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PETITIONER: MS. JORDAN DIENGDEH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.S. CHOPRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1985

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  935            1985 SCR  Supl. (1) 704  1985 SCC  (3)  62        1985 SCALE  (1)952

ACT:      Constitution of  India-Article 44-Uniform  Civil  Code- Necessity of-Emphasised.      Indian Divorce, Act, 1869-Ss. 18, 19 and 22-Petition by wife-Allegation of  impotence of husband-Nullity of marriage or judicial  separation sought-High  Court rejecting  prayer for nullity,  but granting judicial separation on account of cruelty-Validity    of     order-Supreme    Court    holding irretrievable break-down of marriage.      Hindu  Marriage   Act,  1955  ss.  10  and  13B-Special Marriage Act,  1954-Ss. 23  to 28-Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936-Ss.  31 to  34-Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939-S. 2-Grounds  for dissolution  of marriage not uniform- Necessity for uniform Civil Code-Stressed.

HEADNOTE:      The  petitioner   belonged  to  the  ’Khasi  Tribe’  of Maghalaya and  was born  and brought  up as  a  Presbytarian Christian. She  is  now  a  member  of  the  Indian  Foreign Service. The respondent-husband is a Sikh. They were married under the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872. The petitioner filed a  petition in  1980, for  declaration of  nullity  of marriage or  judicial separation  under ss. 18, 19 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, on the ground of the impotence of her husband.      A Single  Judge of  the High  Court rejected the prayer for declaration of nullity of marriage, but granted a decree for judicial  separation on  the ground of cruelty. Division Bench affirmed the decision of the Single Judge on appeal.      In the special leave petition filed by wife, ^      HELD: (1)  A comparison  of the  relevant provisions of the Christian  Marriage Act  1872, Hindu  Marriage Act 1955, Special Marriage  Act 1954,  Parsi Marriage  and Divorce Act 1936, Dissolution  of Muslim  Marriage Act,  1939, show that the law relating to judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far, far from uniform. [717 B]      (2) Under  the Hindu  Marriage Act,  a decree  for  the judicial separation  may be  followed by  a decree  for  the dissolution of marriage on the lapse of 705 one year or upwards from date of the passing of a decree for

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judicial  separation,   if  meanwhile   there  has  been  no resumption  of   cohabitation.  There  is  no  corresponding provision  under   the  Indian  Divorce  Act  and  a  person obtaining a  decree for  judicial separation  will  have  to remain content with that decree and cannot seek to follow it up with  a decree  of divorce, after the lapse of any period of time. [711 B-C]      (3) In  the instant  case, the marriage appears to have broken down irretrievably. If the findings of the High Court stand, there  is no  way  out  for  the  couple.  They  will continue to  be tied  to each  other  since  neither  mutual consent nor irretrievably break-down of marriage is a ground for divorce, under the Indian Divorce Act. There is no point or purpose  to be  served by  the continuance  of a marriage which has  so  completely  and  signally  broken  down.  The parties are  bound together by a marital tie which is better untied. [717 B-C]      (4) Time  has now  come for  the  intervention  of  the legislature to  provide for  a uniform  code of marriage and divorce as envisaged by Article 44 and to provide by law for a way  out of  the unhappy  situations in which couples find themselves in.  It is  necessary to  introduce irretrievably break-down of  marriage, and  mutual consent  as grounds  of divorce in all cases.                [717 C-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 2047 of 1985.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  29.2.1984  of  the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (O.S.) No. 28 of 1982.      Mohinder Narian,  S.S. Jauhar  and Ms. Zubeda Begum for the Petitioner.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. It  was just  the other day that a Constitution Bench  of  this  Court  had  to  emphasise  the urgency of  infusing life  into Art.  44 of the Constitution which provides that "The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens  a uniform civil code through out the territory of India."  The present  case is  yet another  which focuses attention on the immediate and compulsive need for a uniform civil code.  The totally  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs consequent on the lack of a uniform civil code is exposed by the facts  of the  present case. Before mentioning the facts of the  case, we  might as well refer to the observations of Chandrachud,  C.J.,  in  the  recent  case  decided  by  the Constitution Bench  (Mohd Ahmed  Khan v.  Shah Bano  Begum & Ors.) 706           "There is no evidence of any official activity for      framing a  common civil  code for the country ... ... A      common Civil  Code  will  help  the  case  of  national      integration by  removing disparate  loyalties  to  laws      which have  conflicting  ideologies.  No  community  is      likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions      on this  issue. It  is the  State which is charged with      the duty  of securing  a uniform  civil  code  for  the      citizens of the country and, unquestionably, it has the      legislative competence  to do so. A counsel in the case      whispered,   somewhat    audibly,   that    legislative      competence is  one thing,  the political courage to use      that competence  is quite  another. We  understand  the      difficulties involved  in bringing persons of different

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    faiths and  persuasions on  a common  platform. But,  a      beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have      any meaning.  Inevitably, the  role of the reformer has      to be  assumed by  the courts because, it is beyond the      endurance of  sensitive minds  to allow injustice to be      suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts      of courts  to bridge  the  gap  between  personal  laws      cannot take  the place  of a common civil code. Justice      to all  is a  far more  satisfactory way  of dispensing      justice from case to case."      The facts  of the case are somewhat novel and peculiar. The wife,  who is  the petitioner before us claims to belong to the  ’Khasi Tribe’ of Meghalaya, who was born and brought up as  a Presbytarian  Christian at  Shilong. She  is now  a member of the Indian Foreign Service. The husband is a Sikh. They were  married under  the Indian  Christen Marriage Act, 1872. The  marriage was  performed on  October 14, 1975. The present petition  for declaration  of nullity of marriage or judicial separation  was filed in 1980 under sections 18, 19 and 20  of the  Indian Divorce  Act, 1869.  The  prayer  for declaration no nullity of marriage was rejected by a learned single judge  of the  High Court,  but a decree for judicial separation was  granted on the ground of cruelty. On appeal, a Division  Bench of the High Court affirmed the judgment of the learned  single judge.  The wife has filed this petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court. She  seeks a  declaration of nullity of marriage. The ground on  which the  declaration was  sought in  the courts below and  the ground  on which  it is  now  sought  is  the impotence of  the husband  in that  though the husband is of achieving 707 erection and  penetration, he  ejaculates prematurely before the wife has an orgasm, leaving the wife totally unsatisfied and frustrated. At this stage, we are not concerned with the question how  far the  wife has  been able  to establish her case. The  real problem  now is that the marriage appears to have broken  down irretrievably.  Yet if the findings of the High Court  stand, there  is no way out for the couple, they will continue  to be tied to each other since neither mutual consent nor irretrievable break down of marriage is a ground for divorce,  under the  Indian Divorce  Act. Section 10 the Indian Divorce Act prescribes the grounds on which a husband or wife may petition for dissolution of marriage. The ground on which  a husband  may obtain  a decree for dissolution of marriage is the adultery of the wife. The grounds on which a wife may  obtain a  decree for  dissolution of  marriage are change of religion from Christianity to another religion and marriage with  another woman,  incestuous  adultery,  bigamy with adultery,  marriage with  another woman  with adultery, rape, sodomy  or bestiality,  adultery coupled with cruelty, adultery coupled  with desertion for more than two years. It must be  noted that  the Indian  Divorce Act applies only to cases where  the  petitioner  or  respondent  professes  the Christian religion.  Section 19 provides that a marriage may be declared null and void on the ground-           "(1) that  the respondent was impotent at the time      of the institution of the suit;           (2) that  the parties  are within  the  prohibited      degrees of  consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or      affinity;           (3) that  either party  was a  lunatic or idiot at      the time of the marriage;           (4) that  the former  husband or  wife  of  either      party was  living at  the time  of the marriage and the

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    marriage with  such former  husband or wife was then in      fore." Section 22  provides for  judicial aspersion at the instance of either husband or wife on the ground of adultery, cruelty or desertions for two years or upwards.      The provisions  of the  Divorce Act may now be compared with the  provisions of  other  enactments  and  laws  which provide for 708 decrees  of   nullity  of  marriage,  divorce  and  judicial separation. Under  the Hindu  Marriage Act, sec. 10 provides for judicial  separation.  It  enables  either  party  to  a marriage to  seek judicial  separation on any of the grounds specified in  sec. 13(1)  and in  the case of a wife also on any of  the grounds  specified in  sub-sec. 2  of  sec.  13. Section 11  provides for  a declaration that a marriage is a nullity if  it contravene  as  any  one  of  the  conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of sec. 5. Sec. 5 (i) requires that  neither party has a spouse living at the time of the  marriage. Sec.  5 (iv) requires that the parties are not within  the degrees  of prohibited  relationship, unless the custom  or usage  governing each  of them  permits of  a marriage between  the  two.  Sec.  5(v)  requires  that  the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing  each of  them permits of a marriage between the two.  Section 12  further provides  that a  marriage  is voidable and  may be annulled if (a) a marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent; or (b) a marriage  is in  contravention of the conditions specified in sec.  5(ii) (marriage  without valid consent); or (c) the consent of  the guardian,  where required,  under sec. 5 was obtained by  force or  fraud; or  (d) the respondent was, at the time  of the  marriage was pregnant by some person other than the  petitioner. Section  13(1) enumerates  the grounds for the  dissolution of  a marriage  on the  petition  of  a husband  or  wife.  It  provides  that  a  marriage  may  be dissolved by a decree of divorce if the other party-      "(i) has, after  the solemnization of the marriage, had           voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other           than his or her spouse, or      (i-a)has, after  the  solemnization  of  the  marriage,           treated the petitioner with cruelty, or      (i-b)has  deserted  the  petitioner  for  a  continuous           period of  not less  than  two  years  immediately           preceding the presentation of the petition, or      (ii) has  ceased to  be Hindu  by conversion to another           religion, or      (iii)has been  incurably of  unsound mind,  or has been           suffering  continuously   or  intermittently  from           mental disorder  of such  a kind  and to  such  an           extent that 709           the petitioner  cannot reasonably  be expected  to           live with the respondent.       (EXPLANATION) omitted for the present purpose)      (iv) has, been  suffering from a virulent end incurable           form of leprosy, or      (v)  has been  suffering from  venereal  disease  in  a           communicable form, or      (vi) has renounced  the world by entering any religious           order, or      (vii)has not  been heard of as being alive for a period           of seven  years or more by these persons who would           naturally have  heard of  it, had  that party been           alive."

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     (EXPLANATION omitted for the present purpose) Section 13 (1-A) provides-      "(i) that there  has been no resumption of cohabitation           as between  the parties  to  the  marriage  for  a           period of  one year  or upwards after passing of a           decree for  judicial separation in a proceeding to           which they were parties, or      (ii) that there  has been  no restitution  of  conjugal           rights as  between the parties to the marriage for           a period  of one year or upwards after the passing           of the  decree for  restitution of conjugal rights           in a proceeding to which they were parties." Section 13 (2) provides-      "(2) A  wife  may  also  present  a  petition  for  the           dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce           on the ground- 710      (i)  in the  case of any marriage solemnized before the           commencement of  this Act,  that the  husband  had           married again before such commencement or that any           other wife  of the  husband  married  before  such           commencement  was   alive  at   the  time  of  the           solemnization of  the marriage  of the petitioner,           or                Provided that  in either  case the other wife           is alive  at  the  time  of  presentation  of  the           petition, or      (ii) that the  husband has,  since the solemnization of           the marriage,  been  guilty  of  rape,  sodomy  or           bestiality, or      (iii)that in  a suit  under section  18  of  the  Hindu           Adoptions and  Maintenance  Act,  1956,  or  in  a           proceeding  under  section  125  of  the  Code  of           Criminal   Procedure,    1973   (or    under   the           corresponding section  488 of the Code of Criminal           Procedure, 1898),  a decree  or order, as the case           may  be,  has  been  passed  against  the  husband           awarding maintenance  to the  wife notwithstanding           that she  was living  apart  and  that  since  the           passing of  such  decree  or  order,  cohabitation           between the  parties has  not been resumed for one           year or upwards, or      (iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was           solemnized before  she attained the age of fifteen           years and  she has  repudiated the  marriage after           attaining that age but before attaining the age of           eighteen years." Section 13-A  provides that on a petition for dissolution of marriage by  a decree  of divorce,  except in  so far as the petition is  founded on the grounds mentioned in sec. 13 (i) (ii) (vi)  and (vii), the court may, if it considers it just so to  do, having  regard to  the circumstances of the case, pass a  decree for judicial separation. Section 13-B further provides that  a petition  for dissolution  of marriage by a decree of  divorce may be presented to the court by both the parties to  the marriage  together on  the ground  that they have been  living separately  for a  period of  one year  or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage 711 should be dissolved. If the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act are  compared with  the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, it  will be  seen that  apart from  the total  lack  of uniformity  of  grounds  on  which  decrees  of  nullity  of marriage, divorce  or judicial  separation may  be  obtained

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under the  two Acts,  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  contains  a special provision for a joint application by the husband and wife for  the grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent whereas  the   Indian  Divorce   Act  contains   no  similar provision. Another very important difference between the two Acts is  that under  the Hindu  Marriage Act,  a decree  for judicial separation  may be  followed by  a decree  for  the dissolution of  marriage on the lapse of one year or upwards from the  date of  the passing  of a  decree for judicial if meanwhile there  has been  no  resumption  of  cohabitation. There is no corresponding provision under the Indian Divorce Act and  a person obtaining a decree for judicial separation will have to remain content with that decree and cannot seek to follow it up with a decree of divorce, after the lapse of any period  of time.  We may  also notice that irretrievable break down  of marriage  is yet no ground for dissolution of marriage under  the Hindu  Marriage  Act  also,  though  the principle appears  to have  been recognised in sec. 13 (1-A) and sec. 13(B).      We may now have a look at the provisions of the Special Marriage  Act,   1954  which   applies  only   to  marriages solemnized under  that Act.  Sec. 23  of the Act enables the husband or  the wife  to present  a  petition  for  judicial separation-(a) on  any of  the  grounds  specified  in  sub- section (1)  and sub-section  (1-A) of section 27 on which a petition for  divorce might  have been  presented; or (b) on the  ground   of  failure   to  comply  with  a  decree  for restitution of  conjugal rights.  Section 24 declares that a marriage  may   be  declared  nullity  if  (i)  any  of  the conditions specified  in clauses  (a), (b),  (c) and  (d) of section 4 has not been fulfilled; or (ii) the respondent was impotent at  the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of  the suit.  We may  notice here  that sec.  4 clauses (a),  (b), (c),  (d) and  (e) provide  that  neither party has  been subject  to recurrent attacks of insanity or epilepsy, that  the male  has completed  21 years of age and the female  18 years  of age  and that  the parties  are not within  the  degrees  of  prohibited  marriage.  Section  25 declares that  a marriage shall voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity if,-      "(i) the marriage has not been consummated owing to the 712           wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate the           marriage; or      (ii) the respondent  was at  the time  of the  marriage           pregnant by some person other than the petitioner;           or      (iii)the consent  of either  party to  the marriage was           obtained by  coercion or  fraud, as defined in the           Indian Contract Act, 1872."           (The provisos  have been  omitted as  they are not           necessary for the purposes of this case) Section 27  enables either the husband or the wife to seek a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent-      "(a) has, after  the solemnization of the marriage, had           voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other           than his or her spouse; or      (b)  has  since   the  solemnization  of  the  marriage           treated the  petitioner with two years immediately           preceding the presentation of the petition; or      (c)  is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for seven           years or  more for  an offence  as defined  in the           Indian Penal Code;      (d)  has  since   the  solemnization  of  the  marriage           treated the petitioner with cruelty; or

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    (e)  has been  incurably of  unsound mind,  or has been           suffering  continuously   or  intermittently  from           mental disorder  of such  a kind  and to  such  an           extent that  the petitioner  cannot reasonably  be           expected to live with the respondent.                (Explanation omitted as it is not necessary.)      (f)  has been  suffering from  venereal  disease  in  a           communicable form; or 713      (g)  has been  suffering from  leprosy, the disease not           having been contracted from the petitioner; or      (h)  has not  been heard of as being alive for a period           of seven  years or more by those persons who would           naturally have  heard of  the  respondent  if  the           respondent has been alive."                (Explanation omitted as it is not necessary) Section 27  (1A) enables  a wife  to present  a petition for divorce on  the  ground  that  her  husband  has  since  the marriage been  guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or that an order  for maintenance  has been made against the husband and that  cohabitation has  not been resumed for one year or upwards after  the making  of the order. Sec. 27 (2) further provides that  a decree  for divorce may be presented on the ground that  there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards  after the  passing  of  a  decree  for  judicial separation. Sec.  28 provides for the passing of a decree of divorce on  the presentation  of  a  petition  by  both  the parties together  on the  ground that  they have been living separately for  a period of one year or more, that they have not been  able to  live together and that they have actually agreed that  the marriage  should be  dissolved. It  will be seen that  the Special  Marriage Act like the Hindu Marriage Act contains provisions for a decree for judicial separation being followed  up by  a decree of divorce if there has been no resumption  of cohabitation  for a  year or more and also for a  decree of  divorce by  mutual consent. Here again, it will be  seen that the principle of irretrievable break down of marriage  seems to  be accepted  on principle, but is not specifically made a ground of divorce.      Under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, section 30 provides  that a  marriage may be declared to be null and void if  consummation of  a marriage  is from natural causes impossible. Sec.  31  provides  for  the  dissolation  of  a marriage if  a husband  or wife has continuously been absent for a  period of  seven years  and has  not been heard of as being alive  within that  time. Sec.32  provides grounds for divorce:      "(a) that the  marriage has not been consummated within           one year  after its  solemnization  owing  to  the           wilful refusal of the defendant to consummate it; 714      (b)  that the defendant at the time of the marriage was           of unsound  mind and  has been habitually so up to           the date of the suit; (Proviso has been omitted)      (c)  that the  defendant was  at the  time of  marriage           pregnant by  some person other than the plaintiff;           (Proviso has been omitted)      (d)  that  the   defendant  has   since  the   marriage           committed adultery  or fornication  or  bigamy  or           rape or an unnatural offence;           (Proviso has been omitted)      (e)  that  the   defendant  has   since  the   marriage           voluntarily caused  grievous hurt to the plaintiff           or  has   infected  the  plaintiff  with  venereal

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         disease, or,  where the  defendant is the husband,           has  compelled  the  wife  to  submit  herself  to           prostitution;           (The proviso has been omitted)      (f)  that the  defendant is  undergoing a  sentence  of           imprisonment  for  seven  years  or  more  for  an           offence as defined in the Indian Penal Code;           (The proviso has been omitted)      (g)  that the  defendant the deserted the plaintiff for           at least three years;      (h)  that a decree or order for judicial separation has           been passed against the defendant, or an order has           been passed  against the defendant by a Magistrate           awarding separate  maintenance to  the  plaintiff,           and the  parties have  not had marital intercourse           for three  years or  more  since  such  decree  or           order;      (i)  that the  defendant has  failed to  comply with  a           decree for  restitution of  conjugal rights  for a           year or more; and 715      (j)  that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi."           (Proviso has been omitted) Section 34  provides for  judicial separation  on any of the grounds on  which divorce  could be sought; or on the ground that the defendant has been guilty of such cruelty to him or her or  to her  children or has used such personal violence, or has behaved in such a way as to render it in the judgment of the  court improper to compel him or her to live with the defendant. It  will be  noticed here  that under  the  Parsi Marriage  and   Divorce  Act   also,  mutual   consent   and irretrievable break  down of  marriage are  not  grounds  of divorce though  a decree  for  judicial  separation  may  be followed by  a decree of divorce if the parties have not had marital intercourse  for three  years  or  more  since  such decree or order.      Under the  Mohammedan Law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife  by the  pronouncement of  talaq. A Muslim wife may after the  passing of  the dissolution  of Muslim  Marriages Act, 1939,  obtain a  decree for a dissolution of a marriage on one of the following grounds:      "(i) that the  whereabouts of the husband have not been           known for a period of four years;      (ii) that the  husband has  neglected or  has failed to           provide for  her maintenance  for a  period of two           years;      (iii)that   the   husband   has   been   sentenced   to           imprisonment  for  a  period  of  seven  years  or           upwards;      (iv) that the  husband has  failed to  perform, without           reasonable cause,  his martial  obligations for  a           period of three years;      (v)  that the  husband was  impotent at the time of the           marriage and continues to be so;      (vi) that the  husband has  been insane for a period of           two years  or  is  suffering  from  leprosy  or  a           virulent venereal disease;      (vii)that she,  having been  given in  marriage by  her           father 716           or other  guardian before  she attained the age of           fifteen  years,  repudiated  the  marriage  before           attaining the age of eighteen years           (Proviso has been omitted as it is not necessary)      (viii)that the  husband treats her with cruelty that is

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         to say-           (a)  habitually assaults  her or  makes  her  life                miserable by  cruelty of conduct even if such                conduct does  not  amount  to  physical  ill-                treatment, or           (b)  associates with women of evil repute or leads                an infamous life, or           (c)  attempts to  force her  to  lead  an  immoral                life, or           (d)  disposes of  her  property  or  prevents  her                exercising her legal rights over it, or           (e)  obstructs  her   in  the  observance  of  her                religious profession or practice, or           (f)  if he has more wives than one, does not treat                her  equitably   in   accordance   with   the                injunctions of the Qoran;      (ix) on any  other ground  which is recognised as valid           for the  dissolution  of  marriages  under  Muslim           Law." (The  proviso has  been omitted as it is not           necessary in the present case). We may  add that  under strict  Hanafi  Law,  there  was  no provision  enabling  a  Muslim  women  to  obtain  a  decree dissolving her  marriage on  the failure  of the  husband to maintain her  or on his deserting her or maltreating her and it  was   the  absence   of  such   a  provision   entailing ’inspeakable misery  in innumerable  Muslim women’  that was responsible for  the dissolution  of the  Muslims  Marriages Act, 1939.  (See Statements  of Objects  and Reasons of that Act). If  the legislature  could so alter the Hanafi Law, we fail to understand the hallabalcoo about the recent judgment of this court in the case of 717 Mohd. Ahmed  Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. interpreting the provisions of  sec. 125  of the  Criminal Procedure Code and the Muslim  Law. it is also necessary to add that Mohammedan Law provides  for a  decree for  divorce known  as Khula and mubara’ at by agreement of parties.      It is  thus seen  that the  law  relating  to  judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far, far from uniform. Surely  the time has now come for a complete reform of the  law of marriage and make a uniform law applicable to all people  irrespective of religion or caste. It appears to be  necessary  to  introduce  irretrievable  break  down  of marriage and  mutual consent  as grounds  of divorce  in all cases. The case before us is an illustration of a case where the parties  are bound  together by  a marital  tie which is better untied.  There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance  of a  marriage which  has so completely and signally broken  down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention  of the  legislature in  these  matters  to provide for  a uniform  code of  marriage and divorce and to provide by  law for  a way  out of the unhappy situations in which couples  like the  present have find themselves in. We direct that  a copy  of this  order may  be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to  take.  In  the  meanwhile,  let  notice  go  to  the respondents. A.P.J. 718