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PETITIONER: MURLIDHAR MEGHRAJ LOYA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/07/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1929            1977 SCR  (1)   1  CITATOR INFO :  F          1977 SC 435  (5,9)

ACT:         Prevention   of   Food  Adulteration   Art,  1954--5. 16,         proviso--Scope of.         Accused pleaded guilty--If lesser sentence could be awarded.

HEADNOTE:             An analysis of a sample of khurasani oil from the appel-         lants’  mill  collected  by the Food  Inspector  showed  30%         groundnut oil content amounting to contravention of r. 44(a)         of  the  Rules which prohibits sale of a mixture of  two  or         more  edible  oils as an edible oil.   The  appellants  were         charged  with an offence under s. 2(i) of the Act read  with         ss.  7  and 16(1)(a) and r. 44(a).   The  appellants  having         pleaded  guilty, each of them was sentenced to pay  a  small         fine.   On  revision, the High Court converted  the  offence         into  one under s. 2(i) (a) read with s. 16(1) and  enhanced         the  sentence  to a minimum of six month,  imprisonment  and         fine  of rupees one thousand on the ground that the  offence         committed  by them fell within s. 16(1)(a) and did not  fall         within the proviso to that section.             On  appeal  to  this Court it was  contended  that  even         assuming s. 2(i)(a) is all comprehensive it must be read  as         the  genus and thereafter sub-clauses (b) to (e) fall  under         two  broad  categories namely  adulteration  with  injurious         substances  and adulteration with innocent additions or  the         substance  sold  merely  violates a standard  or  degree  of         purity  prescribed and in this case the offence  would  fall         under the non-injurious type covered by s. 2(i)(1).         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD: 1. (a) Sub-clause (a) of s. 2(1) has a wide sweep.         There  causes be any doubt that if the article asked for  is         100% khurasani oil and the article sold is 70% khurasani oil         and  30% groundnut oil, the supply ’is not  of  the  nature,         substance and quality which it purports or is represented to         be. [4 E]             (b) It is not possible to invoke the proviso to s. 16(1)         and the High Court is legally right in its conversion of the         provision  for conviction and enhancement of  the  sentence.         Though  s. 2(i)(a) is read speciously and if the  facts  al-         leged  are  accommodated by the definition  of  adulteration         under  that sub-clause, s. 16.(1) is attracted.   The  first

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       proviso  to  s. 16(1) will be attracted if  and only  if  s.         2(i)(1) applies. [4 F-G]             In the present case the facts disclose that the  offence         is both under s. 2(i)(a) and under s. 7(v) for breach of  r.         44(e).  Section 2(i)(1) is repelled on the facts and this is         not a case. where either s. 2(i)(1) or r. A17.12 applies.             2.(a)  The proviso cannot apply in extenuation  and  the         High Court was right in convicting the appellants.  Judicial         compassion  can play upon the situation only if the  offence         is under s. 16(1)(a)(i) and the adulteration is one under s.         2(i)(1).   The proviso applies if the offence is  under  cl.         (a)(ii), that is to say, the offence is not one of adultera-         tion  but is made up of a contravention of the other  provi-         sions  of the Act or of any rule made thereunder.  Since  in         this  case the offence falls under s. 2(i)(a)  proviso  (ii)         has no application. [5 E-F]             (b)  The  judicial jurisdiction to soften  the  sentence         arises  if the offence of adulteration falls only  under  s.         2(i)(1).  This case does not fall under this sub-clause.  [5         G]             [The  Court drew attention to (a) the propriety  of  ac-         cepting by the prosecution and the Courts the accused’s plea         of  guilty of a lesser offence in dangerous economic  crimes         and  food offences and (b) in view of the fact that  a  sub-         stantial  number of cases of the kind were withdrawn by  the         Government because         2         variably  groundnut  oil is observed in Khurasani  oil,  the         Government   may  consider whether in the  circumstances  of         this  case it is not a matter for exercise  its  commutation         powers].

JUDGMENT:         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  314315         of 1976.             Appeals  by special leave from the Judgment  and   order         dated  4-1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal  Revision         Appln. No. 1115/73.             M.C. Bhandare, (Mrs.) Sunanda Bhandare, M.S. Narasimhan, 7 3         . K. Mathur and A.K. Sharma, for the Appellants.         M.N. Phadke and M.N. Shroff, for the Respondents.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KRISHNA  IYER, J.--Judicial fluctuations  in  sentencing         and  societal  seriousness  in punishing  have  combined  to         persuade  Parliament to prescribe  inflexible,  judge-proof,         sentencing minima in the Food Adulteration law.  This depri-         vatory punitive strategy  sometimes  inflicts  harsher-than-         deserved  compulsory imprisonment on lighter offenders,  the         situation being beyond judicial discretion even if  prosecu-         tion  and accused consent to an ameliorative   course.   The         two  appeals,  by special leave, partially  illustrate  this         proposition.  Khurasani  oil is an edible oil  extracted  by         crushing oil seeds in mills. Groundnut oil, also edible,  is         expressed likewise.  A firm by name almukand Hiralal Loya  &         Co.,  in a minor town in Maharashtra, ms an oil  mill  where         Khurasani  oil  and groundnut oil are  manufactured  by  the         firm.  Sometimes they crush oil seeds for others on ire  who         pay milling charges.             The appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 314 are the manag-         ing partner and the manager of the mill and the appellant in         Criminal  appeal No. 315 is the operator of the expeller  in         the mill who actual sold the offending commodity.  On Febru-

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       ary  16,  1972  the Food inspector  of  Bhagur  Municipality         walked  into the sales  section  of the Mill, asked for  375         grams  of  khurasani oil from accused no.  8,  appellant  in         Criminal Appeal No. 315.  The quantity required was  applied         and, thereafter, the Food Inspector went through the  statu-         tory exercises preparatory to an analysis by the Public Ana-         lyst.  After  receiving  the report of the  Analyst  to  the         effect  that the sample  of hurasani oil sent  for  analysis         contained 30% of  groundnut  oil which amounted to a contra-         vention of rule 44(e) of the Prevention    of Food Adultera-         tion  Rules (for short, the rules), a complaint  was  lodged         for  selling adulterated food within the meaning of s.  2(i)         of  he  Prevention  of Food  Adulteration  Act  (hereinafter         called   the  Act)  read with ss. 7(1)  and  16  (1)(a)  and         r.44(e).   Evidence was led to make out a prima facie  case.         The  accused were questioned under s. 342 Cr.P.C.,  and  the         appellants  confidently pleaded guilty to the charge  where-         upon  the  trial Magistrate, perhaps agreeably  to  expecta-         tions, sentenced them  each to a  piffling  fine  of         3         Rs.  250.  Although the whole process in court  is  strongly         suggestive  of a tripartite consensual arrangement  and  re-         minds one of pie, bargaining procedures in the United States         of  America,  the State Government appears to have  taken  a 7 3         trate’s  adroit   avoidance of  the penal  provisions  which         obligate him to inflict a minimum prison sentence, viz.,  s.         2(i)(a) and s. 16(1) with a view to apply the proviso to  s.         16(1).  This is, at best, a conjecture about the  Magistrate         and might as well be imputed to the prosecutor and the  food         inspector.  However, the State filed a revision to the  High         Court  against  the illegal and ultra-lenient  impost.   The         revisional  Judge  converted the offence into one  under  s.         2(i)(a)  read with s. 16(1 and enhanced the sentence to  the         minimum of  six  months  an Rs. 1,000 by way of fine on  the         ground  that the offence committee by the  accused  squarely         fell within s. 16(1)(a) and did not  face within the proviso         of  that provision which vests a guarded discretion  in  the         Court  to soften the sentence to special cases.  The  appel-         lants,  shocked by this drastic reversal of fortune  at  the         High  Court’s  hand: have sought restoration of  the  Magis-         trate’s  conviction and sentence If this aggravated  convic-         tion is correct, the enhanced punishment is inescapable.             The  circumstances  leading up to and  constituting  the         offence hay ’been briefly set out already and the divergence         between  the  trial court and the High Court  turns  on  the         legal  inferance to be drawn from the factual  matrix.   Has         there been adulteration of food, in the sens imputed to that         expression  by s. 2(i)(a)?  Assuming it fails under s.  2(i)         (1)  of the definition, does that factor exclude it from  s.         2(i)  (a)  Even if s. 2(i)(a) does apply, is  the  benigrant         proviso to s. 16(1 attracted on the score that the crime  in         this  case constitutes a violation of r.  44(e)  prescribing         minimum  standards?   These questions  agricultural  to  the         submission  made  by Shri Bhandare for the  appellants.  his         argument  being that the scheme of s.2 is to erect  separate         corn  apartments for the many types of adulteration so  that         if  a  food  article is adulterated within  the  meaning  of         s.2(i)(1)  more appropriately it falls outside the ambit  of         s.2(i)(a).   Otherwise,  he  argues, there is  no  point  in         itemising the various sub-divisions even though he con cedes         that  marginally  there may be overlapping  among  the  sub-         clauses   He  further  contends  that  even  assuming   that         s.2(i)(a)  is  all-corn prehensive, it must be read  as  the         genus  and thereafter sub-clause (b) to (1) fall under  two.

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       broad  categories, viz., adulteration where  injurious  sub-         stances  have been admixed and adulteration  where  innocent         additions  have  been  made or the  substances  sold  merely         violate a standard or degree of purity prescribed.  If there         were  force  in  this submission, the  culpa,  according  to         counsel, could reasonably ’fall under the non-injurious type         of adulteration covered by s.2(i)(1) The statute, says  Shri         Bhandare,  sensibly dichotomises the senreno. and invests  a         discretion in the court in the second category to reduce the         sentence  below the minimum stipulated, if  special  reasons         exist  for such clemency.  Of course, counsel concedes  that         if  the  adulteration is of the  injurious  brand,  judicial         sympathy is statutorily supplanted 73         4          this, he reasons, fits into and explains the scheme of s.16         which  is a penal provision with dual limbs.             We  wilt  examine the validity  of  this  interpretative         dissection.  Indeed,  if  this  somewhat  strained  argument         fails,. everything fails because, otherwise, the  appellants         have glibly convicted themselves, but of their own mouth, by         an unusually obliging ’yes’ to every material question under         s.342  Cr. P. Code.  Thus, on the merits, the sole  question         is about the proper offence made out on the facts  admitted.         This, in turn, depends on the acceptability of the interpre-         tative dexterity displayed by counsel for the appellants.         It  is  trite that the social mission of  Food  Laws  should         inform the interpretative process so that the legal blow may         fail .on every adulterator.  Any narrow and pedantic, liter-         al  and lexical construction likely to leave  loopholes  for         this dangerous criminal tribe to sneak out of the meshes  of         the law should be discouraged.  For the new criminal  juris-         prudence must depart from the old canons, which make  indul-         gent  presumptions  and  favoured  constructions  benefiting         accused  persons and defeating criminal statutes  Calculated         to protect the public health and the nation’s wealth.   This         humanist  approach  and cute construction  persuades  us  to         reject  Shri Bhandare’s analysis of s.2(1).  Sub-clause  (a)         of s.2(i) has a wide sweep and loyalty to the intendment  of         the  statute forbids truncating its ambit.  There cannot  be         any  doubt that if the article asked for is  100%  khurasani         oil  and  the  article sold is 70%  khurasani  oil  and  30%         groundnut  oil, the supply ’is not of the nature,  substance         or  quality which it purports or is represented to  be’  The         suggestion that  there is no format evidence of  representa-         tion  or prejudice as stated in the section does  not  merit         consideration being a quibble over a trifle.             If we read s.2(i)(a) spaciously and if the facts alleged         are  accommodated by the definition of ’adulteration’  under         that  sub-clause,.  s.  16 ( 1 ) is  attracted.   The  first         proviso  to  s. 16 ( 1 ) will be attracted if  and  only  if         s.2(i)(1)  applies.  In the present case the facts  disclose         that  the offence is both under s.2(i)(a) and under s.  7(v)         for  breach of r.44(e).  Section 2(i)(1) is repelled on  the         facts and it is obvious that this is not a case where either         s.2(i)(1)  or r.A 17.12 urged by Shri Bhandare applies.   In         this  view  it is not possible to  invoke  the  amelioratory         proviso  to s.16(1) and the High Court is legally  right  in         its conversion of the provision for conviction and  enhance-         ment of the sentence.             We unhesitatingly hold that if s.2(i)(a) adequately fits         in, adulteration under that provision must be found. 73             Once  this position is made plain, the penalty that  the         appellants must suffer is fool-proof.  Section 16 lays  down         the  penalties  and classifies them.   We  are  particularly         concerned with s,16(1) of the Act which itself clubs togeth-

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       er many categories out of which we have to pick out only two         for the purposes of this case, viz., (i) sale of any article         of  food which is adulterated; and (ii) sale of any  article         of         5         food    other   than   one   which   is    adulterated---’in         contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any         rule  made thereunder’.  Ordinarily, both these clauses.  of         offences are punishable with the minimum prescribed ’of  not         less  ,than  six months’ imprisonment,  together  with  fine         which shall not be less than Rs. 1,000/-’. However, there is         a  kindly proviso which confers on the court a power  to  be         exercised  for any adequate and special reasons to  be  men-         tioned  in the judgment whereby a sentence  of  imprisonment         for  a lesser term than six months or of fine  smaller  than         Rs. 1,000/- or of both may be imposed, but this more  moder-         ate  punitive net is conditioned by the proviso itself.   We         may read the proviso:                  "Provided that--                      (i)  if the offence is under sub-clause (i)  of                  clause  (a)  and is with respect to an  article  of                  food which is adulterated under  sub-clause (1)  of                  clause  (i)  of sec. 2 or misbranded   under   sub-                  clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section; or                  (ii)  if  the offence is under sub-clause  (ii)  of                  clause (a).                  the court may for any adequate and special  reasons                  to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a  sentence                  of imprisonment for a terms of less than six months                  or  of fine of less than one thousand rupees or  of                  both  imprisonment  for  a term of  less  than  six                  months and fine of less than one thousand rupees."             Judicial compassion can play upon the situation only  if         the  offence is under sub-cl. (i) of cl. (a) of s.16(1)  and         the adulteration is one which fails under sub-cl. (1) of el.         (i)  of  s.2.   Secondly, the proviso also  applies  if  the         offence  is under sub-cl. (ii) of el. (a), that is  to  say,         the  offence is not one of adulteration but is made up of  a         contravention  of any of the other provisions of the Act  or 7 3         already  found that the accused is guilty of an  offence  of         adulteration  of  food under s.2(i)(a).  Therefore,  proviso         (ii)  is out.  Proviso (i) will be attracted,  according  to         Shri Bhandare, if s.2(i)(1) applies to the species of  adul-         teration  committed.  In our view, the only sensible  under-         standing  of  proviso (i) is that judicial  jurisdiction  to         soften  the sentence arises if the offence  of  adulteration         fails  only under sub-cl. (1) of cl. (i) of s.2 and we  have         held  that  it does not.  We cannot but deplore  the  clumsy         draftsmanship  displayed  in  a statute  which  affects  the         common man in his daily bread.   It is unfortunate that easy         comprehensibility and simplicity for the laity. are discard-         ed  sometimes through  oversophisticated scholarship in  the         art  of  drawing up legislative bills.  It cannot  be  over-         stressed  that  a new orientation for  drafting  methodology         adopting directness of language and avoiding involved refer-         ence  and obscurity is overdue.  Be that as it may,  in  the         present  case  s.2(i) (a) applies and  s.16(1)(a)  has  been         breached.  Therefore the proviso cannot be applied in exten-         uation  and the conviction of the High Court has to  be  up-         held.         6             The  possibility  of long argument in a case  where  the         accused  has  pleaded guilty arises  because  the  provision         lends itself to adroit exercises.  The court has to look  at

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       the  interpretative  problem in the social  setting  of  the         statute,  visualising  the rough and tumble  of  the  market         place,  the  finesse with which clever victuallers  fob  off         adulterated edibles and gullible buyers goofily fall victim.         Viewed this way, chasing recondite semantics or niceties  of         classification or chopping of logic has no scope for play.           The appeals must fail, without more.  But we have to  take         note  of a few circumstances of significance brought to  our         notice by counsel for the appellant .with which the  State’s         counsel could not  express serious disagreement, although he         made no concessions.,             We  now proceed to refer to these factors which  do  not         deflect us from confirming the conviction.  The curtain  has         been drawn thereon.             To  begin with, we are free to confess to a  hunch  that         the  appellants  had  hastened with their  pleas  of  guilty         hopefully, induced by an informal, tripartite  understanding         of  light sentence in lieu of nolo contendere stance.   Many         economic  offenders  resort to practices the  American  call         ’plea  bargaining’,  ’plea negotiation’, ’trading  out’  and         ’compromise  in  criminal cases’ and the  trial   magistrate         drowned  by  a  docket burden nods assent to  the  sub  rosa         ante-room settlement.  The business-man culprit,  confronted         by a sure prospect of the agony and ignominy of tenancy of a 7 3         being a plea of guilt, coupled with a promise of ’no  jail’.         These  advance arrangements please everyone except the  dis-         tant victim, the silent society.  The prosecutor is relieved         of the long process of proof, legal technicalities and  long         arguments,  punctuated by revisional excursions  to.  higher         courts,  the court sighs relief that its ordeal,  surrounded         by  a  crowd of papers and persons, is avoided by  one  case         less  and the accused is happy that even if legalistic  bat-         tles might have held out some astrological hope of  abstract         acquittal  in the expensive hierarchy of the  justice-system         he  is free early in the day to pursue his old  professions.         It is idle to speculate on the virtue of negotiated  settle-         ments of criminal cases, as obtains in the United States but         in  our  jurisdiction, especially in the area  of  dangerous         economic crimes and food offences, this practice intrudes on         society’s interests by opposing society’s decision expressed         through  pre-determined  legislative  fixation  of   minimum         sentences  and by subtly subverting the mandate of the  law.         The jurists across the Atlantic partly condemn the bad odour         of purchased pleas of guilt and partly justify it philosoph-         ically  as a sentence concession to a defendant who has,  by         his plea ’aided in ensuring the prompt and certain  applica-         tion of correctional measures to him’,                         "In civil cases we find compromises actually                  encouraged  as a more satisfactory method  of  set-                  tling  disputes between individuals than an  actual                  trial.  However, if the dispute ... finds itself in                  the field of criminal law, "Law Enforcement"  repu-                  diates  the  idea of compromise as immoral,  or  at                  best  a necessary evil. The "State" can never  com-                  promise. It must                  7                  enforce  the law."  Therefore open methods of  com-                  promise are impossible."             (Arnold,  Law Enforcement--An Attempt at Social  Dissec-         tion, 42 Yale L.J. 1, 19 (1932).             We  have no sanction, except surreptitious  practice  in         some courts, for ’trading out’ of punitive severity although         this aspect of the criminal system deserves Indian  jurists’         consideration.   The  sole relevance of this  digression  in

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       this  judgment is to highlight the fact that the  appellants         perhaps  acted on an expectation which came to pass  at  the         trial level but was reversed at the appellate level and this         touch  of ’immorality’ in the harsh morality of the  punish-         ment  is a factor counsel wants us to take note of.  But  we         can  do  nothing  about it when the minimum is  set  by  the 7 3         justice  to  the citizen and relieve over-worked  courts  by         more judicial agencies and streamlined procedures instead of         leaving  the  uninformed public blindly to  censure  delayed         disposals.             One  real  reason  for long litigation  is  inaction  or         ineffective  action of the legislature.   All  knowledgeable         law-men  may  concede that the procedures in  municipal  and         higher  courts  are  ossified to the point,  priced  to  the         level,  and  slow to the degree where they  cannot  flexibly         assist  disputants  in early resolution  of  their  everyday         disputes.  This, we hope, will change and the source of  the         evil eliminated.             The  next  draft on the court’s commiseration,  made  by         counsel,  is based on the milling operation  realities  sur-         rounding the commission of the crime.  It is asserted by the         appellant’s advocate--and not seriously controverted by  his         opponent  that  the small town milling  practice  is  multi-         purpose,  in the sense that whoever brings any  edible  oil-         seed  for extraction of oil gets it done so that  ground-nut         crushing may be followed by Khurasani seed or some other oil         seed  may chance to take turns by rotation.  Even the  mill-         er’s  own  oil seeds may  be sometimes khurasani;  at  other         times,  some other.  This process may result in the  residue         of  one getting mixed up with the next.  May be,  innocently         some  groundnut oil, in the present case, got into the  khu-         rasani oil by the same expeller handling both.  Even so, the         presence of 30% groundnut oil is, perhaps too high an admix-         ture to be explained away this easy way.  While we  appreci-         ate the situation we must adhere to the provision. Where the         law lays down an absolute liability, alibis cancelling  mens         tea are out of bounds.             The  last plea, urged ex mesericordium, ameliorative  in         appeal  and unavailing against conviction, is that  actually         groundnut  oil costs more and so profit motive stands  nega-         tived, that the mixture of these edible oils, though techni-         cally forbidden, is in fact non-injurious  and  a terrifying         term  of six months’ rigorous imprisonment is  unjust.   The         facts are probably right but ex necessitate legis the  court         has  to inflict the heavy minimum sentence.  While in  stray         cases  a jail term even in a trivial food offence may.  look         harsh,   Parliament,  in  its  wider  wisdom,   and   having         regard  .to social defence in a sensitive area  standardised         the sentence by insisting on a minimum, ignoring exceptional         2--1003SC1/76         8         cases where leniency is needed. Individual hardships deserv-         ing of lighter sentence are sometimes exploited by counsel’s 7 3         offenders  milder punishments.  It is worthy of note  though         that  in  the present case the mixing of the two oils  is  a         motiveless  act.  May be.  And the circumstances  above-men-         tioned  add  up to a plea for paring down the  sentence  and         Shri Bhandare, for the appellants, sought to wheedle us into         lending evedence to these circumstances and bring down.  the         offence to a lesser one.  Logically and sociologically  and,         above all, legally, such a course is impermissible.   Never-         theless,  there  is one circumstance which has impressed  us         not  to  the extent of undoing the sentence imposed  by  the

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       High Court but of drawing the attention of the top executive         to what may justly be done by way of remission of sentence.         The appellants have sworn an affidavit in this Court stating         that  khurasam oil is the same as nigar-seed oil.   This  is         backed  by  a certificate from the  Maharashtra  Chamber  of         Commerce and is evidently correct. What is more important is         that  the  appellants, when surprised by a  modification  of         their  sentence to a heavier one for what they  thought  was         undeserving,  moved  in  the matter of  cases  generally  of         adulteration of khurasani oil with groundnut oil.  They drew         the attention of the authorities to punishment of  innocents         and  it  appears that the. State  Government  was  satisfied         about  this grievance and has since withdrawn a  substantial         number of cases against dealers of khurasani oil whose sales         were contaminated with presence of groundnut oil. The  affi-         davit on behalf of the appellants states:                         "I  further say that various cases filed  by                  the  respondents against the dealers  of  khurasani                  oil are now being withdrawn as invariably groundnut                  oil is observed in khurasani oil. I crave leave  to                  refer  to  and rely on the Journal  of  Maharashtra                  Chumher  Patrika dated 21st September,  1975,  when                  produced."         Probably, had the present case survived till the  government         took action, it might have been withdrawn.  Moreover,  there         are circumstances suggesting of innocent admixture  although         it  is beyond us to pronounce definitely on this aspect  and         it is not for us to enquire into the matter when s. 16( 1  )         is clear and the sentence is legal.  Nevertheless, it may be         appropriate  for government to consider whether in the  cir-         cumstances  of this case--and in the light of  the  observa-         tions  made by us in this judgment--it is not a  matter  for         exercise  of  commutation powers.  Sentencing policy  has  a         punitive  and a correctional role and we are sure that  what         is  the need of the appellants will be meted out to them  if         they deserve any activist administrative empathy at all.         accordingly dismiss the appeals.         P.B.R.                                               Appeals 7 3         9