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PETITIONER: N. R. GHOSE alias NIKHIL RANJAN GHOSE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/10/1959

BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  239            1960 SCR  (2)  58  CITATOR INFO :  F          1970 SC 962  (8)

ACT:        Criminal  Trial-Autrefois  acquit, Plea  of-Order  by  trial        Court  at intermediate stage rejecting Plea-Order  confirmed        by High Court --Whether can be challenged in appeal  against        subsequent orders in same proceeding--Principle of  finality        of decisions in criminal cases -Code of Criminal  Procedure,        1898 (V of 1898), s. 403.

HEADNOTE: A  complaint  was filed against the appellant and  one  Bose before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling.  Under the W.B.  Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949  the case was allotted to Mr. Dutta Gupta, Special judge, Alipur, who  by order dated July 11, 1951, acquitted  the  appellant but  convicted Bose.  Bose appealed to the High Court  which held  the Act to be ultra vires and quashed the  conviction. The  Act  was amended and another complaint was  then  filed against  the  appellant and Bose before  Mr.  Lodh,  Special judge, Alipur.  The appellant pleaded the bar of S. 403 Code of  Criminal  Procedure on account of his acquittal  by  Mr. Dutta  Gupta but the Special judge overruled the plea.   The appellant  went to the High Court in revision and  on  March 19, 1953, Chunder, J., held that the acquittal was not by  a competent  Court  as  the Act creating the  court  had  been declared ultra vires and dismissed the application.  In  the meantime  the  case  was withdrawn from  Mr.  Lodh  and  was allotted  to  the  Special judge, Darjeeling,  and  a  fresh complaint was filed against both accused.  On an application made  by Bose the High Court quashed these  proceedings  and directed  the proceedings pending in the Court of  the  Sub- Divisional  Magistrate,  Darjeeling, to be  disposed  of  in accordance  with  law.  By this time the Supreme  Court  had held in Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal  that the  Act  was intra vires.  The appellant again  raised  the plea  of  the  bar of s. 403  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, contending that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court his  acquittal  was  by a competent  Court.   The  plea  was rejected  by the Magistrates and a revision application  was

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dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the appellant was  bound by the decision of Chunder, J., holding that  the acquittal was by a Court not of competent jurisdiction.  The appellant appealed by special leave. Held (Sarkar, J., dissenting), that in view of the  decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria’s case the  trial before  Mr. Dutta Gupta, Special judge was a lawful one  and the acquittal of the appellant which was never set aside was a  bar  to another trial.  It was open to the  appellant  to challenge  in this appeal the order made by Chunder, J.,  on March 19, 1953.  Except                              59 where the statute so required, it was not imperative upon  a party to appeal against every error, defect or  irregularity in  any order by which he may be aggrieved and by not  doing so  he  did  not  forfeit  his  right  to  have  the  matter considered  by  the Supreme Court.  So far  as  the  Supreme Court  was  concerned  it made  no  difference  whether  the intermediate  order  complained of was passed by  the  Trial Court and was not taken to the High Court or it was taken to the High Court and was confirmed by it. Kedar  Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal, [1954]  S.C R. 30, followed. Maharaja  Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government, (1859)  7 M.I.A.  283,  Alexander John Forbes v.  Ameeroonissa  Begum, (1865) 10 M.I.A. 340, Sheonath v. Ram Nath, (1865) 10 M.I.A. 413  and Shah Mukhun Lal v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh,  (1868) 12 M.I.A. 157, referred to. Sambasivam  v.  Public  Prosecutor,  Federation  of  Malaya, [1950]  A.C.  458 and Pritam Singh v. The State  of  Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415, applied. Sarkar J.-The judgment of Chunder, J., prevented the  appel- lant  from raising the question that the Court of Mr.  Dutta Gupta was a court of competent jurisdiction.  That  decision was  a final judgment and it did not lose its force as  such because  a Superior Court in a different  case  subsequently took a view which showed that the judgment was wrong.   That decision  was not an interlocutory order as it decided  that the appellant had no right not to be prosecuted again.   The principle  of finality of judgment obtained in criminal  law as well as it did in civil law. In re May, 28 Ch.  D. 516, Sambasivam v. Public  Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, 1950 A.C. 458 and Ram Kirpal Shukul v. Mussumat Rup Kuari, (1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37, referred to.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 116  of        1957.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        the  February  10,  1955, of the  Calcutta  High  Court,  in        Criminal  Revision  No.  930 of 1954,  arising  out  of  the        judgment  and  order  dated  July  13,  1954,  of  the  Sub-        Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling in G. R.  case No. 108  of        1950.        Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.        N.   R. Khanna and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.        1959.  October 27.  The judgment of Jafer Imam, J. L.  Kapur        and  K.  N. Wanchoo was delivered by Kapur, J.,  Sarkar,  J.        delivered a separate judgment.        KAPUR  J.-This appeal by special leave raises a question  of        the application of s. 403 of the Criminal        60        Procedure  Code.  The circumstances in which  this  question

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      arises are these: A complaint was filed    against one S. K.        Bose  and the appellant under ss. 120-B, 409,  Indian  Penal        Code  and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (2  of        1947) in the   Court   of  the  Sub-Divisional   Magistrate,        Darjeeling.    Against  the  appellant  the  complaint   was        instituted  on March 2, 1950.  As the West  Bengal  Criminal        Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act (West Bengal 21 of  1949)        (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force on June        23,  1949,  the case was allotted to the  Special  Judge  at        Alipore, Mr. S.C. Dutt Gupta who, on July 11, 1951, found S.        K. Bose guilty but acquitted the appellant.  S. K. Bose took        an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta.        In another case J. K. Gupta v. The State of West Bengal  (1)        a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that s. 4(1)        of  the  Act  was ultra vires.  Following  this  judgment  a        Division  Bench of that Court (Trevor Harries, C.J., and  S.        R. Das Gupta, J.) passed the following order in S. K. Bose’s        appeal:-        The appeal must, therefore, be allowed.  The conviction  and        sentence are set aside and the appellant must be regarded as        an  under-trial prisoner awaiting retrial, if Government  so        decides.   He  will  continue on the same  bail  until  such        retrial."        On  April  9, 1952, the West Bengal Criminal  Law  Amendment        (Special Courts Amending) Ordinance 1952 (West Bengal Ord. 8        of 1952) came into force and was replaced by West Bengal Act        XII  of 1952 on July 30, 1952.  By a Notification No.  2047J        Mr. J. C. Lodh was appointed as the Special Judge at Alipore        and  on  May  26, 1952, a petition of  complaint  was  filed        against  both  the appellant and S.K. Bose.  It  was  stated        therein  that the High Court had held that the allotment  of        the  case to the previous Special Court and all  proceedings        thereafter  were  invalid  and "all  such  cases  have  been        directed  to  be retried according to law"  and  prayed  for        cognizance  to be taken of the offences which the  appellant        and S. K. Bose were accused of.  It may be pointed out  that        as far as the        (1)  (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701.        61        appellant  was  concerned the High Court had given  no  such        direction.        The  Special Judge then summoned the appellant who  on  June        19,  1952,  pleaded the bar of s.  403,  Criminal  Procedure        Code,  basing it on his acquittal by the Special Judge,  Mr.        S. C. Dutt Gupta.  The Special Judge overruled this plea  on        the  ground of want of jurisdiction of the previous  Special        Judge  to  try the offences because s. 4(1) of the  Act  had        been  declared ultra vires by the High Court.  Against  this        order the appellant moved the High Court under Articles  226        &  227 and under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure  Code  for        quashing  the  proceedings  before the  Special  Judge.   On        August  22, 1952 Notification No. 2047J. was  superseded  by        Notification  No. 4673J. and Mr. J. C. Lodh ceased  to  have        jurisdiction and he passed an order on August 26 that as the        Court had no jurisdiction to continue the trial the "case be        filed and the accused be held underwater prisoner pending  a        retrial  according to law." The appellant thereupon  amended        his petition in the High Court.  On March 19, 1953, the High        Court   (Chunder,  J.),  dismissed,  the   application   and        discharged the rule.  It held that as the Act "creating the"        Special  Judge’s  Court has been declared ultra  vires,  the        decision  of  that Court had no binding force and  that  the        High   Court  "  did  not  discharge  the  accused   persons        altogether  but  directed  that  they were  to  be  held  as        undertrial prisoners, leaving it to the Government to decide

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      what  further steps the Government would take."  Here  again        there  was  an  error because whatever might  be  the  legal        consequence  of the order of the High Court in  S.K.  Bose’s        appeal there was no specific order as to the appellant.        The  West  Bengal Criminal Law  Amendment  (Special  Courts)        Amending  Act (West Bengal Act 22 of 1952) having come  into        force,  by a notification dated December 22, 1952, the  case        of the appellant and S. K. Bose was allotted to the  Special        Judge at Darjeeling and a fresh complaint was filed on March        27,  1953 in that Court and it issued process  against  both        the  accused.   The appellant again took  objection  to  the        restarting        62        of  the proceedings.  S. K. Bose, the other  accused,took  a        revision to the High Court (Criminal Revision     No. 578 of        1953).   On  April  8,  1954 the High  Court  (Das  Gupta  &        Debabrata  Mookerjee,  JJ), quashed the proceedings  in  the        High Court of the Special Judge at Darjeeling on the  ground        that the Amendment Act        (XXII     of     1952)     was        inapplicable to the facts of the case.  The High Court held:        "The  position  in law therefore was  that  the  proceedings        against  the petitioner were pending in appeal  before  this        Court on the 9th April, 1952; the appeal was disposed of  on        that  date  and  a  retrial  was  ordered.   There  has  not        therefore  been  a, termination of  those  proceedings.   If        consequently the Special Courts Act does not apply to  those        proceedings  and  those  proceedings cannot be  tried  by  a        Special  Court, that position cannot be escaped by filing  a        fresh petition of complaint’.  The filing of fresh  petition        of  complaint will not institute fresh proceedings  distinct        from  the proceedings that were pending in appeal.  So  long        as these proceedings have not been disposed of in accordance        with law, fresh proceedings cannot be instituted against the        petitioner.        The  result in my opinion is that the Special  Court  Judge,        Darjeeling  has no jurisdiction to try the  case  instituted        before  him  on a complaint on the 27th of March,  1953.   I        would  accordingly  quash the proceedings in his  Court  and        order   that  the  proceedings  now  pending   against   the        petitioner  in the Court of the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,        Darjeeling  should  now be disposed of  in  accordance  with        law."        On  May 31, 1954 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,  Darjeeling,        issued  process against the appellant to appear on June  21,        1954, and on the same day the case was transferred to Mr. S.        P. Kar, Magistrate.  The appellant then applied to the  Sub-        Divisional Magistrate for the quashing of proceedings on the        ground  that he had been acquitted by a Court  of  competent        jurisdiction because the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria        v.  The State of West Bengal (1) had declared s.4(1) of  the        Act to be intra vires of the Constitution.  The        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 30.        63        learned  Magistrate dismissed this petition oil  the  ground        that the order of the High Court dated April 8, 1954,  which        directed  the trial of the appellant: was passed  after  the        judgment  of the Supreme Court and that he was bound by  the        order of the, High Court.  Against this order the  appellant        took  a revision to the High Court and the matter was  heard        by Guha Roy and S. K. Sen, JJ.  Guha Roy, J., held that  the        order  of Chunder, J., in Criminal Revision No. 965 of  1952        operated  as  a bar; that the proceedings  before  the  Sub-        Divisional  Magistrate  at  Darjeeling were  really  a  con-        tinuation of the proceedings before Mr. J. C. Lodh,  Special        Judge  and that the appellant was bound by the  decision  of

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      Chunder, J. S. K. Sen, J., agreed and held that the order of        acquittal  was  by  a  Court  which  was  not  of  competent        jurisdiction  and therefore it (the acquital) was no  longer        in existence when Chunder, J., passed the order on March 19,        1953, and the petitioner could not get the benefit under  s.        403 of the Criminal Precedure Code or the "subsequent change        in  the  law introduced by the Supreme Court decision  "  in        Kedar  Nath  Bajoria v. The State of  West  Bengal(1).   The        result was that the appellant’s prayer for quashing the pro-        ceedings  was rejected and the appellant has come in  appeal        by special leave against this decision of the High Court.        Under  s. 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a  person        once tried and acquitted for an offence is not liable to  be        tried  again for the same offence or on the same facts.   It        is this provision of the Code which the appellant relies  on        in  support  of  his  appeal and  submits  that  as  he  was        acquitted  by  a court of competent jurisdiction  and  which        acquittal  remains - operative he cannot be tried again  for        the same offence.  Under the decision of this Court in Kedar        Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal (1) s. 4 (1) of the        Act  is  intra  vires and the court of  the  Special  Judge,        Alipore, Mr. S. C. Dutt Gupta, who passed the original order        of  acquittal  of  the appellant was a  court  of  competent        jurisdiction and if there is no other impediment in the  way        of the appellant the previous acquittal        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 30.        64        must operate as a complete bar to his being tried again   on        the  some facts and for the same offences.  But      it  was        contended on behalf of the State that in his           order        Chunder, J., had held that the appellant could           not        plead  the  bar of s. 403 as the order of acquittal  by  the        Special Judge Mr. S. C. Dutt Gupta, was not by a       court        of competent jurisdiction; and as the order had become final        whether it was right or wrong it barred the raising of  that        question, i.e., applicability of s. 403 even in this  Court.        It  therefore becomes necessary to determine the  effect  of        the order of Chunder, J.        The  Special  Judge  Mr. S. C.  Dutt  Gupta,  acquitted  the        appellant and convicted the co-accused S. K. Bose who  alone        took  an appeal to the High Court.  That Court held s.  4(1)        of  the Act to be ultra vires and set aside  his  conviction        and left it to Government to decide as to whether he  should        again  be tried or not. By filing the proceedings again  the        Government decided that the appellant and S. K. Bose  should        be  retried.   No argument was raised before us  as  to  the        effect  of  that  order  on the  appellant’s  case  and  the        argument has proceeded on the basis that on that view of the        law  the acquittal of the appellant was by a  court  without        jurisdiction  and therefore even if no appeal was  taken  as        against  the  appellant the order of acquittal would  be  no        more than an order of discharge(Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy  v.        The King (3) ). But the appellant contended that in view  of        the  decision  of this Court in Kedar Nath  Bajoria  v.  The        State  of West Bengal (2) where the Act was  declared  intra        vires and s. 4(1) of the Act a good provision, the  decision        of the High Court to the contrary could no longer impede the        efficacy  of his plea and he was entitled to plead  s.  403,        Criminal Procedure Code, as a bar to his being tried on  the        same  facts and for the offences of which he was  acquitted.        It  was  also contended that the verdict  of  acquittal  was        given by a court of competent jurisdiction and that  verdict        has never been reversed and the acquittal is still in force.        It is not necessary in this appeal to decide whether it  was        open to the High Court to take a different view

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      (1) (1949) 76 I.A 158, 168, 169.        (2) [1954] S.C.R. 30.        65        of the effect of the order of acquittal passed by Mr. S.  C.        Dutt  Gupta  because of the pronouncement by this  Court  in        Kedar  Nath Bajoria’s case (1).  What we have to  decide  in        this  appeal  is whether the order of Chunder, J.,  has  the        effect  of  debarring  the appellant  from  the  benefit  of        obtaining  a review by this Court of that decision.   It  is        also not necessary to discuss the scope of res judicata  and        the  extent of its application to criminal  proceedings  and        its   limitation  to  decisions  of  courts   of   competent        jurisdiction.        Except  where the statute so requires it is  not  imperative        upon  a  party  to appeal against  every  error,  defect  or        irregularity  in any order by which he may conceive  himself        aggrieved  under  the  penalty, if he does  not  So  do,  of        forfeiting  for  ever the benefit of consideration  by  this        Court.  Nothing would be more detrimental to the expeditious        administration  of justice than the establishment of a  rule        which  would impose upon a party the necessity of  appealing        against every such order.  It was so held in Moheshur  Singh        v. The Bengal Government (2) where a party had not  appealed        from the order of Sudan, Commissioner, granting a review  of        judgment.   In our opinion, it would make no  difference  as        far as this Court is concerned whether an intermediate order        complained of is passed by the trial court and is not  taken        to the High Court in revision or it is taken in revision  to        the  High  Court  and  is  there  confirmed.   We  think  it        unnecessary  in this case to express any opinion as  to  the        effect  of  that order qua the revision in  the  High  Court        itself, but when the matter properly comes to this Court  in        appeal in such circumstances as this case it is open to this        Court unless there is any statute which provides differently        to  review the order passed by the High Court as much as  it        would  have been if the original order passed by  the  trial        court had not been taken to the High Court in revision.   In        civil  cases  this  principle  was  accepted  by  the  Privy        Council.   See Alexander John Forbes v.  Ameeroonissa  Begum        (3) where an order of remand had not been appealed        (1) [1954] S.C.R. 30.       (2) (1859) 7 M.I.A. 283, 302.        (3)  (1865) 10 M.I.A. 340, 352.        9        66        against; Sheonath v. Ram Nath (1) where the order was a step        in  the procedure that leads to a final decree; Shah  Mukhun        Lal v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh (2) where the question as  to        interest was decided in an interlocutory decree not appealed        from.   These cases are decisions on general principles  and        are not based on    any  particular  statute  or  regulation        peculiar to procedure in civil cases.  We do not see why the        principle  of these cases should, in the absence of any  law        to  the contrary, not be equally applicable to matters of  a        criminal nature.        Chunder, J., in his judgment in Criminal Revision No. 965 of        1952 dated March 19, 1953 said:        " There must be a judicium before there can be res judicata.        If  a  judicium created by an Act is not a judicium  at  all        because  the Act is ultra vires there can be no res  decided        by  it.   Because  there  is no judicium  there  can  be  no        decision which will have a binding force."        It  only  means this that for an order of  acquittal  to  be        binding  it  must  be pronounced by  a  Court  of  competent        jurisdiction.  In the judgment of the High Court in Criminal        Revision No. 930 of 1954 now under appeal S. K. Sen, J., was

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      of  the opinion that as the acquittal was not by a Court  of        competent  jurisdiction  the Government regarded it  as  set        aside and it was no longer in force when Chunder, J., passed        his  order  on  March  19,  1953,  and  "  consequently  the        petitioner  " (Dow the appellant) " could no longer get  the        benefit  thereof  under s. 403 Cr.  P. C.  on  a  subsequent        change  in the law introduced by the Supreme Court  decision        in  Kedar  Nath  Bajoria v. The State of  West  Bengal  (3).        Following  Kedar  Nath  Bajoria’s case (3)  we  are  of  the        opinion that s. 4(1) of the Act was not ultra vires and  the        judgment  of the Calcutta High Court in J.K. Gupta v.  State        of  West Bengal (4) was erroneous and the acquittal  by  the        Special  Judge Mr. S. C. Dutt Gupta was an order made  by  a        court  of  competent jurisdiction; as such  it  was  binding        unless  set  aside in appeal and it was never set  aside  in        appeal.  The observations        (1)  (1865) 10 M.I.A., 413.        (2)  (1868) 12 M.I.A. 157.        (3)  (1954) S.C.R. 30.        (4)  (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701.        67        of the Privy Council in Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King        Emperor (1):        "  If  the  orders of acquittal were passed by  a  court  of        competent  jurisdiction,  though  wrongly,  they  would   be        binding unless set aside in appeal " would be applicable  to        the  case  of the appellant.  If the trial court was  not  a        court  of competent jurisdiction the acquittal would  be  no        more than a discharge; but if it was by a court of competent        jurisdiction it is binding unless lawfully set aside.        The  plea of the appellant effectively falls within  s.  403        Criminal Procedure Code.  We have held that the trial in the        court  of Mr. S. C. Dutt Gupta being a trial before a  court        competent to pass a valid order the prosecution is bound  to        accept  the correctness of the verdict of acquittal  and  is        precluded   from  challenging  it.  As  was  said  by   Lord        Mcdermott in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation  of        Malaya (2) in regard to a verdict pronounced by a  competent        court and after a lawful trial:        "  the verdict is binding and conclusive in  all  subsequent        proceedings between the parties to the adjudication."        This  passage  was  quoted with approval by  this  Court  in        Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab(3).  In our opinion  the        order of Chunder, J., was based on an erroneous view of  the        vires  of  s.  4(1)  of the Act.  The  first  trial  of  the        appellant  was before a court of competent jurisdiction  and        the verdict of acquittal was not a nullity; its efficacy was        not impaired by any binding order of the High Court; and  at        this stage when the matter is properly before this court and        the proceedings are a continuation of the proceedings before        Mr.  J.  C. Lodh, it is not precluded  from  rectifying  any        error  or defect in the order of the High Court  and  giving        effect  to the plea set up under s. 403.  The  trial  before        Mr.  S. C. Dutt Gupta being a lawful one which  resulted  in        acquittal and which has never been set aside, another  trial        would place the appellant in        (1)  (1949)  L.R. 76 I.A. 158, 168, 169.        (2) [1950] A .C. 458, 479.        (3) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415,420.        68        jeopardy a second time which would contravene s. 403 of  the        Criminal  Procedure Code.        We  therefore  allow  this  appeal,  set  aside  the   order        of  the  Calcutta  High Court  directing  the  complaint  to        be   proceeded  within  the  court  of  the   Sub-Divisional

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      Magistrate  and  the proceedings against the  appellant  are        quashed.        SARKARJ.-In my view this appeal fails.        On March 2, 1950, the appellant and one Bose were prosecuted        for  certain  offenses under the West  Bengal  Criminal  Law        Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949.  The case was heard by        Mr.  Dutta  Gupta  who,  on July  11,  1951,  acquitted  the        appellant  but  convicted Bose.  Bose appealed to  the  High        Court  at  Calcutta.   The High  Court,  following  its  own        earlier decision in J. K. Gupta & Ors. v. The State of  West        Bengal  (1), found that the Act was invalid as  it  offended        art. 14 of the Constitution.  The High Court thereupon  held        that Bose’s conviction under the Act could not be  sustained        and set it aside.        This judgment was passed on April 9, 1952.  On the same  day        the  Government of West Bengal passed an Ordinance  amending        the Act, which Ordinance was later replaced by another  Act.        Under  the Act as amended, fresh proceedings in  respect  of        the  same offenses were started both against  the  appellant        and  Bose on May 26, 1952, in the Court of Mr. Lodh who  was        empowered  by  the Government under the Act as  amended,  to        deal with it.        On  June 19, 1952, the appellant made an application to  Mr.        Lodh  for  an  order that the  prosecution  against  him  be        quashed  as  he  had  earlier been  acquitted  of  the  same        offences by Mr. Dutta Gupta.  This application was  rejected        by  Mr. Lodh.  On September 2, 1952 the appellant moved  the        High Court at Calcutta by revision petition No. 965 of  1952        against  the order of Mr. Lodh.  This petition was  disposed        of  by Chunder, J., by order dated March 19,  1953,  whereby        the  learned  Judge held that the proceedings could  not  be        quashed as, in view of the judgment of the High Court dated        (1)  (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701.        69        April 9, 1952, it must be held that Mr. Dutta Gupta was  not        a  court of competent jurisdiction and the acquittal by  him        was  of no effect.  Before the revision petition No. 965  of        1952  was  filed,  the Government  had  withdrawn  the  case        against  the appellant and Bose from Mr. Lodh.  It  is  said        that  the revision petition was filed in ignorance  of  such        withdrawal.        After  withdrawing the case from Mr. Lodh the Government  by        Notifications  dated December 22, 1952 and March  24,  1953,        assigned  it for trial under the Act as amended, to a  court        at Darjeeling.  A fresh petition of complaint was  thereupon        filed  against the appellant and Bose in that  Court.   Bose        then moved the High Court at Calcutta by a revision petition        for  quashing the proceedings on the ground that the Act  as        amended  did  not apply to him.  On April 8, 1954  the  High        Court allowed Bose’s application and quashed the proceedings        holding that the amended Act did not apply to any proceeding        pending  on the date of the commencement of  the  Ordinance,        namely,  April  9,  1952, in any court other  than  a  court        constituted  under  the  Act  and  that  on  that  date  the        proceeding against Bose was pending in the High Court  which        was not a court under the Act.        While  the  revision  petition mentioned  in  the  preceding        paragraph  was pending in the High Court, this Court on  May        22,  1953 delivered judgment in Kedar Nath Bajoria v.  State        of West Bengal (1), whereby it held that the judgment of the        High  Court at Calcutta in J. K. Gupta v. The State of  West        Bengal(2),  was wrong and that the Act was  constitutionally        valid.        After  the  decision  of the High Court of  April  8,  1954,        proceedings  againt  the  appellant and  Bose  were  started

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      afresh  in  the  Court  of  the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,        Darjeeling  under  the provisions of the  Code  of  Criminal        Procedure.   On June 21, 1954 the appellant applied  to  the        Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling for an order  quashing        the  proceeding  against him as in view of the  judgment  of        this  Court  in  Kedar  Nath  Bajoria’s  case(1),  to  which        reference has        (1) [1954] S.C.R. 30.        (2) (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701.        70        been  earlier made, it had to be held that his acquittal  by        Mr.  Dutta  Gupta was an acquittal by a court  of  competent        jurisdiction  and that therefore the appellant could not  be        tried  for  the  same  offence  over      again.   The  Sub-        Divisional  Magistrate  dismissed this  application  by  his        order passed on July 13, 1954     holding that he was  bound        by  the  order of the High Court dated April 8,  1954  which        directed the case to be tried and which was passed after the        judgment of this Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria’s case (1), had        been delivered.  The appellant them moved the High Court  at        Calcutta  in  revision  against  this  order  of  the   Sub-        Divisional Magistrate by criminal revision petition No.  930        of 1954.  The High Court by its judgment dated February  10,        1955    dismissed   this   revision   case   holding    that        notwithstanding  the  judgment of this Court in  Kedar  Nath        Bajoria’s case (1), the judgment of Chunder, J., dated March        19,  1953 was binding on the appellant and it bad  therefore        to be held that the acquittal of the appellant by Mr.  Dutta        Gupta  no  longer remained in force after  the  judgment  of        Chunder,  J.,  It  is from this judgment  that  the  present        appeal arises.        In  my  opinion the view taken by the High Court  is  right.        The  question  is whether the appellant is  entitled  to  an        order quashing the prosecution against him as he bad earlier        been acquitted by Mr. Dutta Gupta.  The appellant  contends,        relying  on the principle of autrefois acquit, that  he  is.        That principle is enacted in s. 403 of the Code of  Criminal        Procedure.  It then comes to this: Is the appellant entitled        to the benefit of s. 403 ?        The  principle stated in the section is that when  a  person        has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for        an  offence and convicted or acquitted of it, he  shall  not        while the conviction or acquittal remains in force, be tried        again  for the same offence.  In order, therefore, that  the        appellant  may have the benefit of the section he must  have        been   tried   by  a  court   of   competent   jurisdiction.        Furthermore, such acquittal must be in force.        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 30.        71        It  is  said that notwithstanding the judgment of  the  High        Court in J. K. Gupta’s case (1) it must now be held in  view        of  the  judgment  of this Court  in  Kedar  Nath  Bajoria’s        case(2)  that  the  acquittal  by Mr.  Dutta  Gupta  was  an        acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction.  It seems to        me  that  the judgment in Kedar Nath  Bajoria’s  case(")  is        really irrelevant.  If the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta, was  in        law a court of competent jurisdiction, it would remain  such        whether  this Court declared it to be so or not.  Any  court        before  which  a  plea of autrefois acquit  is  taken,  must        decide for itself and of course in coming to its decision it        must  follow such precedents as are binding upon  it-whether        the  Court  which had earlier acquitted the  accused  was  a        court  of competent jurisdiction.  Its power to decide  that        question  is not derived from a decision of a  higher  court        pronouncing upon the question of the competence of the Court

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      which earlier acquitted’ the accused.  Therefore it seems to        me  that Kedar Nath Bajoria’s Case (2), does not decide  the        case before us.        Now,  in order to get the benefit of s. 403,  the  appellant        has  to  show  that  the Court of  Mr.  Dutta  Gupta,  which        acquitted  him was a court of competent  jurisdiction.   But        another  prior question arises in this case.  That is  this:        Is it open to the appellant in view of the order of Chunder,        J., to contend that the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta was a court        of  competent jurisdiction ? In other words, can he  at  all        raise the question whether the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta  was        a  court of competent jurisdiction ? Is he not bound by  the        judgment  of  Chunder, J., to the position  that  Mr.  Dutta        Gupta did not constitute a court of competent jurisdiction ?        It  is no doubt true that if it is open to the appellant  to        contend  that  the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta was a  court  of        competent jurisdiction, the decision of this Court in  Kedar        Nath  Bajoria’s  case (2) would help him to  establish  that        contention.  If it is Dot so open to him that decision  does        not avail him at all.        It  seems to me that the judgment of Chunder,  J.,  prevents        the appellant from raising the question that        (1)  (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701.        (2)  [1954] S.C.R. 30        72        the  Court  of  Mr.  Dutta  Gupta,  was  a  court  of   com-        petent,jurisdiction.   That question was directly raised  by        the   appellant  by  revision  petition  No.  965  of   1952        of  in  which  the  judgment of  Chunder,  J.,  was  passed.        Chunder, J., held that the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta, was not        a   court   of   competent  jurisdiction.    He   bad   fall        jurisdiction  to decide the petition and the question.   His        jurisdiction to do so was never questioned.        The  decision of Chunder, J., is a final judgment  and  must        have  effect as such.  It must be treated as binding on  the        appellant.   It is no doubt true that Kedar  Nath  Bajoria’s        case (1) shows that Chunder, J.’s, judgment was wrong.  That        however does not make his decision lose its force as a final        judgment.  A final judgment does not lose its force as  such        because  a superior court in a different  case  subsequently        takes a view which shows that judgment to be wrong.  A final        judgment  however  wrong  is still a  final  judgment.   Its        binding  force  does not depend upon  its  correctness.’  In        order to dispel any doubt as to the jurisdiction of Chunder,        J.,  to  decide the criminal revision petition  No.  965  of        1952,  I wish to observe here that there is nothing  in  the        order of the High Court dated April 8, 1954 to show that  he        did  not have such jurisdiction.  That order only held  that        in  view  of  s.  12 of the Act as  amended,  the  Court  at        Darjeeling constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction  to        try  the  case against Bose as it had been  pending  on  the        specified date in a court which was not a court  constituted        under  the Act.  That reasoning does not apply to  the  case        against  the  appellant  in  which  the  criminal   revision        petition  NO. 965 of 1952 had been moved for that  case  was        not pending on that date in any court at all.        Then it seems to me clear that the decision of Chunder,  J.,        being  a  final judgment and binding on  the  appellant,  he        cannot be heard to contend that the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta        by  which  he  was  acquitted  was  a  court  of   competent        jurisdiction.   That  result follows from the  rule  of  res        judicata which applies to all final judgments.  The rule  is        not a matter of        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 30.                                     73

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      technicality.    It  is  based  on  fundamental   principles        expressed  in the maxims, interest reipublicae ut sit  finie        litium,  and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et  eadem  causa:        see  Halsbury’s  Laws of England, (3rd Ed.),vol.  15  p.177.        Brett, M.R. said in In re May.        The  doctrine  of res judicata is not a  technical  doctrine        applicable  only  to  records.  It  is  a  very  substantial        doctrine, and it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of        all  Courts,  that there must be an end of  litigation,  and        that  the parties have no right of their own  accord,  after        having tried a question between them and obtained a decision        of a Court, to start that litigation over again on precisely        the same- questions."        I  feel  no  doubt that the principle  of  the  finality  of        judgment obtains in criminal law as well as it does in civil        law.  Section 403 of the Code is no doubt based on the  same        principle.  But I find no reason to confine its  application        within the limits of the section.  I find clear support  for        this view in the judgment of the Privy Council in Sambasivam        v.  Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya(2)where  it  was        said at p. 479:        "  The  effect  of a verdict of acquittal  pronounced  by  a        competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful  trial        is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted        cannot be tried again for the same offence.  To that it must        be  added that the verdict is binding and conclusive on  all        subsequent   proceedings   between  the   parties   to   the        adjudication.   The  maxim  "  Res  judicata  pro   veritate        aceipitur " is no less applicable to criminal than to  civil        proceedings."        Then  it  is  said that the order of  Chunder,  J.,  was  an        interlocutory  order to which the principle of res  judicata        does  not  apply.  I am unable to agree that  order  was  an        interlocutory  order.  It plainly decided the right  of  the        appellant; it decided that the appellant had no right not to        be prosecuted again.  It is clear law that the principle  of        res  judicata applies to all orders which finally  determine        the rights of the        (1)(1885) 28 Ch.  D. 516, 518.        10        (2) [1950] A.C. 458.        74        parties: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed.) p. 177.        The case of Ram Kirpal Sukul v. Mussumat Rup      Kuari  (1)        is   of   great  assistance.   There  in   the   course   of        execution  proceedings it had been decided by  the  District        Judge,  Mr.  Probyn,  that the  decree  under      execution        awarded future mesne profits.  It ’Was held by the  Judicial        Committee that in the later stages in the course of the same        execution  proceeding  the question whether the  decree  had        awarded  mesne  profits could not, in view of  Mr.  Probyn’s        decision, be reopened and canvassed again.  It was  observed        at pp. 42-43,        "  The  decree of the Sudder Court was a  written  document.        Mr.  Probyn had jurisdiction to execute that decree, and  it        was  consequently  within his jurisdiction, and it  was  his        duty  to  put  a  construction upon  it.   He  had  as  much        jurisdiction,  upon  examining the terms of the  decree,  to        decide that it did award mesne profits as he would have  had        to  decide  that  it  did  not.   The  High  Court   assumed        jurisdiction  to decide that the decree did not award  mesne        profits, but, whether their construction was right or wrong,        they erred in deciding that it did not, because the  parties        were bound by the decision of Mr. Probyn, who, whether right        or  wrong,  had decided that it did, a decision  which,  not

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      having  been  ’appealed,  was final  and  binding  upon  the        parties and those claiming under them.  It is not necessary,        nor  would it be correct, for their Lordships to  put  their        construction  upon the decree of the Sudder Court.   If  the        Subordinate  Judge and the Judge were bound by the order  of        Mr.  Probyn in proceedings between the same parties  on  the        ’same judgment, the High Court were bound by it and so  also        are  their  Lordships  in  adjudicating  between  the   same        parties.        Applying  the reasoning adopted in Ram Kirpal’s  case(1)  it        would  appear that the order of Chunder, J., cannot  now  be        questioned before us and the appellant is bound by it.        (1)  (1885) L.R. 11 I.A. 37.        75        As  the appellant cannot contend that his acquittal  by  Mr.        Dutta  Gupta  was  an  acquittal by  a  court  of  competent        jurisdiction,  he  cannot plead s. 403 in  support  of  this        appeal.   I  appreciate that the view that I have  taken  is        hard  on the appellant.  But it does not seem to me that  he        was  entirely without a remedy.  I would have been  prepared        to give relief to the appellant if he had appealed from  the        judgment  of  Chunder J. and for that purpose I  would  have        felt  no difficulty in extending the time to appeal.  As  it        is, I feel that the appeal must be dismissed.                              ORDER OF COURT.        In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is        allowed, the order of the Calcutta High Court directing  the        complaint  to  be  proceeded within the Court  of  the  Sub-        Divisional  Magistrate  is set aside,  and  the  proceedings        against the appellant are quashed.