29 September 1975
Supreme Court
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Vs KACHEROO MAL

Bench: SARKARIA,RANJIT SINGH
Case number: Appeal Criminal 174 of 1971


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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KACHEROO MAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/09/1975

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1976 AIR  394            1976 SCR  (2)   1  1976 SCC  (1) 412  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC 621  (22)  RF         1980 SC 360  (8,9,10,14,15)  RF         1982 SC1095  (2)  RF         1983 SC 506  (2)  OPN        1985 SC 741  (9,10,11)  E&F        1989 SC1011  (7)

ACT:      Interpretation of  stature Suppress  the  mischief  and advance the  remedy-Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act-S. 2(i)(f)-Proof of  sample being  insect  infested  enough  or whether further proof of being unfit  for human consumption- Meaning of  insect infested-Wheher  insects must be living.

HEADNOTE:      The  Food   Inspector  purchased  cashewnut  pieces  as sample-for analysis from the grocery shop of the respondent. The sample  was sent to the Public Analyst who reported that the cashewnuts  were insect  infested. After receiving - the report from the Public Analyst the Food Inspector prosecuted the respondent  in- respect  of an  offence under  s. 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The trial  Magistrate convicted and sentenced the respondent to 6 months rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Res. pondent’s appeal before the Sessions Judge failed.      A revision  filed by  the respondent  before  the  High Court succeeded.  The High  Court held that since it was not proved that  the sample  contained living  insects, the same could not  be called ’insect infested’ within the meaning of s. 2(i)(f) of the Act. The High Court held that the presence of living  insect is  necessary before  an article  could be called insect  infested. According  to the  High  Court  the intention of  the  Legislature  was  that  at  the  time  of analysis infestation  by insects should be present. The High Court further  observed  that  if  only  dead  insects  were present the  sample could  be called  insect damaged and not insect infested.  Since the report of the Public Analyst did not show  the presence  of living  insects it  was concluded that the  same could not be said to be adulterated. The High Court, thus, set aside the conviction of the respondent.      S. 2(i)(f) reads as under.:           "If the  article consists wholly or in part of any

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    filthy,  putrid,   disgusting,  rotten,  decomposed  or      diseased animal  or vegetable  substance or  is  insect      infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption."      On appeal by special leave the appellant contended: (i) the construction  of the expression insect infested given by the High  Court was  wrong and  that it  was contrary  to  a Division Bench  judgment of  the same High Court in the case of Dhanraj;  (ii) in  the case of food articles for which no minimum standard  of purity is prescribed, as in the present case  for  cashewnuts,  the  moment  it  is  proved  that  a proportion or  percentage of  the article  is putrid filthy, disgusting,  decomposed  or  insect-infested,  it  would  be deemed to  be unfit  for human  consumption and,  therefore, ’adulterated’ within  the contemplation  of s  2(i)(f).  and (iii), in  the alternative,  it was  contended  that  it  is implicit in  the report  of  the  Public  Analyst  that  the article in question was found unfit for human consumption.      The respondent on tho contrary contened that mere proof of the  fact that  a sample  sent to  the Public Analyst was found to  be insect  infested could  not  make  the  article ’adulterated’ unless  it was further proved that the article was unfit  for human  consumption. In the present case there is no  proof of  that essential  fact. The Public Analyst in his report  did not  slate that the insect infestation found by him had rendered the article unfit for human consumption. ^      HELD: (1)  The construction put by the High Court on s. 2(i)(f) is  manifestly erroneous. It has been disapproved by a Division  Bench of  the same High Court in Dhanraj’s case. The Act has been enacted to curb the widespread evil of food adulteration and  to ensure  the sale  of wholesome  foot to ‘the  people.   The  language  of  such  statute  should  be construed in a manner which 2 would suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, promote its object, prevent  its subtle  evasion  and  foil  its  artful circumvention. The construction adopted by the High Court is repugnant to  this cardinal rule of interpretation. It would be straining  one’s commonsense  to say  that are article of food  which   is  infested   with  living   insects  and  is consequently unwholesome  for human consumption ceases to be so and  becomes wholesome when these insects die out and the infestation turns into infestation by dead insects. [4B-Dl      (2) The  expression ’insect  infestation’ takes its hue from the  phrase ’unfit  for human consumption’ occurring at the end  of sub-clause.  The decision of Delhi High Court in Dhanraj’s case approved.      The  words   ’or   is   otherwise   unfit   for   human consummation’  can   be  read  con  junctively  as  well  as disjunctively.  The   court   preferred   to   construe   it conjunctively as  it comports best with reason, commonsense, realities, the  tenor of this provision and the main purpose and scheme  of the  Act. The  adjectives ’filthy’, ’putrid’, ’disgusting’, ’decomposed ’rotten’, ’insect-infested’, refer to the  quality of  the article  and furnish the indicia for presuming the  article to  be unfit  for human  consumption. But, the  presumption may  not be  conclusive in  all  cases irrespective of  the character of the article and the nature and the  eaten of  The vice  afflicting it.  There are  some articles of  food in respect of which the rules framed under the  Act   lay  down   the  minimum  proportion  of  insect- infestation, which  is not  deemed to make the article unfit for human consumption. This clearly shows that the more fact that any  part of  tho article was ’insect infested’ may not be conclusive  proof of  his being  adulterated  under  sub-

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clause (f). In the case of an article for which the rules do not prescribe  any minimum standard of purity or any minimum proportion of insect infestation, what would exclude it from the definition  of  adulterated  article  will  be  a  mixed question of law and fact depending on the nature, degree and extent of  the insect  infestation which  would  render  the article unfit  for human  consumption. The  opinion  of  the Public Analyst  who examines  and analysis  the sample as to the fitness or otherwise of the sample for human consumption would constitute  legal evidence.  The report  of the Public Analyst including  his opinion on this point is pee evidence by virtue  of s.  13 of the Act. But this does not mean that his ipsi dixit would be conclusive and binding on the court. To treat  it so  would be  to leave the determination of the guilt of  the accused to the whims and fancies of the Public Analyst. In each case it must be proved that the article was unfit for  human consumption.  In the  case of  articles for which the rules lay down any minimum standard of purity with reference to  any of  the vices specified in sub-clause (f), mere proof  of the  fact that  the impurity was in excess of that countenanced  by  the  prescribed  standard,  would  be conclusive to  show that  the article  was unfit  for  human consumption. There  is  no  statutory  minimum  standard  of purity with  reference to  the vice of insect-infestation or other  adtives  used  in  this  sub-clause  as  far  as  the cashewnuts are  concerned. It  will, therefore,  be for  the Judge of  fact to  decide upon  the evidence  in  the  case, whether the  insect infestation  found was  of such a nature and extent  as to  make  it  unfit  for  human  consumption. Dhanraj’s case  over-ruled in so far as it lays down that if for any  article of  food no  standard quality or Purity has been prescribed  or no  limits have  been prescribed for the variability of  its  constituents,  then  subclause  (f)  of clause (i)  of 6.  2 will not apply The governing ingredient of sub-clause  (f) is the quality of the article being unfit for human consumption. In the instant case the report of the Public Analyst  is silent  as to  whether on  account of the insect infestation found in the sample the article was unfit for human  consumption. Therefore,  it became  necessary  to call the  Public Analysts,  as witnesses,  to enable them to elucidate their  opinion and amplify the report and to allow the parties  to test  it by cross-examination. The court was inclined to  remand the case to the High Court but the court was informed  that the Public Analyst who gave the report is no longer in the appellant’s service, and is not residing at Delhi and that his attendance in court could not be procured without undue  delay and inconvenience. The Court considered it unreasonable  in the  circumstances of the case to remand the case  particularly because it would cause undue hardship to the  respondent who has had more than his normal share of the mental suffering. harassment and expenses which go with 3 protracted criminal  proceedings extending  in  the  present case over  81 months. No useful purpose, therefore, would be served by remanding the case. The  Court did not disturb the acquittal of the respondent. [6D-E &, 7 C-E, & H, 8 B. 9G H, l0A-D].

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDSCTION: Civil  Appeal No. 174 of 1971.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  24th December,  1970 of  Delhi High Court in Crl.

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Revsn No. 120 of h l 970.      S. N.  Andley, F.  S. Nariman,  B. P. Maheshwari, N. K. Jain and Suresh Sethi for the Appellant.      D. Mukherjee and U. P. Singh for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.  This appeal  by special leave is directed against a  judgment of  a learned  single Judge  of the High Court of Delhi. It arises out of these circumstances:      On January  8, 1969,  B.. R.  Kochhar, Food  Inspector, purchases 600  grams  of  Kaju-Tukra  (cashewnut  pieces)-as sample for  analysis from  the grocery shop of Kacheroo Mal, Respondent in  Khari Baoli,  Delhi. The  sample was  divided into three  equal parts  and sealed  into three  bottles. An inventory was  prepared which was read over and explained to the respondent,  who thereafter  signed  it.  One  of  these bottles was given to the respondent, one was retained by the Inspector, while  the third  was handed  over to  the Public Analyst on  the following  day for  examination. The  Public Analyst has reported:           "Date  of   Analysis:  10-1-1969.  Insect-infested      pieces of Kajus: 21.9% and I am of the opinion that the      same is  adulterated due  to insect  infested pieces of      Kajus to the extent of 21.9%."      On the  preceding facts,  the Food  Inspector  filed  a complaint for prosecution of the respondent in respect of an offence under s. 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954 (herein  after called  the Act). The trial Magistrate  convicted and sentenced him for six months rigorous  imprisonment   with  a   fine   of   Rs;   1000/-. Kacheroomal’s appeal  before  the  Additional  District  and Sessions Judge,  failed. Against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge,  he preferred  a revision to the High Court. The revision  was heard  by a  learned Judge  who held  that since no  living insect  was  found  in  the  sample  pieces examined by  the analyst,  the  same  could  not  be  called "insect-infested" within the contemplation of s. 2(i) (f) of the Act.  The learned  Judge was  of the  opinion "that  the presence of  living insects  is necessary  before an article could be  called ’insect  infested". According  to him, "the intention of  the legislature  by  using  this  word  in  s. 2(i)(f) in  the sentence ’if the article is insect infested’ clearly is  that at  the time  of  analysis  infestation  by insects .  should be  present". It was further observed that if only dead insects 4 were-present, the  sample could  be called  ’insect-damaged’ and not  in sect-infested’.  Since the  report of the Public Analyst did not show r the presence of living insects in the Kaju sample pieces, it was concluded that the same could not be  said   to  be  ’adulterated’.  On  this  reasoning,  the revision-petition was allowed and the conviction of Kacheroo Mal was  set aside.  Hence this  appeal,  by  the  Municipal Corporation of Delhi.      Having heard  the learned Counsel on both sides, we are of opinion that the construction put by the learned Judge of the  High  Court  is  manifestly  erroneous..  It  has  been disapproved by  a-Division Bench  of the  same High Court in Dhanraj v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi.(1) Indeed, Mr. D. Mukherji, the learned Counsel for Kacheroo Mal has not tried to support it.      The Act  has  been  enacted  to  curb  and  remedy  the widespread evil of food-adulteration, and to ensure the sale af wholesome  food to  the people.  It is  well-settled that wherever  possible,   without  unreasonable   stretching  or straining  the   language  of  such  a  statute,  should  be

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construed in  a manner  which would  suppress the  mischief, advance the  remedy, promote  its object, prevent its subtle evasion and  foil its artful circumvention. The construction adopted by  the learned  Judge is repugnant to this cardinal rule of  interpretation. With  respect, it is less rational, but too  literal narrow  and pedantic. It would be straining one’s commonsense  to say  that an  article of food which is infested  with   f  living   insects  and   is  consequently unwholesome for  human consumption,  ceases  to  be  so  and becomes wholesome,  when  these  insects  die  out  and  the ’infestation’ turns into an infestation by dead insects. The expression ’insect-infested’  is  to  be  construed  in  the context of  an article  of food meant for human consumption. It  takes   its  hue   from  the  phrase  ’unfit  for  human consumption’ occurring  at the  end of  the subclause.  Thus construed, it  means that the article so abounds in insects, dead  or  living,  that  it  is  rendered  unfit  for  human consumption. We  need not  labour the  point further. It has been lucidly  brought out  by Jagjit  Singh J. who spoke for the Bench  of the  High Court  in Dhanraj’s  case (supra) at page 688  of the report. We fully approve that reasoning and would extract it here:           "The expression  ’insect-infested’ was not defined      in the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act and  has,      therefore, to  be given  its ordinary meaning. The word      ’infest’ appears  to have  been derived  from the latin      word ’infestate’  which  meant  to  assail  or  molest.      According to  the oxford  English Dictionary (Volume V-      at page  259)  the  word  ’infest’  means  ’To  attack,      assail, annoy,  or trouble  (a person  or thing)  in  a      persistent manner,"  "to visit persistently or in large      number for  purposes of  destruction or plunder", "to ,      swarm in  or about,  so as  to be  troublesome". In the      same Dictionary  the word  ’infestation’ is  stated  to      mean: "The  action of  infesting, assailing, harassing,      or persistently mol resting". It is also mentioned that      the word is now used (1) I. L. R. [1970] II Delhi 681. 5      especially for-"insects  which  attack  plants,  grain,      etc. in large swarms". Thus-an article of food would be      "insectinfested", if it has been attacked by insects in      swarms or numbers. It however seems to us that there is      no justification  for the  view that insect-infestation      would only  continue so long as the insects continue to      be alive.  If an article of food is attacked by insects      in large  swarms or  numbers and  for some reason those      insects die,  the mere  fact that  the article  of-food      has; no longer living insects but has dead insects will      not change its character of being insect-infested."      In  view   of  the  construction  that  the  expression ’insect-infested’,  includes   infestation  even   by   dead insects, the further point to be considered is, whether mere insect-infestation, without‘more,  would -  be sufficient to hold the  articIe to  be ’adulterated’ within the meaning of sub-clause (f) of clause (i) of sec. 2 of the Act.      Mr. D.  Mukherji, learned  Counsel for  the  Respondent submits that mere proof of the fact that a certain number of pieces of  the sample  sent to the Public Analyst were found to  be   insect-infested,  could   not  make   the   article "adulterated" in  terms of  the aforesaid  sub-clause (f)  r unless it was proved further. that the article was unfit for human con sumption. It is stressed there is no proof of that essential fact on the record. It is pointed out, that in his report, the  Public Analyst  has not  said that  the insect-

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infestation found  by him had rendered the article unfit for human consumption.  In this  connection, Counsel has invited our attention  to an  application which was made by Kacheroo mal in  the first  appellate Court,  praying that the Public Analyst be  summoned and  examined  as  a  witness  He‘  has further drawn  our attention  to an order, dated 17-12-70 of the High  Court which  shows that  on  the  request  of  Mr. Bashamber Dayal,  Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, the court summoned  Mr. Sudama  Roy and  Mr.  P.  P.  Bhatnagar, Public Analysts  for 21-12-1970. The point sought to be made out is that in this case, the prosecution, the defence and - the High  Court all  felt that  the  report  of  the  Public Analyst was  vague, inadequate  and deficient,  and  in  the absence of  clear proof  of the sample, being unit for human consumption, it  could not  constitute basis for holding the article to be adulterated within the in of sec. 2(i) (f).      As against  the above,  Mr. F.  S. Nariman, the learned Counsel for  the appellant  Corporation submits  that in the case of  food articles  for which  no  minimum  standard  of purity is  prescribed,  the  moment  it  is  proved  that  a proportion  on   percentage  of   the  article-not  being  a proportion or percentage as would be covered by the rule, de minimis  non   curat  lex-is   putrid,  filthy,  disgusting, decomposed or  insect infested,  it would  be deemed  to  be unfit for human consumption and therefore adulterated within the contemplation  of s.  2(i)(f) .  In any ‘ case, proceeds the argument,  it is  implicit in the report of the Public t Analyst that  the article  in question  was found  unfit for human consumption. This implication‘according to the Iearned Counsel,  flows  from  the  Analyst’s  conclusion  that  the article was "adulterated". 6 Counsel has  criticised the  view  taken  by  the  Bench  in Dhanraj’s case  that if  for an article of food, no standard of quality  or purity  has been prescribed or no limits have been prescribed  for the  validity of its constituents, then sub-clause (1)  of clause  (f) of sec. 2 will not apply, and that the  Public Analyst  is not competent to say as to what extent  of   insect-infestation  would   make  the   article "adulterated".      The relevant part of Section 2 reads as under:           "(i) "adulterated"-an article  of  food  shall  be                deemed to . be adulterated-           (a)  to (e) ..  ..  .. ..           (f)  if the  article consists wholly ar in part of                any  filthy,   putrid,  disgusting,   rotten,                decomposed or  diseased animal  or  vegetable                substance  of   is  insect   infested  or  is                otherwise unfit for human consumption".      The  phrase   "or  is   otherwise   unfit   for   human consumption"  can   be  read   conjunctively  as   well   as disjunctively. If  it is  read conjunctively,  that  is,  in association with  what  precedes  it,  sub-clause  (f)  with slight consequent  rearrangement and  parenthesis would read like this: ’If the article is unfit for human consumption on account of  (a) its  consisting wholly  or in  part  of  any filthy, putrid,  disgusting, rotten,  decomposed or diseased animal or  vegetable substance  or being insectinfested, (b) or on  account of any other cause". In this view of the sub- clause,  proof  of  ’unfitness  of  the  article  for  human consumption’, is  a must  for bringing  the case  within its purview.      If the  phrase is  to be  read disjunctively,  the mere proof of the whole or any part of the article being-"fifthy, putrid, disgusting,  rotten ....or insect-infested" would be

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conclusive to  bring the  case within  the mischief  of this sub-clause, and  it would not be necessary in such a case to prove  further   that  the   article  was  unfit  for  human consumption.      We would  prefer the  first construction as it comports best with reason,, commonsense, realities, the tenor of this provision and  the main  purpose and  scheme of the Act. The adjectives   "filthy",    "put-   .    rid",   "disgusting", "decomposed" "rotten"  ..  "insect-infested"  refer  to  the quality of the article and furnish the indicia for presuming the article  to be  unfit for  human  consumption.  But  the presumption  may   not   be   conclusive   in   all   cases, irrespective-of the  character.  of  the  article,  and  the nature and  extent  of  the  vice  afflicting  it.  This  is particularly so,  were an  article is  found to  be ’insect- infested’. There  are some  articles of  food in  respect of which the Rules framed under l the Act, lay down the minimum proportion of  insect-infestation or in sect-damage which is not deemed  to make the article unfit for human consumption. For instance,  in the  case of  Nutmag (Jaiphal)  the  pro-r portion of  extraneous  matter  and  infestation  shall  not exceed  3.0   per  cent  by  weight  (Item  A.05.16  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955). In the case of Coriander  (Dhania)  the  proportion  of  extraneous  matter including dirt and insect-damaged seeds shall not 7 exceed 8.0  per cent-by  weight (Item A.05.08). Similarly in the case  of foodgrains,  the proportion of 2() miligrams of insect-damaged grain  per 100 miligrams sample of the grain, and 5  per cent  by weight  of fungus-damaged  grain is  not considered enough,  to treat  it as  - ’adulterated’  either under sub-clause  (f ),  or any  of the other sub clauses of sec. 2(i).  These illustrations  unmistakably show  that the mere fact  that any  part of  an article was insect-infested may not be conclusion proof of its being ’adulterated’ under sub-clause (f). In k other words, all the adjectives used in the subclause  are a presumptive and not an absolute test of the  quality   of  the   article  being   unfit  for   human consumption. To  be more  particular,  in  the  case  of  an article in  respect of  which the Rules do not prescribe any minimum r  standard of  purity or  any minimum proportion of insect-infestation  ,   that  would  exclude  it  from.  the definition of  ’adulterated article’,  it r  will be a mixed question of  law and fact, whether the insect-infestation is of such  a nature,  degree and extent as renders the article unfit for  human consumption.  The  opinion  of  the  Public Analyst who  examines and  analyses the  sample, as  to  the fitness or  otherwise of  the sample  for human consumption, would  constitute   legal  evidence.  A  Public  Analyst  is supposed  to   be  specially   skilled  in  the  science  of dietetics. . As an expert in the science, he is competent to opine and testify about this fact.      The report of the Public Analyst, including his opinion on this  point, is  per se  evidence by virtue of sec. 13 of the Act. But this does not mean that his ipse dexit would be conclusive and binding on the court. To treat it so would be to leave  the determination  of the  guilt of the accused to the whims  and fancies  of the Public Analyst. The Act would not countenance  such abdication of its judicial function by the court,  leaving the  case-as it  were-to be tried by the Analyst. It  is for the court to weigh his opinion and reach its own finding.      In Dhanraj’s case (supra) the High Court construed this sub clause thus:           "The word ’otherwise’ in sub-clause (f) of cl. (i)

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    of sec.  2 does  suggest that  all the  adjectives used      earlier refer to the quality of the article being unfit      for human  consumption. To fall under that subclause an      article of  food must  be unfit  for human  consumption      because it  consists wholly  or in  part of  any fifthy      putrid,  disgusting,  rotten,  decomposed  or  diseased      animal or  vegetable substance  or because  it  is  in-      sect-infested or on account of any other cause."      If we  may say  so with  respect,  this  is  a  correct exposition of  the law embodied in s. 2(i) (f). We need only add for  the  sake  of  elucidation,  but  these  adjectives indicate presumptive  but not  absolute criteria  as to  the quality of  the article. In each case it must be proved that the article  was unfit for human consumption. In the case of articles for  which the  Rules lay down any minimum standard of purity  with reference  to any  of the vices specified in this subclause; mere      2-Ll276SCI/75 8 proof of  the fact  that the  impurity was in excess of that countenanced by the prescribed standard, would be conclusive to show that the article was unfit for human consumption.      In regard to cashewnuts there is no statutory provision prescribing any minimum standard of purity with reference to the vice  of in sect-infestation or other adjectives used in this sub-clause. It will therefore, be for the Judge of fact to decide upon the evidence in the case, whether the insect- infestation found was of such a nature and extent as to make it unfit  for human consumption. We have already pointed out that the  Report of  the Public  Analyst, is  admissible  in proof of this fact.      In Dhanraj’s case (supra), the High Court after holding that in order to bring a case within the purview of the said sub-clause (c),  it must be proved that the article is unfit for human  consumption, proceeded  to say something-which in our opinion  is not  correct-as to  the proof this issue, as under:           "By referring  to Appendix  to the  Prevention  of      Food Adulteration  Rules, 1955  the learned counsel for      the petitioners also urged that as for purposes of sub-      clause (1)  of clause  (i) of  section 2 no standard of      quality  had   been  prescribed  for  Kaju  the  Public      Analysts were  not justified  i  treating  the  samples      found insect-infested above 5% lo be adulterated. There      can hardly  be any doubt that if for an article of food      no standard of quality or purity has been prescribed or      no limits  have been  prescribed for the variability of      its constituents  then sub-clause  (f) of clause (i) of      section 2 will not apply and for considering whether or      not the  article is adulterated it will have to be seen      if any other portion of the definition of "adu1terated"      is applicable.  Of course  as no standard of quality or      purity was prescribed for Kaju it was not competent for      any Public  Analyst to  him self  fix any such standard      and to say that he will not treat Kaju which is insect-      infested to  the extent  of 5%  as nat  adulterated but      will regard any higher percentage of insect infestation      to make the article adulterated. In the case of Jagdish      Prasad alias  Jagdish Prasad  Gupta v.  State  of  West      Bengal  (1972-1,   SCC  326),  it  was  held  by  their      Lordships of  the Supreme  Court that  the standards of      quality and  limits of  variability fixed by Government      are not  even subject  to alteration  or  variation  by      Courts."      We are  unable to agree with the proposition propounded

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by the  High Court  that if  for  any  article  of  food  no standard of  quality or  purity has  been prescribed  or  no limits have  been prescribed  for  the  variability  of  its constituents, then  sub-clause (f)  af clause  (i) of sec. 2 will not apply.      As already  discussed, the governing ingredient of sub- ciause (f)  is the  quality of  the article  being unfit for human consumption. If the 9 quality of  the article  suffers from any of the vices, i.e. filthiness, put-  A refection  insect-infestation etc.  this sub-clause would be inexorably attracted and on proof of the article being  unfit for human consumption, the requirements of the  clause would be completely satisfied. Such proof may consist of  the report  of the  Public Analyst. The value of his report  however would depend on its being selfcontained, rand comprising  the necessary  data  and  reasons  for  his opinion. It  is desirable  that the  Public  Analyst  should express  his   opinion  on  all  the  relevant  points  with reference to  the particular  sub-clause or  sub-clauses  of sec. 2(i)  of the  Act. This will not only enhance the value of his  report but also facilitate the task of the Court. If it  is   merely  dogmatic,  that  would  be  a  circumstance detracting from  its evidential  value, though  it  may  not render it  inadmissible. Ultimately  the decision rests with the  court   which  would   take  into   account   all   the circumstances of  the case  including the  character of  the article, the nature and the extent of the insect-infestation and other relevant factors. If the Public Analyst says ’that since the insect-infestation in the Kaju pieces is less than 5 per cent, the sample, in his opinion, is adulterated’ then all that  can be  said about  it  is  that  the  opinion  is dogmatic. He should say with particularity as to how and why the percentage of insect-infestation found by him lenders to sample unfit  for human  consumption. The additional reasons which he  might give,  in addition to the certain proportion of the sample being insect-infested, would enhance the value of his  report, still  further. It is not possible for us to speculate the  reasons which the Public Analyst as an expert in the  science might  advance in support of his opinion. By giving the opinion that if the insect-infestation is above 5 per cent, the sample of Kaju pieces would be unfit for human consumption,  the  expert  would  not  be  laying  down  any standard of  quality or  Limits  of  variability  which  the Legislature in  its wisdom  has not  prescribed. His opinion would be just a piece of evidence which has to be‘ evaluated by the  Court in  the circumstances  of a particular case to reach a  finding as  to the  unfitness or  otherwise of  the sample for  human consumption.  The question of varying. any standard of  quality or limits of variability in the case of Kaju pieces does not arise because no such standard has been fixed either  in the Act or in the rules framed there-under. Reference to  what this Court said in Jagdish Prasad Gupta’s case (ibid), made by the High Court was thus not in point.      In the instant case the report of the Public Analyst is silent as  to whether  on account  of the insect-infestation found by  him in  the sample of Kaju pieces, the article was unfit for-human  consumption.  The  respondent,  as  already noticed, had  made an application to the Additional Sessions Judge, in  appeal, for  summoning the  Public Analysts.  His request was  however declined. When the case was in the High Court, Counsel  for the  Municipal Corporation,  also,  felt that the report was vague, incomplete and deficient, and, on his request  the High  Court actually  summoned  the  Public Analysts, M/s. Sudama Roy and P. P. Bhatnagar, as witnesses,

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for  21-12-1970,   for  evidence.  Despite  the  adjournment granted by  us, the learned Counsel for the parties have not been able to throw light as to what had happened in the High Court on 21-12-1970. 10      The Public  Analysts, as  is apparent from the judgment of the  learned single  Judge of  the High  Court have  been expressing different  opinions on  different occasions as to when an  article can be said to be ’insect-infested’. In the circumstances  of   this  case   therefore,  it  had  become necessary to call the Public Analysts as witnesses to unable them to elucidate their opinion and amplify their report and to allow  the parties  to test  it by cross-examination. For this purpose,  on our  first reaction,  we were  inclined to remit the  case to  the High  Court for  redecision. But the learned Counsel for the Municipal Corporation has brought to our notice  that the  Public Analyst,  Mr. Sudama  Roy whose report is in question-is no longer in the service of the Cor poration and is not residing at Delhi. It is obvious that it will not  be possible  to procure  Mr. Roy’s  attendance  in court without  an amount  of delay  and inconvenience  which will be  unreasonable in  the circumstances  of the case and will cause undue hardship to the respondent who has had more than his  normal share  of the  mental suffering. harassment and expense which go together with protracted criminal proceedings,  extending in the present case over 81 months. No  useful  purpose  will  therefore  be  served  by remanding  the  case  for  a  fresh  decision.  Taking  into consideration all  the circumstances  of the case, we do not think it proper to disturb the acquittal of the respondent.      Subject to  the clarification  of the points of law and the reversal  of the  view taken by the High Court as to the meaning and scope of s. 2(i)(f), the appeal is dismissed. P.H.P.                                     Appeal dismissed. 11