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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL COUNCIL RAIPUR & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/1969

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. MITTER, G.K. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1923            1970 SCR  (1) 915  1969 SCC  (2) 582

ACT:     Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961), ss. 2(g) and   38--Motor   Transport   Undertaking’,   if    includes municipality owning transport vehicles used for carriage  of goods--’Public order’ in s. 38--if includes ’public health’.     Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 243, 244 and  245-Summons case--Complaint dismissed  without  stating particulars  of  offence to accused--Order,  if  amounts  to discharge or acquittal.

HEADNOTE:     The   appellant  (Municipal  Council)  owned   transport vehicles  and  used those vehicles for  the  maintenance  of public health in the Municipality by transporting the  night soil  and  refuse of  the town, and by  distributing  water. It  employed  50  transport  workers. As  it  had  not  been registered as ’required under s. 3(1) of the Motor Transport Workers  Act,  1961, a complaint was filed against  it.   On receiving    the  summons,  the   Chief  Municipal   Officer appeared,  and  even before the particulars of  the  offence were  stated to him, filed preliminary objections  that  the Municipal  Council was not a ’motor  transport  undertaking’ and  that the transport vehicles owned by the  Council  were exempt under s. 38 of the Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint  and  a revision to the Sessions  Court  was  also dismissed.   A further revision to the High Court  under  s. 439 Criminal Procedure Code, was allowed.     In appeal to this Court, it was contended that: (1)  the case  being a summons case the dismissal  of  the  complaint was  an  order  of acquittal and not one  of  discharge  and hence, only an appeal lay under s. 417, Cr. P.C., and not  a revision under s. 439; (2) the appellant did not fail within the   definition   of  the  expression   ’motor    transport undertaking’  in s. 2(g) of the Act; and (3)  the  transport vehicles  owned by the appellant were exempt under s. 38  of the  Act,  because, the transport vehicles were used  for  a purpose connected with the maintenance of ’public order’.     HELD:  (i)  Since the complaint   was  dismissed  before anything was done it amounted to. an order of discharge  and not an acquittal, and so the revision was competent. [917 C]

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   (2)  The expression ’motor transport undertaking’ in  s. 2(g)  includes a ’private carrier’ as defined in  the  Motor Vehicles   Act,  1939.  The:  appellant  fell   within   the definition  of ’private carrier’ inasmuch as  the  appellant owned  transport  vehicles  and used  them  solely  for  the carriage   of  goods.  It  cannot  be  said  that  only   an undertaking  of  a  commercial nature  was  intended  to  be included   within   the  definition   of   motor   transport undertaking, because, (a) the Motor Transport Workers Act is a  beneficial  Act and the Legislature intended  to  enlarge the meaning  of the expression ’motor transport undertaking’ and so, the enactment should not be construed strictly;  (b) the   words  of  the  definition  are  plain  and  are   not susceptible of any limitation: and (e) s. 38, which  exempts certain  transport  vehicles proceeds on the  basis  that  a private  carrier carrying on activities which are not  of  a commercial   character  would  also  be  included   in   the expression ’motor transport undertaking’. [918 C-F] 916      (3)  The  words ’public order’ in s.  38  mean  ’public peace and tranquility’ and do. not include ’public  health’. Therefore,  the exemption under s. 38 is not attracted. [920 A-B] Ramesh  Thappar  v.  State of Madras,  [1950]  S..C.R.  594, explained.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Criminal  Appeal  No. 163 of 1967.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated  March  6, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court  in Criminal Revision No. 159 of 1966. G.L. Sanghi and P.C. Bhartari, for the appellants. I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Sikri,  J.  This appeal by special leave arises  out  of the   following  facts.   Inspector  Ahuja   inspected   the Municipal Council, Raipur, under the Motor Transport Workers Act,  1961---hereinafter referred to as the  Act--and  found that  50 transport workers, including  drivers,  conductors, mechanics,  etc., had been employed by the Council  but  the Council had not been registered as required under s. 3(1) of the Act.  He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and  Presiding  Officer, Labour  Court,  who issued  summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council and the  Chief Municipal  Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur.  The  accused appeared  by  counsel and filed preliminary  objections.  Be fore  the  Magistrate two. points were taken: (1)  that  the Municipal  Council was not a ’motor  transport  undertaking’ within  s.  2(g) of the Act, and (2) that  the  Council  was exempt  under  s.  38  of the Act insofar  as  it  uses  the vehicles  for transporting sick or injured persons. and  for maintenance  of public order, i.e., for  transporting  night soil and refuse of the town free of charges.  The Magistrate accepted  these contentions and dismissed the complaint  and discharged the accused persons.     The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision before  the Sessions  Judge, Raipur, who agreeing with the  findings  of the  Magistrate,  dismissed the revision.   The  State  then filed  a revision under s. 439, Cr. P.C.  Three points  were debated  before the High Court: (1) whether a  revision  lay under  s. 439, Cr. P.C. The contention was that the  accused had been acquitted  and not discharged and, therefore,  only

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a.n   appeal   under  s. 417. Cr. P.C., lay;  (2)  that  the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" in s. 2(g); and (3) that  the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal  Council are exempt under s. 38(1) of the Act. 917     The  High Court overruled the preliminary objection  and held  that a revision lay under s.  439, Cr. P.C.,   because the  order  passed  by  the  Magistrate  was  an  order   of discharge  and  not of acquittal.  On the second  point  the High Court held that the Municipal-Council fell  within  the definition    of     the   expression    "motor    transport undertaking".  On tire  third point the High Court held that the  vehicles of the Municipal Council did not  come  within the exemption under s. 38 of the Act.     The  same  points  have been debated before  us  by  the learned counsel.  Coming to the first point,  we agree  with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal.  It is true that it is  a summons case and no formal charge is necessary  to be framed under  s. 242, Cr. P.C., but even so. here when the  accused appeared,  before  anything  was done the  accused  filed  a preliminary  objection and no particulars of the offence  of which the accused was charged were even stated to him.     Coming  to  the second point, it  seems to us  that  the High Court was right in holding that the. Municipal  Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act.   It is  necessary to set out the relevant definition in s. 2  of the Act.                      "2(g)  ’motor  transport   undertaking’               means a motor transport undertaking engaged in               carrying passengers or goods or both by.  road               for  hire  or reward, and includes  a  private               carrier;                      (n)  all other words  and   expressions               used  but not defined in this Act and  defined               in  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,  shall  have               the meanings respectively assigned to them  in               that Act."               The expression "private carrier" is defined in               the  Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939,  to  mean  "an               owner  of  a transport vehicle  other  than  a               public  carrier who uses that  vehicle  solely               for  the  carriage  of  goods  which  are  his               property or the carriage of which is necessary               for the purposes of his business  not being  a               business of providing transport, of who.  uses               the vehicle for any of the purposes  specified               in   sub-section  (2)  of  section   42."    A               "transport  vehicle" is defined in  the  Motor               Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "a public  service               vehicle  or  a goods vehicle," and a   ":goods               vehicle" is defined to mean "any motor vehicle               constructed   or  adapted  for  use  for   the               carriage  of goods, or any motor  vehicle  not               so. constructed or  adapted when used for  the               carriage   of goods solely or in  addition  to               passengers." "Goods" is defined as follows:                      "Goods"   includes   live-stock,    and               anything (other than equipment ordinarily used               with the vehicle) car-               918               ried  by a vehicle except living persons,  but               does  not include luggage or personal  effects               carried  in  a  motor  car  or  in  a  trailer

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             attached  to  a  motor  car  or  the  personal               luggage   of  passengers  travelling  in   the               vehicle."     It  seems  to  us  that  the  accused  fell  within  the definition  of a "private cartier" inasmuch as the   Council owned   transport vehicles and  used these vehicles   solely for the  carriage  of goods which are its property.  In this case  we  are  not concerned with the  second  limb  of  the definition, and the  authority  cited by the learned counsel for  the ’accused (Mohamed Zarful Islam v. Birendra  Lall(1) which dealt with the  second limb,   is of no assistance to. us.     The  main  argument which the learned counsel  urges  is that the word "includes" in the definition of the expression "motor  transport undertaking" helps him because this  shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature  which was intended to be included within the definition of  "motor transport undertaking".  He says that a Municipal Council is not  carrying on any business but is carrying  on  statutory obligations   imposed  upon it and, therefore,  a  Municipal Council cannot be called an undertaking.     We are unable to accept this contention.  First, the Act provides  for  the welfare of motor  transport  workers  and regulates  the  conditions of their work.   Such  beneficial acts are not, as  a rule, construed strictly.  Secondly, the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable  limitation.   It seems to us that by  using  the word  "includes"  the. Legislature undoubtedly  intended  to enlarge  the  meaning  of the  expression  "motor  transport undertaking".  The  words "private  carrier" have been given a  specific meaning in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and  it is   difficult  to  limit  this  specific   meaning  on  any reasonable   basis.   Further,  s.  38  of  the  Act,  which exempts  certain  transport vehicles, also proceeds  on  the basis  that a private carrier who is carrying on  activities which  are  not  commercial would  be  included  within  the expression "motor transport undertaking".     Relying  on  the  decision  of the  House  of  Lords  in Dilworth  v. The Commissioner of Stamps(2) and the  decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya  Pradesh v.  Mother Superior Convent School(3), the  learned  counsel contends   that  sometimes the  legislature uses  the   word "includes"    to  mean  "means  and  includes".    This   is undoubtedly  so  but we are unable to  appreciate  how  this would help the appellants.  (1) A.I.R. 1965 Bom. 120.    (2) [1899] A.C. 99.  (3) A.I.R. 1958 M.P, 362. 919     The  learned counsel also suggests that we should  limit the  meaning  of  the words "private carrier"  in  the  same manner as the Madhya Pradesh High Court limited the  meaning of  the  word "church" occurring in s. 2(4)  of  the  Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act.  We are unable to see any  analogy between the two definitions.  The definition there is  quite different and the High Court was of the view that the scheme of  the  Act  itself shows that what  was  intended  was  to regulate,   not   religious   institutions   but   religious institutions  impressed  with  the  character  of  a  public trust."     Coming  to the last point, we agree with the High  Court that the words "public order" in S. 38(1)(ii) do not include the maintenance of public health.  Section 38 reads:                     "38. Exemptions.--(1) Nothing  contained               in   this Act shall  apply to or in   relation               to  any transport vehicle--

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             (i) used for the transport of sick or  injured               persons;                   (ii)  used for any purpose connected  with               the  security of India, or the. security of  a               State,   or   the   maintenance   of    public               order  ......  ".                   The learned counsel relies on the decision               of  this Court Ramesh Thappar v. The State  of               Madras  (1).  In Ratnesh  Thappar’s  case  the               question  before this Court was. "whether  the               impugned  Act  (Madras Maintenance  of  Public               Order  Act, 1949) in so far as it purports  by               section  9(1-a)  to authorise  the  Provincial               Government  ’for the: purpose of securing  the               public   safety  or the maintenance of  public               order, to prohibit or regulate tie entry  into               or  the circulation, sale or  distribution  in               the Province  of Madras or any part thereof of               any  document or class of documents’ is a  law               relating  to any matter which  undermines  the               security of or tends to overthrow the  State."               Patanjali   Sastri,  J.,  as  he   then   was,               observed:                     "Now ’Public Order’ is an expression  of               wide  connotation and signifies that state  of               tranquillity which prevails among the  members               of a political society as a result of internal               regulations  enforced by the government  which               they have established."               Later he observed:                      "’Public   safety’  ordinarily    means               security  of the public or their freedom  from               danger.   In that sense, anything which  tends               to prevent danger to public health may also be               regarded as securing public safety." (1) [1950] S.C.R. 594. 920     The  learned counsel urges that "public order"  includes "public  safety" and the latter comprises  "public  health". We  see  no force in this contention  and  Ramesh  Thappar’s case(1) does not say so.  In our view "Public Order" in this context means public peace and tranquillity.  We agree  with the  High Court that the functions of the Municipal  Council in  carrying  night soil and in distributing water  do   not fail within  "maintenance of public order." In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. V.P.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 594. 921