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PETITIONER: MRINALINI ROY RATNA PROVA MONDAL& ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       21/11/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      These appeals  by special leave arise from the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated May 27, 1975 in FMA Nos.1021-25/73.      It is  not necessary  to narrate all the facts in these cases. Suffice  it to  state that notification under Section 4(1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894  (for  short,  the ‘Act’) was  published on May 14, 1956 for reclamation of the fisheries in the lands comprising cadastral plots enumerated in the  notification, of  an extent admeasuring more or less 8760.53 acres.  Declaration under Section 6 was published on January 5,  1971 declaring that the land for the reclamation of the  Southern  Salt  Lake  area  was  published.  We  are concerned presently  to an  extent of 1495.93 acres only. It was contended  in the High Court and also repeated by Dr. S. Ghosh, learned  senior counsel,  that the "land", as defined under Section  3(a) does not include fisheries; that is made explicit by  the West  Bengal Amendment  Act, 1981  bringing within the  ambit of the word ‘land’. It would indicate that the authorities  have understood that the Act does not apply to acquisition  of the  fisheries rights and, therefore, the acquisition  was   without  authority  of  law.  In  support thereof, Dr.  Ghosh placed  reliance on  the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pasupati Roy v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [AIR 1974 Calcutta 99] and State of West  Bengal &  Ors.  v.  Suburban  Agriculture  Dairy  & Fisheries  Pvt.   Ltd.  &  Anr.  [(1993)  Supp.  4  SCC  674 paragraphs 6,  13, 14 and 16] and in State of West Bengal v. Shebaits of  Iswar Shri  Saradiya Thakurani & Ors. [AIR 1971 SC 2097  at 2098  para 3].  We find  it  difficult  to  give acceptance to  the contentions  of the  learned counsel. The expression ‘land’  includes benefits  to arise  out of  land and, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached  to the  earth.  Tank    fisheries  cannot service independent  of the  tank and there cannot be a tank without  the  land.  Therefore,  the  expression  ‘land’  is required to  be understood in that perspective when the tank fisheries are  sought to be acquired. Tank fisheries thereby would be  a benefit  to arise  out of  the land. Thereby the word ‘land’ should be understood to have been covered by the

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elongated definition  since it  defines  with  inclusiveness that the tank fisheries is a benefit to arise out of land.      It is  then contended that the acquisition is not for a public purpose  and, therefore,  the Notification  is bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the declaration under  Section 6  expressly  mentions  that  the acquisition was  for reclamation of the Salt Lake area. Sub- section (3)  of Section 6 of the Act gives conclusiveness to the public purpose.      It is  true that  a memo  was filed  on behalf  of  the Fisheries Department  and was  reiterated  in  the  counter- affidavit filed  in the  High Court  that the  land acquired would  be   used  to  rehabilitate  some  of  the  displaced fishermen to  eke out  the livelihood  in  reclamation  tank fisheries. The  above statement is not inconsistent with the public purpose  which became  conclusive under Section 6(3). As seen,  that while  reclamating the tank Fisheries for the public purpose, some of the displaced fishermen on the other lakes are sought to be rehabilitated in the lake in question by enabling  them to  catch the  fish to earn livelihood. It would, therefore,  be not  inconsistent with the declaration conclusiveness of  which has  been attached  by operation of sub-section (3)  of Section  6 which is also consistent with Section 114(h) of the Evidence Act. It is true that prior to the Amendment  Act, 1981  tank fisheries  were not expressly brought within  the definition of land. In 1981, with a view to avoid  any further  litigation on  the interpretation  in that behalf,  the Legislature  expressly brought  within the ambit of the land the tank fisheries or fisheries. That does not mean  that it  would not be capable of interpretation to bring within  the ambit  of a  benefit to  arise out  of the land. The  Division Bench  judgments of  the  Calcutta  High Court relied  upon by Dr. Ghosh have not correctly laid down the  law.   In  Suburban   Agriculture  Dairy  and  Saradiya Thakurani cases  (supra), that  question  did  not  squarely arise. That  was  a  case  under  the  West  Bengal  Estates Acquisition Act. the definition of "land" expressly mentions that the  tank fisheries  are included within the definition of the  "estate" but  vis-a-vis the rights attached therein, option have  been given to the intermediary within specified time for  its retention.  Therefore, the intermediary, if he had exercised  the option  after the notification abolishing the concerned  estates within  the specified  time, then the tank fisheries  stand excluded  from vesting. That principle has no  application to  the facts in this case. Accordingly, we hold  that the  tank  fisheries  are  the  land  and  the acquisition was  for public  purpose. We  do  not  find  any illegality warranting  interference with  the Division Bench judgment.      The appeals  are accordingly  dismissed,  but,  in  the circumstances, without costs.