http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BHOPAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SINDHI SAHITI MULTIPURPOSE TRANSPORTCO-OP.  SOCIETY LTD. & A

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/07/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2420            1974 SCR  (1) 274  1973 SCC  (2) 478  CITATOR INFO :  F          1987 SC1339  (6)

ACT: Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961-Bye-laws made  under provisions  s. 358 (7) (f) and (m) read with s. 349 (ii)  of Act-Bye-law  2 providing for motor-buses Plying for hire  to be compulsorily parked at Municipal bus stand Bye-laws 3  to 7  providing for fee payable for parking-Bye-law 2 does  not fall under s. 349(ii) or s. 358(7) (f) or (m) of Act and  is invalid-Consequently  bye-laws 3 to 7 providing for levy  of fee also invalid. Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939 s. 68(2)-Power to specify place of  Bus-stand under section rests with State Government  and not with Dist.  Magistrate-Cannot he    delegated         to District Magistrate.

HEADNOTE: The  Municipal  Council of Bhopal made  bye-laws  under  the provisions of s.    358(7)(f)  and  (m)  read  with  section 349(ii)  of  the Madhya Pradesh  Municipalities  Act,  1961. Bye-law  2  provided that no person inching of  a  motor-bus plying  for  hire  shall for the purpose  of  taking  up  or setting  down of passengers, park or stop his  bus  anywhere within  the  limits  of  the  municipality  ,except  at  the municipal Bus Stand.  The other bye-laws provided for a levy of  a fee of Re.  1 /- for every 8 hours or part thereof  in respect  of the use of the bus stand by such buses  and  for the issue of a permit on such payment.  The respondent filed a  writ in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging  the said  bye-laws.   The High Court held that  bye-law  1  (c). which defined the expression ’Municipal Bus Stand’ and  bye- law  2 were valid but held bye-laws 3 to 7.  which  provided for  the  payment of fee and the giving of permit  etc.,  as invalid  and  restrained the Municipal Council  from  giving effect to those bye-laws in any manner. Dismissing the appeal by certificate filed by the  Municipal Council. HELD  : (i) Section 349(ii) was not applicable to the  case. The section itself does not enable the Municipal Council  to require that permission should be obtained for any  purpose. It  deals  with  levy- of fees  for  permissions  which  are required  to  be  taken for  various  purposes  under  other

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

sections of the Act such as sections 187(3), 194 and 223(4). The  relevant  words in the section  deal  with  permissions granted to individuals to temporarily occupy municipal land. It  would be doing violence to that section to hold that  it deals with the provision of a bus-stand.  In the context  of that section it was difficult to  hold that when people were compelled to use the bus stand constructed by the  Municipal Council it was a permission for temporary occupation of land belonging to the Council. [276F] (ii) It  was not possible to relate the provision of  clause (f)  of sub-section 7 ,of section 358 as having anything  to do with the provision of a bus-stand.  As regards clause (m) of  sub-section  7,  "the  regulating  and  prohibiting  the stationing of carts..... on any ground under the control  of the Council or the using of such ground as halting place  of vehicles  cannot  be  said to relate  to  the  provision  of Municipal bus stand.  The power to regulate or prohibit  the use  of Municipal land as halting place of vehicles  cannot be  used to compel people use such land as  halting  places. Such  a  power  must be specifically given.   The  power  to compel  persons  in charge of motor buses to  stop  only  at certain places for the purpose of taking up or setting  down of passengers is a matter which relates to motor traffic and there is a specific provision in section 68 (2) (4) and  (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act for this specific purpose. [277H] 2 75 T.   B.  Ibrahim v. S.T.C. Tanjore, [1953] S.C.R.  290.  and Municipal  Board,  Pushkar v. State.   Transport  Authority, Rajasthan, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373, referred to. (iii)     The  bye-laws  compel persons in charge  of  motor buses to use the Municipal bus stand, which the Municipality had no power to do.  Consequently it must be held that  bye- law 2 is not valid and with it must go the other bye-laws. (iv) Further,  in the present case the  District  Magistrate had  admittedly declared the Bhopal Municipal Bus  Stand  as bus  stand.  Power to specify the place under section  68(2) (r) and (s) vests in the State Government.  It has not  been shown  that the State Government had any power  to  delegate their power under this section to the District  Magistrate,. It  has also not shown that the District  Magistrate  issued any  notification  specifying the’ Bhopal Bus Stand  as  one under  the  provisions of section 68(2)(r) and  (s)  of  the Motor  Vehicles Act.  If at all the District Magistrate  had taken  any  action it could only be under s. 76.   But  that section  does not enable him to specify places  for  setting down or picking up of passengers.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1547  of 1967. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment  and  order  dated October  18,  1966  of  the Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  at Jabalpur in Misc.  Petition No. 557 of 1960. M.   C.  Chagla, Rameshwar Nath and Seeta Vaidialingam,  for the appellant. M.   N.  Phadke and A,.  G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent  No. 1. I. N. Shroff and R. P. Kapur, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-On 6-11-1964 the Municipal Council of  Bho- pal  made bye-laws under the provisions of s. 356.(7) (f)  & (x)   read   with   s.  349(ii)  of   the   Madhya   Pradesh Municipalities  Act, 1961 after previous publication in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

M.  P. Rapatra as required under s. 357(4) and  confirmation by  the  State Government under s. 357(3) in  respect  of  a Municipal  bus  stand.  Bye-law 2 of the  bye-laws  provided that  no  person in charge of a motor-bus  plying  for  hire shall  for  the  purpose of taking up  or  setting  down  of passengers, park or stop his bus anywhere within the  limits of  the  Bhopal  Municipality except at  the  Municipal  Bus Stand.   The other bye-laws provided for a levy of a fee  of Re.  1/for every eight hours or part thereof in  respect  of the, use of the bus stand by such buses and for the issue of a  permit  on such payment.  On 13-11-1964  the  respondents filed  a writ petition in the High Court of  Madhya  Pradesh challenging  the  said bye-laws.  The High Court  held  that bye-law  1 (c), which defined the expression ’Municipal  Bus Stand’  and bye-law 2, which has been set out earlier,  were valid,  but  held  by laws 3 to 7, which  provided  for  the payment of fee and the giving of a permit etc., as  invalid, and  restrained the Municipal Council from giving effect  to those  bye-laws  in any manner.  The Municipal  Council  was also   directed  to  refund  the  fee  collected  from   the respondents.,  This appeal has been filed by  the  Municipal Council by certificate granted by the High Court. 276 Section  349(ii)  of the Madhya Pradesh  Municipalities  Act reads               ’The  Council  may charge such fee as  may  be               prescribed by bye-laws for-               (i)...........................               (ii)  any  permission granted under  this  Act               for  making  any  temporary  erection  or  for               putting up any projection or for the temporary               occupation of any public street or any land or               building belonging to the Council; and               (iii)........................               Section  358 in so far as it is  relevant  for               the purpose of this case reads:               "In addition to any power specially  conferred               by  this  Act,  the Council  may,  and  if  so               required  by the State Government shall,  make               bye-laws for-               (1)               (7)   Public,  Health,  Safety,  Nuisance  and               Sanitation-               (f)   prohibiting or regulating with a view to               sanitation  or the prevention of disease,  any               act  which  occasions or which  is  likely  to               occasion   a  public  nuisance  and  for   the               prohibition   or   regulation  of   which   no               provision is made under this heading;               (n)   regulating    and    prohibiting     the               stationing of carts or picketing of animals on               any ground under the control-of the Council or               the using of such ground as halting place,  of               vehicles   or  animals  or  as  a  place   for               encampment or the causing or permitting of any               animal to stray.               It  appears  to us that S.  349(ii)  does  not               apply  to this case.  The relevant portion  of               that section reads :               "The  Council  may charge such fee as  may  be               prescribed.for  any permission  granted  under               this Act   ..........for     the     temporary               occupation of    any land ..........belonging               to the Council." The  section itself does not enable the Municipal Council to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

require that   permission   should  be  obtained   for   any purpose.  It deals with levy  of fees for permissions  which are  required to be taken for various purposes  under  other sections  of  the  Act.  Section  187(3)  which  deals  with permission to erect, alter, add to or reconstruct buildings, and section 194 which deals with permission to the owners or occupiers of buildings in public street to put up verandahs, balconies or rooms, to project from any upper Story  thereof are  instances  in  point.   The,  permission  mentioned  in section  194  is one of the matters for ’which fees  can  be prescribed  under  section 349(ii).   Section  223(4)  deals with’, allowing any temporary occupation or erection in  any public  street on occasions of festivals and ceremonies,  or allowing  the  occupation  of,  or  temporary  erection   of structures for any other purpose. 2 7 7 Fees  can be prescribed under section 349(ii) in respect  of these  matters.  The words above mentioned in  that  section deal  with permission granted to individuals to  temporarily occupy  municipal land.  It would be doing violence to  that section  to hold that it deals with the provision of a  bus- stand.   In the context of that section it is  difficult  to hold  that  when  people are compelled to use  a  bus  stand constructed by the Municipal Council it is a permission  for temporary occupation of land belonging to the Council. Let us now consider if under the provisions of section  358, already  extracted, the Municipal Council can  validly  make the  present  bylaws.   It is not  possible  to  relate  the provision of clause (f) of subsection (7) as having anything to do with the provision of a bus stand.  As regards  clause (in) of sub-section (7) "the regulating and prohibiting  the stationing of carts...... on any ground under the control of the Council or the using of such ground as halting place  of vehicles"  cannot  be said to relate to the provision  of  a Municipal bus stand.  The power to regulate or prohibit  the use of municipal land as halting place of vehicles cannot be used to compel people use such land as halting places.  Such a  power must be specifically given.  Compare  this  section with  sections  270-B  and  270-C  of  the  Madras  District Municipalities Act, 1920, which read as follows               "270-B.   (1)   The  municipal   council   may               construct  or  provide  and  maintain   public               landing places, halting places and cart stands               and may levy fees for the use of the same.               (1-A)............................               (2)...A statement in English and a  vernacular               language of the district of the fees fixed  by               the council for the use of such place shall be               put up in a conspicuous part thereof.               Explanation:A  cart  stand shall  be  for  the               purposes  of  this Act includes  a  stand  for               carriages including motor vehicles within  the               meaning of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1914               and animals."               "270-C.    Where  a  municipal   council   has               provided a public landing place, halting place               or  cart-stand,  the executive  authority  may               prohibit  the use for the same purpose by  any               person within such distance thereof, as may be               determined  by the municipal council,  of  any               public  place  or  the  sides  of  any  public               street." Even these sections deal with use of landing places, halting places  and  cart-stands  outdo not  deal  with  places  for setting down or taking up of passengersIt  is well to  keep

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

clear  in one’s mind the distinction between halting  places which would be the equivalents of garages of private persons and  places  where passengers may be set down and  taken  up which can properly be called bus stands.  The power to  com- pel persons in charge of motor buses to stop only at certain places  for  the  purpose of taking up or  setting  down  of passengers  is a matter which relates to motor  traffic  and there is a specific provision in sec- 278 tion  68  (2) (r) & (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act  for  this specific purpose.  They read as follows :               "68.  (2) Without prejudice to the  generality               of  the’  foregoing power,  rules  under  this               section may be made with respect to all or any               of the following matters, namely               (r)   prohibiting  the picking up  or  setting               down  of  passengers  by  stage  or   contract               carriages at specified places or in  specified               areas  or at places other than  duly  notified               stands  or  halting places and  requiring  the               driver of a stage carriage to stop and  remain               stationary  for  a  reasonable  time  when  so               required  by a passenger desiring to board  or               alight from the vehicle at a notified  halting               place;               (s)   the requirements which shall be complied               with  in the construction or use of  any  duly               notified  stands or halting  place,  including               the   provision  of  adequate  equipment   and               facilities  for the convenience of  all  users               thereof,  the  fees,  if  any,  which  may  be               charged  for the use of such  facilities,  the               records  which  shall be  maintained  at  such               stands  or  places, the staff to  be  employed               thereat,  and the duties and conduct  of  such               staff,  and  generally  for  maintaining  such               stands  and places in a serviceable and  clean               condition." This Court in T. B. Ibrahim v. R.T.C., Tanjore() held  that the  expression ’duly notified stand’ in the Motor  Vehicles Act   means  ’a  stand  duly  notified  by   the   Transport Authority’.  It was contended before this Court that section 68(2) (r) of the Motor Vehicles Act did not confer the power upon  the  transport authority to direct the fixing  or  the alteration  of  a  bus-stand.   This  Court  rejected   that contention.  It pointed out that the section gives power  to the Government to prohibit a specified place from being used for picking up or setting down passengers.  This Court  held that  section 270-B, 270-C and 270-E of the Madras  District Municipalities Act do not affect the power of the  Transport Authority to regulate traffic control or impose restrictions upon  the  licence of any such  cart-stand.   In  Municipal. Board,  Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan  (2) this  Court  pointed out that a ’bus stand’  meant  a  place where  bus service commenced or terminated and that  section 86  dealt with _parking places referred to in section  91(2) (c)  of the Motor Vehicles Act.  The fixation of bus  stands was held to be within section 68 (2) (r) of the Act and  the power  to  issue the necessary notification was held  to  be implied in that clause. Under  section  76  of  the Motor  Vehicles  Act  the  State Government or any-authority authorized in this behalf by the State   Government  may  in  consultation  with  the   local authority   having  jurisdiction  in  the  area   concerned, determine  places at which motor vehicles may  stand  either

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

indefinitely  or  for a specified period of  time,  and  may determine  the places at which public service  vehicles  may stop  for a longer time than is necessary for the taking  up and  setting  down of passengers.  Unlike section  68  which confers power on the State Government alone this (1)[1953] S.C.R. 290. (2) (1963) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 373. 27 9 section  enables  the  State  Government  to  authorize  any authority  to  take  action under it.  As is  clear  from  a reading of section 76, it does not deal with a bus stand  in the  sense  of  a place for taking up and  setting  down  of passengers,  which is dealt with under section 68  (2)  (r). While section 258(7)(n) may enable the Municipal Council  to regulate or prohibit the use of any ground under its control it  does  not  enable it to compel any body  to  use  it  as halting  place  etc. much less to prescribe  that  no  place other  than the one provided by the Municipal Council  shall be used for setting down and taking up of passengers.   That can be done only under a provision like the one   contained in section 68 (2) (r) & (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is interesting to note that in this case the  respondents as  well  as  the  Municipal Council  had  stated  that  the District  Magistrate had declared the Bhopal  Municipal  Bus Stand  as  a bus stand.  Power to specify  the  place  under section  68  (2) (r) & (s) vests in  the  State  Government. Neither  party  has been able to show us that there  is  any power in the State Government to delegate their power  under this  section  to the District Magistrate nor have  we  been shown any notification by the District Magistrate specifying the  Bhopal Municipal Bus Stand as one under the  provisions of  section  68(2)  (r) & (s) of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act. Apparently both the parties proceeded on a  misapprehension. If  at all the District Magistrate had taken any  action  it could  only be under section 76.  But that section does  not enable him to specify places for setting down or picking  up of passengers as we pointed out earlier.  Therefore, we must hold  that  the Madhya Pradesh High Court was  in  error  in holding bye-law 2 valid. Mr. M. C. Chagla, appearing for the Municipal Council,  made those four points               1.    There  is no compulsion on any  body  to               park  his bus within the municipal limits  and               that  he  can park it  outside  the  municipal               limits  for  the  purpose of  picking  up  and               setting down passengers.               2.    That   if  he  parks  the  bus  in   the               municipal  bus  stand he  is  using  municipal               land.               3......  That this is with the  permission  of               the Municipality.               4.    That  for  this permission a  permit  is               issued and a fee is charged. The first proposition has only to be stated to be  rejected. The person plying a motor bus for hire cannot exercise  ’his trade or profession effectively if he is not allowed to  set down or take up passengers within the limits of a town.  The Municipal  Council  cannot do indirectly what it  cannot  do directly.  It cannot compel buses to go outside the  munici- pal limits in order to set down or pick up passengers.  This argument  is  as fallacious as the one put  forward  by  Mr. Phadke on behalf of the respondent that he had a fundamental right  to  use  the  Municipal  bus  stand.   Nobody  has  a fundamental right to use a land belonging to 280

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

another without that persons permission or paying for it  if necessary.   While  the Municipal Council has  no  power  to compel  persons plying motor buses for hue to use  only  the Municipal bus stand for the purpose of taking up and setting down passengers, there can be no objection to its  providing a  bus stand for anybody who chooses to use it  ,voluntarily and  to such person being required to pay for such use.   In that  sense propositions 2 and 3 put forward by  Mr.  Chagla are  unexceptionable.  If for this permission the  formality of the issue of a permit is followed and a fee is charged it cannot  be  said  to be objectionable.   In  that  case  the charges  may  be  such as may be  agreed  upon  between  the parties,  i.e.  if the Municipality charges a  certain  rate only  people  who  are prepared to pay at  that  rate  would resort to that place.  Nobody can be compelled to go to that place.   Such  a  provision is  permissible  not  under  any provisions  of  the Madhya Pradesh  Municipalities  Act  but arises  out of the right which the Municipal  Council,  like the owner of any other property has, to permit people to use any  property  belonging to it only on  certain  conditions. The  bylaws compel persons in charge of motor buses  to  use the Municipal bus stand, which the Municipality has no power to do.  Consequently we hold bye-law 2 as not valid and with it  go  the other bye-laws.  As we have  held  bye-laws  not valid  we  do  not consider it necessary to  deal  with  the argument  advanced by Mr. Phadke based on section 6  of  the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947. In the result the appeal is dismissed; the appellant win pay the respondents’ costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed. 281