceeding as contrasted with a  proceeding  by way of appeal.  That being the character of the proceedings, the  rule applicable is that which governs the trial of  all original proceedings; that is, it is open to a party to  put forward all grounds in support of or negation of the  claim, subject only to such limitations as may be found in the Act. 632 It should be noted in this connection that if a petition  to set aside an election on the ground of improper rejection of a nomination paper is in the nature of an appeal against the

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decision, of the returning officer, then logically speaking, the  decision  of  the Tribunal must be based  only  on  the materials  placed  before the returning officer  given  with respect  to  the ground which was urged before him,  and  no fresh evidence could be admitted before the Tribunal  except in accordance with 0. 41, R. 27.  The learned judges in  the court below, however, observe that though the enquiry before the  Tribunal  is restricted to the  particular  ground  put forward  before the returning officer, it is not  restricted to  the  material placed before him, and that  all  evidence bearing on that ground could be adduced before the Tribunal. This,  in our view, is quite correct.  The enquiry  which  a returning  officer  has to make under s. 36  is  summary  in character.   He may make " such summary enquiry, if any,  as he thinks necessary "; he can act suo motu.  Such being  the nature  of the enquiry, the right which is given to a  party under  s.  100(1)(c) and s. 100(1)(d)(1)  to  challenge  the propriety  of  an  order of rejection  or  acceptance  of  a nomination  paper would become illusory, if the Tribunal  is to base its decision only on the materials placed before the returning officer. It was contended for the respondent that even with reference to  the  ground  taken  before  the  returning  officer,  no evidence  other  than what was placed before  him  could  be brought before the Tribunal, and he relied on the  following observations of the learned judges in Charanjit Lal v. Lehri Singh (1) : " Whether a nomination has been improperly rejected or  not, has  to be considered in relation to the state  of  evidence before  the returning officer at the time of  the  scrutiny. The  testimony  of  the  returning  officer  shows  that  he rejected  the nomination, because it did not appear  to  him that  on the question of age the candidate Shri  Pirthi  was qualfied to stand for election’ " (1)  A. I. R. 1958 punj. 433. 435.                     633 There,,  a  nomination  paper  had  been  rejected  by   the returning officer on the ground that the candidate did,, not appear  to  possess the age qualification required  by  Art. 173.   The  correctness of this order was challenged  in  an election petition.  Evidence was taken as to the age of  the candidate in this petition, and eventually it was held  that the order of the returning officer was right.  In the  order of rejection, the returning officer also stated: " The nomination is rejected as the age is not mentioned  in the  nomination  paper.   Neither  the  candidate  nor   the proposer  or  any person duly authorised on  his  behalf  is present to testify to his age." Now, the argument before the High Court was that the failure to  mention  the age in the nomination paper  was  a  formal defect which should have been condoned under s. 36(4) of the Act.  The learned judges held that the defect was not merely one  of  failure  to  mention the age but  of  want  of  the requisite  qualification in age, and that that could not  be cured  under  s. 36(4).  In this context,  the  observations relied  on  could not be read as meaning  that  no  evidence could be adduced even in respect of a ground which was urged before  the  returning officer, as, in  fact,  evidence  was taken  before the Tribunal and a finding given, and if  they meant what the respondent suggests they do, we do not  agree with  them.   It is to be noted that in many  of  the  cases which came before this Court, as for example, Durga  Shankar Mehta  v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others (1), the  finding of the Tribunal was based on fresh evidence admitted  before it,   and  the  propriety  of  such  admission   was   never

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questioned.  And if the true position is, as we have held it is, that it is open to the parties to adduce fresh  evidence on  the matter in issue, it is difficult to imagine how  the proceedings  before the Tribunal can be regarded as  in  the nature  of  appeal  against the decision  of  the  returning officer. In support of his contention that it is only the ground that is urged before the returning officer that (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267. 80 634 can  be  raised  before the  Tribunal,  Mr.  Sinha,  learned counsel  for the respondent, relies on the provision  in  s. 36(6)  that  when  a  nomination  paper  is  rejected,   the returning  officer should record his reasons therefor.   The object  of  this provision, it is argued, is to  enable  the Tribunal  to  decide  whether the  order  of  the  returning officer is right or not, and by implication it confines  the scope  of the enquiry before the Tribunal to the ground  put forward  before the returning officer.  This contention  is, in  our opinion, unsound.  Now, when a nomination  paper  is accepted,  s. 36(6) does not require that any reason  should be  recorded therefor.  If the contention of the  respondent is  right, it would follow that acceptance of  a  nomination paper can never be questioned.  But that would be against s. 100(1)(d)(1),  and  it  must  therefore  be  held  that   an acceptance  can be questioned on all the  grounds  available under  s. 36(2).  Section 100(1)(d)(1) deals  with  improper acceptance of a nomination paper, and if the word " improper "  in that provision has reference to the matters  mentioned in  s.  36(2),  it  must have the  same  connotation  in  s. 100(1)(c)  as well.  The word " improper " which  occurs  in both  s.  100(1)(c) and s. 100(1)(d)(1) must bear  the  same meaning in both the provisions, unless there is something in the context to the contrary, and none such has been shown. There  is  another difficulty in the way of  accepting  this argument  of the respondent.  A candidate may be subject  to more than one disqualification, and his nomination paper may be  questioned  on all those grounds.   Supposing  that  the returning  officer  upholds one objection  and  rejects  the nomination  paper  on the basis of  that  objection  without going  into other objections, notwithstanding that under  s. 36(2) he has to decide all the objections, is it open to the respondents  in the election petition to adduce evidence  on those  objections ? According to the respondent, it is  not, so  that  if the decision of the returning  officer  on  the objection on which he rejected the nomination paper is  held to  be bad, the Tribunal has no option but to set aside  the election under s. 100(1)(c), even though the candidate  was, in fact, disqualified and his nomination paper  was rightly rejected.  Mr. Sinha for  the  respondent concedes  that  the result would be anomalous, but  he  says that  the Law of Election is full of anomalies, and this  is one of them, and that is no reason for not interpreting  the law  on its own-terms.  It is no doubt true that if  on  its true construction, a statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave  it to the legislature to amend and alter the law.  But when  on a  construction  of a statute, two views are  possible,  one which  results  in an anomaly and the other not, it  is  our duty  to  adopt  the  latter and  not  the  former,  seeking consolation  in  the  thought that  the  law  bristles  with anomalies.   Anomalies will disappear, and the law  will  be found  to  be simple and logical, if it is  understood  that when a question is raised in an election petition as to  the

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propriety of the rejection of a nomination paper, the  point to  be decided is about the propriety of the nomination  and not  the decision of the returning officer on the  materials placed before him, and that decision must depend on  whether the  candidate is duly qualified and is not subject  to  any disqualifications as provided in s. 36(2) It  remains  to deal with one more  contention  advanced  on behalf of the respondent, and that is based on the following observations in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others (1): " Under this provision R. 47(4), the Tribunal is constituted a  court  of appeal against the decision  of  the  returning officer,  and as such its jurisdiction must be  co-extensive with  that  of  the  returning  officer  and  cannot  extend further." The argument is that if the jurisdiction of the Tribunal  is co-extensive  with that of the returning officer,  then  the enquiry before it must be confined to the grounds which were urged  before the returning officer.  Now, the  observations quoted above were made statedly with reference to R. 47, and assuming  that they apply to an enquiry under s.  100(1)(c), the question still remains, what is the jurisdiction of  the returning  officer  in  hearing  objections  to   nomination papers? (31) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104, 1132. 636 His  jurisdiction is defined in s. 36(2), and  the  Tribunal must therefore have jurisdiction to decide all the questions which  can  be raised under that section.  The fact  that  a particular ground which- could have been raised was not,  in fact,  raised before the returning officer does not  put  an end to his jurisdiction to decide it, and what he could have decided  if  it  had been raised, could be  decided  by  the Tribunal, when raised. Mr.  Ganapathy  Iyer,  learned counsel  for  the  appellant, invited  our  attention  to the decisions  of  the  Election Tribunals  on the question whether grounds other than  those raised before the returning officer could be put forward  in an  enquiry  in an election petition.  They held,  with  one solitary  exception, that it is permissible, and indeed,  it is stated in Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas (1) as settled law  that the  rejection  of a nomination paper can  be  sustained  on grounds  not  raised before the returning officer.   If  the legislature which must be taken to have knowledge of the law as interpreted in those decisions wanted to make a departure from  it, it would have said so in clear terms, and  in  the absence  of  such  an  expression,  it  would  be  right  to interpret  s. 100(1)(c) as not intended to alter the law  as laid down in those decisions. It  is  now necessary to refer to the decisions  which  have been  cited before us.  In Durga Shankar Mehta’s  case  (2), the  election  was  to a  double-member  constituency.   The appellant  who  obtained  the largest number  of  votes  was declared elected to the general seat and one Vasantarao,  to the  reserved  seat.   The  validity  of  the  election  was challenged  on the ground that Vasantarao was below the  age of 25 years, and was, therefore, disqualified to stand.  The Election  Tribunal upheld that objection, and set aside  the entire  election.  The decision was taken in appeal to  this Court,  and  the  point for determination  was  whether  the election  of  the appellant was liable to be  set  aside  on account of the disqualification of Vasantarao.  It was  held that  the matter fell within s. 100(2)(c) as it  then  stood and  not  under s. 100(1)(c), and that the election  of  the appellant could not be declared void.

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(1) [1952] 2 E.L.R. 301, 31O. (2) [19551 1 S.C.R. 267. 637 This  is  not  a direct pronouncement on the  point  now  in controversy, and that is conceded.  In Vashist Narain Sharma v.  Dev Chandra and others (1), a question was raised as  to what would be " improper acceptance " within the meaning  of s. 100; but in the view taken by this Court, no opinion  was expressed thereon. The  question now under consideration came up  directly  for decision before the High Court of Rajasthan in Tej Singh  v. Election  Tribunal,  Jaipur (2), and it was  held  that  the respondent  to an election petition was entitled to raise  a plea  that the nomination of the petitioner rejected on  one ground by the returning officer was defective on one or more of  the other grounds mentioned in s. 36(2) of the Act,  and that  such  a plea, if taken, must be enquired into  by  the Election  Tribunal.  In Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath  Y. Tamaskar  (3),  it  was observed by a Bench  of  the  Madhya Pradesh High Court that in determining whether a  nomination was improperly rejected, the Election Tribunal was not bound to confine its enquiry to the ground on which the  returning officer  rejected it, and that even if the ground  on  which the  returning officer rejected the nomination could not  be sustained,  the rejection could not, be held to be  improper if the Tribunal found other fatal defects in the nomination. An  unreported judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in Badrivishal  Pitti v. J. V. Narsing Rao (4) has  been  cited before  us, and that also takes the view that in an  enquiry before  the Election Tribunal, it is open to the parties  to support  an  order  of rejection of a  nomination  paper  on grounds  other than those which were put forward before  the returning   officer.   We  are  in  agreement   with   these decisions. As the question has also been raised as to the propriety  of interfering   in   writ  petitions  under  Art.   226   with interlocutory  orders  passed in the course  of  an  enquiry before  the Election Tribunal, we shall express our  opinion thereon.  The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue  writs against orders of the Tribunal is (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 509. (2) [1954] 9 E.L.R.193         (3) [1958] 15 E.L.R. 260. (4)  Special Appeal No. 1 Of 1957. 638 undoubted; but then, it is well settled that where there  is another remedy provided, the court may properly exercise its discretion  in  declining to interfere under Art.  226.   It should be remembered that under the election law as it stood prior  to  the  amendment in1956,  election  petitions  were dismissed on preliminary grounds and the correctness of  the decision  was challenged in applications under Art. 226  and in  further appeals to this Court, with the result  that  by the  time  the matter was finally decided, the life  of  the legislatures  for  which the election was  held  would  have itself  very  nearly  come  to an  end  thus  rendering  the proceedings infructuous.  A signal example of a case of this kind  is  to be found in the decision  reported  in  Bhikaji Keshao  Joshi  and  another v. Brijlal  Nandlal  Biyani  and others   (1).   It  is  to  remedy  this  defect  that   the legislature has now amended the law by providing a right  of appeal against a decision of the Tribunal to the High  Court under  s.  116-A,  and  its  intention  is’  obviously  that proceedings before the Tribunal should go on with expedition and without interruption, and that any error in its decision should  be  set right in an appeal under that  section.   In

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this view, it would be a proper exercise of discretion under Art. 226 to decline to interfere with interlocutory orders. In the result, we allow the appeals, set aside the orders of the  court below, and dismiss the writ petitions.  filed  by the respondent, with costs here and in the court below.               Appeal allowed (1) [1055] 2 S.C.R. 428. 639