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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4527-4528 of 1999

PETITIONER: N. Srinivasa Rao

RESPONDENT: Spl. Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/03/2006

BENCH: B.P. Singh & Altamas Kabir

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4534-4535/1999 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4529-4532/1999  AND  CONT. PETN ) Nos.89-92/2000 of in CA Nos.4534-35/99 & 4527-28/99

ALTAMAS  KABIR,J.         Applications for substitution  are allowed.         All these appeals arising out of leave granted involve  common questions of fact  and  law and  have, therefore, been   taken up for hearing and disposal together. One Kaneez  Fatima Begum was the former owner of  the  lands covered by Survey No. 65 to 74 of Yousufguda village  governed by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land  Act, 1950.  One Uppari Ramaiah was her tenant in respect of   the said  lands.  From the materials on record, it appears  that  the said Uppari Ramaiah purchased  14 acres and 6 guntas of  land from Kaneez Fatima Begum under a sale deed dated 1st  May, 1961 for a consideration  of Rs.13,000/- and obtained a   certificate in respect thereof under Section 38E of the Andhra   Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands  Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenancy Act of 1950")   from the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad, West.   Prior   to execution  of the said deed,  Uppari Ramaiah is purported  to have sold an  extent of 20,086 square yards from out of the  total area measuring 14 acres   and  6 guntas to one Mir  Riyasat Ali by a sale deed dated 8th February, 1961.  Out of  the said 20,086 square yards,  the  said Mir Riyasat Ali sold  8,866 square yards to Smt. P. Neelakanteswaramma and to  one  Chandra Ramalingaiah  by a sale deed dated 21st  November, 1961.  Their names were duly mutated in the   Town Survey Registers and in the Revenue Records.  On the  death of Chandra Ramalingaiah  on 7th February, 1973, his  share in the land devolved on his legal heirs, namely, his  widow, Chandra Suryamba, and  his two daughters, C. Raja  Kumari and P. Sandhya Kumari and son Chandra  Ramakoteswar Rao.    Smt. Neelakanteswaramma and the  widow of Chandra Ramalingaiah  entered into an agreement  for  sale with Bhagyalakshmi  Cooperative Housing  Society,  but in view of the Government Order R.T. No.3591 dated 1st  December, 1975 and Government Order M.S. No.189 dated  17th January, 1976, they could not execute the sale deeds in  favour  of the  Housing Society.                According to P. Neelakanteswaramma and the heirs of  Chandra Ramalingaiah, since the legal heirs of Uppari  Ramaiah conspired to grab the lands which had been

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conveyed in their favour by Mir Riyasat Ali, they were  constrained to file a complaint in the Special Court of A.P.  Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad,   being  L.G.C. No.32/1989.  It was alleged in the complaint  that  the heirs of Uppari Ramaiah, who were made respondent  Nos. 1 to 10 in the complaint, executed three General  Powers  of Attorney in favour  of one N. Srinivasa Rao, who was made  the respondent No.11.  In the said Powers of Attorney, the  facts regarding transfer of the lands by Uppari Ramaiah  in  favour of Mir Riayasat Ali and the subsequent transfer  by Mir  Riyasat Ali in favour of  P. Neelakanteswarama and the  predecessor-in-interest of the applicant  nos.  2 to 5 were  suppressed and the property in dispute  was described as the  property of Uppari Ramaiah who had purchased the same  from Kaneez Fatima Begum  and after Uppari Ramaiah’s  death, it was stated that the lands had devolved on the    respondent Nos. 1 to 10. as his legal heirs.  By virtue of a   General Power of Attorney, the said respondent Nos. 1 to 10  authorised respondent No.11 to convert the schedule property  into plots and to sell  and execute sale deeds in respect   thereof in favour of  purchasers.  The respondent Nos. 1 to 10  also executed an Agreement of Sale dated 26th June, 1980,  in  favour of  respondent No.11 in respect of the said lands.         On the strength of the said General Power of Attorney  and   Agreement of Sale, the respondent No.11 executed 5  registered sale deeds covering a part of  the disputed lands in  favour of  one Ch. Laksminarasamma and five others, who  were also impleaded  as respondent Nos. 12 to 17 in the  complaint before the Special Court.         On receipt of notice of the complaint, the respondent Nos.  1 to 12 entered appearance and filed counter affidavits.  Respondent Nos. 1 to 10  filed a counter contending that late  Uppari Ramaiah, the husband of respondent no.1 and the  father of respondent Nos. 2 to 10,  was a  "protected tenant" of  Smt. Kaneez Fatima Begum in respect of the disputed lands  covered by Survey Nos. 65 to 74  of Yousufguda village and  that he had purchased the  said lands from Kaneez Fatima  Begum  by a registered sale deed dated 1st May, 1961 for a  sum of Rs.13,000/-. It was further contended that the  applicants had falsely stated that they had purchased the said  lands from  Mir  Riyasat Ali by sale deed dated 21st November,  1961.  The lands in question were agricultural lands and were  referred to as such in the revenue records in terms of acres  and guntas and the transaction entered into by Mir  Riyasat  Ali with Uppari Ramaiah was  effected  with the intention of  avoiding  having to obtain  formal permission from the  Tahasildar under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act of 1950 for  transfer of the said lands.  The specific case made out in the  counter filed by respondent nos. 1 to 10 was that the sale deed  executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of Mir Riyasat Ali was  fraudulent as would be evident from the fact that the same  had been executed even before Uppari Ramaiah acquired full  title to the properties from Kaneez Fatima Begum by the sale  deed dated 1st May, 1961.  It was also contended that  when  the applicants started interfering with the possession of the  respondents over the lands in question, they had filed  O.S.No.926/1981 which was pending before the IVth  Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.                   Upon noticing   that Uppari Ramaiah and his legal heirs   had joined Mir Riyasat Ali and K. Satyanarayana in  effecting  sale  of  some of the lands  in favour of Srinivasa Government  Emplyees Co-oerative Housing Society  Limited by the  Deed of  Sale  dated 6th May, 1961(Ext.B-9)  and after referring to other  similar  transactions entered into by  Mir Riyasat Ali, the  learned Special Judge overruled the objection  that Mir Riyasat

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Ali had not  acquired title to the properties   in question  by  virtue of     the sale deed  executed in his favour by Uppari  Ramaiah on 8th February, 1961.  Relying on Section 43  of the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the decision of this Court  in the  case of Ram Pyare  vs. Ram Narain & Ors., reported in  (1985) 2 SCC  P.162, the  learned Special Judge held that the  subsequent acquisition of title  by Uppari Ramaiah to the  property  conveyed to Mir Riyasat Ali  inures to the benefit  of    Mir Riyasat Ali as the same feeds Uppari Ramaiah’s title to the  said property.             In addition to the above, the learned Special Judge found   Mir Riyasat Ali to be in actual physical possession of the  properties since the same was conveyed  to him by  Uppari  Ramaiah  and since the respondents  had not taken any steps  to evict   Mir Riyasat Ali  but  had allowed him to continue in  possession  without any  interruption till 1980.  The learned  Judge  found that the applicants had acquired title to the  property by  adverse possession  notwithstanding the mischief  of Section 47 of the Tenancy Act of 1950.           The plea taken  by the respondents that the application  was hopelessly time-barred, was also negated by the learned  Special Judge  on account of  his aforesaid findings.           Once the other issues had been decided in favour of  the  applicants, the learned Special Judge  held that the burden  shifted to the respondents to prove that they were not land  grabbers within the meaning of the Andhra Pradesh  Land  Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982  (hereinafter referred to as  ’’the A.P. Land Grabbing Act, 1982").   On the basis of the  materials before him and in particular of the fact that Uppari  Rammaiah and his sons had joined Mir Riyasat Ali and  K.Satyanarayana in the conveyance executed in favour of the  Cooperative Group Housing Society, the learned Special   Judge  came to the conclusion that by their actions it must be  held that  the said respondents were land grabbers.  The  learned Special Judge accordingly proceeded to declare the  respondent Nos. 1 to 17 before him as land grabbers  within  the  meaning of the A.P. Land Grabbing Act, 1982 and directed  that criminal proceedings  be  commenced against them  for  offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act.         The heirs  of Uppari Ramaiah filed a writ petition before  the Andhra Pradesh High Court, being W.P.No.4991/1990,  against the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned  Judge.  Another writ petition, being W.P.No.4026/1990, was  filed by N. Srinivasa Rao,  to whom  a General  Power of  Attorney had  been given by the heirs of Uppari Ramaiah, and  since  they arose  out of a common judgment, they were heard   together  and disposed of  by a common order dated 11th July,  1997.         The High Court reversed the findings of the learned  Special  Judge  upon holding that the sales effected by Kaneez  Fatima Begum in favour of Uppari Ramaiah on 1st May, 1961  (Ext.A-1) and  the sale  executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour  of Mir Riyasat Ali on 8th February, 1961 (Ext.A-3) were not  valid as they were  hit by Section  47 of the Tenancy Act of  1950.  It was held  further  that  in the absence of  a  Validation certificate,  transfers if any,  in favour of the others,  including the applicants before the learned  Special Judge, did  not confer any right or title on them.         The High Court also  held that Section 43 of the Transfer  of Property Act would not come to the aid  of the transferee,   since  a transfer in the absence of prior permission or sanction  of the Tahsildar  under Section 47 of the Tenancy  Act of 1950  was prohibited.  The High Court, accordingly,  concluded that  the respondent Nos. 1 to 11 before the learned Special Judge  were not  land grabbers and quashed  the order and decree of

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the Special Court, Hyderabad, dated  5th March, 1990, upon  holding that the same was illegal.         The judgment  and order passed by the Division Bench of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court  allowing the two writ  applications is the subject matter of Civil Appeal Nos. 4534- 4535/1999 filed by N. Srinivasa Rao whose writ petition had  been allowed but with certain observations which according to  the petitioner are contrary to his interest.            On the other hand,  Uppari Ramaiah and others filed two  Review Petitions, being W.P.M.P.Nos.22810/1997 and  22811/1997 in the two Writ Petition Nos. 4991/1990 and  4026/1990, for review of the judgment  dated 11th July, 1997.         The petitioner, in his turn, filed a clarification  application, being W.P.M.P. No.24605/1997, in  W.P.No.4026/1990, on the ground  that  certain observations  had been made by the High Court in its judgment dated 11th  July, 1997 de hors  the issues involved, which would have the  effect of adversely affecting his interests and would stand in  his way in working  out his civil rights in the Civil Court with  regard to  his legitimate  proprietary rights.  Uppari Ramaiah  and others filed an application in the clarification petition for   being added as  parties therein since any favourable order  passed therein would have the  effect of adversely  affecting  their interests.         All the said applications  were  taken up for hearing  by  the High Court on 24th October, 1997 and by its order dated  21st November, 1997, the High Court dismissed all the said  applications.   Civil Appeal Nos. 4527-4528/1999 have been  filed by the said N. Srinivasa Rao against the said order of the  Hon’ble High Court dismissing his application for clarification.    P. Neelakanteswaramma also challenged  the orders   passed by the High Court in  the two writ  applications, in the  Review Petition in W.P.No.4991/1990 and Miscellaneous  Petition filed by N. Srinivasa Rao in W.P.No.4026/1990  in  the   four  Civil Appeals, C.A.Nos. 4529-4532/1999.  All the   aforesaid appeals have been taken  up together for  hearing  and are being disposed  of by this common judgment. Appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 4529- 4532 of 1999, Mr.  K. Parasaran,  learned senior advocate,   took us through  the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act,  1982,  wherein  the expression "land grabbing" has been  defined in Section 2 (e) of the aforesaid Act  as follows:-  "2(e) "land grabbing" means every  activity of grabbling of any land (whether  belonging to the Government, a local  authority, a religious or charitable  institution or endowment, including a  wakf, or any other private person) by a  person or group of persons, without any  lawful entitlement and with a view to  illegally taking possession of such lands,  or enter into or create illegal tenancies or  lease and licences agreements or any  other illegal agreements in respect of  such lands, or to construct unauthorized  structures thereon for sale or hire, or give  such lands to any person on rental or  lease and licence basis for construction,  or use and occupation, of unauthorized  structures; and the term "to grab land"  shall be construed accordingly;"  

Mr. Parasaran contended that having regard to the   manner in which the heirs of Uppari Rammaiah had at one

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stage acquiesced  in accepting Mir Riyasat Ali’s title to the  lands conveyed to him by their predecessor-in-interest,  their   subsequent  volte face in contending that  Mir Riyasat  Ali had  no title to the said properties, which were  subsequently   conveyed by him to  P. Neelakanteswaramma and Chandra  Ramalingaiah, must be held to attract the provisions of  the  1982 Act and the penal consequences thereof.    It was then submitted that notwithstanding the fact that  the lands in question had been recorded in the revenue  records as agricultural lands and Uppari Ramaiah had been  recorded as a "protected tenant", over the passage of time, the   lands comprised in Yousufguda village  came  to be included  within   Hyderabad Municipality  though  the  revenue records   pertaining  to  the lands in question had not been rectified to  keep up with the changing times.  Viewed  from such an angle,   it could very well be said that  the said lands did not  attract  the provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1950 which  dealt with   agricultural lands which were subject to the various  restrictions imposed in the Act itself. In support of such contention reliance was  placed on a  decision of this Court in the case  of  Motor General Traders  And Anr. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh And Ors., (1984) 1 SCC  222, wherein it was held  that an exemption provision which  was initially valid could with the passage of time become  discriminatory when the nexus  with the object    did not  continue to survive. Mr. Parasaran also relied on   a decision of this Court  in  the case of  Collector of Bombay vs. Municpal Corporation of   the City of  Bombay And Ors., (1952)  SCR  43, wherein   following the  principle in  Ramsden  v. Dyson  (1866)  L.R. 1  H.L. 129, the High Court of Bombay held  that the  Government had lost its right to assess the  land in question  by reason of the  equities  arising  in  the facts of the case in  favour of the Corporation which had spent a considerable  amount in erecting and maintaining   markets on the site in  question. Another decision of this Court  on which  a good deal of  reliance was placed by Mr. Parasaran was in the case of  Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (Smt.) And Ors. vs. Commissioner  of Income Tax, Gujarat, 1993 Supp.(4) SCC 707, wherein the  assessee-appellants as co-owners of  a piece of land  sold it to  a Group Housing Society.  A reference under Section 256(1)  of  the Income Tax Act was made to the Gujarat High Court as to  whether that land was   agricultural land within the meaning  of Section 2 (14) of  the Income Tax Act for the purpose of  tax  on capital gains.  The reference was answered by the High  Court in favour of the Revenue and in appeal this Court   affirmed the view taken by the  High Court  upon  holding that  whether a land is   agricultural land  or not is essentially  a  question of fact.  Several tests have been evolved in the  decisions of  the Supreme Court and the High Courts, but all  of them are more or  less in the nature of guidelines.  The  question has to be   answered in each case having regard to  the facts and circumstances of  the  case.   It was observed  that  an inference  has to be drawn on  a cumulative   consideration of all the relevant facts. It was suggested on behalf of the appellants that   the  provisions  of Section 47 of the  Tenancy Act of 1950, wherein  the previous sanction of the Tahsildar was required to be  taken for permanent alienation of agricultural land, would not  be attracted in the instant case since the  lands were no   longer  agricultural  in nature. The corner-stone of the  appellant’s case is based on the perfection of title by Uppari  Rammaiah by virtue  of the sale deed executed in his favour by  Kaneez Fatima Begum on 1st May, 1961 which in turn

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perfected Mir Riyasat Ali’s title in respect of the lands  conveyed  to him  by Uppari Ramaiah on 8th February, 1961.   This  also had the effect  of legitimizing  the subsequent   transfers made by Mir Riyasat Ali in favour of P.  Neelakanteswaramma and Chandra Ramalingaiah  and also in  favour of Srinivasa  Cooperative Housing Society  Ltd., wherein  in recognition of such a right both Uppari Ramaiah and  his  legal heirs  had  joined on receipt of  a certain part of the  consideration  amount. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Parasaran referred  to a Notification  No.44 dated 6th June, 1949, by  which  the  area in question  was included in the Jubilee Hills area within   the limits of the Hyderabad Municipality.  It was  urged that  the said fact would go  a long way to establish that the lands  had lost their  agricultural character   long ago and would no  longer be governed by the provisions of the Tenancy Act of  1950 but by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882.  To lend further support to his submission, Mr.  Parasaran also pointed out that in 1969 Section 47 had been  omitted from the 1950 Act, inasmuch as, by then the lands   governed by the said  Act  had lost their agricultural  character  and had been converted into urban holdings.  In addition to  the  provisions of Section 43 of  the Transfer of Property Act,  reference was also made to Section 13(1)(b)  of the Specific  Relief Act, 1968, whereunder  a person with no title or  imperfect title may be compelled  by the  purchaser or lessee  to execute or  procure documents to validate the title. Reference was  made to  a decision of this Court  in the  case of   The Jumma  Masjid, Mercara  vs.  Kodimaniandra   Deviah, (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 554, which was  a  case   dealing  with  a representation made by a person  having only a  spes- successionis in the property transferred.   It was held that the  transferee was entitled to the benefit  of Section 43 of the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if he had taken the transfer for  consideration and on the faith of the representation.        The decision   already referred to  hereinbefore in the  case of Ram Pyare (supra)  echo the sentiments in the  aforesaid  Jumma Masjid case. In applying the provisions of Section 43 of the aforesaid  Act in respect of the sale deed executed by a tenure holder, an  alternative argument was advanced to the effect that even if  the sale deeds executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of Mir  Riyasat Ali   and  Kaneez Fatima Begum  in favour of  Uppari  Ramaiah should be  held  to be void on account of  non- compliance  with the provisions  of Section 47 of the Tenancy  Act of 1950,  it could  not be denied  that Mir Riyasat Ali  continued to be in possession  of  the lands as conveyed in his  favour by Uppari Ramaiah from 1961 till 1982, during which  period not  only did Uppari Ramaiah and his  legal heirs  acquiesce in Mir Riyasat Ali’s  title to the said land, but they  did not also   take any steps to challenge such title or to  initiate eviction proceedings against Mir Riyasat Ali under  Section 98 of the said Act.  It was submitted that, as had been  found by the learned Special Judge, the mischief under  Section 47 of the 1950 Act did not  prevent Mir Riyasat Ali and  or  those claiming under  him from acquiring  title to the  property by adverse possession, and, in fact, the respondents  in these  appeals lost  their   possession in the lands upon  execution of the conveyance by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of  Mir Riyasat Ali and the subsequent transferees from Mir  Riyasat Ali were in continuous and uninterrupted possession  of the land  and that they had consequently  perfected their  title in the lands  by way of adverse possession as against the  respondents.      Appearing for the heirs of  Uppari Ramaiah, Mr.K.K.

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Venugopal,  learned senior counsel,  at  the very outset  contended that A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,  1982,  was not attracted to the facts of the instant case, since  admittedly  the transferees from  Mir Riyasat Ali were in  possession    of  the lands conveyed in their favour.  Referring  to the  definition of the expression "land grabber" and "land  grabbing" as defined in Sections 2 (d)  and 2 (e) of the said Act,  Mr. Venugopal submitted that an act of  land grabbing would  necessarily have to be followed by a physical attempt to take  possession of  the  lands involved, which element was lacking  in this case. Referring to the Deed of Sale  dated  21st  November,  1961 executed by Mir  Riyasat Ali in favour of Chandra  Ramalingaiah and P. Neelakanteswaramma (Ext.A-5), Mr.  Venugopal urged that a  genuine civil dispute had been raised  regarding acquisition of title by Mir Riyasat Ali and through  him his transferees in view of the recitals contained in the said  deed wherein Uppari Ramaiah’s protected tenancy was  referred to and it was also mentioned that  under the  Tenancy  Act of 1950 the protected  tenant  had a right to purchase the  interest of the land holder, which in  fact, was the  case when  Uppari Rammaiah  obtained the sale deed in his favour from  Kaneez Fatima Begum on 1st May, 1961 and the same was  registered on 4th May, 1961 before the Sub-Registrar,   Khairatabad, Hyderabad.   Pursuant thereto, Uppari Ramaiah  had applied for a certificate under Section 38 of the aforesaid  Act and the same was issued in his favour by the Revenue  Divisional  Officer, Hyderabad (West), Hyderabad District, on  19th May, 1961.   According to  Mr. Venugopal, the learned  Special Judge had on  a wrong interpretation of the provisions  of the Tenancy Act of 1950  held  the heirs of  Uppari Ramaiah    to be  land grabbers within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. It was also submitted that the purported sale deed  executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of Mir Riyasat Ali on 8th  February, 1961 was contrary to the concept of "protected  tenancy" envisaged under the Tenancy Act of 1950 Act.  In the  event  the recitals in the deed executed by Mir Riyasat Ali on  21st November, 1961, in favour of  Chandra Ramalingaiah  and  P. Neelakanteswaramma are to be accepted, then, Uppari  Ramaiah had only  a  protected tenancy  in the lands in  question which he could  not  have conveyed to Mir Riyasat Ali  on 8th February, 1961, without the prior sanction of the  Tahsildar under Section 47  of the Tenancy Act of 1950 which  otherwise  bars transfers in favour of non-agriculturists under  Section 49 of the aforesaid Act. Mr.Venugopal submitted that since the A.P. Land  Grabbing Act, 1982 provides for   penal consequences,  including imprisonment under Sections 4 and 5 of the said  Act, and against which no appeal has been provided, the High  Court  was entitled to question  the decision-making process  of the Special Court in exercise of  its  powers under  Articles  226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  It was   submitted  that the said view had also been expressed by this Court  in  State of A.P. vs. P.V. Hanumantharao,  (2003) 10 SCC 121.   Mr. Venugopal  submitted  that   Ext.B-9,  being the sale  deed executed by Mir Riyasat Ali and Uppari Ramaiah and his  heirs in favour of Srinivasa Government Employees  Cooperative Housing Society Limited could not be relied upon  on account of the fact that of the consideration amount of  Rs.85,854/-, only  a sum of Rs.1,500/- was paid to Uppari  Ramaiah and his heirs, which clearly established the sham  nature of the transaction.  In addition it was  contended that  Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act would  also not have  any application in the facts of the instant case since it would  first have to be established as to who had committed fraud  

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since  both, Mir Riyasat  Ali, Uppari  Ramaiah   and his heirs  were in pari delicto and  the  original contract between Uppari  Ramaiah and Mir Riyasat Ali was void. Mr. Venugopal submitted that  the doctrine of in pari  delicto   which had been  explained by this Court in  Sita Ram  vs. Radhabai And Ors. ,  (1968) 1  SCR 805, being  an  equitable principle, one  whose title to  a property  was based  on fraud  could not claim that another had obtained the said  property by fraudulent means.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that   the principle embodied in Section 43 of  the Transfer of  Property Act regarding feeding the estoppel had been  held  to  be inoperative and invalid in Ram Bhawan Singh vs. Jagbir  Singh And Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 309 when the transfer itself was  invalid. A further submission was made that in the case of   Manchegowda And Ors. vs. State of Karnataka And Ors.  (1984) 3 SCC 301, this Court while considering certain   prohibited transfers under statute had held that the same  were void as the transferees acquired only  a defeasible  title to  the lands transferred.    Mr. Venugopal  denied  the claim  made that Mir Riyasat Ali  had perfected his imperfect title by  operation of Section 43 of the Transfer  of Property Act, 1882  when Kaneez Fatima Begum  executed the sale deed in favour  of Uppari Ramaiah  on 1st May, 1961.  It was reiterated that  since the sale deed  executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of  Mir Riyasat Ali  was not based on any misrepresentation, the  provisions of Section 43, which feeds its estoppel, would not  be available to the transaction, notwithstanding the fact that  Uppari Ramaiah subsequently acquired  full  rights  over the  land in question.  It was urged that the prohibition contained  in Section 47 of the Tenancy Act of 1950 could not be   circumvented  and/or   defeated in the fraudulent  manner in  which it had been done.  Mr. Venugopal, submitted that the   said principle had been  considered by  this  Court in the case  of Kartar Singh (dead) by Lrs. And Ors. vs.  Harbanskaur  (Smt.) (1994)  4 SCC 730, wherein it was held that the rule of  estoppel  by deed by transferor would apply only when the   transferee is  misled.  Where the transferee  knows  for  a fact  that the transferor does not possess the title which he  represents, then he cannot be said to have  acted on such  representation in  taking  a transfer.  Section 43 then would  have no application and the transfer would fall under Section  6(1)  of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. According to Mr. Venugopal it was well within the   knowledge of the parties that Uppari Ramaiah was only a   protected tenant under Kaneez Fatima Begum.  The sale deed   executed by Uppari Ramaiah in favour of Mir Riyasat Ali as  such   protected tenant was hit by the provisions  not only of  Section 47  but also  by  Section 49 of the Tenancy Act of  1950. Apart from  the above,  there is also no  pleading on  behalf of the appellants on the application of Section 43 of the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Mr.Venugopal also opposed the alternative submission  made by Mr. Parasaran that  P. Neelakantenswaramma  and  the heirs of Chandra Ramalingaiah  had acquired title to the  property in question by adverse possession on the principle  that  the  question of adverse possession could only be decided  by a civil court and not by a Special Court constituted under  the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. Mr. R.F. Nariman,  learned senior  advocate, who  appeared  for     some of the respondents,  adopted the  submissions of Mr. Venugopal and contended that that since  the Limitation Act would not apply  to the Special Tribunal,  the plea of adverse  possession was not available in the

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proceedings before the Special Court.   In any event, relying on   a decision  of this Court in  Balkrishan vs.  Satyaprakash And   Ors.,  (2001) 2 SCC 498, Mr. Nariman submitted that as had  been held  therein  the adverse  possession must be adequate  in   continuity, in publicity and in extent and  a plea is  required at the least to show  when possession becomes  adverse so that the  starting point of limitation against the  party affected can be found.(See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina   AIR  1964 SC 1254). In addition, Mr. Nariman submitted that the Full Bench    of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  had  in the case of Sada   vs. Tahsildar, Utnoor, Adilabad District and Ors., reported in  1987 (2) ALT 749, held that a plea of adverse possession could  not be taken by a land holder against a protected tenant, in  this  case Uppari Ramaiah,  to whom a certificate had been  issued under Section 38E of the Tenancy Act of 1950.   Reiterating Mr. Venugopal’s submission,  Mr. Nariman   concluded on the note that mere attempt  to grab  cannot  be  equated  with an act of land grabbing and hence the  provisions of A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 would   have no application to the facts of this case. Appearing for the appellant in CA Nos.4534-4535/99 and  4527-4528/99 Mr. C. Pandari, learned advocate, adopted the    submissions made by Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Nariman and    submitted in addition that while  adjudicating on the  complaint by P. Neelakanteswarama and the  heirs of Chandra  Ramalingaiah, the learned Special Judge had exceeded his  jurisdiction  in making observations on the rights  said to have  been assigned  in favour of  respondent Nos. 7 to 16  which  allegedly obstructed  the appellant’s  right  to work out his  civil rights in respect of the property.  It was urged  that the   learned  Special Judge was only   required to adjudicate on the  question as to whether  the opposite parties had acted  in a  manner in respect  of  the lands in question which would  attract the provisions of the A.P.Land  Grabbing (Prohibition)  Act, 1982.   In his brief reply Mr. Parasaran contended that not all  acts done contrary to any statutory provision are always   void  but in  some cases voidable and  if a voidable act is not  avoided within  a  reasonable time, parties  are subsequently  precluded from challenging the same.   He also attempted to show  that fraud had not been   pleaded by  the appellant which would take out the matter  from the ambit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882.  Referring once again to Kartar Singh’s case (supra), Mr.  Parasaran tried to  convince us that in  the said decision  nothing different  to what had been held in the Jumma  Masjid’s case (supra)  had been indicated.   Although, the facts involved in these appeals   necessitated lengthy submissions, the scope and ambit thereof  is limited.   The main issue  which surfaces in these appeals is  whether the  actions arising out of the dispute  raised by the  heirs of Uppari Rammaiah  can be said to attract the  provisions of the  A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.    Admittedly, the transferees from  Mir Riyasat Ali and Chandra  Ramalingaiah    as also P. Neelakanteswaramma have been in  possession of  the properties in dispute and at no point of time   had their possession been disturbed.  The  attempts by the  heirs of Uppari Ramaiah to dispossess the said transferees  could at  best be said to be an attempt to gain possession  of  the lands  without actually obtaining possession thereof,  which  would not constitute an act  of land grabbing within  the meaning of the    A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,  1982.  We agree with both Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Nariman

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that in order to constitute an act  of land grabbing, an attempt  to dispossess must be followed by actual dispossession which  would then constitute land grabbing so as to attract the penal   provisions of the 1982 Act. These appeals should fail  on the said ground alone but it   has also been argued, and, in our view, quite rightly so, that  the initial document executed by Uppari Ramaiah  in favour of  Mir Riyasat Ali on  8th February, 1961, was void since Uppari  Ramaiah did not have any saleable interest in the land at that  stage having regard  to the express prohibition under Sections  47 and 49 of the Tenancy Act of 1950.  We are unable to agree  with Mr. Parasaran that this was merely a voidable  transaction and was capable of being avoided without the  defect being cured under Section 50B of the said Act.  It was  all the more so since the transfer   was being made by a  protected tenant  as an agriculturist  to a non-agriculturist  which has also been  expressly prohibited under the Act.  That  Uppari Ramaiah was aware that the lands were agricultural in  nature is evident from the application filed before the learned  Special Judge in which the said lands aware described as "dry  agricultural lands".  Except for the fact that the said lands  were now included within  an urban area there is nothing  to   show that the user of the same  had been  altered with the  passage of time.  The decision in Sarifabibi’s  case (supra)  cited by Mr. Parasaran  does not, therefore, help his clients’  case.  The scheme of the Tenancy Act of 1950  is reflected  in  Section 30 of the Act which prohibits  sub- division or   subletting of  any land by a tenant or assignment  of any  interest  held by him therein.  The  Preamble  to the Act  provides that it was   expedient inter alia  to amend   the law  regulating the relations of landlords and tenants of  agricultural lands  and the alienation of such lands and to  enable the land holders  to prevent excessive sub-division of  agricultural holdings.  In our view, in a proceeding before the  Special Court the only issue which fall for decision  is whether  there  has been an act of land grabbing as alleged and who is  the guilty  party.  The Special Court has no jurisdiction to   decide questions relating to acquisition of title  by adverse  possession in a  proceeding under the Act as the same would  fall within  the domain of the civil  courts.  The learned Special  Judge apparently traveled beyond  the  jurisdiction vested in  him under the 1982 Act in deciding that even if the  provisions  of Section 47 of the Act was a  bar to transfer without the  sanction of the Tahsildar, the occupants of the land had  perfected their title thereto by way of adverse possession. Even on the question of the applicability of Section 43 of  the Transfer of Property Act, we agree with the view taken by  the High Court  that  when the initial  transfer itself  between   Uppari Ramaiah and Mir Riyasat Ali was  invalid, the question  of application of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to  such a transaction on account of  subsequent acquisition of  title by Uppari Ramaiah would not be available. As far as the appeals filed by N. Srinivasa Rao  are  concerned, his only  grievance is with regard to the  observations   made by the Writ Court while disposing of the  writ applications in  his favour.   Such observations appear to   have been made in passing  and  cannot bind the parties in a   properly constituted suit where the rights of the parties are to  be adjudicated.  We, therefore, clarify that in the event any  civil action is taken by the said N. Srinivasa Rao in  furtherance of his rights, if any, under the General Power of  Attorney  granted in his favour and/or any other document,  such observations will not be relied upon in coming to a  decision in the suit. We do not think that the orders passed by the High Court

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call  for any interference in these appeals  which are disposed  of accordingly.  There will be no order as to costs. In our view, nothing further remains to be considered in  the contempt applications and they stand disposed of  accordingly.