[REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 15 OF 2010

Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot                      ….Appellant

Vs.

State of Gujarat                                     ……Respondent

O R D E R

The facts leading to this appeal are as under:

1. The  appellant  accused,  a  lawyer  by  profession,  was  

residing in Kalol, District Mahesana whereas Kamlaben Ratilal  

Parmar, wife of Ratilal Hemabhai Paramar PW-7, deceased was  

residing along with her family at Mahesana and was serving as  

a  Mid-wife  at  the  Primary  Health  Centre  in  village  Vamaj,  

Taluka Kadi,  District  Mahesana.   Kamlaben had also been  

allotted a residential quarter in village Vamaj.  The appellant  

was known to the family of the deceased as she had appointed  

him  as  an  advocate  to  represent  her  in  a  departmental

enquiry.   On the 14th September 1993 the deceased, as per  

her routine, left for village Vamaj to attend to her duties.   At  

about  11  a.m.  she  went  to  her  residential  quarter.   The  

appellant also reached that place and taking advantage of the  

fact that she was alone, asked her to have intercourse with  

him saying that he would not disclose the facts to anyone, but  

in case she refused his advances, he would disclose her illicit  

relationships with several other persons to her husband.  The  

deceased, however, did not succumb to the pressure, which  

annoyed the appellant and he pushed her onto a cot and tried  

to  rape  her.   The  deceased  resisted  the  attempt  but  the  

appellant picked up some kerosene oil and threw it on her and  

set her on fire.  The cries of agony of the deceased attracted  

several  persons residing in the  locality  and fearing that  his  

guilt  would  be  exposed,  the  appellant  himself  doused  the  

flames  and  removed  the  deceased  (who  was  by  then  

unconscious) in a jeep to the Kalol Civil Hospital where she  

was admitted at about 12.45 p.m.  PW1 the Medical Officer,  

who was on duty at the relevant time, informed the Kalol City  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

Police Station and the Officer In-charge in turn informed the  

Kadi Police Station.  On receiving the information PSI Trivedi  

PW14 of Kadi Police Station went to the place of incident and  

made the necessary enquiries and prepared the Panchnama  

and  also  picked  up  several  incriminating  articles.   In  the  

meanwhile, as the condition of the victim had deteriorated, she  

was shifted to the Ahmedabad Civil Hospital and the Officer  

In-Charge  of  Kadi  Police  Station  was  also  told  about  the  

transfer.  Necessary arrangements were made for recording the  

dying declaration of the victim which came to be recorded on  

the same day i.e. on 14th September 1993 by the Executive  

Magistrate.   A second statement was recorded by the police  

two days thereafter and in both these two dying declarations  

she stated that she had been burnt accidentally and nobody  

was responsible for her injuries.  Kamlaben succumbed to her  

injuries on the 18th September 1993 and on 26th September  

1993 the husband of the deceased, Ratilal Hemabhai Parmar  

PW7, gave a complaint in the police station alleging inter-alia  

that shortly before her death she had informed him that the  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

appellant was responsible for her injuries and he had thrown  

kerosene on her and set on fire, on her refusal to accept his  

sexual advances.  It is in this background that the appellant  

was arrested, and after investigation a charge-sheet was filed  

against him and he was ultimately brought to trial for offences  

punishable under Section-302 etc. of the IPC.   

2. The  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  in  the  course  of  an  

elaborate  judgment,  held  that  there  were  three  dying  

declarations made by the deceased; the first Ex.44 dated 14th  

September  1993  recorded  at  4  p.m.  by  the  Executive  

Magistrate,  a  second  Ex.48  by  the  police  on  the  16th of  

September  1993  and  in  both  these  statements  she  had  

completely exonerated the appellant whereas in the third dying  

declaration Ex.59 dated 17th September 1993 allegedly written  

by  PW-7  her  husband  on  her  dictation  she  had  made  a  

complete  departure  from the  earlier  dying  declarations  and  

inculpated the  appellant  and as such there  appeared to be  

great uncertainty in the veracity of the dying declarations.  It  

also observed that the deceased had died on 18th September  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

1993 and it was on the basis of the dying declaration Ex.59  

that a complaint had been registered in the police station on  

the  26th September  1993  which  again  was  grossly  delayed.  

The trial court also held that the reliance of the prosecution on  

Exs.22 and 31 admittedly in the handwriting of the accused  

and deceased respectively to indicate that there was something  

amiss and improper in the relationship of the appellant and  

the deceased was misplaced as the two appeared to share a  

close  and  healthy  relationship,  and  were  on  the  contrary  

indicative of the deep attachment and concern which a brother  

would have for a sister.   The trial  court  then examined the  

evidence  of  PW18  Dr.  Vijay,  who  had  conducted  the  post-

mortem on the dead body and opined that this too did not  

support the prosecution version.  The Court also observed that  

at the initial stage a charge under section 302 of the IPC had  

been framed against the appellant but while the matter was  

yet  pending,  an  application  Ex.64  had  been  filed  by  the  

prosecution  seeking  an  alteration  of  the  charge  from  one  

under Section 302 to 306.  The trial court thus opined that in  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

this situation where the prosecution itself was not clear about  

the nature of the case, it appeared that the death was caused  

in a simple accident, as was apparent from the first two dying  

declarations.   The  trial  court,  accordingly,  acquitted  the  

appellant-accused.  An appeal against acquittal was taken to  

the High Court.  The High Court prefaced its judgment in the  

following terms:

“This  is  a  classic  case  where  the  knowledge  possessed by an individual in the specialized filed of  law  has  been  successfully  utilized  by  him  in  influencing the outcome of a criminal case in which  he has been charged of an offence of murder and  alternatively, of the charge of abetment to commit  suicide.   Hereinafter,  we  shall  see  as  to  how  effectively,  tactfully  and  successfully  the  legal  knowledge  possessed  by  the  accused  has  been  utilized  in  converting  a  serious  criminal  act  of  causing  the  death  of  a  married  lady  into  an  accidental death.”

The Court accordingly reversed the judgment of the trial court  

on all material particulars by observing that the neither of the  

dying declarations Ex.44 and 48 could not be treated as First  

Information Reports and it was only Ex.59 on which the FIR  

had formally  been recorded on 26th September 1993,  which  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

was the First Information Report in the light of the provisions  

of Sections 161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C.  The High Court further  

held that the first two dying declarations had no evidentiary  

value and were even otherwise suspicious statements as they  

had been recorded in the presence of the appellant.  The court  

also  held  that  the  appellant  had  indeed  been  with  the  

deceased  in  her  residential  quarter  when  the  incident  had  

happened and that the evidence would have to be appreciated  

in that background.  The High Court,  accordingly,  accepted  

the prosecution story that taking advantage of the fact that the  

deceased was alone in her quarter, the appellant had asked  

her to have intercourse with him and on her refusal, he had  

got annoyed and burnt her after pouring kerosene oil and it  

was only to cover up his criminal act (as her loud cries had  

attracted the neighbours) that he had doused the fire himself  

and had rushed her to the hospital in a borrowed jeep.  The  

High  Court  further  opined  that  Exs.22  and  31  when  read  

cumulatively, (Ex.22 written by the appellant to the deceased  

and Ex.31 written by the deceased to the appellant),  which  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

were admittedly in the hands of the two, proved beyond doubt  

that the appellant was blackmailing the deceased as he was  

aware of her sexual dalliances with other persons and he had,  

accordingly, attempted to take advantage of her predicament  

to satisfy his lust as well.  The Court then examined the dying  

declaration  Ex.59  recorded  on  17th September  1993  and  

observed that it appeared to a genuine statement made at a  

stage  when  Kamlaben  was  on  the  verge  of  death  and  had  

decided to speak the truth, notwithstanding the fact that the  

complaint had been filed on 26th September 1993 after a delay  

of almost ten days.  The court, finally, concluded as under:

“In view of the above discussion,  we are of the  firm opinion that the impugned judgment and order of  acquittal cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is  required to be quashed and set aside.  As discussed  hereinabove, it is established that the deceased died a  homicidal  death.  The  deceased  belonged  to  the  backward  community  and  the  respondent-accused,  with  the  ill-intention  to  satisfy  his  sexual  desire,  entered the quarter of the deceased at a time when no  one else was present in the house.

But,  when the  deceased declined  to  satisfy  his  long  pending  illegitimate  demand,  which  is  evident  from the document at Ex.22 and the dying declaration  at Ex.59, the respondent-accused caused the death of  the deceased and thereafter, tried to create a picture of  accidental death.

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

Looking  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  evidence  on  record,  particularly,  the  document at Ex.22, the dying declaration at Ex.59 and  the oral evidence on record, we find the respondent- accused guilty for the offences punishable u/s 302 IPC  and Section 3(ii)(v) of the Atrocities Act.”

The judgment of the trial court was accordingly reversed.

3. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, the learned counsel for the appellant  

has raised certain basic issues in this appeal.  He has pointed  

out  that  the  only  material  evidence  against  the  appellant  

which had been relied upon by the High Court was the dying  

declaration  Ex.59  and  if  the  story  projected  therein  was  

disbelieved, the appellant’s conviction could not be sustained  

on the basis of the peripheral and circumstantial evidence.  It  

has  been  pointed  out  that  Exs.44  and  48  were  two  dying  

declarations,  one  to  a  Magistrate  and a  second  to  a  police  

officer, in which the appellant had been completely exonerated  

of  any  wrong  doing  and  these  were  admissible  in  evidence  

contrary  to  the  findings  of  the  High  Court,  whereas  Ex.59  

appeared to have been motivated on account of the fact that in  

the case of death of Scheduled Caste such as the deceased in  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

some circumstances, an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 2 lacs was  

disbursable, and this amount had, indeed, been claimed and  

taken by the husband of the deceased, Ratilal PW-7.  It has  

been pointed out that Exs.22 and 31 were, in fact, entirely in  

favour of  the appellant and when read together showed the  

concern he had towards the deceased as he had often advised  

her to desist from her illicit affairs and had warned her that in  

case she did not do so, he would inform her husband.  It has  

also been submitted that even if there was some evidence with  

regard to the smell of kerosene oil on the carpet on the floor it  

would in no way detract from the innocence of the appellant in  

the  face  of  no  other  evidence,  more  particularly  as  the  

statements  Exs.44  and  48  were  to  be  read  as  dying  

declarations.   Mr.  Ninad  Laud,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent State of Gujarat has, however, submitted that the  

medical evidence clearly supported the prosecution story that  

the  deceased  had  been  burnt  after  kerosene  oil  had  been  

sprinkled  on  her  and  corroboration  with  regard  to  the  

involvement of the appellant was available in the evidence of  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

PW9 Vithalbhai  and  PW10 Wankar  Devendrabhai.   He  has  

also submitted that the presence of the appellant at the time  

when  the  first  two  dying  declarations  had  been  recorded  

clearly  showed  that  the  deceased  had  been  pressurized  to  

make them and as such they could not be believed.

4. We  have  considered  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  

learned counsel for the parties.  At the very outset, we must  

deal with the observations of the High Court that the dying  

declarations Ex.44 and 48 could not be taken as evidence in  

view of the provisions of Section 161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C.  

when  read  cumulatively.   These  findings  are,  however,  

erroneous.   Sub-Section  (1)  of  Section  32  of  the  Indian  

Evidence Act, 1872 deals with several situations including the  

relevance of a statement made by a person who is dead.  The  

provision reads as under:

Sec.32.  Cases  in  which statements  of  relevant  fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is  relevant.  – Statements,  written  or  verbal,  of  relevant  facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be  found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence,  or  whose  attendance  cannot  be  procured  without  an  amount  o  delay  or  expense  which,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  appears  to  the  Court  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

unreasonable,  are  themselves  relevant  facts  in  the  following cases:-

(1) When  it  relates  to  cause  of  death.  –  When  the  statement is made by a person as to the cause of  his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the  transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in  which the cause of that person’s death comes into  question.

Such statements  are  relevant  whether  the  person  who made them was or was not, at the time when  they  were made,  under  expectation  of  death,  and  whatever  may be the  nature  of  the  proceeding in  which the cause of his death comes into question.”

We see that the aforesaid dying declarations are relevant in  

view of the above provision.  Even otherwise, Section 161 and  

162 of the Cr.P.C. admittedly provide for a restrictive use of  

the statements recorded during the course of the investigation  

but sub-Section (2) of Section 162 deals with a situation where  

the maker of the statement dies and reads as under:

“(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply  to  any  statement  falling  within  the  provisions  of  clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act,  1872  (1  of  1872),  or  to  affect  the  provisions  of  section 27 of that Act.”

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

5. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision when read with  

Section  32  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act  would  reveal  that  a  

statement of a person recorded under Section 161 would be  

treated as a dying declaration after his death.  The observation  

of the High Court that the dying declarations Ex.44 and 48  

had no evidentiary value, therefore, is erroneous.  In this view  

of  the  matter,  the  first  dying  declaration  made  to  the  

Magistrate on 14th September 1993 would, in fact, be the First  

Information Report in this case.

6. Having said as above, we must now examine as to the  

truthfulness  of  the  three  dying  declarations  that  had  been  

made by the deceased.  As already mentioned above, the first  

two  completely  exonerated  the  appellant  from wrong  doing,  

and had attributed the burn injuries to an accident.  The High  

Court  has  given  a  finding  that  those  documents  have  no  

evidentiary  value  and  were  even  otherwise  shrouded  in  

suspicion as the appellant had been present at the time when  

they had been recorded.  We find this assertion is factually  

incorrect.  We requested the learned State counsel to show us  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

any material on record which could indicate that the appellant  

had, indeed, been present at that time.  He was unable to do  

so.  On the contrary,  we find that the Executive Magistrate  

had given a note at the end of the dying declaration Ex.44 in  

the following word:

“ At the time of recording the dying declaration  the police officer/staff  or any relatives of the  patient  are  not  present,  the  patient  is  conscious, this verified.

Sd/- P.P.Patel Executive Magistrate Metropolitan Area Ahmedabad ”

Even more significant perhaps is the dying declaration Ex.48.  

This dying declaration had, admittedly, been recorded by the  

Police Officer in the presence of Babulal Parmar, the brother of  

the deceased and Ratilal PW, the husband of the deceased and  

they had attested this document as well.  On the contrary, the  

statement Ex.59 is obviously suspicious.  We have perused the  

original  document  which  is  on  record  and  notice  that  the  

manner  in  which  it  has  been  written,  the  clarity  of  the  

language used, the writing and spacing of the words being very  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

symmetrical and the flow of words indicate that this could not  

be the statement of a person who was on the verge of death.  

The High Court has been at pains to point out that as there  

was a reference to  letter  Ex.22 in this  dying declaration,  it  

completed the chain against the appellant as this document  

had apparently been concealed by the deceased and it was she  

and she alone who could have told her husband where to find  

it.  We find this story to be far fetched.  Ex.59 was written on  

17th September 1993 and the complaint was filed on the 26th  

September  1993  on  which  date  PW7,  the  husband  of  the  

deceased,  had also made an application to the  Government  

seeking compensation on the death of his wife as she belonged  

to  a Scheduled  Caste  and was entitled  to compensation on  

that account.  We are told that the compensation has since  

been taken.

7. Mr. Laud has, however, submitted that the story given in  

Ex.59 was supported by the evidence of PW9 Vithalbhai and  

PW10 Wankar Devendrabhai.  We find this assertion without  

any  basis.   PW  was  declared  hostile  as  he  disowned  the  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

statement  made  under  Section  161  of  the  Cr.P.C.  whereas  

PW10 had nothing whatsoever to say about the incident.    

8. The High Court has been at pains to emphasize that the  

two  letters  Exs.22  and  31  being  of  signal  importance  

completed the prosecution’s case against the appellant.  Ex.22  

is an undated letter written by the appellant to the deceased  

whereas  Ex.31  is  a  letter  written  by  the  deceased  to  the  

appellant.  It is the case of both parties that they are indeed  

written in the hands of the appellant and the deceased.  Ex.22  

reads as under:

“Do  tell  me  and  Vasu  to  stay  at  your  house  during Sunday night otherwise I  will  come on  Sunday night or early morning on Monday and  will create a problem. Today the Doctor was to  come  and  you  were  knowing  about  it  and  therefore, you stayed back at home and made  me a fool. After Master left for service, you both  had  met.  Now  onwards  the  Doctor  must  not  come  at  your  house.  Do  come  to  office  on  Monday. So lovingly you were talking with the  Doctor.  I  will  create  a  problem.  I  am  not  bothered even if  my relationship breaks but, I  will disclose the truth to Master.”

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

It bears explanation that ‘Vasu’ is the appellant’s wife whereas  

‘Master’  is  the  husband of  the  deceased.   The  letter  Ex.31  

which is on an inland letter card dated 15th February 1992 is  

reproduced below:

Maheshbhai Gopalbhai Barot Hodi Chakla Barot Vas Nandlal Chowk Kalol North Gujarat District Mehasama

Shri  Mukeshbhai,  Vasu,  all  and  mother- father must be happy and I pray accordingly.

Kamlaben  Parmar  writing  from  Vamaj  village blesses you all. This is for Mukeshbhai to  know that, I have become so helpless before you  that  I  cannot  even  ask  for  your  pardon  personally, therefore I am writing this letter and  begging your pardon. Because, today because of  me you and Master had hurt feelings. What you  have  done  for  me perhaps  a  real  brother  also   may  not  do. When you suddenly  came  to  my  house  then  seeing  me  and  Mohmmed Shaikh  (Valisan) and hearing our conversation and from  our conduct you had become suspicious, in this  regard I had confessed before you on the same  day, that is my relationship with Mohmed and  Mohmed  had  said  that  my  brother-in-law Dr.  Hemu  Vaghela  (Valrao)  I  had  illicit  relations  with both these persons, and he had immoral  relations with me two to three times.  You had  said  that  do  what  you please,  from today  our   relationship of brother-sister is over. At that time   

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

I had given you promise that I will not have any  relations with  any of  these two,  and I  will  not  allow  them  to  enter  into  my  house,  and  on  finding the time and occasion I will confess this   to Master. At that time you had agreed to have  and  continue  the  relationship  of  brother-sister,   and if after this day if these persons come to my  house  then  you will  inform Master,  therefore  I   had said yes, and secondly when you came to   know  that  the  Solanki  of  Kalol  had  immoral  relationship with me at Kadi Government Guest  House. At  that  time  I  had  only  informed  you  that  yes  Master  and  Solanki  had  home  relations, therefore since I was in need of money  I  had  demanded  and  I  had  gone  to  get  the  money on my own, at that time he had cheated  me  and  called  me  to  the  Government  Guest  House  and  gave  the  money  and  forcibly  took  advantage  of  my  helplessness  and  informed  others, at that time I had only told you not to  call  Solanki  hereafter,  and I  will  also  not  call  him, at that time you became calmed. But, on  Tuesday you and Solanki suddenly met in the  bus and when he had called me that you had  become  annoyed  and  informed  the  entire  incidence to Master but you had not seen the  time and circumstances,  therefore  Master  was  annoyed  so  you  keep  patient  and  peaceful.  When the truth is understood by you then he will   call you and please pardon me, and if you do not   pardon then if you do not keep relations with me  then I will commit suicide and die.

Written by, Yours, Kamlaben M. Parmar Vamaj, Date : 15/2/92

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

9. A cumulative reading of these two documents far from  

showing any illicit relationship between the appellant and the  

deceased,  shows  a  close  family  relationship.   In  Ex.31  the  

deceased refers to the appellant as her brother and also fondly  

says “what you have done for me perhaps a real brother may  

not do”.  This document also indicates that the deceased was  

involved in several relationships and when this document is  

read  in  the  context  of  Ex.22  it  becomes  clear  that  the  

appellant had been advising the deceased to desist from her  

activities and in case she did not do so he would reveal all to  

“master”  i.e.  her  husband.   To  our  mind,  therefore,  these  

documents  do  not,  in  any  way,  advance  the  case  of  the  

prosecution  and  on  the  contrary  they  indicate  that  the  

allegation  of  an  attempted  rape  of  the  deceased,  whom he  

regarded  as  his  sister,  was  a  story  created  long  after  the  

incident by PW7 in order to take compensation.  The finding of  

the High Court, therefore,     that the appellant’s conduct in  

dousing  the  flames,  and  rushing  her  to  hospital  in  a  

commandered  Jeep,  was  a  subterfuge   in  order  to  allay  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

suspicion away from him, does not appear to be correct.  On  

the contrary, it is indicative of a person trying desperately to  

save someone he cared for.   

10. Mr. Laud has however, pointed out that a reading of the  

(Panchnama)  Ex.38  along  with  the  statement  of  Dr.Vijay  

PW18,  and the  post-mortem report  would  support  the  view  

that the story that the appellant had poured kerosene oil and  

then set her on alight was borne out.

11. We have examined the statement of the Doctor.  He had  

found several injuries on the dead body, mostly on the front of  

the  body  which  could  be  caused  if  kerosene  oil  had  been  

sprinkled on the person and then set alight.  He was, however,  

forced to admit that he had not recorded any such fact in the  

post-mortem report and further clarified in cross-examination  

that he had not observed any smell of kerosene oil and further  

that if there was indeed a smell from the body, he would have  

recorded such fact in the Post-Mortem Report.  In the light of  

this statement of the Doctor, the Panchnama looses much of  

its  significance.   Concededly  in  this  document  there  is  a  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

reference to the fact that there was a smell of kerosene on the  

burnt saree as well as on the carpet in the room.  It also noted  

the presence of a tin with some kerosene oil in it and a primus  

stove  with  the  cap  of  the  oil  receptacle  lying  open.   This  

document to our mind in no way advances the prosecution  

story as it is more compatible with the version of accidental  

death than homicide and explains the sudden flare up of the  

oil.  In the light of the discussion above, we find absolutely no  

evidence  of  homicide  in  this  case.   We  must,  accordingly,  

endorse  the  findings  of  the  trial  court  that  the  deceased  

suffered an accidental death.

12. Before parting with the judgment, we must re-administer  

an  oft  repeated  caution.   It  has  repeatedly  been  held  that  

interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal  

should  be minimal  and only  in  cases where  the  trial  court  

judgment is perverse or does not flow from the evidence.  We  

must  record  that  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  has  

completely ignored this basic principle.  The judgment of the  

Additional Sessions Judge based on a correct appreciation of  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

the evidence, was completely in accordance with law.  This did  

not warrant interference by the High Court.  We, accordingly  

allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court,  

and order the appellant’s acquittal.

……………………………..J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

……………………………..J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

AUGUST 4, 2010 NEW DELHI.

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010

[PART-I]    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  15  OF 2010

 MUKESHBHAI  GOPALBHAI BAROT  ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT  ..... RESPONDENT

O R D E R

We have heard the learned counsel for the  

parties.

Vide our separate reasoned order, we have  

allowed this appeal.  As per the counsel, the  

appellant is stated to be in jail. The appellant  

shall  be  set  at  liberty  forthwith  if  not  

required in connection with any other case.   

The reasoned order to follow.   

......................J  [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]

......................J  [C.K. PRASAD]

NEW DELHI AUGUST 04, 2010.

Criminal Appeal No.15 of  2010