http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1208-1209 of 2001

PETITIONER: Mukesh K. Tripathi                                               

RESPONDENT: Sr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors.                                 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2004

BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde,S.B. Sinha & A.K. Mathur

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J:

       These appeals are directed against a judgment and order dated  8.1.1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc.  Writ Petitions No. 30393 of 1996 and 28474 of 1998 whereby and  whereunder the writ petitions filed by the Respondent herein were allowed  setting aside an award dated 28.5.1996 passed by the Central Government  Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kanpur.   

       The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.           The Appellant was appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation of  India (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as "the  Corporation") on or about 16.7.1987 as Apprentice Development Officer.   The relevant terms and conditions contained in the offer of appointment are  as under:

"2. You will be taken, at the outset, as an  Apprentice for a period of one year commencing  from 16.7.1987 on a stipend of Rs. 1250/- per  month, and will be given two months theoretical  training at Divisional Office, Kanpur and  thereafter the (sic) months Branch training  followed by Field Training in a Branch as may be  decided to us.  You will faithfully and diligently  apply yourself to the course of training fixed for  you and carry out all orders and directions given to  you.

3. On completion of the apprenticeship period, if  your work and conduct are found satisfactory, you  will be appointed as a Development Officer on  probation on a monthly basic pay of Rs. 700/- and  such other allowances as are admissible in  accordance with staff Regulations.

4. During the period of apprenticeship, you shall  be liable to be discharged from service without any  notice.

7. You are not entitled to any travelling allowance  for joining the Training Centre at Division Office,  Life Insurance Corporation of India, Kanpur."

       The services of the Respondent were terminated purported to be in  terms of para 4 of the said offer of appointment by a letter dated 14.7.1988.   Contending that he has been retrenched in contravention of Section 25F of  the Industrial Disputes Act,  the Appellant herein raised an industrial dispute

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

whereupon the Central Government by a notification dated 23rd August,  1991 referred the following dispute for adjudication of the Central  Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Pandu Nagar, Kanpur  (for short "the Tribunal"):

"Whether the action of the Divisional Manager,  LIC of India, Kanpur, in discharging Sri Mukesh  Kumar Tripathi from service w.e.f. 14.7.88 is legal  and justified?  If not to what relief the concerned  workman is entitled?"

       Before the Tribunal a contention was raised by the Respondent No. 1  herein that the Appellant is not a workman within the meaning of Section  2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

By reason o f its award dated 28.5.1996, the Tribunal held that in view  of the fact that the Appellant was discharged after the completion of the  apprenticeship period, he must be held to be a workman within the meaning  of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

       The Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High  Court questioning the said award.  Before the High Court, the Appellant  herein relied upon a decision of this Court in S.K. Verma Vs. Mahesh  Chandra and Another [(1983) 3 SCR 799 : (1983) 4 SCC 214] in support of  its contention that a Development Officer of the Corporation is a workman.  

       The High Court, however, relying on or on the basis of a Constitution  Bench decision of this Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Others Vs. Sandoz  (India) Ltd. and Others [(1994) 5 SCC 737] held that as therein S.K. Verma  (supra) was  held to have been rendered per incuriam, it was no longer a  good law.  The writ petition was allowed on that premise.

       Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  Appellant would contend that in S.K. Verma (supra) this Court upon taking  into consideration the works performed by a Development Officer came to  the conclusion that as neither the same are managerial or supervisory in  nature, he would be deemed to be a workman and, furthermore, in view of  the fact that the said decision has not been overruled by this Court in H.R.  Adyanthaya (supra), the High Court has committed a manifest error in  passing the impugned judgment.

Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the Respondents, on the other hand, would submit that in H.R. Adyanthaya  (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly laid down the law that  even if a person does not perform managerial or supervisory duties, with a  view to hold that he is a workman, it must be established that he performs  skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire  or reward and as it has not been established that the Appellant herein  performed  any of the jobs enumerated in Section 2(s) of the Act, he is not a  workman.          The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to a Scheme known  as the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Apprentice Development  Officers) Recruitment Scheme, 1980 (for short "the Scheme") for the  purpose of showing that an Apprentice Development Officer is a person  recruited for training and subsequent appointment to the cadre of  Development Officers. It was  submitted that as the Appellant was appointed  in terms thereof, unless he was appointed and confirmed as a Development  Officer the question of his becoming a workman would not arise.          The Scheme framed by the Corporation although is not a statutory one   but the same governs the terms and conditions of appointment of Apprentice  Development Officer.  An Apprentice Development Officer is a person  recruited for training and subsequent appointment to the cadre of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

Development Officer.  Clause 4 of the Scheme lays down the eligibility  criteria for recruitment as also the recruitment procedure.  Clause 5 of the  said Scheme provides for apprenticeship and training.  The period of  apprenticeship is one year.  During the said period, the Apprentice is  required to undergo theoretical training at training centre for two months,  training in a selected rural branch for one month and a field training for a  period of nine months.  An Apprentice Development Officer is paid a  monthly stipend.  The period of apprenticeship is not counted as service for  any purpose including seniority, increments, gratuity, etc.

       Clause 6.1 of the Scheme provides that an Apprentice Development  Officer may be discharged at any time without any notice or without  assigning any reason whatsoever.  Only upon satisfactory completion of the  apprenticeship period, an Apprentice Development Officer is appointed as a  Development Officer on probation, the period wherefor is also one year.   The terms and conditions of service of a Development Officer are governed  by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960.          The question as to whether a sale representative is a workman within  the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act came up for  consideration before a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Management of M/s.  May and Baker (India) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen [AIR 1967 SC 678]  wherein upon considering the definition of workman, as it then stood, it was  held:

"9\005At that time the definition of the word  "workman" under S. 2 (s) of the Industrial  Disputes Act did not include employees like  Mukerjee who was a representative. A "workman"  was then defined as any person employed in any  industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or  clerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing  manual or clerical work was necessary before a  person could be called a workman. This definition  came for consideration before industrial tribunals  and it was consistently held that the designation of  the employee was not of great moment and what  was of importance was the nature of his duties. If  the nature of the duties is manual or clerical then  the person must be held to be a workman. On the  other hand if manual or clerical work is only a  small part of the duties of the person concerned  and incidental to his main work which is not  manual or clerical, then such a person would not  be a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each  case from the nature of the duties whether a person  employed is a workman or not, under the  definition of that word as it existed before the  amendment of 1956. The nature of the duties of  Mukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only  question, therefore, is whether looking to the  nature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee  was a workman within the meaning of S. 2 (s) as it  stood at the relevant time. We find from the nature  of the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main  work was that of canvassing and any clerical or  manual work that he had to do was incidental to  his main work of canvassing and could not take  more than a small fraction of the time for which he  had to work. In the circumstances the tribunal’s  conclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is  incorrect. The tribunal seems to have been led  away by the fact that Mukherjee had no  supervisory duties and had to work under the  directions of his superior officers. That, however,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

would not necessarily mean that Mukerjee’s duties  were mainly manual or clerical. From what the  tribunal itself has found it is clear that Mukerjee’s  duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual.  Therefore, as Mukerjee was not a workman his  case would not be covered by the Industrial  Disputes Act and the tribunal would have no  jurisdiction to order his reinstatement\005"

       A similar view was taken by this Court in Western India Match Co.  Ltd. Vs. Workmen [(1964) 3 SCR 560], Burmah Shell Oil Storage &  Distribution Co. of India Ltd. Vs. Burmah Shell Management Staff Assn.  [(1970) 3 SCC 378] and in other cases.

       A Division Bench of this Court, however, without noticing the  aforementioned binding precedent, in S.K. Verma (supra) held that the  duties and obligations of a Development Officer of Life Insurance  Corporation of India  being neither managerial nor supervisory in nature, he  must be held to be a workman.  Correctness  of S.K. Verma (supra) came up  for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in H.R.  Adyanthaya (supra).  Referring to this Court’s earlier decisions in May and  Baker (supra), Western India Match Co. (supra) and Burmah Shell Oil  Storage (supra), it was observed that as in S.K. Verma (supra) the binding  precedents were not noticed and furthermore in view of the fact that no  finding was given by the court as to whether the Development Officer was  doing clerical or technical work and admittedly not doing any manual work,  the same had been rendered per incuriam.   

       The Constitution Bench summarized the legal position that arose from  the statutory provisions and from the decisions rendered by this Court,  stating : "Till 29-8-1956 the definition of workman under  the ID Act was confined to skilled and unskilled  manual or clerical work and did not include the  categories of persons who were employed to do  ’supervisory’ and ’technical’ work. The said  categories came to be included in the definition  w.e.f. 29-8-1956 by virtue of the Amending Act 36  of 1956. It is, further, for the first time that by  virtue of the Amending Act 46 of 1982, the  categories of workmen employed to do  ’operational’ work came to be included in the  definition. What is more, it is by virtue of this  amendment that for the first time those doing non- manual unskilled and skilled work also came to be  included in the definition with the result that the  persons doing skilled and unskilled work whether  manual or otherwise, qualified to become  workmen under the ID Act."

       Considering the decisions in May and Baker (supra), Western India  Match Co. (supra), Burmah Shell Oil Storage (supra) as also S.K. Verma  (supra) and other decisions following the same, this Court  in H.R.  Adyanthaya (supra) observed: "However, the decisions in the later cases, viz., S.  K. Verma ((1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S)  510 : (1983) 3 SCR 799), Delton cable ((1984) 2  SCC 569 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 281 : (1984) 3 SCR  169), and Ciba Geigy (1985) 3 SCC 371 : 1985  SCC (L&S) 808 : 1985 Supp (1) SCR 282) cases  did not notice the earlier decisions in May & Baker  ((1961) 2 LLJ 94 : AIR 1967 SC 678 : (1961) 2  FLR 594) WIMCO ((1964) 3 SCR 560 : AIR 1964  SC 472 : (1963) 2 LLJ 459), and Burmah Shell  ((1970) 3 SCC 378 : (1971) 2 SCR 758 : AIR 1971

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

SC 922 : (1970) 2 LLJ 590) cases and the very  same contention, viz., if a person did not fall  within any of the categories of manual, clerical,  supervisory or technical, he would qualify to be  workman merely because he is not covered by  either of the four exceptions to the definition, was  canvassed and though negatived in earlier  decisions, was accepted. Further, in those cases the  Development Officer of the LIC, the Security  Inspector at the gate of the factory and  Stenographer-cum-Accountant respectively, were  held to be workmen on the facts of those cases. It  is the decision of this Court in A. Sundarambal  case ((1988) 4 SCC 42 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 892)  which pointed out that the law laid down in May  and Baker case ((1961) 2 LLJ 94 : AIR 1967 SC  678 : (1961) 2 FLR 594) was still good and was  not in terms disowned."  

       The Constitution Bench although noticed the distinct cleavage of  opinion in two lines of cases but held:

"\005These decisions are also based on the facts  found in those cases. They have, therefore, to be  confined to those facts. Hence the position in law  as it obtains today is that a person to be a workman  under the ID Act must be employed to do the work  of any of the categories, viz., manual, unskilled,  skilled, technical, operational, clerical or  supervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered  by either of the four exceptions to the definition.  We reiterate the said interpretation."

       The said reasonings are, therefore, supplemental to the ones recorded  earlier viz.: (i) They were rendered  per incurium; and (ii) May and Baker  (supra) is still a good law.

       Once the ratio of May and Baker (supra) and other decisions  following the same had been reiterated despite  observations made to the  effect that S.K. Verma (supra) and other decisions following the same were  rendered on the facts of that case, we are of the opinion that this Court had  approved the reasonings of May and Baker (supra) and subsequent decisions  in preference to S.K. Verma (supra).   

       The Constitution Bench further took notice of the subsequent  amendment in the definition of ’workman’ and held that even the Legislature  impliedly did not accept the said interpretation of this Court in S.K. Verma  (supra) and other decisions.

       It may be true, as has been submitted by Ms. Jaisingh, that S.K.  Verma (supra) has not been expressly overruled in H.R. Adyanthaya (supra)  but once the said decision has been held to have been rendered per incuriam,  it cannot be said to have laid down a good law.  This Court is bound by the  decision of the Constitution Bench.

       From a perusal of the award dated 28.5.1996 of the Tribunal, it does  not appear that the Appellant herein had adduced any evidence whatsoever  as regard the  nature of his duties so as to establish that he had performed  any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or operational duties.  The offer of  appointment dated 16.7.1987 read with the Scheme clearly proved that he  was appointed as an apprentice and not to do any skilled, unskilled, manual,  technical or operational job.   The onus was on the Appellant to prove that  he is a workman.  He failed to prove  the same.  Furthermore, the duties and  obligations of a Development Officer of the Corporation by no stretch of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

imagination can be held to be performed by an apprentice.            Even assuming that the duties and obligations of a Development  Officer, as noticed in paragraph 8 of S.K. Verma (supra), are applicable in  the instant case, it would be evident that the Appellant herein could not have  organized or developed the business of the Corporation without becoming a  full-fledged officer of the Corporation.  Only an officer of the Corporation  duly appointed can perform the functions of  recruiting agents and take steps  for organizing and developing the business of the Corporation   No area  furthermore could be allotted to him for the purpose of recruiting active and  reliable agents drawn from different communities and walks of life in view  of the categorical findings of the Tribunal that he had been  working as an  apprentice.  If organizing and developing the business of the Corporation  and to act as a friend, philosopher and guide of the agents working within his  jurisdiction were the primary duties and obligations of a Development  Officer, an apprentice evidently cannot perform the same.   

       We may consider the matter from another angle, viz., the appointment  of the Appellant as an apprentice under the Scheme vis-‘-vis the Apprentices  Act, 1961.          The expression ’Apprentice’ has been included in the definition of  ’workman’ contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but  by reason of a subsequent Parliamentary legislation, namely, Apprentices  Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act),  the term ’apprentice’ has been defined in Section  2(aa) to mean "a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a  designated trade in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.  Section 18 of  the 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as  otherwise provided in the Act.  Clauses (a) and (b) of  Section 18 of the 1961  Act read thus : "(a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship  training in a designated trade in an establishment  shall be a trainee and not a worker; and

(b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour  shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice."       

The term  ’employee’ under various labour laws has been defined by  different expressions but Section 18 of the 1961 Act carves out an exception  to the applicability of labour laws in the event the concerned person is an  apprentice as contra-distinguished from the expressions ’worker’,  ’employee’ and ’workman’,  used in different statutes.  

’Apprentice’ under the general law means a person who is bound by a  legal agreement to serve an employer for an  agreed period and the employer  is bound to instruct him.  In Halsbury’s Laws of  England, 4th Edn. Volume  16, it is stated :

"586. Form and parties.  A contract of  apprenticeship is unenforceable if it is not in  writing.  Usually the contract is effected by deed  under which the apprentice is bound to serve a  master faithfully in a trade of business for an  agreed period and the master undertakes to give  the apprentice instruction in it and either to  maintain him or pay his wages.  Technical words  are not necessary.

An apprentice cannot be bound without his  own consent, and consent without  execution of the  instrument is insufficient.  The instrument must be  executed by the apprentice himself, for no one else  has a right to bind him.  In the case of a minor his  father or mother or other guardian, although not  necessary parties to the contract, usually execute it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

too in order to covenant for the apprentice’s due  performance of the contract since, in the absence  of a local custom, an apprentice who is a minor  cannot be sued on his own covenant. A contract of   apprenticeship is binding on a  minor only if it is  on the whole beneficial to him.

       It is not essential that the master should  execute a deed of apprenticeship, but where a  master had in fact executed one part of an  instrument of apprenticeship, a recital in that part  of the instrument that the apprentice had bound  himself apprentice to the master is evidence  against the master that the apprentice had executed  the other part of the instrument.  A corporation  may take an apprentice."

        ’Apprentice’, as noticed hereinbefore, is defined to mean a person  who is undergoing apprenticeship training pursuant to a contract of  apprenticeship.  How a contract of apprenticeship would be entered into is to  be found in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 1961 Act.   The embargos  placed in this regard are: (i) entering into a contract of apprenticeship with a  minor in which event the contract must be executed by his guardian; and (ii)  on such terms or conditions which shall not be inconsistent with any  provision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder.

Furthermore, the apprentice must satisfy the statutory requirements as  regard qualification to be appointed as an apprentice.    

Training of apprenticeship by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 4  shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which the contract of  apprenticeship has been entered into under sub-section (1) thereof.  

       The provisions of the Scheme framed by the Corporation conform to  the provisions of the Apprentices Act and Rules framed thereunder.  It is  worth noticing that Provident funds and insurance have been specified to be  a ’designated trade’ within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Apprentices  Act, 1961 by a notification No. G.S.R. 463(E) dated 23rd August, 1975.

The definition of ’workman’ as contained in Section 2(s) of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 includes an apprentice, but a ’workman’  defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must conform to the  requirements laid down therein meaning thereby, inter alia, that he must be  working in  one or the other capacities mentioned therein and not otherwise.           We may further notice before the Tribunal a contention was raised by  the Appellant that upon expiry of the period of one year he was  appointed as  a probationary officer but the said plea was categorically rejected by the  Tribunal holding :

"7. The concerned workman has also pleaded that  after expiry of one year he was appointed as  Probationary Development Officer.  No date of  issuance of such order has been filed.  In its  absence the version of the concerned workman is  disbelieved and it is held that concerned workman  after expiry of apprenticeship was not appointed as  Probationary Development Officer.  Instead he  continued to work as Apprentice."

A ’workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 must not only establish that he is not covered by the  provisions of the Apprenticeship Act but must further establish that he is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

employed in the establishment for the purpose of doing any work  contemplated in the definition.  Even in a case where a period of  apprenticeship is extended, a further written contract carrying out such  intention need not be executed.  But in a case where a person is allowed to  continue without extending the period of apprenticeship either expressly or  by necessary implication and regular work is taken from him, he may  become a workman.  A person who claims himself to be an apprentice has  certain rights and obligations under the statute.            In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed  from apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts.   In absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or  by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought  about,  an apprentice  cannot be held to be workman.                    It is true that the definition of ’workman’ as contained in Section 2(s)  of the Industrial Disputes Act is exhaustive.  

The interpretation clause contained in a statute although may deserve  a broader meaning having employed the word ’includes’ but therefor also it  is necessary to keep in view the scheme of the object and purport of the  statute which takes him out of the said definition.  Furthermore, the  interpretation section begins with the words "unless the context otherwise  requires".

In Ramesh Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. reported in 2004  (5) SCC 409, it was noticed :

       "A definition is not to be read in isolation.   It must be read in the context of the phrase which  would define it.  It should not be vague or  ambiguous.  The definition of words must be given  a meaningful application; where the context makes  the definition given in the interpretation clause  inapplicable, the same meaning cannot be  assigned.

In State of Maharashtra v. Indian Medical  Assn. one of us (V.N. Khare, C.J.) stated that the  definition given in the interpretation clause having  regard to the contents would not be applicable.  It  was stated : (SCC p.598, para 8)

"8.     A bare perusal of Section 2 of  the Act shows that it starts with the words  ’in this Act, unless the context otherwise  requires\005’.  Let us find out whether in the  context of the provisions of Section 64 of  the Act the defined meaning of the  expression ’management’ can be assigned to  the word ’management’ in Section 64 of the  Act.  In para 3 of the Regulation, the  Essentiality Certificate is required to be  given by the State Government and  permission to establish a new medical  college is to be given by the State  Government under Section 64 of the Act.  If  we give the defined meaning to the  expression ’management’ occurring in  Section 64 of the Act, it would mean the  State Government is required to apply to  itself for grant of permission to set up a  government medical college through the  University.  Similarly it would also mean the  State Government applying to itself for grant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

of Essentiality Certificate under para 3 of  the Regulation.  We are afraid the defined  meaning of the expression ’management’  cannot be assigned to the expression  ’management’ occurring in Section 64 of the  Act.  In the present case, the context does  not permit or requires to apply the defined  meaning to the word ’management’  occurring in Section 64 of the Act.""

In Sri Chittaranjan Das vs. Durgapore Project Limited & Ors. [1995  (2) CLJ 388], it was opined:

"In my opinion, it is not difficult to resolve the  apparent conflict.  Both in the Industrial  Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 as also  the certified Standing Order of the company the  word "including an apprentice" occurs after the  word ’person’.  In that view of the matter in place  of the word ’person’, the word ’apprentice’ can be  substituted in a given situation but for the purpose  of becoming a workman either within the meaning  of the 1946 Act or the standing order framed  thereunder, he is required to fulfil the other  conditions laid down therein meaning thereby he is  required to be employed in an industry to do the  works enumerated in the said definition for hire or  reward, whether the terms of employment be  express or implied."

       The question as to who would answer the description of the term  ’workman’ fell for consideration before this Court in Dharangadhra  Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra and Others [AIR 1957 SC 264],  wherein this Court held :

"The essential condition of a person being a  workman within the terms of this definition is that  he should be employed to do the work in that  industry, that there should be,  in other words, an  employment of his by the employer and that there  should be the relationship between the employer and  him as between the employer and employee or  master and servant.  Unless a person is thus  employed there can be no question of his being a  workman within the definition of the term as  contained in the Act."

Yet again in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs. Management of  Dimakuchi Tea Estate [AIR 1958 SC 353], this Court held :

"A little careful consideration will show, however,  that the expression ’any person’ occurring in the  third part of the definition clause cannot mean  anybody and everybody in this wide world.  First  of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to  (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of  employment or conditions of labour of any person;  these necessarily import a limitation in the sense  that a person in respect of whom the employer- employee relation never existed or can never  possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a  dispute between employers and workman.  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the  context of the subject matter and scheme of the  Act, and consistently with the objects and other  provisions of the Act.  It is well settled that \026

       "the words of a statute , when there is a  doubt about their meaning are to be understood in  the sense in which they best harmonise with the  subject of the enactment and the object which the  legislature has in view.  Their meaning is found  not so much in a strictly grammatical or  etymological propriety of language, nor even in its  popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on  which they are used, and the object to be attained."

(Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition,  p.55).

       For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has  been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.  There is no  merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.  No costs.