http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 13  

PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THECITY OF AHMEDABAD & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAN MOHAMMED USMANBHAI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/04/1986

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1205            1986 SCR  (2) 700  1986 SCC  (3)  20        1986 SCALE  (1)1180

ACT:      Bombay Provincial  Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 - S. 466(1)(D)(b) -  Standing Orders  issued directing closure of slaughter house  on seven specified days in a year - Whether violates fundamental right to carry on trade.

HEADNOTE:      Section  466   (l)(D)(b)  of   the  Bombay   Provincial Municipal Corporation  Act, 1949  confers on  the  Municipal Commissioner power  to make  standing orders, rules and bye- laws. One  of such  powers extends  to fixation  of days and hours during which any market, slaughter house or stock-yard may be  kept open  for use. The appellant-Corporation framed such bye-laws  on 18th  July 1957  and  the  same  had  been sanctioned by the Government. A standing  order was  made by the Municipal Commissioner in the year 1956 fixing four days as holidays in a year on which the municipal slaughter house shall remain  closed. By  an amendment  to the said standing order effected  on 17th  September, 1965 three more holidays were added.      The respondent,  a beef  dealer, filed  a writ petition challenging the  validity of  the said  two standing  orders directing the  closure of  slaughter houses on seven days as being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution alleging that  the closure  of the slaughter house adversely effected his  trade; that  the power  to keep  the municipal slaughter house  closed on  any particular day in an area is vested in  the Municipal Commissioner and such a power could only be  exercised by  a standing  order properly issued and promulgated by him; that under the earlier standing order of 1956 slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days except on  the four  days viz. Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari, 2nd Oct.  (Mahatama Gandhi’s  Birthday)  and  12th  February (Sharddha day  of  Mahatama  Gandhi);  that  the  resolution passed by the 701 Corporation on 18th January, 1965, adding three more days as the closure  days of  the slaughter houses viz. 30th January (Mahatama Gandhi’s  Nirwan Day),  Mahabir  Jayanti  and  Ram

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 13  

Navami, was therefore, null and void; that the said standing orders put  an unreasonable  restriction on the petitioner’s right to carry on his trade or business as a beef dealer and that restriction  was not  in the  interest of  the  general public but  was based on extraneous considerations; that the standing orders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him,  who slaughter  only cattle and not sheep or goat, for hostile  discrimination inasmuch  as the standing orders effect only  the butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat of goat and sheep.      Allowing the  petition, the  High Court  held that  the impugned standing orders were ultra vires being violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.      The  appellant-Corporation   appealed  to  this  Court, contending that  the restriction imposed by the two standing orders was  a reasonable  one and  in the  interests of  the general public.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD :  1. The closure of slaughter house on seven days specified in  the two standing orders did not in any way put an  unreasonable   restriction  on   the  fundamental  right guaranteed to  the respondent  under Art.  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution. [717 C]      Hanif Quareshi  & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 629,  Minerva Mills  Ltd. &  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981]  1 S.C.R. 206, 257, Abdul Hakim Quraishi & Ors. v. State  of bihar  & Ors.,  [1961] 2  S.C.R. 610  and Mohd. Faruk v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh  & Ors.,  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 156, referred to.      2. The  Court must  in considering  the validity of the impugned law  imposing prohibition  on  the  carrying  on  a business or a profession attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate  impact upon  the fundamental  rights  of  the citizens affected  thereby and  the larger  public  interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be 702 achieved, the  necessity to  restrict the citizens, freedom, the inherent  pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or  tendency to  be harmful  to the general public, the possibility  of achieving  the object by imposing a less drastic  restraints,  and  in  the  absence  of  exceptional situations such  as the  prevalence of a State of emergency, national or  local or  the necessity  to maintain  necessary supplies or  the necessities  to stop activities, inherently dangerous, the  existence of  a  machinery  to  satisfy  the administrative  authority   that   a   case   for   imposing restriction is  made out  or a  less drastic restriction may ensure the  object intended to be achieved. [713 G-H; 714 A- C]      3. Clause  (6) of  Art. 19 protects a law which imposes in the  interest of  general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-c1. (g) of c1. (1) of Art. 19. It is left to the Court in case of a dispute to determine  the reasonableness  of the restriction imposed by the law. But the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of  what  is  reasonable  in  the  abstract  or  even  on  a consideration of  what is  reasonable from the point of view of the  person or  persons  on  whom  the  restrictions  are imposed. The  right conferred by sub-c1. (g) is expressed in general  language  and  if  there  had  been  no  qualifying provision like  c1. (6)  the right  so conferred  would have been an  absolute one.  What the  Court  has  to  do  is  to consider whether  the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of general public. [714 G-H; 715 A-B]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 13  

    State of  Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, relied upon.      4. The  expression "in  the interest of general public" is of wide import comprehending public order, public health, public security,  morals, economic  welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution. No body can  dispute a  law providing  for basic amenities; for the dignity  of human  labour as a social welfare measure in the interest of general public. [716 B-C]      5.1 The  tests of  reasonableness have  to be viewed in the context  of the  issues which  faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and in judging their validity, Courts must approach the problem from the point of view of 703 furthering the  social interest  which it  is the purpose of the legislation  to promote.  They are  not in these matters functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying, by the  enacted law  to solve its problem and furthering the moral and  material progress  of the  community as  a whole. [716 G-H; 717 A]      Joti Prasad  v. Union Territory of Delhi, [1961] S.C.R. 1601, relied upon.      5.2 Normally, the legislature is the best judge of what is good  for the  community by whose sufferage it comes into existence. This  should be the proper approach of the Court. But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the  law must  rest with the Court and the Court must not shirk that  solemn duty  cast upon  it by  the Constitution. [717 E-F]      5.3 In the instant case, it was, therefore, open to the Municipal Commissioner  to fix  days and hours at and during which any  slaughter house  should be  kept open for use. If the Municipal Commissioner declares certain days as holidays for the  slaughter house  in order to give facilities to the municipal staff working in the municipal slaughter house, no body could  have any objection to such a standing order. The grievance  of   the  respondent   is  that   the   Municipal Commissioner by standing orders had declared days concerning Mahatma Gandhi,  Lord Mahavir,  Sri Ram  and Lord Krishna as holidays. Mahatama  Gandhi and Lord Mahavir were apostles of non-violence who  lived and  died for  that cause.  Mahatama Gandhi was venerated by the people of India as the Father of the Nation. Lord Mahabir preached and practised Ahimsa. Rama is considered  by the  people to  be the  embodiment of  all virtues. Krishna  is  known  to  be  the  expounder  of  the philosophy of  the  Geeta.  Their  birthdays  are  generally observed by  the people  not merely as days of festivity but also as days of abstinence from meat. One cannot, therefore, complain that these days are ill chosen as holidays. [715 E- H; 716 A-B]      6. When  the validity  of a  law placing restriction on the exercise  of a  fundamental right  in Art.  19(1)(g)  is challenged, the  onus of  proving to the satisfaction of the Court that  the restriction  is  reasonable  lies  upon  the State. If  the law  requires that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious  or injurious  to  the  public  interest, health or safety 704 or is  likely to  prove a nuisance to the community shall be done under  a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is  not per  se unreasonable  and no  person may  claim a licence or  a permit  to do  that act as of right. Where the law providing  for grant  of a  licence or  permit confers a discretion upon  an administrative  authority  regulated  by rules or principles, express or implied, and exerciseable in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 13  

consonance with  the rules  of natural  justice, it  will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is  entrusted to  an administrative agency to grant or withhold a  permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law  ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g). Imposition  of restriction  on the  exercise of  a fundamental  right   may  be  in  the  form  of  control  or prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the  burden of  proving that  a total ban on the exercise of  the right  alone may  ensure the maintenance of the interest  of general public lies heavily upon the State. [713 C-G]      7. While  Art. 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid  reasonable   classification  for   the  purposes  of legislation. There  is always  a presumption  in  favour  of constitutionality of  an enactment  and the  burden is  upon him, who  attacks it,  to show  that there  has been a clear violation of  the constitutional principles. The Courts must presume  that  the  legislature  understands  and  correctly appreciates the  needs of  its own people, that its laws are directed against  problems made  manifest by  experience and that its  discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The legislature is  free to  recognise degrees  of harm  and may confine its  restrictions to  those cases  where the need is deemed to  be the  clearest, and  finally, that  in order to sustain the  presumption of  constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common  rapport, the  history of the times and may assume every state  of facts  which can be conceived to be existing at the time of legislation. [717 D-H; 718 A-B]      8. The  butchers who  slaughter cattle  formed the well defined class based on their occupation. That classification is based  on intelligible differentia and distinguishes them from those who kill goats and sheep and this differentiation has close  connection with  the object sought to be achieved by 705 the impugned  Act, namely  the preservation,  protection and the  improvement  of  livestock.  The  attainment  of  these objectives may  well necessitate  that the  slaughterers  of cattle  should   be  dealt   with   differently   than   the slaughterers  of  goats  and  sheep.  The  standing  orders, therefore,  adopt   a  classification  based  on  sound  and intelligible basis  and can  quite clearly  stand the  test. [718 E-G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1685 of 1970.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  3rd March, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 102 of 1965.      S.T. Desai,  T.U. Mehta, H.S. Parihar, Mrs. A.K. Verma, Joel  Peres,   D.N.  Mishra   and  Vipin   Chandra  for  the Appellants.      G.A. Shah,  Girish Chandra,  C.V. Subba  Rao  and  R.N. Poddar for the Respondents.      T.U. Mehta and H.J. Zaveri for the Interveners.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      R.B. MISRA,  J. Slaughter of cows and calves has been a sensitive issue  and it  has generated  violent  sentimental differences time and again between different sections of the people of this country. Part IV of the Constitution of India enshrines what  are called the Directive Principles of State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 13  

Policy. These  Directive Principles are not enforceable in a court  of  law  but  are  nevertheless  fundamental  in  the governance of the country and are to be applied by States in making laws. Article 48 contained in Part IV provides :           "48.  The   State  shall   endeavour  to  organise           agriculture and  animal husbandry  in  modern  and           scientific lines  and shall,  in particular,  take           steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and           prohibiting the  slaughter, of cows and calves and           other milch and draught cattle."      It  appears   that  pursuant   to  Article  48  of  the Constitution   several   States   enacted   laws   for   the preservation 706 and prohibition  of the  slaughter of  cows and  calves  and other milch  and draught  cattle. The State of Bihar enacted the ’Bihar  Preservation and  Improvement  of  Animals  Act, 1955’ the U.P. State enacted the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter  Act, 1955 and Madhya Pradesh enacted the C.P. and  Berar   Animal  Preservation   Act,  1949,  hereinafter referred to  as the  Bihar,  U.P.  and  C.P.  &  Berar  Acts respectively, for  short. These  Acts put a total ban on the slaughter of  all categories of animals or species of bovine cattle.  The  constitutional  validity  of  these  Acts  was challenged in  Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,  [1959] S.C.R. 629, by those whose trade or business was affected,  as being  violative of Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 25 of the Constitution. This Court held :           "The result is that we uphold and declare that the           Bihar Act  in so far as it prohibits the slaughter           of cows  of all ages and calves of cows and calves           of buffaloes, male and female, is constitutionally           valid and  we hold  that, in  so far as it totally           prohibits the slaughter of she-buffaloes, breeding           bulls and  working bullocks  (cattle and buffalo),           without prescribing  any test or requirement as to           their age  or usefulness,  it infringes the rights           of the  petitioners under  Art. 19(1)(g) and is to           that extent void.           As regards the U.P. Act we uphold and declare, for           reasons    already     stated,    that    it    is           constitutionally valid  in so  far as it prohibits           the slaughter  of cows  of all  ages and calves of           cows, male  and female, but we hold that in so far           as it  purports to  totally prohibit the slaughter           of breeding  bulls and  working  bullocks  without           prescribing any  test or  requirement as  to their           age  or   usefulness,  it   offends  against  Art.           19(1)(g) and is to that extent void.           As regards  the Madhya  Pradesh  Act  we  likewise           declare that  it is  constitutionally valid  in so           far as  it prohibits  the slaughter of cows of all           ages and calves of cows, male and female, but that           it is void in so far as it totally prohibits the 707           slaughter of  breeding bulls  and working bullocks           without prescribing  any test or requirement as to           their age of usefulness.           We also hold that the Act is valid in so far as it           regulates the  slaughter of  other  animals  under           certificates granted  by the authorities mentioned           therein."      The Court  observed that  these Acts  were made  by the States in  discharge of  the obligation laid on them by Art. 48 of the Constitution.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 13  

    Article 19(1)(g)  confers a  fundamental right  upon  a citizen to  practise any  profession, or  to  carry  on  any occupation, trade  or business.  Article 14 enjoins that the State shall  not deny  to any person equality before the law or the  equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article  13(2) provides that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part  and any  law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.      Dealing with  Fundamental Rights  as given  in Part III and the  Directive Principles  as detailed in Part IV of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v.  Union of  India &  Ors., [1981]  1 S.C.R. 206, 257, observed as follows :           "The significance of the perception that Parts III           and IV  together constitute the core of commitment           to social  revolution and  they, together, are the           conscience of  the Constitution is to be traced to           a deep  understanding of  the scheme of the Indian           Constitution.   Granville   Austin’s   observation           brings out the true position that Parts III and IV           are like  two wheels  of a  chariot, one  no  less           important than  the other.  You snap  one and  the           other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin           formula for achieving the social revolution, which           is the  ideal which  the visionary founders of the           Constitution  set   before  themselves.  In  other           words, the  Indian Constitution  is founded on the           bed-rock of the 708           balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute           primacy to  one over  the other  is to disturb the           harmony of  the  Constitution.  This  harmony  and           balance between  fundamental rights  and directive           principles is  an essential  feature of  the basic           structure of the Constitution.           This is  not mere  semantics. The  edifice of  our           Constitution   is    built   upon   the   concepts           crystallised  in  the  Preamble.  We  resolved  to           constitute ourselves  into a Socialist State which           carried with  it the  obligation to  secure to our           people justice-social, economic and political. We,           therefore,  put  Part  IV  into  our  Constitution           containing directive  principles of  State  policy           which specify the socialistic goal to be achieved.           We promised  to our  people  a  democratic  polity           which carries  with it  the obligation of securing           to the  people  liberty  of  thought,  expression,           belief, faith  and worship; equality of status and           of opportunity  and the assurance that the dignity           of the  individual will at all costs be preserved.           We, therefore,  put Part  III in  our Constitution           conferring  those  rights  on  the  people.  Those           rights are  not an  end in  themselves but are the           means to  an end. The end is specified in Part IV.           Therefore, the  rights conferred  by Part  III are           subject  to   reasonable  restrictions   and   the           Constitution provides  that enforcement of some of           them may,  in stated  uncommon  circumstances,  be           suspended. But  just as  the rights  conferred  by           Part III would be without a radar and a compass if           they were  not geared  to an  ideal, in  the  same           manner the  attainment of  the ideals  set out  in           Part IV would become a pretence for tyranny if the           price to be paid for achieving that ideal is human

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 13  

         freedoms.  One  of  the  faiths  of  our  founding           fathers was the purity of means. Indeed, under our           law, even  a decoit  who has  committed  a  murder           cannot be put to death in the exercise of right of           self-defence after he has made good his escape. So           great is  the insistence  of civilised laws on the           purity of  means. The  goals set  out in  Part  IV           have, therefore, to be achieved 709           without the  abrogation of  the means provided for           by Part  III. It  is in  this sense that Parts III           and  IV   together  constitute  the  core  of  our           Constitution and  combine to  form its conscience.           Anything that destroys the balance between the two           parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element           of the basic structure of our Constitution."      Attempts were,  however, made  from  time  to  time  to circumvent  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Mohd.  Hanif Quareshi’s case (supra). After the judgment in that case the legislatures of the State of Bihar and U.P. passed Amendment Acts prescribing  minimum age  of animals to be slaughtered. The Bihar  Act prohibited  slaughter of  a bull,  bullock or shebuffalo unless  the animal was of 25 years of age and was useless. Under  the U.P.  Act slaughter of a bull or buffalo was permitted  only if  it was  over 20 years of age and was permanently unfit.  The Madhya  Pradesh Legislature passed a new Act, the M.P. Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1959 under which  slaughter of  a bull, bullock or buffalo except on a  certificate issued  by  the  competent  authority  was prohibited. A  certificate could  not be  issued unless  the animal was  of over  20 years’ age and was unfit for work or breeding. These  Acts were  again challenged  in Abdul Hakim Quraeshi &  Ors. v.  State of  Bihar & Ors., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 610. This  Court took the view that the ban on the slaughter of bulls,  bullocks and she-buffaloes below the age of 20 or 25 years  was not  a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and was void. It was on the basis that a bull,  bullock or  buffalo did  not remain useful after 15 years and  whatever little  use it may have then was greatly offset  by   the  economic   disadvantages  of  feeding  and maintaining unserviceable  cattle. This  Court further  held that the  additional condition  that the  animal must, apart from being  above 20 or 25 years of age, also be unfit was a further unreasonable  restriction. Accordingly  the relevant provisions in  the Bihar,  U.P. and Madhya Pradesh Acts were declared invalid.      The present  case is apparently another attempt, though on a  slightly different  ground, to circumvent the judgment of this  Court in  Mohd. Hanif  Quareshi’s case (supra). The writ giving  rise to  the present appeal sought to challenge two Standing  Orders made  by the  Municipal Commissioner of the 710 Municipal Corporation  of the  City of Ahmedabad in exercise of his powers under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation  Act 1949 directing that the Municipal ?laughter houses  should be  kept open  for use  on all days except on seven days mentioned in the two standing orders.      Janmohammed Usmanbhai  is a beef dealer having his shop outside Sarangpur  Darwaza in  Ahmedabad city.  His case  is that he  gets his animals slaughtered at the slaughter house owned  by   the   Municipal   Corporation.   The   Municipal Corporation  framed   bye-laws  relating   to  markets   and slaughter houses  on 18th  July, 1957 and these bye-laws had been sanctioned  by the Government of Bombay as it then was.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 13  

Section 466(1)(D)(b)  of the  Act confers  on the  Municipal Commissioner power  to make  standing orders consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules and bye-laws. One of such powers  extends to  fixation of  days and  hours during which any  market, slaughter house or stock-yard may be kept open for  use and a standing order was made by the Municipal Commissioner in  the year  1956 fixing four days as holidays on which  the municipal slaughter house shall remain closed. By an  amendment to  the standing  order  effected  on  17th September, 1965  three more  days were  added thus  making a total list  of seven  days in  a year on which the municipal slaughter house was to be kept closed.      Janmohammed Usmanbhai  challenged the  validity of  the aforesaid two  standing orders  framed under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the  Bombay Provincial  Municipal Corporation  Act,  1949 directing the  closure of  slaughter houses  on  seven  days named in the standing orders being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of  the Constitution inasmuch as the closure of the slaughter house  adversely effected  his  trade  as  animals could not  be admitted in the slaughter house on those seven days specified in the standing orders and therefore he could not get the meat of those animals for his beef shop.      It appears  that at the time of the presentation of the writ petition  the amended  standing order adding three more days to  the list of holidays in the slaughter house had not seen the  light of  the day.  The Municipal  Corporation  of Ahmedabad had, however, passed a resolution on 18th January, 1965 whereby  three more  days were  added to  the  list  of holidays for the slaughter house. The petitioner took up a 711 plea that  the power  to keep  the municipal slaughter house closed on  any particular  day in  an  area  vested  in  the Municipal Commissioner  and  such  a  power  could  only  be exercised  by   a  standing   order  properly   issued   and promulgated by the Municipal Commissioner. Under the earlier standing order  on 1956  made by  the Municipal Commissioner municipal slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days except  on the  following four  days viz.  Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari,  2nd October  (Mahatama Gandhi’s  Birthday) and 12th  February (Sharaddha  Day of  Mahatama Gandhi). The resolution passed  by the  Corporation on 18th January, 1965 declaring  three   additional  holidays  for  the  slaughter houses, therefore, was null and void. During the pendency of the writ petition, however, a new standing order was made by the  Municipal  Commissioner  on  17th  September,  1965  in exercise of  his powers  under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal  Corporation Act adding three more days as the  closure days  of the slaughter houses : 30th January (Mahatama Gandhi’s  Nirwan Day),  Mahavir  Jayanti  and  Ram Navmi to  the previous  list. Consequently respondent No. 1, the  petitioner  in  the  writ  petition,  applied  for  the amendment of  the writ  petition, which  was allowed  by the Court on  12th August,  1969. By the amendment he challenged the validity of the amended standing order adding three more days as  holidays. The  result was that the respondent No. 1 challenged the constitutional validity of all the seven days declared as holidays in the slaughter houses.      The main  ground of  challenge was  that  the  impugned standing orders  put  an  unreasonable  restriction  on  the petitioner’s right  to carry  on his  trade or business as a beef dealer and that restriction was not in the interests of the  general  public  but  was  based  on  other  extraneous considerations. The  other ground  of attack  was  that  the standing orders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him  who slaughter  only cattle  and not sheep or goat,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 13  

for hostile  discrimination inasmuch  as the standing orders effect only  the butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat of goat and sheep.      The High  Court relying  on Mohd.  Faruk  v.  State  of Madhya Pradesh  & Ors.,  [1970] 1  S.C.R. 156  held that the impugned standing orders were ultra vires being violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In that case the bye-laws of the 712 Jabalpur Municipality  permitted the  slaughter  of  various animals including  bulls and  bullocks. A  licence had to be obtained for  that purpose.  The  slaughter  of  animals  in places outside  the premises  fixed by  the municipality was prohibited by  s. 257(3)  of the  Act and  the sale of meat, within the  area of  the Municipality,  of  the  animals  so slaughtered in  the premises  not fixed  by the municipality was also  prohibited. Under  the notification  by which  the bye-laws were  issued in  1948 bulls  and bullocks  could be slaughtered in the premises fixed for the purpose but by the notification dated  12th January,  1967 the  confirmation of bye-laws in so far as they related to bulls and bullocks was cancelled. The  effect of  that notification was to prohibit the slaughter  of bulls and bullocks within the Municipality of Jabalpur.  This cancellation  of the confirmation of bye- laws, it  was urged,  imposed a  direct restriction upon the fundamental right  of the  petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This Court laid down :           "The  impugned  notification,  though  technically           within the  competence of  the  State  Government,           directly infringes  the fundamental  right of  the           petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g), and may be           upheld only  if it be established that it seeks to           impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of           the general public and a less drastic restrictions           will  not  ensure  the  interest  of  the  general           public." This Court further observed :           "The sentiments  of a section of the people may be           hurt by permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks           in premises maintained by a local authority. But a           prohibition  imposed   on  the   exercise   of   a           fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade           or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if           it is  imposed not  in the interest of the general           public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities           and sentiments  of a  section of  the people whose           way of  life, belief or thought is not the same as           that of the claimant." 713      The High  Court, however, overruled the objection based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.      The appellants  have now come to challenge the judgment and order of the High Court by certificate, and they contend that the  restriction imposed by the two standing orders was a reasonable one and in the interests of the general public.      Before proceeding  to deal  with the  points  urged  on behalf of  the appellants it will be appropriate to refer to the well  established principles  in the construction of the constitutional  provisions.  When  the  validity  of  a  law placing restriction  on the  exercise of a fundamental right in Art. (19)(1)(g) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon  the State.  If the law requires that an act which is inherently  dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public interest, health  or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 13  

to the  community shall  be done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person  may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of right.  Where the law providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by  rules or  principles, express  or implied, and exerciseable  in   consonance  with  the  rules  of  natural justice,  it   will  be  presumed  to  impose  a  reasonable restriction.  Where,  however,  power  is  entrusted  to  an administrative agency  to grant  or  withhold  a  permit  or licence in  its uncontrolled  discretion the  law  ex  facie infringes  the   fundamental  right   under  Art.  19(1)(g). Imposition of  restriction on  the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition. But when the exercise  of a  fundamental  right  is  prohibited,  the burden of  proving that  a total  ban on the exercise of the right alone  may ensure  the maintenance  of the interest of general  public   lies  heavily  upon  the  State.  In  this background  of   legal  position   the  appellants  have  to establish that  the restriction put on the fundamental right of the  respondents to  carry on  their trade or business in beef was a reasonable one. The Court must in considering the validity of  the impugned  law imposing  prohibition on  the carrying on  of  a  business  or  a  profession  attempt  an evaluation of  its direct  and  immediate  impact  upon  the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the 714 larger public  interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object  sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizen’s freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited  or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general  public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing  a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations  such as the prevalence of a state of emergency, national  or local,  or the necessity to maintain necessary supplies  or  the  necessity  to  stop  activities inherently  dangerous,  the  existence  of  a  machinery  to satisfy  the   administrative  authority  that  a  case  for imposing  restriction   is  made   out  or  a  less  drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved.      In the  light of  the aforesaid principles the question for consideration  is whether  the closure  of the slaughter house on  seven days  specified in  the two  standing orders puts a  reasonable restriction  on the  fundamental right of the  petitioner   guaranteed  under  Art.  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution. Out  of the seven days declared as closed days for the slaughter house three of the days are connected with Mahatma Gandhi,  that is,  2nd October  being his  birthday, 12th February  being his  Sharaddha Day and the 30th January as his  Nirwan day,  and out  of the  remaining  four  days, Janmashtami relates  to the  birth day  of Lord Krishna, Ram Navami relates  to the birth day of Sri Ram, Mahabir Jayanti and Jain  Samvatsari relate to Lord Mahabir, the exponent of Jainism. Normally  the legislature is the best judge of what is good  for the  community by  whose suffrage it comes into existence. This  should be the proper approach of the Court. But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the  law must  rest with the court and the court must not shirk that solemn duty cast upon it by the Constitution.      Clause (6)  of Art.  19 protects a law which imposes in the interest  of general  public reasonable  restrictions on the exercise  of the  right conferred  by sub-clause  (g) of clause (1)  of Art. 19. Obviously it is left to the court in case of  a dispute  to determine  the reasonableness  of the restrictions  imposed   by  the  law.  In  determining  that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 13  

question the  court cannot  proceed on  a general  notion of what  is   reasonable  in   the  abstract   or  even   on  a consideration of  what is  reasonable from the point of view of the  person or  persons  on  whom  the  restrictions  are imposed. The right conferred by sub-clause 715 (g) is  expressed in  general language and if there had been no  qualifying  provision  like  clause  (6)  the  right  so conferred would  have been  an absolute  one. To the persons who have  this right any restriction will be irksome and may well be  regarded by  them as unreasonable. But the question cannot be decided on that basis. What the Court has to do is to consider  whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of general public. In the State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597 this Court laid down the test of reasonableness in the following terms :           "It is  important in  this context to bear in mind           that  the   test  of   reasonableness,   whereever           prescribed, should  be applied  to each individual           statute impugned,  and no  abstract  standard,  or           general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down           as applicable  to all  cases. The  nature  of  the           right  alleged   to  have   been  infringed,   the           underlying purpose  of the  restrictions  imposed,           the extent  and urgency  of the  evil sought to be           remedied  thereby,   the  disproportion   of   the           imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time,           should all enter into the judicial verdict."      In the  instant case  it  was  open  to  the  Municipal Commissioner to  fix days  and hours at and during which any slaughter  house  should  be  kept  open  for  use.  If  the Municipal Commissioner declares certain days as holidays for the slaughter  house in  order to  give  facilities  to  the municipal staff working in the municipal slaughter house, no body could  have any objection to such a standing order. The grievance of  the petitioner-respondent  in the instant case is on the ground that the Municipal Commissioner by standing orders had  declared days  concerning Mahatma  Gandhi,  Lord Mahavir, Sri  Ram and  Lord  Krishna  as  holidays.  Mahatma Gandhi and  Lord Mahavir  were apostles  of non-violence who lived and  died for that cause. Mahatma Gandhi, venerated by the People  of India  as the  Father of  the Nation  was  an apostle of  non-violence.  Mahavir  preached  and  practised Ahimsa and  even today has a large following in the State of Gujarat. Rama  and Krishna  are the  beloved  of  the  Hindu Pantheon and  are worshiped by large sections of the people. Rama is  considered by  them to  be the  embodiment  of  all virtues and of everything that is good in 716 humanity. Krishna  is known  to  be  the  expounder  of  the philosophy of  the  Geeta.  Their  birthdays  are  generally observed by  the people  not merely as days of festivity but also as days of abstinence from meat. One cannot, therefore, complain that these days are ill chosen as holidays.      The expression  ’in the  interest of general public’ is of wide  import comprehending  public order,  public health, public security,  morals, economic  welfare of the community and the  objects mentioned  in part  IV of the Constitution. Nobody can  dispute a law providing for basic amenities; for the dignity of human labour like provision for canteen, rest rooms, facilities  for drinking  water, latrines and urinals etc. as  a social welfare measure in the interest of general public.   Likewise    in   respect   of   legislations   and notifications concerning  the wages,  working conditions  or the other  amenities for  the working class, the courts have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 13  

adopted a  liberal attitude  and the interest of the workers has been  protected notwithstanding  the hardship that might be caused  to the  employers. It was, therefore, open to the Legislature or  the authority  concerned, to  ensure  proper holidays for  the Municipal  staff working  in the Municipal slaughter houses  and provide  certain closed  days  in  the year. Even  according to  the observations of the High Court nobody could  have any  objection  to  the  standing  orders issued  by   the  Municipal   Commissioner   under   section 466(1)(d)(b) if  Municipal slaughter  houses were  closed on certain days  in order  to ensure  proper holidays  for  the municipal staff  working in  the Municipal slaughter houses. The only  objection was  that  the  standing  orders  direct closure  of  the  slaughter  houses  on  Janamashtami,  Jain Samvatsari, 2nd  October (Mahatama  Gandhi’s birthday), 12th February (Sharaddha  day of  Mahatama Gandhi),  30th January (Mahatma Gandhi’s  Nirvan  day),  Mahavir  Jayanti  and  Ram Navami. These  days were  declared  as  holidays  under  the standing orders  for  the  Municipal  Corporation  slaughter houses.      The tests  of reasonableness  have to  be viewed in the context of  the issues  which faced  the legislature. In the construction of  such laws  and in  judging their  validity, courts must  approach the  problem from the point of view of furthering the  social interest  which it  is the purpose of the legislation  to promote.  They are  not in these matters functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying, 717 by the enacted law, to solve its problems and furthering the moral and  material progress  of the  community as  a whole. (See Joti  Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi, [1961] S.C.R. 1601) If  the expression ’in the interest of general public’ is of  wide import  comprising public order, public security and public  morals, it  cannot be  said  that  the  standing orders closing  the slaughter houses on seven days is not in the interest of general public.      In view of the aforesaid discussion we are not prepared to hold  that the  closure of  slaughter house on seven days specified in  the two  standing orders  in any  way  put  an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed to the  petitioner-respondent under  Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.      This leads us to the second contention raised on behalf of the  respondent,  which  is  based  on  Art.  14  of  the Constitution. The  High Court  had repelled  this contention for a valid reason with which we fully agree.      It is  now well-established  that while Art. 14 forbids class   legislation    it   does   not   forbid   reasonable classification for  the purposes  of legislation and that in order to  pass the  test of  permissible classification  two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must  be   founded  on  an  intelligible  differentia  which distinguishes persons  or things  that are  grouped together from others  left out of the group and (ii) such differentia must have  rational relation  to the  object  sought  to  be achieved by the statute in question. The classification, may be founded  on different  basis,  namely,  geographical,  or according to  objects or occupations or the like and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification   and   the   object   of   the   Act   under consideration. There  is always  a presumption  in favour of constitutionality of  an enactment  and the  burden is  upon him, who  attacks it,  to show  that there  has been a clear violation of  the constitutional principles. The courts must presume  that  the  legislature  understands  and  correctly

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 13  

appreciates the  needs of  its own people, that its laws are directed against  problems made  manifest by  experience and that its  discriminations are  based on adequate grounds. It must be  borne in  mind that  the  legislature  is  free  to recognise 718 degrees of  harm and  may confine  its restrictions to those cases where  the need  is deemed  to be  the  clearest,  and finally  that   in  order  to  sustain  the  presumption  of constitutionality the  court  may  take  into  consideration matters of  common knowledge, matters of common rapport, the history of  the times  and may  assume every  state of facts which can  be conceived  to be   existing  at  the  time  of legislation.      The objects  sought to  be  achieved  by  the  impugned standing  orders   are  the   preservation,  protection  and improvement of  live-stock. Cows, bulls, bullocks and calves of cows  are no  doubt the  most important  cattle  for  the agricultural economy of this country. Female buffaloes yield a large  quantity of  milk and  are, therefore,  well looked after and  do not need as much protection as cows yielding a small quantity  of milk  require.  As  draught  cattle  male buffaloes are not half as useful as bullocks. Sheep and goat give very  little milk  compared to  the cows and the female buffaloes,  and  have  practically  no  utility  as  draught animals.  These   different  categories   of  animals  being susceptible of  classification into  separate groups  on the basis of  their usefulness to society, the butchers who kill each category  of animals  may also  be placed  in  distinct classes according  to the  effect produced on society by the carrying on  of their  respective occupations.  The butchers who slaughter  cattle formed the well defined class based on their  occupation.   That   classification   is   based   on intelligible differentia  and distinguishes  them from those who kill  goats and  sheep and  this differentiation  has  a close connection  with the  object sought  to be achieved by the impugned  Act, namely  the preservation,  protection and the improvement  of our  livestock. The  attainment of these objectives may  well necessitate  that the  slaughterers  of cattle  should   be  dealt   with   differently   than   the slaughterers of  say, goats  and sheep. The standing orders, therefore, in  our view,  adopt a  classification  based  on sound and intelligible basis and can quite clearly stand the test laid down above.      For the  foregoing discussion, the appeal must succeed. It is  accordingly allowed.  The judgment  and order  of the High Court  dated 3rd March, 1970 are set aside and the writ petition filed  by the  respondents before  the  High  Court stands dismissed with costs. A.P.J.                                       Appeal allowed. 719