17 April 1970
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal (civil) 2062 of 1969






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1970


CITATION:  1970 AIR 1292            1971 SCR  (1) 288  1970 SCC  (2) 280  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1971 SC 231  (5)  RF         1973 SC1461  (566)  RF         1975 SC1234  (7)  D          1975 SC2037  (11)  RF         1975 SC2299  (190,607)  RF         1984 SC1780  (8,10)  R          1992 SC 522  (17)

ACT: Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (59 of 1949), s. 152A-Scope of-Constitutional validity of s. 152A(3).

HEADNOTE: The appellant Corporation assessed the immovable  properties of the respondents to property-tax for the year 1964-65  and 1965-66  on  the basis of the ’flat rate’ method  under  the Bombay  Provincial  Municipal Corporation  Act,  1949.   The assessments  were  challenged  in the  High  Court  but  the petitions  were  dismissed.  While appeals were  pending  in this  Court,  the appellant initiated  proceedings  for  the recovery  of  the taxes and attached the properties  of  the respondents.   The  respondents  challenged  the  attachment proceedings  but their petitions were again  dismissed.   In appeals  against those orders in this Court the  respondents prayed  for interim stay, but this Court did not grant  stay because the appellant undertook to return the amounts if the respondents  succeeded.  This Court thereafter  allowed  the appeals  by  the  respondents.  Meanwhile  an  amending  Act entitled   the  Bombay  Provincial   Municipal   Corporation (Gujarat,  Amendment) Act, 1968, was passed  introducing  s. 152A  into the 1949 Act, but that provision was not  brought to the notice of this Court. However,  when.  the  respondents  demanded  refund  of  the amounts illegally collected from them the appellant did  not comply and hence the respondents moved the High Court again. Those  petitions were allowed and the appellant appealed  to this  Court.   While the appeals were  pending,  the  Bombay Provincial  Municipal  Corporation  (Gujarat  Amendment  and Validity Provisions) Ordinance, 1969, was passed and  sub-s. (3) was introduced in s- 152A. HELD  :  Under s. 152A before a Corporation can  retain  any



amount  collected  as  property  tax,  there  must  be   an, assessment according to law.  But in the present case  there Were no ’assessment orders in accordance with the provisions of  the 1949 Act and the rules as amended by  the,  Amending Act,  1968.   Therefore, the appellant was not  entitled  to retain,  the  amounts  collected as  the  section  does  not authorise  the  Corporation  to  retain  amounts   illegally collected. [293 G; 294 D] (2)  Sub-Section (3) of s. 152A, commands the Corporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally collected despite  the orders of this Court and the High Court.  It markes a direct inroad   into  the  judicial  powers  of  the  State.    The Legislatures under the Constitution have, within  prescribed limits,  powers  to  make  laws  prospectively  as  well  as retrospectively.    By   exercise  of   those   powers   the legislature can remove the basis of a decision rendered by a competent, court thereby rendering the decision ineffective. But,  no  legislature in this Country-has power to  ask  the instrumentalities  of the State to disobey or disregard  the decisions   given   by  courts.   Therefore,   s.   152A(3), introduced   by   the   Ordinance  is   repugnant   to   the Constitution. 1294 H; 295 A-C; 297 F] Shri   Prithvi   Cotton  Mills  Ltd.   v.   Broach   Borough Municipality [1970] 1 S.C.R. Mahal Chand Sethia v. State  of West Bengal Cr.  A. No. 75/69 dt. 289 10-9-69  and Janpada Sabha, Chhindwara v. Central  Provinces Syndicate  Ltd. and State of Madhya Pradesh  v.  Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 745, followed. The  apart  it  authorises the  Corporation  to  retain  the amounts  illegally collected and’ treat them as loans,  that is,  authorises  the  collection of forced  loans  which  is impermissible under the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals  Nos. 2062 to 2064, 2072 and 2251 of 1968. Appeals from the judgment and order dated July 3, 4, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 52 of 1969 etc.                         and Writ Petitions Nos. 51, 52 and 57 to 60 of 1970. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. B.   Sen  and 1. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in C.A.  No. 2062  of 1969) and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (in V.P.  Nos.  59 and 60 of 1970). M.   C.  Setalvad and I. N. Shroff, for the  appellants  (in C.A. No. 2063 of 1969) and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (in  W.P. Nos. 51 and 52 of 1970. I.   N. Shroff, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 2064,  2072 and 2251 of 1969) and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (in W.P. No. 57 and 58 of 1970). S.   T.  Desai,  R. N. Bannerjee, K. M. Desai  and  Ravinder Narain,  for  respondents  (in  all  the  appeals)  and  the petitioners (in all the petitions). B.   D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1  (in all the petitions) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J.  These  are connected  proceedings.   Herein  the validity  as  well  as the interpretation  of  some  of  the



provisions  of the Bombay Provincial  Municipal  Corporation Act, 1949 (Act 59 of 1949) (to be hereinafter referred to as the  Act) as amended from time to time by the Gujarat  State comes  up for consideration.  In these proceedings  some  of the Textile Mills of Ahmedabad are ranged against the  State of Gujarat as well as the Municipal Corporation of the  City of  Ahmedabad.   They  are seeking to  get  refund  of  some amounts  paid  as  property  tax,  by  them,  which  amounts according to them were illegally collected from them. 290 In  order to understand the controversies involved in  these proceedings,  it  is best to set out the  course  of  events leading upto these proceedings.  Various Textile Mills which are involved in these cases will hereafter be referred to as the  "companies".  These companies own immovable  properties consisting of lands and buildings in the city of  Ahmedabad. The  Municipal Corporation of the City of  Ahmedabad  (which will hereinafter be referred to as the "Corporation") in the purported exercise of its power under the Act and the  rules framed  thereunder assessed the immovable properties of  the companies  to property tax for the assessment years  1964-65 and  1965-66.  Those assessments were done on the  basis  of the method popularly known as "flat rate" method.  According to that method in valuing the lands, the value of plants and machinery were also taken into consideration.  The buildings were  assessed  on  the basis of their  floor  area.   Those assessments were challenged by means of writ petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High  Court of   Gujarat,  by  the  companies.   Those  petitions   were dismissed  by  the  High  Court.   The  aggrieved  companies thereafter  brought up the matters in appeal to this  Court. During  the  pendency  of  those  appeals,  the  Corporation proceeded  to assess those companies as well as  others,  to property  tax  for  the  assessment  year  1966-67.    Those assessments were challenged before this Court by some of the companies  by means of writ petitions under Art. 32  of  the Constitution.   Meanwhile on the strength of the  assessment made  for  the  assessment years 1964-65  and  1965-66,  the Corporation initiated proceedings for recovery of the  taxes due under those assessments.  Some of the companies paid the tax  assessed but some others including the New Manek  Chowk Spinning  and  Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. did not  pay  the  tax levied  on  them.   Hence the Officers  of  the  Corporation resorted  to the attachment ’of their properties.   At  that stage,  those  companies challenged the  validity  of  those attachment  proceedings  before the High  Court  of  Gujarat under  Art. 226 of the Constitution.  Those  writ  petitions were  dismissed.   The  High Court  also  refused  to  grant certificates under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.  But the concerned  companies appealed to this Court after  obtaining special  leave  from this Court.  In  those  appeals,  those companies  prayed  for  an  interim  stay  of  the  recovery proceedings.  This Court declined to stay the proceedings in view  of the undertaking given on behalf of the  Corporation to refund the tax collected within a month from the date  of the judgment of this Court, if those companies succeeded  in the writ petitions before this Court.  By its judgment dated February  21, 1967, this Court struck down the rules  framed under the Act permitting the Corporation to value the  lands and buildings on the "flat rate" method.  This, Court opined that it was not permissible for the Corporation to value the premises  on the basis of the floor area nor could  it  take into consideration 291 the  value  of  plants  and  machinery  in  determining  the



rateable,  value of the lands and buildings.  That  decision is  reported in [1967]2, Supreme Court Reports p.  679  (New Manek Chowk Spinning and Heaving Mills Co. Ltd. and ors.  v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and ’ors.  In view of that conclusion the assessments impugned in the writ petitions were set aside. The  judgment of this Court dealt with the validity  of  the assessment for the year 1966-67.  But at the time when  that judgment  was  delivered, the appeals filed by some  of  the companies  in respect of the assessment made for  the  years 1964-65  and 1965-66, were still pending in this Court.   On March 30, 1968, the State of Gujarat brought into force  ’an Act   entitled,  Bombay  Provincial  Municipal   Corporation (Gujarat  Amendment) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred  to  as the  amending Act).  The appeals filed by the  companies  in this Court cam up for hearing on April15, 1968.  This  Court allowed  those appeals following its decision in  New  Manek Chowk Spg. and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and ors. case (supra). When those appeals were heard neither the State of  Gujarat, nor the Corporation brought to the notice of this Court, the provisions of the amending Act.  After the judgment of  this Court in those appeals, the concerned companies called  upon the  ’Corporation to refund the amounts illegally  collected from them as property taxes for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66.  The Corporation did not respond to the demands made  by those companies.  Hence they again moved  the  High Court of Gujarat under Art. 226 of the Constitution  seeking writs  of Mandamus against the Corporation and its  Officers directing  them to refund’ the amounts  illegally  collected from  them  and for a declaration that s. 152A  of  the  Act newly  introduced  by the amending Act is  ultra  vires  the Constitution.   The  High  Court of  Gujarat  allowed  those petitions.  That Court did not go into the vires of s.  152A but  on  a construction of that provision, it  came  to  the conclusion  that  the  said provision  did  not  permit  the Corporation  to  withhold the amounts  illegally  collected. The  appeals with which we are concerned now were  filed  by the  State  of  Gujarat and  the  Corporation  against  that decision.   During  the  pendency  of  those,  appeals,  the Corporation  moved this Court to stay the operation  of  the judgment  of  the  High  Court  pending  disposal  of  those appeals.    Those  applications  came  up  for  hearing   on November.  5,  1969.  On that date, this  Court  stayed  the operation  of the. judgment of the High Court of Gujarat  on the Corporation undertaking to pay interest on the.  amounts in-  question  at 6% per annum from the date on  which  they were  collected till the date of refund in the event of  the appeals  failing.   A few days thereafter,  the  Corporation moved this Court to modify that order.  It wanted to  resile from the undertaking given by it.  Hence this 292 Court  modified  its earlier order and  dismissed  the  stay applications on December 9, 1.969. On or about December  23, 1969 the Governor of Gujarat promulgated an Ordinance  under Art. 213  of the Constitution entitled  Bombay  Provincial Municipal  ,Corporation  (Gujarat Amendment  and  Validating Provisions)   Ordinance,  1969.   This  Ordinance  will   be hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance".  That  Ordinance came into effect immediately.  By means of that Ordinance, a new  sub-section  namely sub-s. (3) was introduced  into  s. 152A.  The effect of the insertion of sub-s. (3) in s. 152A is to authorise the Corporation and its ,Officers to refuse to refund the amount of tax illegally collected despite  the orders of this Court as well as the Gujarat High Court till the  assessment or reassessment of property tax is  made  in



,,accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended.  But under  its  provisions, the Corporation is required  to  pay interest  at 6% on the amount ultimately found liable to  be refunded.   In the writ petitions under  consideration  the validity  of  the aforementioned  provision  is  challenged. This, in brief is the history of these cases. In  these  proceedings  three questions  of  law  arise  for decision namely (1) What is the true scope of s. 152A  (2) Is that pro-vision ultra vires any of the provisions of  the Constitution and (3) Is sub-s. (3) of s. 152A (introduced by the Ordinance) violative. of the Constitution?               Section 152A reads as follows                "(1)  In the City of Ahmedabad if in  respect               of  premises included in the assessment,  book               relating  to  Special  Property  Section,  the               levy,  assessment, collection or  recovery  of               any  of  the property taxes for  any  official               year  preceding, the official year  commencing               on the 1st April 1968 is affected by a  decree               or  order  of a court on the ground  that  the               determination  of  the rateable value  of  the               premises on the basis of rental value per foot               of the floor area was not according to law or               that  sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 7  of  the               rules contained in Chapter VIII of Schedule  A               to  this  Act were invalid, then it  shall  be               lawful  for the Municipal Corporation  of  the               City  of  Ahmedabad to assess or  reassess  in               respect of such premises any such property tax               for  any  such  official year  at  the rates               applicable  for that year in ’accordance  with               the  provisions of this Act and the  rules  as               amended  by the Bombay  Provincial  Municipal               Corporations (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1968, as               if  the said Act had been in force during  the               year for which ’any such tax is to be assessed               or  reassessed; and accordingly  the  readable               value of lands and buildings in such               293               -premises may be fixed and any such tax,  when               assessed   or   reassessed  may   be   levied,               collected   and   recovered   by   the said               Corporation and the provisions of this Act and               the rules shall so far as may be apply to such               levy, collection and recovery and the fixation               of  rateable  value  and the  assessment  or               reassessment, levy collection and recovery  of               any  such  tax  under this  section  shall  be               valid:  and shall, not; be called in  question               on  the ground that the- same were in any  way               inconsistent  with the provisions of this  Act               and  the  rules  as  in  force  prior  to  the               commencement of the said Act               Provided  that  if  in  respect  of  any  such               premises   the  amount  of  tax  assessed   or               reassessed for any year in accordance with the               provisions of this section exceeds the, amount               of  tax which but for the decree or  order  of               the   court  as  aforesaid  could  have   been               assessed  for  that  year in  respect  of  the               premises, then the amount of tax to be  levied               for  that year in respect of the  premises  in               accordance with the provisions of this section               shall be an amount arrived at after  deducting               from   the  amount  of  tax  so  assessed   or



             reassessed such amount as may be equal to  the               amount as so in excess.               (2)   Where  any such property tax in  respect               of any such premises is assessed or reassessed               under subsection (1) for any official year and               in respect of the same premises, the property-               tax  for that year has already been  collected               or  recovered,  then  the  amount  of  tax  so               collected  or  recovered shall  be-taken  into               account  in determining the amount of tax  to               be  levied and collected under subsection  (1)               and   if  the  amount  already  Collected   or               recovered  exceeds the amount to be so  levied               and collected, the excess shall be refunded in               accordance with the rules." We  are in agreement with the High Court that  this  section does  not  empower  the Corporation to  retain  the  amounts illegally  collected  as property tax.. Under  this  section before  a  Corporation can retain any  amount  collected  as property tax, there must be an assessment according to  law. What  the  section  authorises,  the  Corporation  is  that, despite  the  fact that certain assessments  have  been  set aside  by courts, it shall be lawful for the Corporation  to ’assess   or  reassess  the  premises  concerned  in   those decisions to property tax for the concerned assessment years at  the rates applicable for those years in accordance  with the  provisions of the Act  and the rules as:amended by  the amending  Act as if the: said Act has been, in force  during the  years. for which such tax is to assessed or  reassessed and accordingly fix the rateable value of L 12 Sup CI 70-5 294 lands and buildings of those premises and assess or reassess the  tax  payable  and  when  the  tax  is  so  assessed  or reassessed,  the  tax so assessed may be  levied,  collected ’and  recovered by the Corporation and for that purpose  the provisions  of the amending Act and the rules shall, so  far as  may,  be  apply  to  such  collection  and   proceedings preceding  those collections.  That provision  further  says that  the  fixation  of  rateable  value  so  made  and  the collection and recovery of such tax shall be valid and shall not  be called in question on the ground that the same  were in  any way inconsistent with the provisions of the Act  and the rules in force prior to the commencement of the amending Act.  The section also authorises the Corporation to  deduct from  the  amounts  earlier  illegally  collected  the   tax assessed  according  to law.  All that the proviso  to  that section  says  is  that the  Corporation  shall  pay  simple interest  at  the rate of six per centum for  annum  on  the amount of excess liable to be refunded under sub-s. (2) from the date of the decree or order of the court referred to  in sub-s.  ( 1 ) to the date on which such excess is  refunded. At  this  stage  it  may be noted that  there  had  been  no assessment  orders even when these appeals were  heard.   In view of our above conclusion that s. 152A does not authorise the  Corporation to retain the amounts illegally  collected, it  is  unnecessary for us to examine the validity  of  that section. This  takes  us  to the validity of sub-s. (3)  of  S.  152A introduced  into  that section by means  of  the  Ordinance. That provision reads               "Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any               judgment,  decree  or order of any  court,  it               shall be lawful, and shall be deemed always to               have   been   lawful,   for   the    Municipal



             Corporation  of  the  City  of  Ahmedabad   to               withhold   refund   of  the   amount   already               collected  or recovered in respect of  any  of               the  property taxes to which  sub-section  (1)               applies  till  assessment or  reassessment  of               such property taxes is made, and the amount of               tax  to be levied and collected is  determined               under subsection (1 ) :                Provided  that  the  Corporation  shall   pay               simple  interest at the rate of six  per  cent               per  annum on the amount of excess  liable  to               be,  refunded under subsection (2),  from  the               date  of decree or order d the court  referred               to  in  sub-section (1) to the date  on  which               such excess is refunded." This  is  a strange provision.  Prime facie  that  provision appears  to command the Corporation to refuse to refund  the amount illegally collected despite the orders of this  Court and the High Court.  295 The  State  of Gujarat was not well advised  in  introducing this  provision.  That provision attempts to make  a  direct inroad   into  the  judicial  powers  of  the  State. The legislatures   under  our  Constitution  have   within   the prescribed limits, powers to make laws prospectively as well as  retrospectively.   By  exercise  of  those  powers,  the legislature can remove the basis of a decision rendered by a competent court thereby rendering that decision ineffective. But  no  legislature in this country has power  to  ask  the instrumentalities  of the State to disobey or disregard  the decisions  given  by  courts.  The limits of  the  power  of legislatures  to  interfere with the  directions  issued  by courts  were considered by several decisions of this  Court. In  Shri  Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and anr. v.  The  Broach Borough Municipality and ors. (1) our present Chief  Justice speaking for the Constitution Bench of the Court observed               "Before we examine s. 3 to find out whether it               is effective in its purpose or not we may  say               a  few  words  about  validating  statutes  in               general.   When  a legislature  sets  out,  to               validate a tax declared by a court to be ille-               gally  collected  under an ineffective  or  an               invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness  or               invalidity  must be removed before  validation               can  be said to take place  effectively.   The               most  important condition of course,  is  that               the  legislature  must possess  the  power  to               impose  the  tax,  for, if it  does  not,  the               action   must  ever  remain  ineffective   and               illegal.   Granted legislative competence,  it               is  not sufficient to declare merely that  the               decision of the court shall not bind. for that               is  tantamount  to reversing the  decision  in               exercise  of judicial power which  the  legis-               lature  does  not  possess  or  exercise.    A               court’s  decision must always bind unless  the               conditions  on  which  it  is  based  are   so               fundamentally altered that the decision could               not   have   been   given   in   the   altered               circumstances.   Ordinarily, a court  holds  a               tax to be invalidly imposed because the  power               to tax is wanting or the statute or the  rules               or  both  are invalid or do  not  sufficiently               create the jurisdiction.  Validation of a  tax               so  declared illegal may be done only  if  the



             grounds   of  illegality  or  invalidity   are               capable  of being removed and are in fact  re-               moved  and the tax thus made legal.   Sometime               this  is  done by providing  for  jurisdiction               where  jurisdiction  had  not  been   properly               invested  before.  Sometimes this is  done  by               re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal               taxing  provision and then by  fiction  making               the  tax already collected to stand under  the               re-enacted law." (1)  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 388 296 In Mehal Chand Sethia v. State of West Bengal(1),  officer, J..  speaking  for the Court stated the  legal  position  in these words,               "The argument of counsel for the appellant was               that  although  it  was  open  to  the   State               Legislature by an.  Act and the Governor by an               Ordinance  to amend the West  Bengal  Criminal               Law  Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949,  it               was incompetent for either of them to validate               an  order of transfer which had  already  been               quashed  by the issue of a writ of  certiorari               by  the High Court and the order  of  transfer               being    virtually   dead,   could   not    be               resuscitated   by   the  Governor   or,   the:               Legislature and the validating measures  could               not touch any adjudication by, the Court.               It appears to us that the High Court took  the               correct view and the Fourth Special Court  had               clearly gone wrong in its appreciation of  the               scope  and effect of the.  Validating Act  and               Ordinance.   A  legislature  of  a  State   is               competent to pass any measure which is  within               the    legislative   competence   under    the               Constitution  of  India.  Of course,  this  is               subject  to the provisions of Part HI  of  the               Constitution.  Laws can be enacted  either  by               the  Ordinance making power of a  Governor  or               the  Legislature of a State in respect of  the               topics   covered   by  the  entries   in   the               appropriate  List in the Seventh  Schedule  to               the   Constitution.   Subject  to  the   above               limitations  laws can be prospective  as  also               retrospective  in operation. court of law  can               pronounce  upon  the validity of any  law  and               declare the same to be null and void if it was               beyond  the   legislative  competence  of  the               legislature  or  if it  infringed  the  rights               enshrined  in  Part III of  the  Constitution.               Needless to add it can strike down or  declare               invalid  any  Act  or  direction  of  a  State               Government  which  is not authorised  by  law.               The  position  of  a  Legislature  is  however               different.  It cannot declare any decision  of               a court of law to be void or of no effect." Again  Shah, J. (one of us) in Janpada Sabha, Chhindwara  v. The  Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and anr. and State  of Madhya Pradesh v. Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. and anr.  (2) ;  speaking for the Constitution Bench explained  the  legal position in these words :               "The   relevant  words  which   purported   to               validate   the  imposition,   assessment   and               collection  of  cess on coal may  be  recalled               they   are   ’cesses  imposed,   assessed   or



             collected  by  the Board in pursuance  of  the               notifications’               (1)   Cr.  Appeal No. 75/69 decided  on  10-9-               1969.               (2)   [1970] 3 S.C.R. 745.               297               notices  specified in the Schedule shall,  for               all  purposes, be deemed to be-, and  to  have               always  been  validly  imposed,  assessed   or               collected as if the enactment under which they               were  so issued stood amended at all  material               times so as to empower the Board to issue  the               said   notifications/notices. Thereby   the               enactments, i.e. Act 4 of 1920 and the  Rules,               framed  under  the Act pursuant to  which  the               notifications and notices were issued, must be               deemed  to have been amended by the Act.   But               the  Act  does  not  set  out  the  amendments               intended to be made in the enactments.  Act 18               of  1964 is a piece of clumsy drafting.  By  a               fiction it deems the Act of 1920 and the rules               framed thereunder to have been amended without               disclosing the text or even the nature of  the               amendments."               Proceeding further, it was observed               "On  the  words used in the Act, it  is  plain               that the legislature attempted to overrule  or               set aside the decision of this Court.  That in               our  judgment, is not open to the  Legislature               to do under our constitutional scheme.  It  is               open to the Legislature within certain  limits               to   amend   the   provisions   of   an    Act               retrospectively  and to declare what  the  law               shall  be deemed to have been, but it  is  not               open to the Legislature to say that a judgment               of  a court properly constituted and  rendered               in exercise of its powers in a matter  brought               before  it shall be deemed to  be  ineffective               and  the  interpretation of the law  shall  be               otherwise than as declared by the Court." We  are clearly of, the opinion that sub-s. (3) of  s.  152A introduced   by   the   Ordinance  is   repugnant   to   our Constitution.   That apart, the said  provision  authorities the  Corporation to retain the ,amounts illegally  collected and  treat them as loans.  That ,is an authority to  collect forced  loans.   Such conferment of power  is  impermissible under  our  Constitution-see  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v. Ranojirao Shinde and anr. ( 4 ) In  the result, the above appeals are ’dismissed with  costs and  the  writ petitions allowed and s.  152A(3)  is  struck down.  The petitioners are entitled to their costs in  those petitions-one  hearing  fee both in the appeals and  in  the writ petitions. Y.P.                          Appeals dismissed. (4) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489. 298