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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAGDISH LAL SON OF RADHAKISHAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/05/1969

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1970 AIR    7            1970 SCR  (1) 579  1969 SCC  (3) 389  CITATOR INFO :  D          1972 SC1407  (20)

ACT: Prevention  of Food Adulteration Act 1964 (37 of  1964),  s. 20--Municipality  authorizing Municipal Prosecutor  to  file complaint   on  its  behalf-Accused   acquitted-Municipality whether ’complainant’ within meaning of s. 417(3) of Code of Civil  Procedure-Whether competent to file  application  for special leave to appeal.

HEADNOTE: A complaint under s. 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention  of Food   Adulteration   Act,  1964  was  filed   against   the respondent.   It was filed by the Municipal  Prosecutor  who had been authorised to file such complaints by a  resolution passed  by  the  appellant corporation under s.  20  of  the aforesaid  Act.   On  the  respondent  being  acquitted  the appellant corporation filed an application in the High Court for  special  leave to appeal under s. 417 of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure.  The application was allowed.  When  the appeal  came  up  for hearing a  preliminary  objection  was raised  by  the respondent that the  complaint  having  been filed by the Municipal Prosecutor the corporation was not  a ’complainant’ within the meaning of s. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  and therefore special leave  to  appeal should  not  have been granted.  The High Court  upheld  the preliminary objection and dismissed the appeal.  By  special leave the corporation appealed to this Court. HELD  :  (i)  Under  s. 476(1)(h)  of  the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation  Act  the person competent  to  institute  legal proceedings  is the Commissioner.  However the present  case was  governed  not  by that provision but by s.  20  of  the Prevention  of  Food Adulteration Act, 1964  which  provides that a prosecution under that Act may be instituted "by  the Central  Government  or  the State  Government  or  a  local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by  general or  special  order by the Central Government  or  the  State Government  or  a local authority".  Section 2(vii)  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act defines a "local  autho- rity"  to  mean  "in the case of a local  area  which  is  a

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municipality, the municipal board or municipal corporation". The Delhi Municipal Corporation was a local authority within the meaning of s. 20, [581 H; 582 C, G-H; 584 A] (ii)The  Municipal  Prosecutor  had  filed  the   complaint against  the respondent under authority given to him by  the resolution of the Delhi Municipal Corporation under s. 20 of the  Prevention  of  Food Adulteration Act.  in  filing  the complaint  the  said prosecutor was not acting  on  his  own personal behalf but was acting as an agent authorised by the Delhi Municipal Corporation to file the complaint.  It  must therefore  be  deemed  in  law  that  the  Delhi   Municipal Corporation was the ’complainant’ in the case, for according to the Latin maxim.  "One who does an act through another is deemed in law to do it himself." [583 H; 584 C-D] Being  thus  the  complainant  in  the  case  the  appellant Corporation could properly file the application under s. 417 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure. [Case remanded  to  High Court for disposal according to law.] [584 E] 580 Ballavdas  Agarwala v. J. C.  Chakravarty, [1962]  3  S.C.R. 739  and  Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, 63 I.A. 372  as  381, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  8  of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April  29, 1965 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit  Bench  at Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 164-D of 1962. Bishan Narain, K. K. Raizada and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for  the appellant. Sardar Bahadur and Yougindra Khushalani, for respondent  No. 1. R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami,  J. On August 29, 1960 Shri Sham  Sundar  Mathur, Municipal  Prosecutor  of the  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation filed  a  complaint in the court of Magistrate  First  Class against  the respondent, Jagdishlal under S. 7 read with  S. 16  of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37  of 1954).   In the said complain Shri Sham Sundar  Mathur  said that lie was competent to file the complaint under S. 20  of the aforesaid Act in accordance with a resolution passed  by the  Corporation in its meeting held on December  23,  1968. By  his  order dated April 30, 1962 the  learned  Magistrate acquitted  the respondent.  The Delhi Municipal  Corporation made  an  application to the High Court asking  for  special leave  under  s. 417 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  to appeal against the order of acquittal.  The application  was -ranted  on September 3, 1962.  When the appeal came up  for hearing  a  preliminary  objection  was  raised  on  of  the respondent that the only person competent to file the appeal was the complainant, Shri Sham Sundar Mathur.  But the leave application  was  not  filed  by  him  and,  therefore,  the Municipal  Corporation  was not competent to  prosecute  the appeal.   It  was contended that only  the  complainant  was competent to present an application for special leave  under S.  417(3)  of  the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure.   As  the complainant  in  this case was Shri Sham Sundar  Mathur  the appeal   could   not  be  filed  by  the   Delhi   Municipal Corporation.   The High Court upheld the preliminary  objec- tion of the respondent and dismissed the appeal by its order dated  April  29, 1965.  This appeal is brought  by  special

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leave  on behalf of the Delhi Municipal Corporation  against the  judgment of the High Court dated April 29, 1965 in  Cr. Ar.  No. 163-D of 1962. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954 states : 581               " (1) No prosecution for an offence under this               Act shall be instituted except by, or with the               written consent of, the Central Government  or               the State Government or a local authority or a               person  authorised in this behalf, by  general               or special order, by the Central Government or               the State Government or a local authority :               Provided  that  a prosecution for  an  offence               under   this  Act  may  be  instituted  by   a               purchaser  referred  to in section 12,  if  he               produces in court a copy of the report of  the               public analyst along with the complaint.               Section  417, sub-ss. (1), (2) and (3) of  the               Code of Criminal Procedure after its amendment               by Act 26 of 1955 provide :               " (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section               (5),  the State Government may, in  any  case,               direct  the  Public Prosecutor to  present  an               appeal  to the High Court from an original  or               appellate  order  of acquittal passed  by  any               Court other than a High Court.               (2)If such an order of acquittal is  passed               in  any  case in which the  offence  has  been               investigated  by  the  Delhi  Special   Police               Establishment  constituted  under  the   Delhi               Special  Police Establishment Act, 1946  (XXXV               of  1946),  the Central  Government  may  also               direct  the  Public Prosecutor to  present  an               appeal  to  the High Court from the  order  of               acquittal.               (3)If such an order of acquittal is  passed               in any case instituted upon complaint and  the               High  Court, on an application made to  it  by               the complainant in this behalf, grants special               leave  to appeal from the order of  acquittal,               the complainant may present such an appeal  to               the High Court. The principal question to be determined is whether the  com- plaint  dated  August 29, 1960 was instituted by  the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation.   It  is argued  on  behalf  of  the respondent  that  the complaint petition was  not  made  and signed  by  the person competent under the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 to exercise powers of the, Corporation in  the matter of institution of legal proceedings.  In  our opinion  there  is substance in this contention.   The  only provision  under the Delhi Municipal Corporation  Act,  1965 which  confers  power to institute legal proceedings  is  s. 476(1) (h) which states 582               "(1) The Commissioner may-               (h)institute  and  prosecute  any  suit  or               other  legal proceeding, or with the  approval               of  the  Standing Committee withdraw  from  or               compromise  any suit or any claim for any  sum               not  exceeding five hundred rupees  which  has               been  instituted  or made in the name  of  the               Corporation or of the Commissioner;               It  is  clear  that the  phrase  "other  legal               proceedings" includes the power to institute a

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             complaint before a Magistrate and hence it  is               the Commissioner alone who could exercise  the               power  as there is no other provision  in  the               Act  which confers such power on anyone  else.               This view is supported by the decision of this               Court   in   Bailavdas  Agarwala  v.   J.   C.               Chakravarty(1)  in  which it was  pointed  out               that a complaint under The Calcutta  Municipal               Act,  1923 as applied to the  Municipality  of                             Howrah, would only be filed by the  au thorities               mentioned  therein  and  not  by  an  ordinary               citizen.   Section  537 of that  Act  provided               that  the Commissioners may institute,  defend               or  withdraw from legal proceedings under  the               Act;   under  s.  12  the  Commissioners   can               delegate their functions to the Chairman,  and               the Chairman may in his turn delegate the same               to  the  Vice-Chairman  or  to  any  municipal               officer.   It was observed in that  case  that               the  machinery  provided in the  Act  must  be               followed  in enforcing its provisions, and  it               was against the tenor and scheme of the Act to               hold  that  s.  537  was  merely  enabling  in               nature.   The principle invoked in  that  case               was that adopted by the Privy Council in Nazir               Ahmad v. King Emperor (2) viz. : that where  a               power  is  given to do a certain  thing  in  a               certain  way, the thing must be done  in  that               way  or not at all.  It was,  therefore,  held               that  if  a legal  proceeding  was  instituted               under  the Municipal Act in question, it  must               be  done in accordance with the provisions  of               the Act and not otherwise.               But  the question presented for  determination               in  the present appeal is somewhat  different.               Under s. 20 of Act 37 of 1954 the  prosecution               for  the offence may be instituted either  (a)               by   the  Central  Government  or  the   State               Government  or  a  local authority  or  (b)  a               person authorised in that behalf by general or               special order by the Central Government or the               State   Government  or  a   local   authority.               Section  2(vii)  of Act 37 of 1954  defines  a               "local  authority" to mean "in the case  of  a               local area which is a               (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 739.               (2) 63 I.A. 372 at 381. 583 pality,  the  municipal board or municipal  corporation."  A complaint  under  s.  20  of  the  Act  may,  therefore,  be instituted  either  by  the Municipal Corporation  or  by  a person authorised in its behalf by general or special  order by  the Municipal Corporation.  The Resolution of the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation  dated  December 23,  1958  reads  as follows "Subject  :  Authorising the Municipal  Prosecutor  and  the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor to launch Prosecutions  under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The  area  under  the jurisdiction of  the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation has been declared a "local area" under s. 2(vii) of  the  Prevention  of Food  Adulteration  Act  vide  Chief Commissioner’s  Notification  No, F.32(30)  58-M  and  PH(i) dated  13th June, 1958 published in the Delhi Gazette  (Part IV)  dated  26th June, 1959 and consequently  the  Municipal

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Corporation  of Delhi is the Local Authority for  that  area within the meaning of section 2(vii) of the said Act. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954 contemplates  the  appointment  of  persons  who  shall   be authorised  to institute prosecutions under this Act by  the Local Authority concerned. Shri  Sham Sundar Mathur, M.A., LL.B., Municipal  Prosecutor and   Shri  Bankey  Behari  Tawkley,   Assistant   Municipal Prosecutor were authorised by the erstwhile Delhi  Municipal               Committee tinder the above section." "Shri  Vijay Kumar Malhotra moved the following  resolution, which was seconded by Shri Prem Sagar Gupta Resolved  that the recommendations of the Commissioner  vide letter No. 139/Legal/58 dated 1-12-58 regarding  authorising the   Municipal  prosecutor  and  the  Assistant   Municipal Prosecutor  to launch prosecutions under section 20  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 be approved. The resolution was carried." In  the  present  case Shri Sham  Sundar  Mathur,  Municipal Prosecutor filed the complaint under s. 20 of Act 37 of 1954 under L14Sup.C.I/69-8      584 the  authority  given  to  him  by  the  resolution  of  the Municipal  Corporation.  Since  the  Municipal  Corporation, Delhi,  is a local authority within the meaning of S. 20  of Act  37  of  1954 and since it conferred  authority  on  the Municipal  Prosecutor  the complaint was properly  filed  by Sham  Sundar  Mathur.  The question  is  whether  the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation  or Shri Mathur was  the  complainant within  the -meaning of S. 417(3) of the Code  of   Criminal Procedure.  It was argued on behalf of the  respondent  that the  complainant was Shri Sham Sundar Mathur, the  Municipal Prosecutor  and  the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation  was  not competent to make an application for special leave under  s. 417(3),  Cr. P.C. We are unable to accept this  argument  as correct.  It is true that Shri Sham Sundar Mathur filed  the complaint  petition  on August 29, 1960. But in  filing  the complaint  Shri  Mathur was not acting on his  own  personal behalf  but was acting as an agent authorised by  the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation  to  file  the  complaint.  It  must, therefore,  be deemed in the contemplation of law  that  the Delhi Municipal Corporation was the complainant in the case. The  maxim qui per alium facit per seipsum  facere   videtur (he who does an act through another is Jeemed in law  to  do it  himself) illustrates the general doctrine on  which  the law relating to the rights and liabilities of principal  and agent depends. We  are,  therefore,  of  opinion  that  Shri Mathur was only acting in     a representative capacity  and that  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation was  the  complainant within  the  meaning of S. 417(3) of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure and the petition for special leave and the  appeal petition  were  properly instituted by the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation.  For  these reasons we allow  the  appeal,  set aside the judgment of the High Court dated April 9, 1965 and direct that the appeal should be remanded to the High  Court for being heard afresh and disposed of according to law. G.C.                                     Appeal allowed. 585