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PETITIONER: MRS.  HELEN C.  REBELLO & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPN.  & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/09/1998

BENCH: K.  VENKATASWAMI, A.P.  MISRA.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT -------- MISRA, J. -------- The question raised in this appeal is of great importance on which the  High  Courts in India are divided.  Importance of this question is underlined and revealing since 19^  century where  there  is  full  debate  in the English Courts having divergent views leading to legislation and amendments to set at rest  this  controversy.    So  far  as  our  country  is concerned,  as  aforesaid,  we  have  divergent views of the various High Courts, but so  far  this  Court,  it  has  not dwelled this question in depth, except passing references in a few cases to which we shall be reining later. The question  is.   whether the life insurance money of the deceased  is  to  be  deducted  from  the  claimants’ compensation  receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? The  minimum  matrix  of  the  facts   to   appreciate   the controversy is stated hereunder: The husband of appellant No.1, father of  appellants Nos.2  to  6,  was  travelling in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus from Rathare  Badruk  to  Pune  on 12th April,  1973  at  about 4.00 P.M.  when this bus passed the  village  Umbraj  and  came  near  village  Kotri   near milestone No.   89/4, Karnataka State Transport bus was seen coming from the opposite direction, i.e., from  Satara  side towards Kolhapur.    The  drivers  of the two buses were not able to control their buses resulting into collision between the two, seriously injuring the deceased clemant Rebello and Mr.  Vincy John Pereira, in which Rebello received  multiple fractures and  died  on  the  spot.   The appellants filed a Specie Civil Suit No.  24 of 1975 against the aforesaid  two State Road  Transport  Corporations.   It was averred in the plaint that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was the sole bread winner of the family.  He was a well  known  boat builder and  businessman  of  the  Bassein.    He  was doing business in partnership under the name and style  of  Marine Engineering Works.   He was a person of great skill and hard worker.  He was a person of robust health and sober  habits. His  income from the business and other activities was about

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Rs- 40,000/- per annum.  He was assessed for  an  income  of about  Rs.43,000/-  by  the  Income  Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 1971-72.  Being the sole  bread  winner,  he used to provide the family with the support of Rs.25,000/per year.     The    claim    made   by   the   appellants   for damages/compensation under the various admissible  heads  of damages was for  Rs.    4 lacs.  The claim of the appellants was allowed by the Civil  Judge,  Senior  Division,  Satara, holding  that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the  part  of  the  driver  of  respondent  No.2, namely, Karnataka  Road  Transport  Coloration.  It was also held that the deceased had  supported  his  family  with  an amount ofRs.25,OOOA  per  annum.    It was found that as the deceased was of 40 years old at the time of  his  death  and his  father  had  lived upto the age of 85 years, the normal longevity of his life would have been 25 years from the date of death, but since the claimants had claimed a compensation only taking a period of 20 years, the Trial court held  that the   appellants   were   entitled   to  a  compensation  of Rs3,80,000/by  way  of  pecuniary  loss  and  Rs.l0,000/  on account  of  pain  and  suffering,  in  total  Rs.3,90,000/^ However, in view of  the  Division  Bench  judgment  of  the Bombay  High  Court  in Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni and Others vs.  Many Jerome D’souza and others (AIR 1978  Bombay  239), the  Trial  court  deducted  the  amount  of  life insurance received by the appellants to the  tune  of  Rs.3,15,067.95p from  the  aforesaid  compensation  calculated and held that only the balance amount of Rs.74,939.05p  with  interest  at the  rate  of  six  per  cent  per  annum  is payable by the respondent No.2 to the claimants. Through  the  witness  Shashikant  Dattatraya  Kale, Exhibit 67, who  was  serving  in  LIC  at  Bombay,  it  was elicited  that  the  deceased  clement  had insured his life under the said policy.  The claimants were entitled  to  get an  amount  of  Rs.4,40193.65p,  out  of  which an amount of Rs.l,52,125.70p was deducted by way of estate duty  and  the remaining   amount   of  Rs.3,15,067.95p  was  paid  to  the aforesaid heirs.  It is this amount, as aforesaid, which was deducted in view of the decision of the  Bombay  High  Court referred to  above.    On  appeal,  preferred  both  by  the appellants and also the respondents, the High Court rejected the cross appeal of  respondent  No  .2,  namely,  Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.  However, the appeal (No.. 209/81)  of  the appellants was dismissed as it could not be pressed in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid.  It is against this  judgment,  this  appeal  has been preferred by the appellants. At  the  outset,  learned counsel, appearing for the respondents made a preliminary objection that this appeal is not maintainable since the appeal  in  the  High  Court  was dismissed as  not pressed.  We have no difficulty in holding that this preliminary objection of the  respondents  has  no merit.   We find that the High Court had rejected the appeal with the following observation:         "As regards the other appeal, bearing No.209         of 1981, Mr.  Chaphkar, the learned counsel for the         appellants, has urged that  in  view  of  the  (Full         Bench) decision of this Court, he does not press the         appeal as the same does not survive."         (Full Bench, was wrongly recorded for         the Division Bench) This  only  reveals  that  since  the  question   of deduction,   as  aforesaid  being  covered  by  the  earlier decision of the same court, he could not press the point  in that appeal  in  that  court.    It  is  for this reason the

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appellants  challenge  this  point   before   us   for   our consideration. In this case, we are not concerned with the question of compensation assessed under the Motor Vehicles Act as the same is not under challenge before us.  This became final as the cross objections filed by respondent No.2 were dismissed by  the  High  Court  which  challenged  the fixation of the quantum  of  compensation  against  which  no   appeal   was preferred by  the  respondents.   This leaves us to the only question for adjudication, as aforesaid, whether  out:    of the  compensation amount payable to the appellants under the Motor  Vehicles  Act  1939,  the  money  received   by   the appellants  on  account  of  life  insurance  policy  of the deceased, is deductible or not which has been  done  in  the present case through the impugned order? Adverting to the said Bombay High Court decision  in the  case of Jaikumar (supra), we find that it refers to the two sets of decisions of the various High Courts  in  India. One  set,  holding that life insurance money received by the heirs ought to be deducted and the other set, holding not to deduct from.  the compensation payable under  the  aforesaid Act.   The case of Jaikumar (supra), which is the foundation of the  present  appellants  being  deprived  of  the  total compensation,   the   contention  therein  was,  the  amount received towards life  insurance  policy  is  the  pecuniary advantage  received  by  the claimant by reason of the death hence liable to be deducted in terms of  the  ratio  in  the case of Gobald Motor case (AIR 1962 S.C.I), Jaikumar (supra) holds:         "....   Judicial  opinion is also sharply divided on         the question whether life policy amount can be  said         to have come to the claimants by reason of the death         of  the  deceased  to justify its deduction from the         amount of  compensation  payable  to  the  claimants         towards their  pecuniary  loss.    Our attention was         drawn by Mr.  Zaveri the learned  advocate  for  the         respondents,  to  a few judgements of the High Court         of Gujarat in LIC of India V.  Naranbhai  Munjabhai,         1973 ACC  CJ 226:  (AIR 1973 Guj 216), High Court of         Punjab and Haryana in Sood and Company  v.    Surjit         Kaur,  1973  Acc CJ 414, as also Delhi High Court in         Bhagwanti Devi v.  Ish Kumar, 1975  Acc  CJ  56  and         several  other  judgments of same High Courts, which         do support his contention that amounts  so  received         are  not liable to be deducted as the same cannot be         said to have come to the claimants by reason of  the         death of the  deceased.  Mr.  Dwivedee, on the other         band, drew our attention to the  judgments  reported         in Union of  India  v.  S.  Ghosh, AIR 1973 Pat 129,         Sushila Devi v.  lbrahim, AIR  1974  Madh  Pra  181;         Sabha Pati  v.    Rameshwar  Singh,  1973 Acc CJ 319         (Orissa High  Court)  and  Automobiles  Transport  v         Dewalal  AIR 1977 Raj 121, and a few other judgments         of the same courts taking the contrary view.  We may         at once  observe  that  Patna  High  Court  supports         deduction   only  of  such  policy  amounts  as  are         subscribed to  meet  accident  contingency  and  not         other policy   amounts.    It  rather  supports  Mr.         Zaveri’s contention and not that of Mr.    Dwivedee,         Mr.   Zaveri  also  drew our attention to some other         judgments of Delhi High Court, including in the case         of Orissa Road Transport Co.  Ltd.   v.    Sibananda         Pattanak, 1976  ACC  CJ  497:  (AIR 1976 Orissa 205)         which justify deduction only of a portion and not of         the entire policy amounts."

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After recording the divergent options by the various High Courts in India, said decision itself records the state of uncertainty in the following terms :-         "The  answer  turns  really  on whether such         policy  amount  can  be  said   to   be   "pecuniary         advantage’  that come to the claimants ’by reason of         the death of the deceased?’ That such amounts amount         to  pecuniary  advantage  admits  of  little  doubt.         Controversy  really centres round if it comes to the         dependents ’by reason of death’.    Reading  of  the         decided cases only go to show how this very question         can  arise  under  variety  of circumstances, giving         rise  to  different  considerations,  pregnant  with         equally different legal implication, and it is by no         means  easy  to  lay  down any inflexible rule as to         which pecuniary benefit can be  said  to  have  been         received  ’ by reason of the death.’ It is pertinent         to note that in the absence of any provision to  the         contrary  such  policy  amounts  form  part’  of the         estate of the deceased and  come  to  his  heirs  or         dependents  by  way  of  inheritance,  unless  it is         sought to be  disposed  of  by  deceased  otherwise.         Nominee  mentioned  therein  is  not necessarily the         beneficiary but invariable happens to be  merely  an         authorised  collector thereof for the benefit of all         heirs.  We are unable to see any difference  between         this  amount,  and any other income yielding estate.         That comes  to  the  dependents  either  by  way  of         inheritance  or  pursuant to any will or settlement.         The  causal  connection  between  receipt  of   such         amounts,  and  death is too apparent and both really         stand on the same footing legally.  Donations by the         charitable trusts, or provisions for such dependents         by sonic public spirited institutions, or  gifts  or         contributions   by  relatives  or  sympathisers,  of         course stand on different footing  and  arc  clearly         distinguishable   and   can   never  be  treated  as         advantages or benefits or having received by  reason         of  the  death of the bread winner, though the death         may furnish an occasion for such receipts.   We  are         ourselves  unable  to  see  how  and  why the policy         amount or other amounts from income yielding assets,         such as bank balances, or interests thereon,  or  on         fixed   deposits,   or  dividends  from  shares  and         securities, left or settled by the deceased  on  the         dependents,  cannot  be  said  to  have  come to the         claimants by "reason of the death" of  the  deceased         and  why  it  should  not  be  balanced  against the         pecuniary losses caused by the death  of  the  bread         winner  in terms of Gobald Motor’s case (AIR 1962 SC         1) (supra).  The Supreme Court has been at pains  in         the  above  quoted passage to indicate how source of         such pecuniary advantage is irrelevant  by  words  ’         from whatever  sources’.  It should not be forgotten         that these  essentially  are  compensatory  and  not         punitive damages." It records from the decided  cases  that  there  may arise  variety  of  circumstances  giving  rise to different consideration and it is by no means easy  to  lay  down  any inflexible rule.   In fact, answer to the question raised in this appeal would mainly depend on defining this  "pecuniary benefit"  in the context of the law under the Motor Vehicles Act with its preceding  historical  facts.    The  state  of fluidity  shows  writ  at large when the court records while considering   the    ’pecuniary    benefit’    by    further

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circumscribing  its  periphery  which  is  evident  from the following:         "It is nobody’s case that it was an accident         policy  entitling  the  claimants to such amount, on         the death of the deceased only in such an  accident,         and the amount could not have been received by them,         had the  death  been.  due to otherwise than such an         accident.  We express no opinion if this could  have         made  any difference as there is no unanimity in the         decided cases as  to  the  liability  of  even  such         amounts to deduction from compensation". Leaving  this  state  of  affairs  so  tar as Indian courts are concerned, we may now advert  to  the  courts  in England, right  from  the  19th  century  on this issue.  It seems that they have also been  oscillating  with  different interpretations under  various facts and circumstances.  The uncertainty went  for  a  long  time  which  was  ultimately resolved  by making legislation and the statutory amendments to set at rest this question.  Now this question is no  more res  integra there and is settled that life insurance policy is not deductible from the compensation assessed on  account of the  death  of  the deceased.  As aforesaid, before this, even in England, this question, as in Indian courts,  varied its  interpretation depending on the facts of each case, one set by strict interpretation deciding against; the  claimant while  other  based  on  equity, justice, reasonableness and public policy deciding in favour of claimant.   In  England, the  insurance  policy amount was initially considered to be such pecuniary advantage, coming to the  dependents  on  the deceased  death,  which was held deductible under the common law from the amount of compensation payable under the  Fatal Accidents Act,  1846.    This  situation was reversed by the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act  of  1908  which  was  further rendered  advantageous  to  the  claimants  by  Law  Reforms (Personal  Injuries)  Act  of  1948  and   finally   altered drastically  by  the  Fatal  Accidents  Act of 1959 ensuring various kinds of insurance and pensionary benefits not to be excluded from the compensation payable by  the  tortfeasors. In India, first such legislation was the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 analogous  to  English,  Fatal  Accident Act, 1846.  In fact, the interpretation given by the Bombay High  Court  in Jaikumar  (supra),  which  is  also  the  submission  by the learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  that  principle  of deduction  with  reference  to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 has to be the same as in  the  Fatal  Accidents  Act,  1846. Thus,  Jai  Kumar (supra) concludes, it is difficult to find any basis or trace for any rationale not to deduct such life policy amounts when on the face of it, this amounts  to  the pecuniary advantages and are received by the heirs by reason of the death of the bread winner.  The question that arises, firstly,  whether  language of the provisions under 1855 Act and 1846 Act are the same and even if same, whether language of 1939 Act is similar to 1855 Act?  So  far  as  the  first question  is  concerned,  though  something  may be said but since the present case is only under 1939  Act,  it  is  not necessary to go into this question In this case, we would be examining  whether  there  is difference of language between 1855 Act and 1939 Act or not, if  yes,  what  difference  it would makes.    Now we refer to the relevant provisions both of 1855 Act and 1939 Act.  Relevant  section  of  the  Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is quoted hereunder;         "(A)  Suit for compensation to the family of         a person for loss occasioned to it by his  death  by         actionable wrong.   - Whenever the death of a person         shall  be  caused  by  wrongful  act,  neglect,   or

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       default,  and  the act neglect or default is such as         would (if death had not ensued)  have  entitled  the         party  injured  to  maintain  an  action and recover         damages:  in respect thereof, the  party  who  would         have  been liable if death had 3101 ensued, shall be         liable  to  an   action   or   suit   for   damages,         notwithstanding  the  death  of the person, injured,         and although the death shall have been caused  under         such  circumstances  as  amount  in law to felony or         other crime.         And in every such action, the court may give         such  damages  as  it may think, proportioned to the         loss  resulting  from  such  death  to  the  parties         respectively,  for  whom and ’for whose benefit such         action  shall  be  brought,  and   the   amount   so         recovered,  after  deducting all costs and expenses,         including  the  costs   not   recovered   from   the         defendant,  shall  be  divided  amongst  the  before         mentioned parties, or any of them, in such shares as         the court’ by its judgment or decree shall direct." Similarly Section 110-B of the aforesaid 1939 Act is quoted hereunder:         "110-B Award  of  the  claims  Tribunal-  On         receipt  of  an  application  for  compensation made         under Section 110-A the Claims Tribunal shall, after         giving the parties an opportunity  of  being  heard,         hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award         determining the amount of compensation which appears         ’to  it  to  be  just  and  specifying the person or         persons to whom compensation shall be paid’, and  in         making  the  award the Claims Tribunal shall specify         the amount which shall be paid by  the  insurer  (or         owner  or  driver  of  the  vehicle  involved in the         accident or by all or any of them, as the  case  may         be.)"         (Emphasis suppled) Prima  facie  we  find  that  the  language  of  the aforesaid two enactments are not similar, the later  clearly clearly  enlarges  scope of computing the compensation about which we shall be considering later. Returning, to the English decision: In Bradurn Vs.  Great Western Rail Co.  (1874-80 All England law Reports 195) it held:         "Where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries         through the negligence of the defendant, the damages         awarded arc not to be reduced because the  plaintiff         has insured  himself  against accidental injury.  In         such a case the plaintiff is entitled to receive the         amount payable by the insurer  in  addition  to  the         damages recoverable from the defendant." In  this  case,  the  plaintiff  got himself insured against  accident  by  railway  in  the   railway   accident insurance  office  and on account of the injury received, he received for his treatment from the insurance a  sum  of  31 pounds.   The  jury  found  a  verdict for the plaintiff and assessed the  total  damage  sustained  on  account  of  the accident  at 217 pounds, out of which an amount of 31 pounds was deducted, thus making the payment of 186  pounds.    But the Court on these facts held :         "Because  he  had  sustained  these  damages         somebody else gave him 31 pounds, and, therefore, it         is said he has not been damaged to the amount of 217         pounds.   It  is  because he has been damaged to the         amount of 217 pounds that he got the 31 pounds;  and         really  it  would  be the most unreasonable think in

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       the world if he were not to be allowed  to  get  it,         because  a man pays his premiums on these insurances         against accidents with the intention and  object  of         getting  them  back  again,  if  he  should have the         misfortune to meet with an accident and be injured." In  this  decision, another earlier decision is also referred,  which  may  have  some   relevance,   is   quoted hereunder:         "It  is  not  worth while to go into it, but         the subject of insurances will be found to have been         thoroughly discussed a few years  ago  in  Dalby  V.         India and London Life Assurance Co.  (1854 (15) C.B.         365) in  the  Court of Common Pleas.  A man pays the         premiums upon these accident policies upon this kind         of footing, namely, that his right to  an  indemnity         in  case  of  an accident shall be an equivalent for         the mischief or injury that happens to him.  He gets         more, no doubt, if the mischief happens than all the         premiums which he has paid would amount to;  but  he         runs  the  chance  that  he will not get anything at         all; and therefore it is, I say, that  he  ought  to         have this sum in addition to the damages that he may         have  sustained  at  the  hands of the defendants by         reason of the  accident  itself;  for  otherwise  he         would  be a loser by insuring against accidents in a         case where the railway company was in the wrong.   I         am,  therefore,  clearly of opinion that the verdict         stands at present for the right amount." The Grand  Trunk  Railway  of  Canada Vs.  Jennings, (1888) 13 A.C.  800, held that at the Common law,  pecuniary benefits  from  insurance policies, whatever the source, and pension schemes whether  contributory  or  non-contributory, were deducted.  The various English Courts’ decisions reveal the unsettled state of adjudication regarding the deductions from the compensation payable under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846.   Various  divergent  opinions  were  expressed,  some favorable to the claimant to exclude any sum payable on life insurance or pensions from deduction out of the compensation payable to the claimant and other not  to  deduct  till,  as aforesaid,   the   matter   was   set  at  rest  by  various legislations culminating into the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959. Till before this, within the limitation of  the  restrictive language of the Act and in the absence of any motivating and guiding words under the statute the general principles under the  common  Jaw was applied to ascertain the pecuniary loss and gain.  Thus, the  ’pecuniary  advantage’  from  whatever source  comes  to  the  claimant by reason of the death, was interpreted giving its widest meaning.   This  amplitude  of large  sphere  has  been the cause of concern of the Courts, Legislative and the Jurists with reference to the insurance, pension, gratuity etc.   whether  it  is  a  pecuniary  gain deductible,  if  it is, whether one’s conscience, equity and fairness  are  eroded,  specially  if  it  is  applied  with reference to  the  provisions  of  Motor  Vehicles  Act?  To salvage from this  onslaught,  some  decisions  declined  to interpret  for  deduction and some other, even after holding deductible, expressed their  conscience  in  favour  of  the sufferer.   This  we  find both in the English decisions and the Indian decisions. In Parry Vs.    Cleaver  (1969 (Vol.  1) All England Law Reports p.555) records uncertainty in England, which  is evident from the following words:         "My Lords, the facts of this case are  of  a         pattern becoming increasingly common.  The appellant         was in  pensionable  employment.    By the negligent

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       driving of  the  respondent  he  was  disabled  from         continuing in  that  employment.    So he received a         disablement pension.    How  arc  damages  for   his         financial loss to be assessed?  In particular how is         the disablement  pension  to  be  dealt  with?   The         authorities are not consistent with each other, so I         find it necessary to begin  by  considering  general         principles." Two questions  were  raised  for  the  adjudication, first  what  did  the  appellant  lose  as  a  result of the accident?  What are the sums  which  he  or  his  dependents would  have  received  but  the  the  accident but which, by reason of the accident, he or his dependents can  no  longer get?   And  second,  what  are  the  sums  which  he  or his dependents did in fact receive as a result of  the  accident but  which  he  or his dependents would not have received if there had been no accident?

The Court while dealing with the second  point  also felt  the  same  difficulty,  to  which  we are in, which is recorded hereunder :         "None  of  the  noble  and learned Lords who         took part gave it more than a passing reference, and         I am satisfied that none of them intended to go  out         of their  way  to pronounce on it.  Before Gourley’s         case (1955  (3)  All.E.R.     796)   it   was   well         established  that  there  was no universal rule with         regard to sums which came  to  the  plaintiff  as  a         result of the accident but which would not have come         to him  but  for the accident.  In two large classes         of case such sums were disregarded - the proceeds of         insurance and  sums  coming  to  him  by  reason  of         benevolence.  In  Gourley’s  case  (i.e.   The Fatal         Accidents Act, 1846) had any bearing on this  matter         it must  have impinged on these classes.  But no one         suggests that it had  any  effect  as  regards  sums         coming  to  the  plaintiff by reason of benevolence,         and I see no reason why  it  should  have  made  any         difference as regards insurance." It further records:         "The common law has treated this  matter  as         one  depending on justice, reasonableness and public         policy.                xxx             xxx           xxx         As regards moneys coming to the  plaintiff  under  a         contract  of  insurance,  I  think that the real and         substantial reason for disregarding them is that the         plaintiff has bought  them  and  that  it  would  be         unjust and unreasonable to hold that the money which         he  prudently spent on premiums and the benefit from         it should enure to the benefit  of  the  tortfeasor.         Here again I think that the explanation that this is         too remote is artificial and unreal.  Why should the         plaintiff  be  left  worse  off than if he had never         insured?  In that case he would have got the benefit         of the premium money; if he  had  not  spent  it  he         would  have  had it in his possession at the time of         the accident grossed up at compound interest" It is true that the aforesaid two English  decisions were  cases  of  injuries, but the principle as spelt out is equally applicable in cases of death.    The  English  Court held  that any money coming under the contract of insurance, it would be unjust and unreasonable to hold that  the  money which he  prudently spent:  on premiums, the benefit from it should enure to the benefit of the tortfeasor.  To this,  we

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fully endorse.   Under the life insurance, in case one lives upto the time of maturity,  after  paying  full  premium  he receives  the  assured money back, based on the terms of the contract.  In fact, he receives less than the total  premium paid.   It  is for this gain to the insurer it is obliged to pay to the extent the sum assured; to the claimant  in  case of injury  or  death  under  the  contract.  In other words, payable  only  on  the  contingency  as  referred,  if   the contingency  of injury or death does not happen, the insurer is the gainer as it receives more under premium than to  pay on  maturity  of  the policy, and in case contingency occurs the claimant, the gainer as  he  receives  the  amount  even before  paying  the  full  premiums  and  the gain is to the proportion of the balance  unpaid  premium,  whether  it  is injury or  death.    A  Large  number  of persons, under the policy may live upto the maturity of policy by  paying  full premium  and  the  contingency  of  injury  or death may not happen.  On each of such.  matured policies.  Life Insurance Corporation has their gain in mind enters into its business, to offer to the policy holders in term, in case of happening of the said contingency to pay the full amount  assured,  if it takes place earlier, without paying the full premium.  It is  this game of gain or loss the Life Insurance Corporation enters into the contract.  This  fact  is  revealed  by  the Preamble  of  the  Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 {Act No.  31 of 1956), quoted hereunder:         "An Act to provide for  the  Nationalisation         of  life insurance business in India by transferring         all such business to a Corporation  established  for         the  purpose  and to provide for the regulation, and         control of the business of the Corporation  and  for         matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." Many invest  through  this  policy  for  variety  of reasons,  maybe,  to  secure  the  sum for himself as forced saving, maybe,  as  in  India,  for  deduction  towards  his income-tax  liability,  to  secure  loan  by himself in case needed on a meagre interest for building his residence or to secure sum in case of happening of  the  said  contingencies etc..   He enters into this contract with an open eye, as an act of wisdom, of  course,  not  towards  the  gain  to  the tortfeasor.   The  English  Court expressing concern on this aspect in the aforesaid decision recorded; "why  should  the plaintiff  be  left worse off than if he had never insured". Thus, the interpretation  of  deduction  of  life  insurance would  result" into the gain to the wrong doer in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid by the  insured  for  no contribution  of  bus and loss to the claimant in proportion to the higher scale  of  premium  paid,  as  he  would  have received  the  compensation  amount  without  payment of any premium.  Before we proceed to decide the  question  raised, it  is  necessary  to refer to the decision of this Court in Gobald Motor case (supra) which is  the  foundation  of  the decision in  Jaikumar  (supra).   The passage relied upon is quoted hereunder:-         "Only by balancing on the one hand the  loss         to  the  claimants  of the further pecuniary benefit         and on the other any pecuniary advantage which  from         whatever  source  comes  to  them  by  reason of the         death, that is.  the balance of Loss and gain  to  a         dependant by the death must be ascertained...  " This was a case under the Fatal Accidents Act,  1855 as  it  stood  before  its amendment by the Act (3 of 1951). This Court, in this case, was not called  upon  to  consider regarding  any  deduction out of the compensation payable as assessed, either under the aforesaid Act or under the  Motor

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Vehicles Act.    The  question  of life insurance deduction, which is in issue here or the deduction of pension, gratuity or any other pecuniary advantage received  by  the  claimant was neither  raised, considered or adjudicated.  The passage quoted above only referred to the  general  principle  under the  common  law  with  reference  to  tile decisions of the English Courts made under the Fatal Accidents Act  of  1846. In that  case  the  Gobald Motor Service Ltd.  (Company) was engaged in the business of transporting passengers  by  bus, when  one  of  its bus met with an accident causing death to some of the passengers in which one Rajaratnam  died.    The Claimants,  the  heirs  of  Rajaratnam, filed a suit against this company, claiming compensation under Section I  of  the Fatal  Accidents Act, 1855 for the loss of pecuniary benefit sustained by them personally and under  Section  2  for  the loss  sustained  by  the  estate  on account of the death of Rajaratnam.  ’the Court awarded damages  to  the  claimants. On  appeal  to the High Court, it confirmed the compensation awarded  with  some   modification   in   the   quantum   of compensation.   In  this  background,  this Court was called upon to decide the limited question raised  by  the  counsel for the appellant, which is evident from the following:         "Learned  counsel  for the appellants raised         before us the following points:  (I ) The finding of         the High  Court  that  the  bus  was  driven  at  an         excessive  speed  at  the  place  where the accident         occurred, based  on  probabilities,  was  erroneous.         (2)  The  concurrent finding of the two courts’ that         respondents 2 to 7 would be entitled to damages in a         sum  of  Rs.25,200/-  for  the  loss  of   pecuniary         advantage  to them was not based upon any acceptable         evidence but only on surmises.  (3) The  High  Court         went  wrong  in awarding damages separately for loss         of expectation of life  under  S.2  of  the  Act  as         damages  under that head had already been taken into         consideration in giving compensation to  respondents         2  to  7 for the pecuniary loss sustained by them by         the death of Rajaratnam." These questions,  raised  itself,  reveal  that  the Court was adjudicating limited issue raised.  It is true, in adjudicating   the   said   questions  that  the  Court  did scrutinise two English decisions  based  on  its  Section  9 under  the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 as that Act was similar to Section I of our Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.  The relevant paragraph  quoted  in  Jaikumar  (supra)  was  in  fact  the quotations  out  of  the  two  English  decisions  where the general rule under the common  law  was  enunciated,  viz.., loss and  gain theory.  The Court referred two cases, one of them was the case of Davies Vs.  Powell  Duffryn  Associated Collieries Ltd..  1942 AC 601.         "The  general  rule  which  has  always prevailed in         regard to the assessment of damages under the  Fatal         Accidents  Acts  is  well  settled, namely, that any         benefit accruing to a dependent  by  reason  of  the         relevant death  must  be  taken into account.  Under         those Acts  the  balance  of  loss  and  gain  to  a         dependant  by  the  death  must  be ascertained, the         position  of   each   dependent   being   considered         separately".         Lord Write elaborated the theme further thus at p.         611:         "The  damages  arc  to  be  based   on   the         reasonable   expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  or         benefit reducible to money value.  In assessing the         damages  all circumstances which may be legitimately

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       pleaded  in  diminution  of  the  damages  must   be         considered..........   The  actual pecuniary loss of         each  individual  entitled  to  sue  can   only   be         ascertained  by balancing, on the one hand, the loss         to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and  on  the         other  any  pecuniary  advantage which from whatever         source comes to him by reason of the death". The  second  decision  was  of the Viscount Simon in Nance V.  British Columbia Electric Railway Co.  Ltd.,  1951 AC 601.    Here  the  Lords  were  considering the analogous provisions of the British Columbia  legislation.    Viscount Simon Said  down  the mode of estimate of the damages.  This authority spelt out the method of  calculating  damages  and thus held:         "...It   would   be  seen  from  the  said  mode  of         estimation that many imponderables  enter  into  the         calculation.   Therefore,  the  actual extent of the         pecuniary loss to the respondents  may  depend  upon         data  which  cannot  be  ascertained accurately, but         must necessarily be an estimate, or  even  partly  a         conjecture.   Shortly  stated, the general principle         is that the pecuniary loss can be  ascertained  only         by  balancing  on  the  one  hand  the  loss  to the         claimants of the futile pecuniary benefit and on the         other any pecuniary advantage  which  from  whatever         source  comes  to  them by reason of the death, that         is, the balance of loss and gain to a  dependent  by         the death must be ascertained." This   Court   in   Gobald   Motor  Service  (supra) considering the quantum of damages under Sections I and 2 of the  Fatal  Accidents  Act,  1855,  referred  to  the   said principle  as enunciated in the English decisions, since our provisions under the Act in consideration,  was  similar  to Section 9  of  the  English  Fetal Accidents Act 1846.  This Court was neither called upon to consider computing  damages under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act nor to consider any form of deductions, whether justified under the Motor Vehicles Act. We have already referred to above the  Section  (1A) of  the  Fatal  Accidents Act, 1855 and Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under which compensation is payable to the claimant.  Section I of 1855 Act  was  renumbered  as Section I A  through  the  amending  Act No.  3 of 1951.  We find  that  the  language  of  Section  110-B  of  the  1939 Enactment  is different than what is under Section IA of the 1855 Act.  Section IA of 1855  Act  provides  that  whenever death, occurs on account of wrongful act or neglect entitles the party injured to maintain a suit to recover damages from the party,  who  caused  the  injury  or  the  death.   This entitles the party to recover  damages,  whenever  death  is occasioned by the wrongful act, negligence or default, which would  have  entitled  the  party  injured (if death had not resulted) to  maintain  an  action  to  recover  damages  in respect thereof.  This provision was interpreted within the limitation  of  the words used therein and in the absence of any guiding words therein.   The  Courts  rightly  drew  the general principle  of  common  law  of  loss  and gain.  But Section 110-B of 1939 Act empowers the Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just.  The  words used in  Section  110-B  are:    "which  appears to it to be just".  Use of these words, widen the scope of determination of compensation which is  neither  under  the  Indian  Fatal Accidents  Act,  1855  nor under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846., So  far,  as  observed  above,  apart  from  the conflictingly  decisions  of  the  Indian  High  Courts’  no decision  has  been  placed  before  us   of   this   Court,

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determining  any  principle  of deductibility of any amount, like, life  insurance,  gratuity,  pension  etc.,  from  the amount payable  under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act.    In  M/s Sheikhupura Transport Company Ltd.    Vs.    Northern  India Transporters Insurance Co.    Ltd.   (AIR 1971 SC 1624) this Court did consider the case of  compensation  under  Section 110-B  of  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and did refer to the decision in  Gobald  Motor  Service  (supra),  in  case  the compensation is  to  be  computed  under  1855  Act.    This inference was drawn by assuming if 1855 Act  is  applicable, however,  it  further  holds  that language used in the 1939 Act, is wider.  This apart, again in this case  neither  any question  was  raised  for fact were pleaded and adjudicated regarding the deduction of life insurance, gratuity, pension etc..  The relevant portion is quoted herein-under.         "Under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939         the tribunal is required to  fix  such  compensation         which appears  to it to be just.  The power given to         the tribunal in the  mater  of  fixing  compensation         under that  provision  is wide.  Even if we assurane         (we do not propose to decide that question  in  this         case)  that compensation under that provision has to         be fixed on the same basis as is required to be done         under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act  13  of  1855),         the  pecuniary  loss  to  the  aggrieved party would         depend  upon  data  which  cannot   be   ascertained         accurately  but  must  necessarily be an estimate or         even partly a conjecture.  The general principle  is         that  the  pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by         balancing on the one hand the loss to the  claimants         of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any         pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources come         to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance         of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be         ascertained -  See  Gobald  Motor  Service  Ltd.  v.         R.M.K.Veluswami, (1962) I SCR 929=(AIR 1962 SC 1)." This Court , in this case did  observe,  though  did not  decide,  to  which  we refer that the use of the words, "which appears to it to be just" under Section  110-B  gives wider  power  to the Tribunal in the matter of determination of compensation under 1939 Act.  There is  another  case  of this  Court  in  which  there  is  passing  reference to the deduction out of the compensation payable  under  the  Motor Vehicles Act.  In N.Sivammal & Ors.  Vs.  Managing Director, Pandian  Roadways  Corporation & Anr., 1985 (1) SCC 18, this Court held that Rs.  .10,000/receivable as monetary  benefit to  the  widow of the pension amount, the deduction of which is not qualified.  So, though deduction of  widow’s  pension was  not  accepted  but for this, no principle was discussed therein.  However, having given our full  consideration,  we find there is deliberate change in the language in the later Act,  revealing  the  intent  of  the  legislature, viz., to confer wider discretion to the Tribunal which is not  to  be found in  the  earlier Act.  Thus, any decision based on the principle applicable  to  the  earlier  Act,  would  not  be applicable  while  adjudicating  the compensation payable to the claimant in the later Act. Fleming,  in  his classic work; on the Law of Torts, has summed up the law on the subject in these words.    This is also referred  to  in Sushila Devi and Ors.  Vs.  Ibrahim and Anr., 1974 MP 181:         "The pecuniary loss of such dependant  can  only  be         ascertained  by balancing, on the one hand, the loss         to him of future pecuniary’  benefit,  and,  on  the         other,  any pecuniary advantage which, from whatever

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       source, comes him by reason of the death...".         "...There is a vital distinction between the receipt         of  moneys  under  accident   insurance   and   life         insurance policies.      In  the  case  of  accident         policies, the full value is deductible on the ground         that there was no certainty, or  even  a  reasonable         probability,  that  the insured would ever suffer an         accident.  But since man.  is  certain  to  die,  it         would  not  be  Justifiable  to  set  off  the whole         proceeds from a life insurance policy, since  it  is         legitimate  to  assume  that  the  widow  would have         received  some   benefit,   if   her   husband   had         pre-deceased  her  during the currency of the policy         or if the policy  had  matured  during  their  joint         lives.   The  exact extent of permissible reduction,         however, is still a matter of uncertainty..,." Fleming has also expressed that  the  deduction,  or set  off  of  the  life  insurance could not be justifiable. When he uses the words "not be  justifiable"  he  refers  to one’s conscience, fairness and contrary to what is just.  In this  context, the use of the word ’just’, which was neither in the English 1846 Act nor  in  the  Indian  1855  Act  now brought in  under  1939  Act,  gains importance.  This shows that the word "just’ was deliberately brought  in  110-B  of the  1939  Act to enlarge the consideration in computing the compensation which, of course, would include the question of deductibility, if any.  This leads  us  to  an  irresistible conclusion that principle of computation of the compensation both  under  the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and under the  Indian  Fatal  Accidents  Act,  1855  by  the   earlier decision,  were  restrictive in nature In the absence of any guiding words therein, hence the courts applied the  general principle  at the common law of loss and gain but that would not apply to the considerations under Section 110-B of  1939 Act  which enlarges the discretion to deliver better justice to the claimant, in computing the compensation, to see  what is just.    Thus, we find that all the decisions of the High Courts, which based its interpretation on the principles  of these  two  Acts, viz., English 1846 Act and Indian 1855 Act to hold deductions, were valid cannot be upheld.  As we have observed above, the decisions even  with  reference  to  the decision  of  this  Court  in  Gobald Motor Service (supra), where the question was neither raised  nor  adjudicated  and that case  also.  bang under the 1855 Act, cannot be pressed into service.  Thus,  these  Courts  by  giving  restrictive interpretation  in  computation of compensation based on the limitation of the language of the Fatal Accidents Act,  fell into an error, as it did not take into account the change of language  in  the 1939 Act and did not consider the widening of the discretion of the Tribunal under Section 110-B.   The word  ’just",  as  its  nomenclature,  denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having large  peripheral  field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by  the  conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if  it  exceeds;  it  is  termed  as  unfair,  unreasonable, unequitable, not just.  Thus, this field of wider discretion of  the  Tribunal  has to be within the said limitations and the limitations under any provision of this Act or any other provision having force of law.  In Law Lexicon, 5th Edn., by T.P.Mukherjee "Just" is described:         "The term "just" is  derived  from  the  Latin  word         Justus.   It has various meanings and its meaning is         often governed by the context.  ’Just" may apply  in         nearly  all  of its senses, either to ethics or law,         denoting something which is morally right  and  fair

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       and sometimes that which is right and fair according         to positive  law.    If  connotes reasonableness and         something  conforming  to  rectitude   and   justice         something  equitable,  fair  (vide  page  1100 of of         volume 50, Corpus Juris Secundum).  At page  438  of         Words  and  Phrases,  edited by West publishing Co.,         vol.23 the true meaning of the  word  "just"  is  in         these terms :         "The  word  "Just" is derived from the Latin justus,         which is from the Latin jus, which means a right and         more technically a legal  right-a-law.    ’Thus  JUS         dicere’  was  to  pronounce the judgment; to give he         legal decision.  The word ’’Just’ is denned  by  the         Century  standard  Dictionary  as  right  in  law or         ethics and in Standard Dictionary as  conforming  to         the  requirements  of  right  or of positive law, in         Anderson’s Law Dictionary as  probable,  reasonable,         Kinney’s  Law  Dictionary  defines  ’Just" as  fair,         adequate, reasonable, probable; and justa cause as a         just  cause, a lawful ground. Vide Bregman v. Kress,         81 N.Y.S.1072, 1073, 83 App.Div. I." Thus;  we  have  no  hesitation  concluding that the Tribunal, which computing  the  compensation  under  Section 110-B  of the 1939 Act, has a wider discretion, than what it had under the 1855 Act.   Various  provisions  of  this  Act indicate  legislature’s intend conferring visible benefit to the  claimant  by  securing  compensation  through   casting obligation in  the  tortfeasor  and the insurer.  Section 94 makes it obligatory to insure a vehicle against third  party risk before  putting  on the road.  Statutory obligatory and the limit of the  insurer  is  provided  under  Section  95. Under  Section  95-AA in addition to the deposits under See. 7 of the Insurance Act, 1938.  the insurer  has  to  deposit with  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India or State Bank of India a security of thirty thousand for  discharging  any  liability covered by  the  insurance  policy.   Then, Section 96 casts obligation on the insurers to satisfy judgements in  respect of third  party  risks.    No settlement between insurer and insured in respect of any claim to which the third party  is entitled,  is  valid  unless  third party is a party to such settlement under Section 97.    All  these  and  such  other provisions  are clearly beneficial legislation, hence should be interpreted which confers benefit and not which usurp its benefit. This being so, we finally revert  to  the  question, which   is   in   issue   for   consideration,  whether  the compensation computed under 1939  Act,  the  life  insurance amount  received by the claimants occasioned by the death of the deceased, is deductible from it or not? Submission by the learned counsel for the appellants is, the insurance  money  is  by  virtue  of  a  contractual relationship  between the deceased and the Insurance Company and is payable to the legal heirs of the deceased  in  terms of the  contract.    Such  money  cannot be aid to have been received by the heirs only on account of the  death  of  the deceased, but truly it is a fruit of the premium paid by the deceased during  his  hie  time.    The deceased bought this insurance policy as  an  act  of  his  prudence,  to  confer benefit  either to himself or to his heirs in case of death. This amount is receivable by the  claimant  irrespective  of the accidental death, even if he would have died the natural death.   He further submits that the interpretation given by the High Court confers benefit to  the  tortfeasor  for  his negligence  and  wrong leading to the untimely death without any contribution by him.  It permits him to escape from  the

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liability cast by the statute.  Thus, his submission is, any amount payable under any contract of social assurance or any insurance,  ought  not to be deducted as the same Is payable to the heirs because of the contract and not on  account  of the death   of   the  insured  person.    Referring  on  the dictionary’ meaning of the word ’compensation he submits  it would mean anything given to make things equal in value.  He submits  that in this case the death of the deceased-husband of the claimant was due to the negligence of the respondents has to be offset by a.  just equivalent, where claimants are put back in position where they would have been but for such death.  On this, he draws the conclusion,  the  benefits  of insurance  policy  cannot  be  deducted  while  awarding the compensation.  On the other hand, learned  counsel  for  the respondents  restricted  the argument as was advanced before the  High  Court  and  submitted,  the  High  Court,   after considering  all aspects including English decisions and the decisions of this Court, rightly  concluded  to  deduct  the life  insurance money out of the compensation payable to the claimant. So  far  as  the  general  principle  of  estimating damages under the common law is  concerned,  it  is  settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on  one  hand,  the  loss  to  the  claimant  of  the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to  him  but  for the  death with the ’pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death.  In other words, it is the  balancing  of  loss  and  gain  of  the  claimant occasioned by  the death.  But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do.  Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of  the  provisions  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act,  1939.  It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that  this  Act  delivers  compensation  to  the claimant  only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account  of  any  other  death.    Thus,  the   pecuniary advantage  accruing  under  this  Act  has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental  death.    The  compensation payable  under  the  Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death.  If there is natural death  or death  by  suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident., through train, air  flight  not  involving  motor vehicle.  would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus.  the application of general principle under the common law  of  loss  and  gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must co-relate to  this  type  of  injury  or deaths, viz, accidental.  If the words "pecuniary advantage’ from  whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death  under  this  Act  it  would  dilute  all  possible benefits  conferred on the claimant and would be contrary of the spirit  of  the  law.    If  the  ’pecuniary  advantage’ resulting  from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then  it  will  include  all  the  assets movable,  immovable,  shares,  bank accounts, case and every amount receivable under any contract.  In other  words,  all heritable  assets  including  what is willed by the deceased etc.  This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the  deceased  and  the intentions of  the  legislature.   By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act  or  negligence, which  contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability.  In our  considered  opinion, the  general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as  a result  of  the  accidental death and the loss on account of

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the accident death.  Thus, under the  present  Act  whatever pecuniary  advantage  is  received  by  the  claimant,  from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and  not  other  form  of death.   The  constitution  of  the  Motor  Accidents Claims Tribunal itself under Section 110 is, as the Section states;         "....for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for         compensation  in  respect of accidents involving the         death of, or bodily injury to, ....." Thus,  it  would  not  include  that  which claimant receives on account other form of  deaths,  which  he  would have received even apart from accidental death.  Thus, such. pecuniary   advantage  would  have  no  correlation  to  the accidental death for which compensation is  computed.    Any amount  received  or  receivable  not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come  to  the  claimant even  otherwise, could not be construed to be the "pecuniary advantage", liable  for  deduction.    However,  where   the employer  insures  his  employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received out of  such insurance on the happening  of  such  incidence  may  be  an amount  liable  for  deduction. However, our legislature has taken not  of  such  contingency,  through  the  proviso  of Section  95.  Under  it  the  liability  of  the  insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out  of,  in the course of employment of an employee. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the  happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources.  This, it is excluded thus, either through  the wisdom  of  legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to  give  gain  to  the  claimant twice   arising   from  the  same  transaction,  viz.,  same accident.  It is significant to  record  here  in  both  the sources,  viz.,  either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the  security  of  the  employer securing  for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution.  How thus an amount  earned out  of  one’s  labour or contribution towards one’s wealth, savings, etc.  either for himself or for his  family,  which such  person  knows,  under  the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a  will  could be  said to be the ’pecuniary gain’ only on account of one’s accidental death.  This, of course, is  pecuniary  gain  but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to  be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts.   Not  even remotely.   How  can  an  amount  of  loss  and  gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss  and  gain  of another contract.  Similarly, how an amount receivable under a  statute  has  any co-relation with an amount earned by an individual.  Principle of loss and gain has  to  be  on  the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment  out  of  the  contribution made by  an employee during the tenure of his service.  Such employee or his heirs are entitled to  receive  this  amount irrespective of  the  accidental  death.    This  amount  is secured, is certain to be received, while the  amount  under the  Motor  Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event viz., accident which  may  not take place  at  all.    Similarly.,  family  pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family  in  the form  of  his  contribution  in  the service in terms of the

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service conditions receivable by the heirs after his  death. The  heirs  receive  family  pension even otherwise than the accidental death.    No   co-relation   between   the   two. Similarly,  life  insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs  of  the  insured  on  account  of  the contract  with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium.  It is receivable even by the  insured, if  he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to  the heirs, again in terms of the contracts for the premium paid. Again,  this  amount  is  receivable  by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise  on  insured’s death.   Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount.  Similarly any  case,  bank balance, shares,  fixed  deposits,  etc.    though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs  on  account  of one’s  death  but  all  these  have  no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death.  How could such an amount  come  within the  periphery  of  the  Motor  Vehicles Act to be termed as ’pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction.   When  we  seek the  principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter so between  them  and  not  to which, there  is  no  semblance  of  any  co-relation.   The insured (deceased) contributes his own money  for  which  he receives  the  amount has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against torfeasor for his negligence on  account of accident.     As  aforesaid,  the  amount  receivable  as compensation under the Act is on account of  the  injury  of death  without  making  any contribution towards it then how can fruits of an amount received  through  contributions  of the  insured  be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act.   The  amount  under  this  Act,  he receives without  any  contribution.    As  we have said the compensation  payable  under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act   is statutory while the amount received under the life insurance policy is contractual. As  we have observed the whole scheme of the Act, in relation of the payment of compensation to the claimant,  is beneficial  legislation, the intention of the legislature is made more clear by the change of language from what  was  in Fatal  Accidents Act, 1855 and what is brought under Section 110-B of 1939  Act.    This  is  also  visible  through  the provision  of  Section  168(1) under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 92-A of 1939 Act which fixes the  liability on the  owner  of the vehicle even on no fault.  It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any  person  has resulted  from an accident spite of no fault of the owner of the vehicle, an amount  of  compensation  fixed  therein  is payable to  claimant  by such owner of the vehicle.  Section 92-B ensures that the claim for compensation  under  Section 92-A  is  addition  to any other right to claim compensation respect whereof under any other provision of this Act or  of any other  law  for  the  time being in force.  This clearly indicates  the  intention  of  the  legislature   which   is conferring larger  benefit  to the claimant.  Interpretation of  such  beneficial  legislation  is  also  well   settled. Whenever  there  be  two  possible  interpretations  in such statute  then  the  one  which  subserves  the   object   of legislation,   viz.,   benefit  to  the  subject  should  be accepted.  In the present  case,  two  interpretations  have given  of  this  statute,  evidenced by two distinct sets of decisions of the various high courts.  We have no hesitation to conclude that the set of  decisions,  which  applied  the principle  of  no  deduction  of  the  life insurance amount

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should be accepted and the other set, which  interpreted  to deduct, is  to  be rejected.  For all these consideration we have no hesitation to hold that such High Courts were  wrong in  deducting  the  amount  paid  or  payable under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions  of the  Motor  Vehicles  Act  basing  mostly on the language of English statutes  and  not  taking  into  consideration  the changed  language  and  intends  of  the  legislature  under various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1 "39. Accordingly, we  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment dated  9th  September,  1985 and restore the judgment of the tribunal dated 29 September, 1980 and hold that  the  amount received  by  the  claimant  on  the  life  insurance of the deceased is not deductible from  the  compensation  computed under the  Motor  Vehicles  Act..   The concerned respondent shall make the payment accordingly, if not already  paid  in terms thereof. Accordingly, the   appeal   is  allowed.    Cost  on parties.