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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R. SAHARI, GENL. MANAGER, DAURALA SUGAR MILLS, DAURALA & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/03/1979

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1544            1979 SCR  (3) 625  1979 SCC  (2) 387

ACT:      Prevention of Food Adulteration Act-Sections 20 & 20-A- Scope of

HEADNOTE:      Toffees sold  by a  vender to  a Food  Inspector having been found  to  be  adulterated,  prosecution  was  launched against him.  The vendor  produced a  warranty in  the Trial Court  as  a  result  of  which  he  was  acquitted  by  the Magistrate. The  Magistrate however  directed notice  to the respondents under  section  20-A  for  being  impleaded  and prosecuted on the grounds that the articles manufactured and distributed the  them were  adulterated.  On  revision,  the Session Judge  dismissed the same but on further revision to the High  Court, it  allowed the  revision and set aside the order of the Magistrate,      In the  other two  Criminal Appeals  Nos. 166  & 167 of 1972, the appellants were impleaded under section 20A before the acquittal  of the  last seller and that order was upheld by the  High Court.  On the  question whether the magistrate was entitled  to implead  the distributors  or manufacturers under s.  20A even after acquitting the seller on the ground that he was protected by a warranty.      Dismissing the appeals ^      HELD  :The   opening  lines   of  section  20A  clearly contemplate   a    contingency   where   the   discretionary jurisdiction under this Act can be exercised only during the trial of any offence, i.e. the stage at which the magistrate can exercise  his jurisdiction  under this  section must  be before the  trial has  concluded and  ended in  acquittal or conviction. A combined reading of section 20A and 20 is that where a  distributor or  manufacturer or any other person is impleaded in  the course of a trial, the obligation to get a fresh sanction  for such  a person is dispensed with and the sanction obtained  for the  last seller  in the  trial, will ensure for  the benefit  of the  prosecution  of  the  other person impleaded.  Therefore protection of section 20 is not available if  the parties  concerned are impleaded after the trial was over. The special statutory concession is given to the prosecution  only if  the conditions mentioned in s. 20A are fulfilled and not otherwise. [627B-C, F-H]

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    V. N.  Kamdar v. Municipal Corpration of Delhi [1974] 1 S.C.R. 157 followed.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal Nos. 152-153 of 1972.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 426/68 and 5/70.                             AND                CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 166-167 OF 1972      From the  Judgment and  Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 72-73/68. 626      Soli J.  Sorabji, Addl.  Sol. Genl.  of  India,  B.  P. Maheshwari and  Suresh Sethi  for the  Appellant in  Crl. A. Nos. 152-153/72.      V. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwala for RR 4 in Crl. A. 152/72.      H. K. Puri for RR. 3 in Crl. A.153/72      Mrs. Urmila Sirur for RR. 3 in Crl. A. No. 152/72.      B. K.  Jaggi for  the Appellant  in Crl.  A.  No.  166- 167/72.      H. S.  Marwah and  M. N. Shroff for RR. in Crl. A. Nos. 166-167/72.      B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Intervener.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI, J. These appeals by certificate arise out of a common  Judgment delivered  by the High Court of Delhi and will be  disposed of  by us by one judgment. In Appeals Nos. 152-153/72,  one   Gian  Singh  sold  toffees  to  the  Food Inspector and as the toffees were found to be adulterated, a prosecution was  launched against  him under  S. 7/16 of the Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act. Gian  Singh, however, produced in  course of  the trial  a warranty  given by  the distributors and  manufacturers as  a result  of  which  the Magistrate  acquitted   accused  Gian  Singh.  After  having acquitted Gian  Singh, the Magistrate issued notice under S. 20A  against   the  Respondents   for  being  impleaded  and prosecution on  the ground that the articles manufactured by the distributors  were adulterated.  The respondents went up in revision  to the  Sessions Judge which was dismissed. But on further revision to the High Court the High Court allowed the petition  and set  aside the  order  of  the  Magistrate impleading the  respondents. In  the other  two appeals i.e. Crl. Appeals  Nos. 166  and 167/1972, the manufacturers were impleaded under  S. 20A  before the  acquittal of  the  last seller and  that order  was upheld  by the  High Court  and, hence these appeals before us by the appellants.      The  common   question   of   law   that   arises   for consideration in  all these  appeals is:  whether or not the Magistrate  is  entitled  to  implead  the  distributors  or manufacturers under  S. 20A  even after  acquitting the last seller on  the ground that he is protected by a warranty. In other words,  the question  for decision  in  these  appeals turns upon  the interpretation  of S.  20A and  S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. S. 20A runs thus:-           "Where at any time during the trial of any offence      under this  Act, alleged  to have been committed by any      person, not 627      being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any of      food, the  Court is  satisfied, on the evidence adduced      before  it,  that  such  manufacturer,  distributor  or

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    dealer is  also concerned  with the  offence, then  the      Court may,  notwithstanding anything  contained in sub-      section(1) of S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,      1898, or  in Section 20 proceed against him as though a      prosecution had  been instituted  against him  under S.      20". The  opening   lines  of   S.  20A   clearly  contemplate  a contingency where  the discretionary jurisdiction under this Act can  be exercised  only during the trial of any offence, that is  to say,  the stage  at  which  the  Magistrate  can exercise his  discretion under  this Section  must be before the  trial   has  concluded   and  ended   in  acquittal  or conviction. S. 20 which precedes S. 20-A runs thus:-           "S. 20  (1) No  prosecution for  an offence  under      this Act,  not being  an offence under S. 14 or section      14A, shall  be instituted  except by  or  with  written      consent  of   the  Central   Government  or  the  State      Government or  a person  authorised in  this behalf, by      general or  special order, by the Central Government or      the State Government;           Provided that  a prosecution  for an offence under      this Act  may be  instituted by a purchaser referred to      in section  12, if  he produces  in court a copy of the      report of the public analyst alongwith the complaint.           (2) No  court inferior  to that  of a Metropolitan      Magistrate or  a Judicial Magistrate of the first class      shall try any offence under this Act.           (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code      of Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  an  offence  punishable      under  subsection   (IAA)  of   Section  16   shall  be      cognizable and non-bailable". A combined  reading of  S. 20A  and S.  20 is  that where  a distributor or manufacturer or any other person is impleaded in the  course of  a trial,  the obligation  to get  a fresh sanction for  such person is dispensed with and the sanction obtained for  the last  seller in  the trial will ensure for the benefit of the prosecution of the other person impleaded also and  no further  sanction is  necessary. It is manifest that this  special statutory  concession  is  given  to  the prosecution only  if the  conditions mentioned in S. 20A are fulfilled and  not otherwise. In other words, the protection of S.  20 is not available to the prosecution if the parties concerned are  impleaded after  the trial is over. In such a case, a  fresh trial  will have  to be  started by obtaining sanction under 628 S. 20.  This matter  is no longer res integra as it has been fully considered  by this Court in V. N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi(1) where this Court observed as follows:-           "....In order  that the  manufacturer, distributor      or  dealer  may  be  impleaded  under  S.  20A,  it  is      necessary that  there should  be a trial for an offence      committed under  the Act  by  a  person  and  that  the      manufacturer, distributor  or dealer  must be concerned      in the offence. When once the manufacturer, distributor      or dealer  is impleaded, the trial proceeds as if he is      also an  accused in the case. That is made clear by the      closing words  of the section. As already indicated, no      prosecution  for  an  offence  under  the  Act  can  be      instituted by  a Food  Inspector without  the  sanction      specified in  S. 20.... The real purpose of enacting S.      20A is  to  avoid.  as  far  as  possible,  conflicting      findings. If, in the prosecution instituted against the      vendor, it  is found  that  the  vendor  has  sold  the      article of  food in  the same  state as he purchased it

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    and that while it was in his possession it was properly      stored, and  the vendor  is acquitted,  it  would  look      rather ridiculous  if in  the prosecution  against  the      manufacturer, distributor or dealer, it is found on the      evidence that  he did  not give  a false  warranty, but      that the  article was  not stored properly while it was      in the possession of the vendor or that he did not sell      the article  in the same stage as he purchased it. This      being so, the object of the legislature in enacting the      section will  be frustrated  if a  Magistrate  were  to      exercise  his   discretion  improperly  by  failing  to      implead the  manufacturer, distributor  or dealer under      S. 20A in a case where he should be impleaded. But that      is no  reason  to  hold  that  a  separate  prosecution      against the  manufacturer, distributor  or dealer would      be barred,  if he  is not  impleaded under  s. 20A, and      tried along  with the  person who  is alleged  to  have      committed an  offence under  the Act. In order to avoid      multiplicity of  proceedings and  conflict of findings,      it is  imperative that   the  Magistrate should implead      these persons under S. 20A whenever the conditions laid      down in  the section  are satisfied. As I said, it is a      far cry  from this to say that if this is not done, the      manufacturer,  distributor   or  dealer  would  get  an      immunity from a separate prosecution." For  these   reasons,  therefore,   and  in  the  facts  and circumstances of  the case  so far  as Cr.  Appeals No. 152- 153/1972 are concerned, the 629 Magistrate had  no jurisdiction  to implead  the respondents after having   concluded  the trial  by the acquittal of the last seller.  Similarly, the  Magistrate was fully justified in Crl.  Appeals  No.  166  and  167/72  in  impleading  the appellants during  the course  of the trial as the trial was still continuing  and the  case would,  therefore,  squarely fall under  S. 20A  of the Act and no further sanction would be necessary.  For these reasons, therefore, all the appeals are dismissed. N.K.A.                                    Appeals dismissed. 630