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PETITIONER: MRS. JUDITH FERNANDES & ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CONCEICAO ANTONIO FERNANDES & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/08/1996

BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (7)   639        1996 SCALE  (6)292

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The plaintiffs  are the  appellants in  this appeal. On January 18,1967  the original plaintiff No.1 executed a deed of lease  for a  period  of  six  years  in  favour  of  the defendant-Respondent No.1 herein (hereinafter referred to as the  Respondent)   in  respect  of  the  lands  in  question containing  coconut   trees.  On   May  5,  1972  notice  of termination  of   the  lease  was  given  by  the  aforesaid plaintiff. There  is no  dispute that  the lease  expired in January, 1973.  On October  10, 1973  the plaintiffs filed a suit for  eviction of  the defendant. During the pendency of the said  suit amendments  were introduced in the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as  the Act). The amendments were introduced by the Fifth Amendment Act  which came  into force with effect from April 20, 1976.  The Trial Court decreed the suit which decree was affirmed by  tho court of Appeal. However, the High Court on appeal filed by the defendant-respondeont set aside the said decree saying  that  Civil  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to entertain the  suit after  coming into  force of  the  Fifth Amendment Act.      It may  be mentioned that by the Amending Act aforesaid in  Section   2(1A)  new  definition  of  ’agriculture’  was introduced. Section  2 (7A)  defined ’garden’  to mean  land used primarily  for growing  coconut trees,  arecanut trees, cashew nut  trees and  mango trees.  In  view  of  aforesaid introduction of sub-section (7A) in Section 2 the expression ’garden’ shall  include the  land used primarily for growing coconut trees.  Section 7  of the  Act provides  that if any question arises  whether any  person is  or was  a tenant or should be  deemed  to  be  a  tenant  under  this  Act,  the Mamlatdar shall,  after  holding  an  enquiry,  decide  such question. In  view of Section 8 of the Act no tenancy of any land shall  be terminated  and no  person holding  land as a tenant shall  be liable  to be  evicted  therefrom  save  as provided under the Act. Section 58 of the Act is as follows:

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    "Bar to jurisdiction of Courts           (i)   No    suit   or    other      proceeding shall  lie  against  any      person in respect of anything which      is in  good faith  done or intended      to be done under this Act.           (ii) Save  as provided in this      Act,   no    Court    shall    have      jurisdiction to  settle, decide  or      deal with  any question which is by      or under  this Act  required to  be      settled, decided  or dealt  with by      the Mamlatdar,  Tribunal, Collector      or Governmant,  and no order passed      by  these   authorities  under  Act      shall be questioned in any Civil or      Criminal Court."      In view of sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act, no court has  jurisdiction to  settle, decide  or deal with any question which  is by  or under  this  Act  required  to  be settled, decided  or dealt  with by the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or  Government. It can be said that aforesaid sub- section (2)  of Section  58 prescribes a bar on the power of the Civil  Court to  entertain a suit for settling, deciding or dealing  with any  question which is by or under this Act required to  be  settled,  decided  or  dealt  with  by  the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or Government.      As already  mentioned above,  the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs had  been filed on October 10,1973 when the Fifth Amendment was  not in force and Section 2(7A) was not in the Act. It  can be  said that on the date of filing of the suit the expression ’agriculture’ as defined then did not include the land  which was being used primarily for growing coconut trees. The  necessary corollary  thereof shall  be that  any suit for  eviction filed  against a  person in possession of such land which was being used primarily for growing coconut trees was  not barred  by sub-section  (2) of Section 58. It cannot be  disputed that  after the  amendment aforesaid and the introduction  of Section Z(7A) which defines ’garden’ to include land  used primarily  for growing coconut trees, the provisions of  the act  became applicable even in respect of lands growing  coconut trees  and the bar prescribed in sub- section (2) of Section 58 became applicable.      On behalf of the appellants it was urged that as on the date when  the suit  in question  had Been  filed the bar of sub-section (2)  of Section  58 was  not applicable,  it was well within  the jurisdiction  of the  Trial Court to decree the said  suit which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. As such, the  High Court  should not  have set aside the decree passed in  the suit  in question. As a first impression this argument is  attractive especially  when it  is an  admitted position that  the date  on which the Trial Court passed the decree, the  Fifth Amendment  had been  declared to be ultra vires. It  may be  mentioned  that  the  aforesaid  judgment declaring the Fifth Amendment to be ultra vires has been se’ aside by  this Court and the said amendment has been held to be legal and valid in the case of Union of Territory of Goa. Daman and  Diu vs. Lakshmibai Narayan Patial & Ors. reported in (1990)  4 SCC 102. In this background, we have to proceed that when  the Fifth  Amendment came  into force,  it was  a valid piece  of legislation. The only question which remains to be  examined is  as to what effect it shall have to suits which were  pending before the Civil Courts. This aspect has also been  examined by  this Court  in the  case  of  Inacio Martines (d)  through LRs.  v.  Narayan  Hari  Naik  &  Ors.

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reported in  (1993) 3  SCC 123,  wherein it  was observed as follows:           "After the amendment came into      force, the  provisions of  the  Act      became applicable  to the  lands in      question which  were primarily used      for  growing   coconut  trees   and      receiving  produce   therefrom.  By      virtue of  Section 7  any  question      whether a  person is  a tenant or a      deemed tenant  was required  to  be      decided by  the Mamlatdar  and  the      jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court      stood ousted  by Section Section 58      (2) of  the Act.  The  question  is      whether this  subsequent change  in      the law deprived the civil court of      jurisdiction which  it  undoubtedly      possessed  on   the  date   of  the      institution  of   the  suit.  Three      situations, therefore,  develop  in      the context  of the  provisions  of      the Act  as amended  by  the  fifth      amendment, namely,  (i)  the  civil      court retains  jurisdiction or (ii)      the civil  court is  precluded from      deciding,    even     incidentally,      questions falling  within the ambit      of Section  7 of  the Act  or (iii)      the civil  court’s jurisdiction  is      wholly ousted.  Since  the  Act  is      silent as  to the  fate of  pending      litigation    after    the    fifth      amendment the  situation arising on      the amendment  of the  Act must  be      decided on  first principles.  If a      suit is filed to recover possession      of   agricultural   land   from   a      trespasser and  no dispute  arises,      the   adjudication    whereof    is      required to  be done by the special      machinery set up under the Act, the      civil court  will continue  to have      jurisdiction.  If,   however,   the      defendant raises a dispute which is      required  to  be  resolved  by  the      special machinery  under the Act, a      question will  arise what procedure      the civil court should adopt. There      may arise  a  situation  where  the      entire dispute  pending before  the      civil court  can be  adjudicated by      the special  machinery only and not      the  civil  court,  what  procedure      should the  civil court  follow  in      such a situation?...........           Before   we    answer    those      questions we  must  decide  on  the      impact of  the fifth  amendment  on      pending  litigation.  The  question      whether  the   fifth  amendment  is      prospective or retrospective really      recedes in  the  background  if  we      examine the question from the angle      whether the  civil court can decide

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    any  question  falling  within  the      jurisdiction of  the special  forum      under  the   Act   in   a   pending      litigation in  the  absence  of  an      express provision  in that  behalf.      If  the   question  of  tenancy  in      regard to  agricultural land cannot      be decided by the civil court under      the Act  and there  is  no  express      saving clause  permitting the civil      court to  decide the  same,  it  is      obvious that  any decision rendered      by the civil court would be without      jurisdiction.      So far  the facts  of the  present. case are concerned, the plea  of the  defendant-respondents was  that they  were tenants of  the land  in question  having coconut  trees, as such the  Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree for eviction  against them,  because of  subsection  (2)  of Section 58  of the  Act. From a bare reference to subsection (2) of  Section 58  it is  apparent that  the bar  has  been placed on  the court from settling, deciding or dealing with any question  which is  by or under the said Act required to be  settled,   decided  or  dealt  with  by  the  Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector  or Government.  In the present case, no doubt the  suit had  been filed  on October 10, 1973 but the Trial Court  passed the  judgment and  decree on January 27, 1983, the Fifth Amendment having come into force with effect from April  20,1976, several years before the passing of the decree. According  to us,  the bar  of  sub-section  (2)  or Section 68  became applicable.  In this background, the High Court was justified in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by  the Trial  Court which  had been  affirmed by the Court of  Appeal. We  find no ground to take a view contrary to the view taken by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs.      In order  to expedite  the disposal  of the dispute, we direct  that   the  plaint,   written  statement  and  other connected records  which had  been filed  before  the  Civil Judge,  Senior  Division,  Quepem,  be  transferred  to  the concerned Mamlatdar  of the  area within  whose jurisdiction the disputed  lands are  situate. We further direct that the Mamlatdar shall  pass appropriate  orders in accordance with law as  early as possible, preferably within six months from the date of the receipt of the records.