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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TEK CHAND BHATIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1979

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1980 AIR  360            1980 SCR  (1) 910  1980 SCC  (1) 158  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1983 SC 506  (2)  OPN        1985 SC 741  (11,14)

ACT:      Prevention  of   Food  Adulteration  Act  1954  Section 2(i)(f), interpretation  of-The words  "or is otherwise unit for human  consumption" are  disjunctive of  the rest of the words preceding  them-Warranty whether  the mere description of the  words in  the sealed  container as  "SW Best  Borma" entitles protection under S. 19(2) cf the Act.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent  is a  partner of  the Firm  M/s. Narain Dass Tek  Chand, Khari  Baoli, Delhi. The firm is engaged in wholesale business in dry fruits including cashew nuts which it gets  from different  manufacturers. On  August 1,  1968, these samples of cashew nuts were taken from its shop by the Food Inspectors PWs 1 and 3, from three sealed tins supplied by Sri  Venkateswara Cashews,  Panruti and were forwarded to the Public  Analyst, Delhi  who by  his three  reports dated August 3,  1968 in  Form III  Exts. PE,  PE/1 and PE/2 found that all  the three samples taken were "insect infested". Of these, two  were "insect-infested  to the extent of 20.6 and 20.7 percent  and the  third to  the extent of 5.63 percent. Both the trial Magistrate and the Delhi High Court acquitted the Respondent.  The  High  Court  relying  on  its  earlier decision in Dhanraj’s case ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 681, held that merely because  an article  of food  is  insect-infested  it cannot be  treated as  "adulterated" within  the meaning  of section 2(i)  (f) of the Act, unless it is further proved to be  ’otherwise  unfit  for  human  consumption’  within  the meaning of that section. In that view, it did not touch upon the question  whether the invoice Ext. DW 3/A was sufficient warranty in law as to the purity of the article sold.      Allowing the appeal on certificate, the Court, ^      HELD: 1.  The interpretation  of Section 2(i)(f) by the High Court  was clearly  wrong. On the plain language of the definition section,  it is quite apparent that the words "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" are disjunctive of the rest  of the  words preceding  them. (b) It relates to a distinct and  separate class altogether. The last clause "or

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is otherwise  unfit  for  human  consumption"  is  residuary provision which  would apply  to a  case not  covered by  or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. tc) If the phrase is  to be  read disjunctively  tho mere  proof of the article of  food being "filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed.. or insect-infested"  would be per se sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word "adulterated" as defined in sub-clause  (f) and  it would  not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption. [914 F-H, 915A]      (c) The decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi  v. Kacheroo  Mal [1976]  2  SCR  1  approving  the decision in  Dhanraj’s case ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 681 should be confined to  the particular facts of that case. The decision in that  case was largely based on the circumstance that the standard of quality 911 and purity  was not prescribed in respect of cashewnuts. Now that Rule  48-B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules in 1955 has been framed, the decision in Kacheroo Mal’s case is rendered inapplicable. [916 B-C]      (d) In  the definition clause, the collocation of words filthy, rotten,  decomposed and  insect-infested" which  are adjectives qualifying  the term  ’an article  of food’  show that it  is not of the nature, substance and quality fit for human consumption.  A comma  after each  of the  first three words is  significant. These qualifying adjectives cannot be read with the last portion of the definition i.e., the words "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption" which is quite separate and distinct from others. [916 D-E]      (e) The  word "otherwise" signifies unfitness for human consumption due  to other  causes. If  the last  portion  is meant to  mean something  different, it becomes difficult to understand how  the word  ’or’ as  used in the definition of ’adulterated’  in  s.  2(i)  (f)  between  "filthy,  putrid, rotten, etc."  and "otherwise  unfit for  human consumption" could have  been intended to be used conjunctively. It would be more appropriate in the content to read it disjunctively. [916 E-F]      (f) The  word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive,  but at  times they  are read  as vice versa. To  carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found  necessary to  read the conjunctions ’or’ and  "and"   one  for   the  other.   The  substitution   of conjunctions  however,   has  been  sometimes  made  without sufficient reason  and it  has been  doubted whether some of the cases of turning ’or’ into ’and’ and vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation. [917 A-Cl      Green v.  Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R. [1928] 1 K. B. 561  at 568;  Mersey Docks  & Harbour  Board v. Henderson L.R. [1888] 13 A.C. 603, referred to.      2.  (a)   Various  categories   of  ’adulterated  food’ mentioned in  s. 2(i)  (f) broadly  fall into  two kinds  of adulteration; firstly  where the  constituent elements  make the food  obnoxious to  human health or the existence of the particular  composition   of  it,   itself  makes  the  food ’adulterated’  and   secondly,  where  the  adulteration  is constituted by the fact that the prescribed standard has not been observed  in selling what purports to be a food of that standard or quality. [917 D-E]      (b) Mere proof of an article of food like decomposed or diseased meat  r rotten fish or putrid fruits and vegetables by the  condition of  the articles  should be  sufficient to attract the  definition of  "adulterated"  contained  in  s. 2(i)(f) and  further proof of ’unfitness of the articles for

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human consumption’  still is not necessary for bringing home the guilt. [917E-F]      (c) Thy  decision in  Kacheroo Mal’s  case  is  however distinguishable inasmuch  as there  was no evidence that the cashew nuts,  which were  insect-infested to  the extent  of 21.9 per  cent, were  unfit for human consumption. In regard to cashew nuts there was, at the material time, no statutory provision prescribing  any minimum  standards of  purity. It was, therefore, for the Court to decide upon the evidence in the same,  whether the  insect infestation found was of such nature and extent as to make it unfit for human consumption. [917 F-H] 912      (d) Assuming  the test  in Kacheroo  Mal’s case  to  be correct, and  the report  of the Public Analyst to be just a piece of  evidence which has to be evaluated by the Court in the facts and circumstances of each particular case to reach a finding as to the unfitness or otherwise of the sample for human  consumption,  there  is  in  the  present  case,  the evidence of  respondent’s own witness Dr. B. D. Narang DW.1. In view  of clear  evidence, two  of the  samples of  cashew purchased from  the  respondent,  which  were  Found  to  be insect-infested to  the extent of 20.6 per cent and 20.7 per cent are  "adulterated" within  the meaning  of section 2(i) (f). [918 A-D]      (e) Part  IX of  the Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration Rules, 1955  deals with  the conditions of sale and licence. Rule 50  states. that  no person  shall  manufacture,  sell, stock, distribute  or exhibit  for sale  the article of food mentioned therein  except under  a licence. "Nuts" is one of the articles  mentioned therein.  It is  wide and  enough to include cashew  nuts. Originally the Rules did not prescribe the standards  of quality  or purity  in  relation  to  dry- fruits. That  lacuna has.  however, now  been removed by the insertion of Rule 48B. [920A-B]      3. In  the instant  case (a) there is no proof that the samples were  taken from  tins  bearing  the  manufacturer’s label guaranteeing  purity of  goods, nor  is there any such warranty in  the invoice  Ext. DE3/A.  There is  nothing  to substantiate this  fact, and  even if  it were  so, it is of little consequence. [921 D-E]      (b) The  word "good"  merely contains  a description of the goods.  The word  "good"  is  not  warranty  as  to  the quality. The  respondent is,  therefore,  it  not  protected under section  19(2) of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 read with r. 12A of the rules framed under the Act. [921 E-F]      Ranganath Reddiar  v. The  State of Kerala [1970] 1 SCR 864; Andhra  Pradesh Grain  & Seed Merchants’ Association v. Union of India [1971] SCR 166, distinguished.      R. G. Pamanani v. The State of Maharashtra [1975] 2 SCR 886, applied.      4. The provisions of Section 20AA inserted by Act 34 of 1976 interdicts  the Court  from applying  the provisions of section 4  of the  Probation of  offenders Act,  1958  to  a prosecution under  the Prevention of Food Adulteration: Act, 1954. [921G]      [Keeping in  view of  the provisions  of Section  16 of POFA, 1954  giving the  Court the discretion for special and adequate reasons under proviso to subsection (1) not to pass a sentence  of  imprisonment  and  considering  the  age  of respondent The  Court sentenced the respondent to the period already undergone and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/.]

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JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 1973.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  26-5-1972  of  the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 177/71.      V. S.  Desai, B.  P. Maheshwari,  Suresh Sethi  and  B. Bhaduraj for the Appellant. 913      O. P.  Soni, S. N. Mehta, Miss Kamlesh and V. D. Chopra for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J. In this appeal, on certificate, from a judgment of  the   Delhi  High  Court,  by  which  it  acquitted  the respondent of an offence punishable under s. 16 ( 1 ) (a) of the Prevention  of Food  Adulteration  Act,  1954,  for  the alleged contravention  of s.  7(1)  thereof,  two  questions arise, namely  (1) whether  even though  the Public  Analyst found in  one of  the reports,  Ext. PE  that  a  particular sample of  cashew nuts  purchased from the respondent’s shop was ’insect-infested’  to the  extent of  20.6 per  cent and that it  contained  living  insects,  that  circumstance  by itself was  not sufficient  to warrant a conviction, and (2) whether the  respondent was protected by sub-s. (2) of s. 19 of the  Act inasmuch  as he had purchased the cashew nuts in scaled tins  from a  dealer in cashew nuts under the invoice Ext. DW  3/A, which  contained a description of the goods as ’SW Best Bormia’.      The facts  of  the  prosecution  case  are  these.  The respondent is  a partner  of the  firm M/s.  Narain Dass Tek Chand, Khari  Baoli, Delhi. The firm is engaged in wholesale business in  dry-fruits including  cashew nuts which it gets from  different  manufacturers.  On  August  1,  1968  three samples of  cashew nuts  were taken from its shop by the two Food Inspectors,  S. L. Mehra, P.W. 1 and H. K. Bhanot, P.W. 3 from  three  sealed  tins  supplied  by  Sri  Venkateswara Cashews, Panruti.  These samples  were duly forwarded to the Public Analyst,  Delhi who by his three reports dated August 3, 1968  in Form III, Exts. PE, PE/1 and PE/2 found that all the three  samples taken  were ’insect-infested’.  Of these, two were  insect-infested to  the extent Fr of 20.6 and 20.7 per cent and the third to the extent of 5.63 Per cent.      The  Magistrate   1st  Class,   Delhi   acquitted   the respondent holding  (1) that  the respondent  was a sleeping partner residing  at Kanpur,  and that  there was nothing to show that  he was  incharge of  and was  responsible for the conduct of  the business which was carried on at the shop of the firm  at Khari Baoli, Delhi; (2) that alternatively, the invoice Ext.  DW 3/A  produced by the respondent contained a warranty which absolved him from liability, and (3) that the ratio of  living insects  to dead  insects not  having  been given  in  the  Public  Analyst’s  report,  there  being  no evidence to  show that  the cashew  nuts  in  question  were deleterious to health, and if so, how much harmful effect it would have upon the health of a person consuming them, 4-743 SCI/79 914 the mere  fact of  the cashew nuts being insect-infested was not sufficient to bring home the charge.      The Delhi High Court without going into the question as to whether  the respondent was protected under sub-s. (2) of s. 19,  maintained the  order  of  acquittal,  holding  that merely because  an article  of food  is insect-infested,  it cannot be  treated as ’adulterated’ within the meaning of s. 2(i) (f)  of the  Act unless  it is  further  proved  to  be

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’otherwise unfit  for human  consumption’ within the meaning of  the   section  following  its  decision  in  Dhanraj  v. Municipal Corporation  of Delhi.(l) In that view, it did not touch upon  the other  question namely,  whether the invoice Ext. DW  3/A was sufficient warranty in law as to the purity of the article of food sold.      The term ’adulterated’ as defined in s. 2(i) (f) reads:           "(f) if  the article consists wholly or in part of      any filthy,  putrid,  rotten,  decomposed  or  diseased      animal or  vegetable substance or is insect-infested or      is otherwise unfit for human consumption."      In Dhanraj’s case (supra) the High Court construed sub- cl. (f) thus:           "The word ’otherwise’ in sub-clause (f) of cl. (1)      of sec.  2 does  suggest that  all the  adjectives used      earlier refer to the quality of the article being unfit      for human consumption. To fall under that sub-clause an      article of  food must  be unfit  for human  consumption      because it  consists wholly  or in  part of  any fifty,      putrid,  disgusting,  rotten,  decomposed  or  diseased      animal or vegetable substance or because it is  insect-      infested or on. account of any other cause."      We are  of the  opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong in  its interpretation  of s.  2(i) (f).  On the plain language of  the definition  section, it  is quite  apparent that the words ’or is otherwise unfit for human consumption’ are disjunctive  of the rest of the words preceding them. It relates to  a distinct  and separate  class  altogether.  It seems to  us that the last clause ’or is otherwise unfit for human consumption’  is residuary provision which would apply to a  case not  covered by  or falling  squarely within  the clauses  preceding   it.  If   the  phrase  is  to  be  read disjunctively the  mere proof  of the  article of food being ’filthy, putrid,  rotten, decomposed....or  insect-infested’ would be  per se  sufficient to  bring the  case within  the purview of the word 915 ‘adulterated’ as  defined in sub-cl. (f) and it would not be necessary A  ’ in  such a  case to  prove further  that  the article of food was unfit for human consumption.      It is,  however,  pointed  out  that  the  construction placed by  the High  Court in Dhanraj’s case upon s. 2(i)(f) of the  Act has been received with approval by this Court in Municipal Corporation  of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal.(l) where it is observed  that ’the construction placed by the High Court in Dhanraj’s  case is  the correct  exposition  of  the  law embodied in  s. 2(i)  (f). It  is  added  for  the  sake  of elucidation that the adjectives which precede the phrase ’or is  otherwise   unfit  for   human   consumption’   indicate presumptive but  not absolute  criteria as to the quality of the article  of food. If we may say so with respect, we have reservations about  the correctness of this decision, but it is not necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench.      In Kacheroo Mal’s case it is observed:           "The phrase  "or  is  otherwise  unfit  for  human      consumption" can  be  read  conjunctively  as  well  as      disjunctively. If it is read conjunctively, that is, in      association with  what precedes it, sub-clause (f) with      slight consequent  rearrangement and  parenthesis would      read like  this: "If  the article  is unfit  for  human      consumption on  account of (a) its consisting wholly or      in part  of any  filthy,  putrid,  disgusting,  rotten,      decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or      being insect-infested,  (b) or  oh account of any other      cause". In  this  view  of  the  sub-clause,  proof  of

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    unfitness of  the article  for human  consumption’ is a      must for bringing the case within its purview.           If the  pharse is  to be  read disjunctively,  the      mere proof  of the  whole or  any part  of the  article      being  "filthy,   putrid,  disgusting,   rotten....  Or      insect-infested" would  be conclusive to bring the case      within the  mischief of  this sub-clause,  and it would      not be  necessary in  such a case to prove further that      the article was unfit for human consumption.           We would  prefer  the  first  construction  as  it      comports best  with reason, commonsense, realities, the      tenor of this provision and the main purpose and scheme      of  the   Act.  The   adjectives  "filthy",   "putrid",      "disgusting", "decomposed",  "rotten"....  ’’insect-in-      fested’’ refer to the quality of the 916      article and  furnish  the  indicia  for  presuming  the      article to  be unfit  for human  consumption.  But  the      presumption  may   not  be  conclusive  in  all  cases,      irrespective of  the character  of the article, and the      nature and  extent of  the vice  afflicting it. This is      particularly so,  where  an  article  is  found  to  be      ’insect-infested’." With utmost  respect, we are not able to share this view and would hold that the observations made in the judgment should be confined to the particular facts of that case.      The decision in Kacheroo Mal’s case (supra) was largely based on  the circumstances that the standard of quality and purity was  not prescribed  in respect  of cashew  nuts. Now that r.  48-B of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 has  been framed,  the decision  in Kacheroo Mal’s case (supra) is rendered inapplicable.      In the  definition clause,  the  collocation  of  words ’filthy, putrid,  rotten,  decomposed  and  insect-infested’ which are  adjectives qualifying  the term  ’an  article  of food’, show  that it  is not  of the  nature, substance  and quality fit  for human  consumption. It will be noticed that there is  a comma  after each  of the  first three words. It should also be noted that these qualifying adjectives cannot be read  into the  last portion  of the definition i.e., the words ’or  is otherwise  unfit for human consumption’, which is  quite  separate  and  distinct  from  others.  The  word ’otherwise’ signifies unfitness for human consumption due to other causes. If the last portion is meant to mean something different, it  becomes difficult  to understand how the word ’or’ as  used in  the definition of ’adulterated’ in s. 2(i) (f) between  ’filthy, putrid,  rotten etc.’  and  ’otherwise unfit for  human consumption’ could have been intended to be used conjunctively.  It would  be more  appropriate  in  the context to  read  it  disjunctively.  In  Stroud’s  Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., vol. 1, it is stated st p. 135:           "And" has  generally a cumulative sense, requiring      the fulfillment  of all  the conditions  that it  joins      together, and  herein  it  is  the  antithesis  of  OR.      Sometimes, however,  even in  such a connection, it is,      by force of a context, read as "or"."      While dealing  with the  topic ’OR  is read as AND, and vice versa’ Stroud says in vol. 3, at p. 2009:           "You will  find it  said in  some cases  that ’or’      means ’and’; but ’or’ never does mean ’and’." 917 Similarly, in  Maxwell on  Interpretation of  Statutes, 11th Edn., p.  229- A 30, it has been accepted that ’to carry out the intention  of the  legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to  read the  conjunctions "or"  and "and" one for

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the other’.  The word ’or’ is normally disjunctive and ’and’ is normally  conjunctive, but at times they are read as Vice versa. As  Scrutton L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co.(’).  ’you do  sometimes read  ’or’ as  ’and’ in  a statute. ..  But you  do not  do it  unless you are obliged, because ’or’  does not  generally mean  ’and’ and ’and’ does not generally  mean ’or’.  As Lord Halsbury L.C. Observed in Marsey Docks  & Harbour Board v. Henderson(’) the reading of ’or’ as  ’and’ is  not to  be resorted to "unless some other part of  the same  statute or  the  clear  intention  of  it requires that to be done". The substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes made without sufficient reasons, and it  has been  doubted whether  some of  cases of turning ’or’ into  ’and’ and vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation.      Various categories  of ’adulterated  food’ mentioned in s. 2(i)  (f) broadly  fall into  two kinds  of adulteration; firstly,  where  the  constituent  elements  make  the  food obnoxious to human health or the existence of the particular composition of  it, itself makes the food ’adulterated’, and secondly, where  the adulteration is constituted by the fact that the  prescribed  standard  has  not  been  observed  in selling what  purports to  be a  food of  that  standard  or quality.      We really  fail to  comprehend why the mere proof of an article of  food like  decomposed or diseased meat or rotten fish or putrid fruits and vegetables by the condition of the article itself  should not  be  sufficient  to  attract  the definition of  ’adulterated’ contained  in  s.  2(i)(f)  and further  proof  of  ’unfitness  of  the  article  for  human consumption’ is still necessary for bringing home the guilt.      The  decision  in  Kacheroo  Mal’s  case  is,  however, distinguishable inasmuch  as  there  was  in  that  case  no evidence that the cashew nuts, which were insect-infested to the  extent   of  21.9   per  cent,  were  unfit  for  human consumption.      In regard  to casew  nuts there  was, at  the  material time,  no   statutory  provision   prescribing  any  minimum standards of  purity. It  is, therefore,  for the  Court  to decide upon  the evidence  in the  case, whether  the insect infestation found  was of  such nature and extent as to make it unfit for human consumption. Assuming the test in 918 Kacheroo Mal’s  case to  be correct,  and the  report of the Public Analyst  to be  just a piece of evidence which has to be evaluated  by the Court in the facts and circumstances of each particular  case to reach a finding as to the unfitness or otherwise  of the  sample for human y. consumption, there is in  the present  case such evidence. Dr. B. D. Narang, DW 1, examined  by the respondent, is an expert on the subject, being a  member of  the Central  Committee of Food Standards besides  holding   Ph.  D.  degree  in  Chemistry  from  the University of  Texas. He  unequivocally states that although in regard  to  cashew  nuts,  there  was  at  that  time  no statutory provision  prescribing  any  minimum  standard  of purity, the Committee had recommended to allow a 10 per cent insect infestation  as it  was of  the view  that this  much infestation should  not be  taken as  an act of adulteration since it  was not  harmful to  human consumption. In view of this dear  evidence, two  of  the  samples  of  cashew  nuts purchased from  the  respondent,  which  were  found  to  be insect-infested to  the extent  of 20.6  and 20.7  per cent, must be  held to  be ’adulterated’  within the meaning of s. 2(i) (f).  There is  no reason  for us  not to  act upon the testimony  of  Dr.  Narang,  who  is  the  respondent’s  own

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witness.      That takes  us to  the next  ground namely  whether the respondent  having   sold  cashew   nuts  from  sealed  tins purchased  from   the  supplier  Sri  Venkateswara  Cashews, Panruti  under   the  invoice   Ext.  DW   3/A  bearing  the description that  they were ’SW Best Borma’ cashew nuts, was protected under s. 19(2) of the Act which reads:           "19. (2)  A vendor  shall not  be deemed  to  have      committed an  offence pertaining  to the  sale  of  any      adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves-      (a) that he purchased the article of food-           (i)   in a  case where a licence is prescribed for                the  sale   thereof,  from  a  duly  licensed                manufacturer, distributor or dealer;           (ii) in  any other  case, from  any  manufacturer,                distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and      (a)   that the  article of food while in his possession           was properly  stored and  that he  sold it  in the           same state as he purchased it."      There can  be no  doubt that M/s. Narain Dass Tek Chand had    purchased  the  cashew  nuts  in  question  from  Sri Venkateswara Cashews.  Ramesh Chand,  DW 3,  manager of  the firm states  that the  goods are  purchased and  sold by the firm in wholesale at its shop at Khari 919 Baoli, Delhi.  According to  this  witness,  all  the  three partners of the firm reside at Kanpur. They come to Delhi in a month or two for scrutinising the accounts. He states that the cashew nuts were purchased under the invoice Ext. DW 3/A and they  were of  ’SW’ mark.  We are left to guess what the letters ’SW or ’SW Best Borma’ signify.      It is,  however, strenuously  urged  that  the  invoice describes the  cashew nuts  to he  ’SW Best  Borma’ and this amounts to  a warranty  as to  quality. Strong  reliance  is placed on  the decision of this Court in Ranghanatha Reddiar v. The  State of  Kerala(1) and  Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seed Merchants’  Association   v.  Union   of  India(2)  for  the contention that  if an  article of  food is sold in the same condition in which it was purchased from the manufacturer or dealer, the  vendor i.e.,  the retailer, like the respondent will not  lose the  protection  of  sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  19, particularly when  it is certified to be of good quality. We are afraid  we cannot appreciate this line of reasoning. The two decisions  in Ranganatha  Raddiar’s case  and in  Andhra Pradesh  Grain   &  Seed   Merchants’   case   are   clearly distinguishable. In the former case, the cash memo contained the words  ’quality is  up to the mark’ which meant that the quality of  the article  supplied was  up  to  the  standard required by the Act and the vendee. It was observed:           "It must  be remembered  that it is not a document      drafted by  a solicitor;  it is  a document  using  the      language of  a tradesman.  Any tradesman,  when  he  is      assured that  the quality  of the  article is up to the      mark will  readily conclude  that he  is being  assured      that the article is not adulterated." In the latter case, it was a branded article of food, and it was said:           "If the  article of  food  is  sold  in  the  same      condition in  which it  was purchased  from a  licensed      manufacturer  or   dealer,  or  was  purchased  with  a      warranty, the  vendor will  not lose  the protection of      sub-s. (2)  of s.  19  merely  because  he  opened  the      container. If  the vendor has obtained the article from      a licensed  manufacturer, distributor or dealer or from

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    a manufacturer,  distributor or dealer with a warranty,      he is  protected, provided  he has  properly stored the      article and  sells it in the same state as he purchased      the article,  even if it turns out that the article was      adulterated or misbranded." In the  absence of  any evidence  that  the  respondent  had purchased the  cashew nuts under warranty, these authorities are of no avail. 920      Part IX  of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration Rules 1955 deals  with the conditions of sale and licence. Rule 50 states  that  no  person  shall  manufacture,  sell,  stock, distribute  or   exhibit  for  sale  the  articles  of  food mentioned therein  except under  a licence  ’Nuts’ is one of the articles mentioned therein. It is wide enough to include cashew nuts.  originally the  rules did  not  prescribe  the standards of  quality or  purity in  relation to dry-fruits. That lacuna  has, however, now been removed by the insertion of r. 48-B, which is in these terms:           "48-B.  Sale  of  insect-damaged  dry  fruits  and      nuts.-The dry  fruits and  nuts like raisins, currents,      figs, cashewnuts,  apricots, almonds  may  contain  not      more than S per cent of insect-damaged fruits and nuts,      by count."           Rule 12A which deals with warranty reads thus:           "Rule  12-A.   Warranty-Every  trader  selling  an      article of  food to  a vendor  shall, if  the vendor so      requires, deliver  to the vendor a warranty in Form VI-      A:           Provided that  no warranty  in such  form shall be      necessary if  the label  on the  article of food or the      cash memo  delivered by  the trader  to the  vendor  in      respect of  that article contains a warranty certifying      that the  food contained in the package or container or      mentioned in  the cash  memo is  the  same  in  nature,      substance and quality as demanded by the vendor.           Explanation:  The  term  ’trader’  shall  mean  an      importer,  manufacturer,   wholesale   dealer   or   an      authorised  agent  of  such  importer  manufacturer  or      wholesale dealer." Admittedly, there  was no warranty in the prescribed form in the instant  case. The testimony of the two Food Inspectors, S. L.  Mehra, PW  1, and  H. K.  Bhanot, PW 3, no doubt show that they  bought the  samples out  of the  sealed tins, but there is  nothing to  show that  they were  tins bearing the manufacturer’s label guaranteeing purity.      In R.  G. Pamanani  v. The State of Maharashtra(1) this Court after  distinguishing  Andhra  Pradesh  Grain  &  Seed Merchants’ case observed:           "The reason why a warranty is required in both the      cases contemplated  in section  19(2)(a)(i) and (ii) is      that if  warranty were  not to  be insisted upon by the      statue and  if a  vendor would  be permitted  to have a      defence merely by stat- 921      ing that the vendor purchased the goods from a licensed      manufacturer,  distributor  or  dealer  adulterated  or      misbranded articles would be marketed by manufacturers,      distributor, dealers  as well  as purchasers  from them      with impunity.  That  is  why  a  written  warranty  is      enjoined in  both the  cases in  section 19 (2) (a) (i)      and (ii) . Section 19 (2) (a) of the Act will provide a      defence where  a vendor purchases articles of food from      a licensed  manufacturer, distributor  or dealer with a      written warranty  in  the  prescribed  form.  Again,  a

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    vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence      pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded      article of  food if  he proves  that he  purchased  the      article from  any manufacturer,  distributor or  dealer      with e  written warranty  in the prescribed form. These      salutary provisions  are designed for the health of the      nation. Therefore,  a warranty  is enjoined.  No laxity      should be permitted." (Emphasis supplied).      That, in  our opinion,  really concludes the matter. In the instant  case, there  is no  proof that the samples were taken   from   tins   bearing   the   manufacturer’s   label guaranteeing purity of goods, nor is there any such warranty in the  invoice Ext.  DW 3/A. It is, however, urged that the tins  bore   the  imprint   "Good".  There   is  nothing  to substantiate this  fact, and  even if  it were  so, it is of little consequence.  The word ’Good’ on which great emphasis is placed merely contains a description of the goods. At the most it  amounts to  ’puffing of  goods’. The word ’Good’ is not a  warranty as to quality. The respondent is, therefore, not protected  under s.  19(2) of  the  Prevention  of  Food Adulteration Act,  1954 read with r. 12A of the rules framed under the Act.      The result,  therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The order of acquittal of the respondent is set aside, and  he is  convicted for having committed an offence punishable under  s. 16(1)  (a) read  with s.  7(1)  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.      The contention  that the  respondent should be released on probation  of good conduct under s. 4 of the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 cannot be accepted. The provisions of s. 20 AA  inserted by  Act 34 of 1976 intendicts the Court from applying the  provisions of  that Act to a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.      While we  agree that adulteration of an article of food is a  serious social  offence which  must  be  visited  with exemplary punishment, 922 it will  be rather  harsh to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the  facts and circumstances of this case. Under s. 16 of the Prevention  of Food  Adulteration Act, 1954, as in force at the  material time,  the Court  had  the  discretion  for special and adequate reasons under proviso to sub s. (1) not to pass a sentence of imprisonment. In the instant case, the respondent is a man aged 75 years. The offence was committed on August  1, 1968  i.e., more  than eleven  years ago.  The order of  acquittal was  based on  the decision of the Delhi High Court  in Dhanraj’s  case. The  samples were taken from sealed tins.  These are  all  mitigating  circumstances.  We accordingly refrain  from passing  a substantive sentence of imprisonment and  instead sentence  the  respondent  to  the period already  undergone and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- or in default  to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. V.D.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 923