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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY A

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. HAKIMWADI TENANTS ASSOCIATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/11/1987

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  233            1988 SCR  (2)  21  1988 SCC  Supl.   55     JT 1987 (4)   448  1987 SCALE  (2)1133

ACT:      Maharashtra Regional  and Town  Planning Act,  1966: s. 127-Limitation  of   six  months-Failure   to  acquire  land reserved for  town planning  within statutory  period of ten years-Purchase notice served by owners-Limitation whether to reckon from date of notice.      Practice and  Procedure:  Waiver-Requirements  of-Where there is no estoppel there is no waiver.

HEADNOTE: %      Section  127  of  the  Maharashtra  Regional  and  Town Planning Act,  1966 provides that if any land reserved under the Act  was not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final regional plan or final development plan came  into force  or if proceedings for the acquisition of such  land under  that Act  or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  were not  commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the appropriate authority  to that  effect  and  if  within  six months from the date of the service of such notice, the land was not acquired or no steps as aforesaid were commenced for its acquisition,  the reservation  should be  deemed to have lapsed.      The Planning  Authority, the  Municipal Corporation  of Greater Bombay, published a draft development plan reserving the land  in dispute  for a recreation ground. The said plan was finalised  and sanctioned  by the  State  Government  on January 6,  1967. It  came into effect from February 7, 1967 and thereunder  the land  was again  reserved for recreation ground. No  action having  been taken for acquisition of the land, the trustees of the land served a notice dated July 1, 1977 on the Commissioner for Municipal Corporation either to acquire the  land or  release it  from acquisition. The same was received by the latter on July 4, 1977.      On July  28, 1977  the Corporation’s Executive Engineer asked for  information regarding  the ownership  of the land and the  particulars of  the tenants  thereof from trustees- respondents Nos.  4-7, and  stated that  the  relevant  date under s. 127 cf the Act would be the date 22

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upon which  this information  was received.  The trustees by their lawyer’s letter dated August 3, 1977 conveyed that the period of six months stipulated by s. 127 has to be computed from the  date of  the receipt of the purchase notice by the Corporation,  i.e.   July  4,   1977  and  stated  that  the Corporation had  access to  all the  relevant  records.  The requisite  information   was  also   provided  therein.  The Executive Engineer  wrote stating  that the  period  of  six months allowed by s. 127 of the Act would commence on August 4,  1977,  the  date  when  the  requisite  information  was furnished. Thereafter  the Executive  Engineer by his letter dated November 2, 1977 inquired of the trustees whether they were prepared  to sell the property in question to which the trustees quoted  an overall  rate of Rs.650 per square metre through their  lawyer’s reply  dated November 18, 1977. They expressly stated  that the  offer was made without admitting the power and authority of the appellant to acquire the land or to  initiate the  proceedings for acquisition. Instead of accepting the  same, the  Executive Engineer  by his  letter dated January 11, 1978 asked the respondents to disclose the basis for  the rate of Rs.650 per sq. metre. The Corporation had, in  the meanwhile  passed a  resolution on  January 10, 1978 for the acquisition of the land and made an application to the  State Government  dated January  31, 1978 for taking necessary steps.  The State  Government issued the requisite notification dated  April 7,  1978 under  s. 6  of the  Land Acquisition Act 1894 for acquisition of land.      On July  17,  1978,  respondent  No.  1,  the  tenants’ association, filed  a petition  in the High Court under Art. 226  of   the  Constitution   for  quashing   the   impugned notification. The High Court held that the most crucial step was the  application to  be made  by the  Corporation to the State Government  under s. 126(1) of the Act for acquisition of the  land within the period of six months commencing from July 4,  1977, the  date of  service of the purchase notice, and that  upon the  expiry of  the said period on January 3, 1978, the  reservation of  the land  had lapsed  and it  was released from  such reservation.  It took  the view that all that  was   required  was  that  the  owner  or  the  person interested in  the land  must inform  the Authority that the land reserved  for any  plan under  the  Act  had  not  been acquired by  agreement within  ten years  from the  date  on which  plan   came  into   force  and  the  proceedings  for acquisition of  such land under the Land Acquisition Act had not been  commenced  within  that  period.  Consequently  it struck down  the impugned  notification as invalid, null and void.      In the  appeal to  this Court  by special  leave it was contended that  there was  waiver or abandonment of right by respondents Nos. 4-7, 23 the trustees,  to question  the validity  of the acquisition proceedings, and  that there  was inordinate delay or laches on the  part of  respondent No.  1 which  disentitled it  to grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  Section 127  of the  Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning  Act, 1966  is a  fetter  upon  the  power  of eminent domain.  By enacting it the legislature has struck a balance between the competing claims of the interests of the general public as regards the rights of an individual. [30B- C]      2. The  condition pre-requisite for the running of time under 127  of the  Act is  the service  of a  valid purchase

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notice. In  the instant case, the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977  was a  valid notice. The appellant having failed to take any  steps for  acquisition of the land within a period of six  months therefrom  the reservation of the land in the development  plan   for  a   public   purpose   lapsed   and consequently the  impugned notification  dated April 7, 1978 issued by  the State  Government under  s.  6  of  the  Land Acquisition Act  must be  struck down  as a nullity. [29A-B; 31D-F]      3.1 The question whether the reservation has lapsed due to the  failure of  the planning authority to take any steps within a  period of six months of the date of service of the notice of  purchase as  stipulated by  s.  127  is  a  mixed question of  fact and  law. A  rule of universal application cannot, therefore, be laid down. [28G-H]      In the  instant case  the High  Court  found  that  the planning authority  had failed  to acquire the land reserved for the  plan under  the Act  by agreement  within ten years from the  date  on  which  the  plan  came  into  force  and proceedings for  acquisition of  the  land  under  the  Land Acquisition Act  had not been commenced within the period of six months  from the receipt of notice from respondents Nos. 4 to  7, the  trustees. The  Municipal Corporation  had been assessing the  trust properties  to property tax and issuing periodic bills and receipts therefor and obviously could not question the  title or  ownership of the trust. Accordingly, it struck  down the  impugned notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition  Act and  declared that  the reservation of the land  under the  development plan had lapsed. [28E, 29F, 28B]      3.2 There  was no  question of the period of six months being 24 reckoned from  the date  of receipt  from respondents of the information requisitioned.  Section 127  of the Act does not contemplate an  investigation into the title by the officers of the  Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the running of  time if  there is  a valid notice. The Executive Engineer of  the appellant  Corporation was not justified in addressing the  letter dated  July  28,  1977  calling  upon respondents  13   Nos.  4-7,   the  trustees,   to   furnish information regarding their title and ownership, and also to furnish particulars  of the  tenants, the  nature of user of the tenements  and the  total area  occupied  by  them.  The Corporation had  the requisite information in their records. The Planning  Authority was  the Municipal  Corporation. The said letter  was, therefore,  just an attempt to prevent the running of time and was of little or no consequence.[29A, B- E]      4.  In  order  to  constitute  waiver,  there  must  be voluntary and  intentional relinquishment  of a  right.  The essence of  a waiver  is an  estoppel and  where there is no estoppel, there  is  no  waiver.  Estoppel  and  waiver  are questions of  conduct and  must necessarily be determined on the facts of each case. [34B]      In the  instant case,  respondents Nos. 4-7 had without admitting that  the appellant  had the authority or power to initiate the  proceedings for  acquisition, signified  their willingness to  sell the  property subject to certain terms. But the appellant did not accept the offer. On the contrary, the appellant  took further steps for the acquisition of the land by  moving the  State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act to initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a notification under  s. 6  of the  Land Acquisition  Act.  It cannot, therefore,  be said  that the conduct of respondents

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Nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference of relinquishment of a known existing legal right. [34B-D]      5.  The   tenants  were  not  parties  to  the  earlier proceedings. They  were,  therefore,  not  disentitled  from maintaining the  writ petition. The objection that there was undue delay in moving the High Court cannot prevail. [34E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4139 of 1986.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  18.6.1986  of  the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 874 of 1983.      R.P. Bhatt and D.N. Misra for the Appellant. 25      L.C. Chogale,  M.N. Shroff,  K.M.M. Khan, R.F. Nariman, R. Karanjawala,  Hardeep Singh, Mrs. Manek Karanjawala, S.V. Deshpande,  A.S.   Bhasme  and   A.M.  Khanwilkar   for  the Responlents .      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  By s.  127 the  Maharashtra  Regional  &  Town Planning Act, 1966 enacts:           "  127.   If  any   land  reserved,   allotted  or           designated for  any purpose  specified in any plan           under this Act is not acquired by agreement within           ten years  from the date on which a final Regional           plan, or  final Development  plan comes into force           or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land           under this  Act or under the Land Acquisition Act,           1894, are  not commenced  within such  period, the           owner or  any person  interested in  the land  may           serve   notice    on   the   Planning   Authority,           Development Authority  or  as  the  case  may  be,           Appropriate  Authority  to  that  effect;  and  if           within six  months from the date of the service of           such notice,  the land is not acquired or no steps           as aforesaid  are commenced  for its  acquisition,           the reservation, allotment or designation shall be           deemed to  have lapsed,  and  thereupon  the  land           shall  be   deemed  to   be  released   from  such           reservation, allotment  or designation  and  shall           become available  to the  owner for the purpose of           development or  otherwise, permissible in the case           of adjacent land under the relevant plan."      The short  point involved  in this  appeal  by  special leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated  June 18,  1986, is  whether the  period of  six months specified in s. 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from the date  of service  of the  purchase notice  dated July 1, 1977 by  the  owner  on  the  Planning  Authority  i.e.  the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here, or the date on which the  requisite information of particulars furnished by the owner.      The late  Dr. Eruchshaw  Jamshedji Hakim was the former owner  of   a  double-storeyed   building  situate  on  land admeasuring 3645.26  square  metres  bearing  the  cadastral survey no. 176 of Tardeo, Bombay known as Dr. Hakimwadi. The property is  located at  the junction  of Falkland  Road and Eruchshaw Hakim Road. It 26 consists  of   several  structures  housing  24  small-scale industries, 13  shops on the ground floor and 26 residential tenements on  the first  floor, facing the Falkland Road. On the rear side of this building, there are several structures

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housing  about  24  small-scale  industries.  The  said  Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji  Hakim created a trust in respect of the properties and respondents nos. 6-9 i.e. respondents nos. 4- 7 in  the High  Court, herein  described  as  such  are  the present trustees  appointed under  the  deed.  The  Planning Authority published  a draft  Development Plan in respect of ’D’ ward  where the  property in  dispute is situate. In the Development Plan  property of  Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim was reserved  for a  recreation ground. The Development Plan was finalised  and sanctioned  by the  State  Government  on January 6,  1967. The  final development  scheme  came  into effect from  February 7,  1967 and  thereunder the  land was again reserved  for recreation ground. No action having been taken for acquisition of the land until January 1, 1977, the owners thereof  i.e. the  trustees served  a purchase notice dated July,  1,  1977  on  the  Commissioner  for  Municipal Corporation of  Greater Bombay either to acquire the same or release it  from acquisition,  and the  same was received on July 4,  1977. On  July 28, 1977 the Corporation’s Executive Engineer  wrote  to  respondents  nos.  4-7  and  asked  for information regarding  the ownership  of the  land  and  the particulars of  the tenants  thereof. The letter stated that the relevant  date under s. 127 of the Act would be the date upon which  this information  was received. The trustees for the time  being the  landlords  of  the  property  known  as Hakimwadi by  their lawyer’s  letter dated  August  3,  1977 conveyed that the date of six months stipulated by s. 127 of the Act has to be computed from the date of the receipt from them of  the information required. Further, they stated that as  the  Planning  Authority  for  Greater  Bombay  was  the Municipal Corporation  of Greater Bombay, it had p access to all the relevant records including the records pertaining to cadastral survey no. 176. It was also appointed out that the Corporation had  been assessing  them  to  property  tax  in respect of  the said property and issuing bills and receipts therefor and could not now question their title to ownership of the property.      It was  further said  that as  regards  the  number  of tenants,  the   inspection  registers   maintained  by   the Corporation’s  Assessment   Department,   upon   which   the assessment of  the rateable  value of  the various tenements was based, bear ample testimony. It was next stated that the property  was  partly  residential,  partly  commercial  and partly meant  for storage.  The trustees went on to say that they were not aware of any rule framed under the Act whereby the Planning 27 Authority could make an inquiry at that stage without taking a decision  on the  material question and thereby attempt to extend the  time limit  of six  months stipulated in s. 127. The said  letter was  received by  the Executive Engineer on August 16,  1977 and presumably the information required was furnished on  August 16,  1977. The Executive Engineer wrote to respondents  nos. 4-7  stating that  the  period  of  six months allowed  by s.  127  of  the  Act  would  accordingly commence on  August 4,  1977, the  date when  the  requisite information was  furnished. Next,  the Executive Engineer by his letter dated November 2, 1977 intimated respondents nos. 4-7 that  the Municipal Corporation had accorded sanction to initiate acquisition  proceedings in respect of the property in question  under the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, the Corporation passed  a resolution  dated January 10, 1978 for the acquisition  of the  land and made an application to the State Government dated January 31, 1978 for taking necessary steps. The  State Government  being satisfied  that the land

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was required  for a  public  purpose  issued  the  requisite notification dated  April 7,  1978 under  s. 6  of the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 for  acquisition of the land. On July 17, 1978  respondent no. 1 Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association filed a  petition in  the High  Court under  Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the impugned notification.      A learned  Single Judge  (Pendse, J.)  by his  judgment dated September  21, 1983  allowed the  writ petition on the ground that the Planning Authority having taken no steps for acquisition of  land under s. 126(1) of the Act read with s. 6 of  the Land Acquisition Act within 10 years from the date on which  the final  Development Plan  came into  force, the acquisition proceedings  commenced by  the State  Government under sub-s.  (2) of  s. 126 at the instance of the Planning Authority were  not valid  inasmuch as  the issuance  of the impugned notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for  the   reservation  of  the  property  under  the  final Development Plan  for a recreation ground was not within the period of  six months as-required under s. 127. According to the  learned   Single  Judge,   the  period  of  six  months prescribed under  s. 127 of the Act begin to run on the date of service  of the  purchase notice  on the  Corporation and therefore the  Corporation had  to take steps to acquire the property before  January 4, 1978. The Corporation not having taken any steps till the expiry of the period of six months, the resolution  dated January 10, 1978 passed to acquire the property and the consequent notification dated April 7, 1978 were invalid  and of no legal consequence In other words, he held that  the commencement  of the  statutory period of six months was  not dependent  upon the directions issued by the officers 28 of the Planning Authority, nor could the officers extend the period fixed under s. 127. As regards the practice prevalent in the  Corporation to compute the period of six months from the date  of receipt of the information sought, he held that it  was   wholly  unwarranted   and  entirely   illegal.  He accordingly struck down the impugned notification under s. 6 of  the   Land  Acquisition   Act  and   declared  that  the reservation of  the land  under  the  Development  Plan  had lapsed and  it was  open to  the tenants  of the property to claim that  due to  the lapse  of reservation,  the Planning Authority and  the State  Government had  no jurisdiction to acquire the  land in  exercise of  the powers under s.126 of the Act.      Aggrieved,  the   appellant  carried  an  appeal  to  a Division Bench  under s. 15 of the Letters Patent. Bharucha, J. speaking for himself and Desai, J. upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and held that the most crucial step was the application  to be  made by the Corporation to the State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act for acquisition of the land, it  ought to  have been taken within the period of six months commencing  from July 4, 1977, the date of service of the purchase  notice. That  decision proceeds  upon the view that the  details of ownership or particulars of tenants are not required  to be  furnished in the purchase notice served by the  owner or any person interested in the land. All that is required  is that  the owner  or the person interested in the land  must inform  the authority  that the land reserved for any  plan  under  the  Act  had  not  been  acquired  by agreement within  10 years  from the  date on which the plan came into force and that proceedings for acquisition of such land under  the Land  Acquisition Act had not been commenced within  that  period.  It  was  accordingly  held  that  the purchase notice  dated July  1, 1977  served by  respondents

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nos. 4-7,  the trustees,  was a valid notice under s. 127 of the Act  and therefore the period of six months specified in s. 127  commenced running  from July  4, 1977,  the date  of service, and  came to  an end on January 4, 1978. That being so, it  was held  that upon  the expiry of the period of six months on  January 3,  1978, the reservation of the land for recreation ground  lapsed and  it  was  released  from  such reservation.      According to the plain reading of s. 127 of the Act, it is manifest  that the  question whether  the reservation has lapsed due  to the failure of the Planning Authority to take any steps  within a  period of  six months  of the  date  of service of  the notice  of purchase as stipulated by s. 126, is a  mixed question  of fact and law. It would therefore be difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a rule 29 of universal  application. It  cannot be  posited  that  the period of six months would necessarily begin to run from the date of  service of  a purchase  notice under  s. 127 of the Act. The  condition pre-requisite  for the  running of  time under s.  127 is  the service of a valid purchase notice. It is needless  to stress that the Corporation must prima facie be satisfied  that the notice served was by the owner of the affected land  or any person interested in the land. But, at the same  time, s.  127 of  the Act  does not contemplate an investigation into  title by  the officers  of the  Planning Authority, nor  can the officers prevent the running of time if there  is a valid notice. Viewed in that perspective, the High Court  rightly held  that the Executive Engineer of the Municipal Corporation  was not  justified in  addressing the letter dated  July 29, 1977 by which he required respondents nos. 4-7,  the trustees,  to furnish  information  regarding their title  and ownership,  and also to furnish particulars of the tenants, the nature and user of the tenements and the total area  occupied by them at present. The Corporation had the requisite  information in  their records. The High Court was therefore  right in reaching the conclusion that it did. In  the   present  case,  the  Planning  Authority  was  the Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay.  It  cannot  be doubted that  the Municipal  Corporation has  access to  all land records  including the  records pertaining to cadastral survey no.  176 of  Tardeo. We are inclined to the view that the aforesaid  letter dated  July 28,  1977 addressed by the Executive Engineer  was  just  as  attempt  to  prevent  the running of  time and was of little or no consequence. As was rightly pointed  out by  respondents nos. 4-7 in their reply dated August 3, 1977, there was no question of the period of six months  being reckoned from the date of the receipt from them  of   the  information   requisitioned.  The  Municipal Corporation had  been  assessing  the  trust  properties  to property  tax   and  issuing  periodic  bills  and  receipts therefor and  obviously could  not  question  the  title  or ownership of  the trust.  We are  informed that the building being situate  on Falkland  Road, the  occupants are  mostly dancing  girls   and  this   is  in  the  knowledge  of  the Corporation authorities. The rateable value of each tenement would also  be known  by an  inspection  of  the  assessment registers. We must accordingly uphold the finding arrived at by the  High Court  that the appellant having failed to take any steps,  namely, of  making an  application to  the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act within  a period  of six months from the date of service of the  purchase notice, the impugned notification issued by the State  Government under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act making the requisite declaration that such land was required

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for a  public purpose  i.e.  for  a  recreation  ground  was invalid, null and void. 30      While the  contention of  learned counsel appearing for the appellant  that the  words ’six  months from the date of service of  such notice’  in s.  127 of  the  Act  were  not susceptible of  a literal construction, must be accepted, it must be borne in mind that the period of six months provided by s.  127 upon  the expiry  of which the reservation of the land  under   a  Development  Plan  lapses,  is  a  valuable safeguard to  the citizen  against arbitrary  and irrational executive action.  Section 127  of the  Act is a fetter upon the  power  of  eminent  domain.  By  enacting  s.  127  the legislature has  struck  a  balance  between  the  competing claims of the interests of the general public as regards the rights of  an individual. An analysis of s. 126 would reveal that  after   publication  of   a  draft  regional  plan,  a development or  any other  plan or town planning scheme, any land is  required or reserved for any of the public purposes specified  therein,   the  Planning  Authority,  Development Authority or  as the  case may be, any Appropriate Authority may, except  as provided in s. 113A, at any time acquire the land either by agreement or make an application to the State Government for  acquisition of  such  land  under  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894. Sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the State  Government   may  on   receipt  of  the  applications contemplated by  s. 126(1)  or if  the Government (except in cases falling   under  s.  49 and  except as  provided in s. 113A) is itself of opinion  that  any  land  included in any such plan is needed for any public purpose, it  may  make  a declaration to  that effect  in the  final gazette,  in  the manner provided  in s.  6 of  the Land  Acquisition  Act  in respect of  the  said  land.  The  rule  is  subject  to  an exception. Proviso  to s.  126(2) interdicts  that  no  such declaration shall  be made  after the  expiry of three years from the  date of  publication of  the draft  regional plan, development plan  or any  other plan.  Sub-s. (3) deals with the procedure  to be  followed for  acquisition of  the land covered  by   a  declaration  under  s.  6  of  the  p  Land Acquisition Act.  Sub-s. (4)  is of some relevance and reads as follows:           "(4). If  a declaration  is not  made  within  the           period referred  to in  sub-section (2)  or having           been made,  the aforesaid  period expired  on  the           commencement of  the Maharashtra Regional and Town           Planning  (Amendment)   Act,   1970,   the   State           Government  may   make  a  fresh  declaration  for           acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act,           1894, in  the manner  provided by sub-sections (2)           and  (3)   of  this   section,  subject   to   the           modification that  the market  value of  the  land           shall be  market value  at the date of declaration           in the  official Gazette  made for  acquiring  the           land afresh." 31      The conjoint  effect of sub-ss. ( 1), (2) and (4) of s. 126 is  that if  no declaration  is made  within the  period referred to in sub-s. (2), that is to say, before the expiry of three  years from  the date  of publication  of the draft regional plan,  development plan  or  any  other  plan,  the compensation payable  to the  owner of  the  land  for  such acquisition, in that event, shall be the market value on the date of  the fresh  declaration  under  s.  6  of  the  Land Acquisition Act i.e. the market value not at the date of the notification under  s. 4(1)  of the Land Acquisition Act but

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the market value at the date of declaration under s. 6. That is one of the safeguards provided under the Act.      Another safeguard  provided is  the one under s. 127 of the Act.  It cannot  be laid down as an abstract proposition that the period of six months would always begin to run from the date  of service  of notice. The Corporation is entitled to be satisfied that the purchase notice under s. 127 of the Act has been served by the owner or any person interested in the land.  If there  is no  such notice  by the owner or any person, there  is no  question of the reservation, allotment or designation  of the  land under  a  development  plan  of having lapsed.  It a fortiori follows that in the absence of a valid  notice under  s. 127,  there is  no question of the land becoming  available to  the owner  for the  purpose  of development  or   otherwise.  In  the  present  case,  these considerations do  not arise. We must hold in agreement with the High  Court that  the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 served  by   respondents  nos.  4-7  was  valid  notice  and therefore the failure of the appellant to take any steps for the acquisition  of the land within the period of six months therefrom, the  reservation of  the land  in the Development Plan for  a recreation  ground lapsed  and consequently, the impugned notification  dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition  Act issued by the State Government must be struck down as a nullity.      Section 127  of the  Act is  a  part  of  the  law  for acquisition of  lands required  for public purposes, namely, for  implementation   of  schemes   of  town  planning.  The statutory bar  created by  s. 127 providing that reservation of land  under a  development scheme shall lapse if no steps are taken  for acquisition  of land  within a  period of six months from  the date  of service of the purchase notice, is an  integral   part  of   the  machinery  created  by  which acquisition of land takes place. The word ’aforesaid’ in the collocation  of   the  words  ’no  steps  as  aforesaid  are commenced for  its acquisition’ obviously refer to the steps contemplated by  s. 126(1).  The effect  of a declaration by the State  Government under  sub-s. (2)  thereof, if  it  is satisfied that the 32 land is  required for the implementation of a regional plan, development plan or any other town planning scheme, followed by the  requisite declaration to that effect in the official gazette, in  the  manner  provided  by  s.  6  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  is to  freeze  the  prices  of  the  lands affected. The  Act lays  down the  principles of fixation by providing firstly,  by the proviso to s. 126(2) that no such declaration under  sub-s. (2) shall be made after the expiry of three  years from  the date  of publication  of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan, secondly, by enacting  sub-s. (4)  of s.  126 that if a declaration is not made  within the  period referred  to in sub-s. (2), the State Government  may make  a fresh declaration but, in that event, the  market value  of the  land shall  be the  market value at  the date of the declaration under s. 6 and not the market value at the date of the notification under s. 4, and thirdly, by  s. 127  that if  any land reserved, allotted or designated for  any purpose  in any  development plan is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which a final  regional plan  or development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under the Land Acquisition  Act are  not commenced within such period, such  land   shall  be  deemed  to  be  released  from  such reservation, allotment  or designation  and become available to the  owner for  the purpose of development on the failure

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of the  Appropriate Authority  to initiate any steps for its acquisition within  a period  of six months from the date of service of a notice by the owner or any person interested in the land.  It cannot be doubted that a period of 10 years is long enough.  The Development or the Planning Authority must take recourse to acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order  that the  compensation paid  to  the  expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real value of the land as otherwise, the  compensation paid  for the acquisition would be wholly  illusory. Such  fetter on  statutory powers is in the interest  of  the  general  public  and  the  conditions subject to  which they  can be  exercised must  be  strictly followed.      There still remain the other two points raised, namely, (i) There  was waiver or abandonment of right by respondents nos. 4-7,  the trustees,  to question  the validity  of  the acquisition proceedings; and (ii) There was inordinate delay or laches  on the part of respondent no. 1 which disentitled it to grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We find it difficult to give effect to these contentions.      In order  to deal with these questions, a few facts are to be  stated.  The  Executive  Engineer  of  the  Municipal Corporation by  his letter  dated November 2, 1977 addressed to the lawyer acting on be- 33 half of  respondents nos.  4-7,  the  trustees,  to  inquire whether they  were prepared to sell the property in question situate at  Cadastral Survey no. 176 of Taradeo. In response thereto, respondents  nos. 4-7  through their lawyer’s reply dated November 18, 1977 intimated that they were prepared to consider the  sale of the property in its existing condition with all  the structures tenanted or otherwise at an overall rate of  Rs.650 per  square metre. This response was without prejudice and  they expressly stated that the offer was made without admitting  the power  and authority of the appellant to acquire  the land  or to  initiate  the  proceedings  for acquisition. Instead  of accepting  the same,  the Executive Engineer  by  his  letter  dated  January  11,  1978  wanted respondents nos.  4-7 to  disclose the basis upon which they claimed price  at the rate of Rs.650 per square metre. While keeping respondents  nos. 4-7  in  suspense,  the  Municipal Corporation had  in the meanwhile on January 10, 1978 passed a Resolution that necessary steps be taken to move the State Government  for  acquisition  of  the  land  and  thereafter actually moved  the Government by their letter dated January 31, 1978 to make the requisite declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 i.e. the property in question was needed for,  public purpose  viz. a  recreation ground under the Development  Plan. The  State Government  accordingly on April 7,  1978 on  being satisfied  that  the  property  was needed issued the requisite impugned notification under s. 6 of the Act. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition officer on January  18, 1979  issued a  general notice under s. 9 of the Land  Acquisition Act  and the same was published at the site and  also issued  individual  notices  to  the  persons interested. The  hearing was fixed for February 26, 1979. On February 22,  1979 i.e. four days before the hearing some of the tenants  approached the Special Land Acquisition officer and applied  for three  months’ adjournment  and accordingly the bearing  was adjourned  to April  24, 1979.  However, no claims for  compensation were filed. Nobody remained present at the  hearing. Accordingly,  the Special  Land Acquisition officer was constrained to issue fresh notices under s. 9 on May 25,  1981. Thereafter,  the Municipal Corporation on the date fixed  applied to  the Special Land Acquisition officer

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to keep the proceedings in abeyance at the behest of some of the tenants  who had  applied to  the Corporation  for three months’ time.  In the  circumstances, respondents  nos.  4-7 moved the  High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ  in the nature of mandamus requiring the Special Land Acquisition officer  to make  an award. On January 20, 1981, the learned  Government Advocate  gave an undertaking before the High  Court that  the Special  Land Acquisition  officer would declare the award within a period of six months 34 and make  payment of  compensation within  eight months.  In view of  this, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as not pressed.      On these  facts, it  cannot be  said that there was any waiver or  abandonment of rights by respondents nos. 4-7. In order to  constitute waiver,  there must  be  voluntary  and intentional relinquishment  of a  right. The  essence  of  a waiver is  an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no  waiver. Estoppel  and waiver are questions of conduct and must  necessarily be  determined on  the facts  of  each case. In  the present case, respondents nos. 4-7 had without admitting that  the appellant  had the authority or power to initiate the  proceedings for  acquisition, signified  their willingness to  sell the  property subject to certain terms. But the appellant did not accept the offer. On the contrary, the appellant  took further steps for the acquisition of the land by  moving the  State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act to initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a notification under s. 6 of the land Acquisition Act. In view of this,  it cannot  be said that the conduct of respondents nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference of relinquishment by a known existing legal right.      There  is   no  question   of   estoppel,   waiver   or abandonment.  There   is  no   specific  plea   of   waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of right. That  apart, the  question of  waiver really does not arise in  the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question of waiver  of rights  by respondents nos. 4-7 not would this disentitle the  tenants from  maintaining the writ petition. The objection  that there was undue delay in moving the High Court  cannot   prevail.   The   reservation   has   lapsed, acquisition upon  such reservation  is bad  and the delay in filing the  petition, such  as it is, can make no difference to this position in law.      In the  result, the  appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. P.S.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. 35