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PETITIONER: MOTOR OWNERS INSURANCE CO. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JADAVJI KESHAVJI MODI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/09/1981

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1981 AIR 2059            1982 SCR  (1) 860  1981 SCC  (4) 660        1981 SCALE  (3)1529  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2158  (3,8)  R          1991 SC1769  (12)  R          1992 SC1261  (7)

ACT:      Motor Vehicles  Act 1939,  S. 95(2) as amended by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1956, S. 74-Scope of. "in all"-"any one accident"-Meaning of,

HEADNOTE:      Section 95  of the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 prescribes the requirements  of an  insurance policy  and the limits OF liability thereunder.  By sub-section  (1) of  section 95, a policy of  insurance must  insure the  person or  classes of persons specified  in the  policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)  against any liability which may be incurred by him  or them  in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any  person caused  by or  arising out  of the use of the vehicle in  a public  place. Section  95(2) of the Act as it originally stood read thus:      "95(2): Subject  to the  proviso to  sub-section (I)  a policy of  insurance shall  cover any  liability incurred in respect of  any one  accident  upto  the  following  limits, namely:-      (a) where  the vehicle  is a vehicle used or adapted to be used  for the  carriage  of  goods,  a  limit  of  twenty thousand rupees.. ".      This provision  was substituted  by  a  new  clause  by section 74  of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 with effect from February 16, 1957. The amended clause read:      "95(2) (a)  :-Where the  vehicle is  a goods vehicle, a limit of  twenty  thousand  rupees  in  all,  including  the liabilities,  if   any,  arising   under  the   Work   men’s Compensation Act,  1923, in  respect of  the  death  of,  or bodily injury  to, employees  (other Than  The driver),  not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle".      This provision underwent further amendment by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)  Act, 1969  which came  into  force  on March 7, 1970.      A collision  took place between a motor car and a goods truck in  February 1966  as a  result of which the driver of

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The car  died instantaneously  and the  person travelling in the car  sustained injuries.  The Truck  was insured against third party risk with the appellant-insurance company. 861      The heirs  and legal  representatives of  the  deceased field an  application  before  the  Motor  Accidents  Claims Tribunal,  under   section  110-D   of  the   Act,  claiming compensation in  the sum  of Rs. 30,000 for the death caused in the accident. The person who was injured filed a separate application asking  for compensation  of Rs.  10,000 for the injuries suffered  by him.  The Tribunal  dismissed both the applications on  the ground  that respondent No. 3 could not be  said   to  have   been  driving  the  truck  rashly  and negligently at the time of the accident.      The claimants filed separate appeals in the High Court, which awarded  a compensation  of Rs. 19,125 to the heirs of the deceased and Rs. 10,000 to the injured person.      In the appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the  appellant insurance  company: (i)  that under clause (a) of  section 95(2)  as it stood at the material time, the liability of the insurer under the statutory policy taken by the owner  of the  goods vehicle is limited to Rs. 20,000 in all and,  therefore, the  insurer cannot  be  asked  to  pay compensation  in   excess  of  that  amount,  and  that  the liability to  pay the  balance must be fixed on the owner of the goods  vehicle who  would be vicariously responsible for the negligence  of his  employee who  was driving  the goods vehicle, and  (ii) that the Amendment Act of 1956 which came into force  on February  16, 1957  introduced the  words ’in all’ in  clause (a)  and that these words were introduced to limit  the  overall  liability  of  the  insurer  to  twenty thousand rupees      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  The High  Court  took  a  just,  correct  and realistic view  of the  matter by  holding that,  under  the statutory policy  the appellant-insurance  company is liable to pay  the full  amount of compensation to the heirs of the deceased and  to the  passenger travelling  in the car, each amount being less than Rs. 20,000. [880 G-H]      The purpose  of law  is to  alleviate, not augment, the sufferings of  the people. The award of compensation depends upon a  variety of factors, including the extent of monetary deprivation  to   which  the   heirs  of  the  deceased  are subjected. [870 G]      3. By common practice and the application of recognised rules  of   statutory   construction,   harsh   consequences following upon  an interpretation  are not considered as the governing factor  in the  construction of  a statute, unless its language is equivocal and ambiguous. [871 E]      4. Clause (a) of section 95 (2) qualifies the extent of the insurer’s  liability  by  the  use  of  the  unambiguous expression ’in  all’ and since that expression was specially introduced by  an amendment,  it must  be allowed  its  full play. The legislature must be presumed to have intended what it has  plainly said.  But, clause  (a) does not stand alone and  is   not  the  only  provision  to  be  considered  for determining the outside limit of the insurer’s liability. In fact, clause  (a) does not even form a complete sentence and makes no  meaning by  itself. Like  the other clauses (b) to (d), clause (a) is governed by the opening words of 862 section 95  (2) to  the effect  that "a  policy of insurance shall cover  any liability  incurred in  respect of  any one accident up  to the  following limits",  that is  the limits

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laid down in clauses (a) to (d). [871 H-872 B]      5 (i) The expression, ’any one accident’ is susceptible of two  equally reasonable meanings or interpretations. If a collision occurs  between a  car and  a truck  resulting  in injuries to  five persons,  it is  as much  plausible to say that five  persons were  injured in one accident as it is to say that  each of  the five per sons met with an accident. A bystander looking  at the  occurrence  objectively  will  be right in  saying that  the truck  and the  car met  with  an accident or that they were concerned in one accident. On the other hand, a person looking at the occurrence subjectively, like the one who was injured in the collision, will say that he met  with an  accident. And  so will  each  of  the  five persons who were injured. From their point of view, which is the  relevant  point  of  view,  "any  one  accident"  means "accident to  any one  ’. In  matters involving  third party risks, it  is subjective  considerations which  must prevail and the  occurrence has  to be  looked at  from the point of view  of   those  who   are  immediately   affected  by  it.                                                    [872 E-F]      5 (ii)  A consideration of preponderating importance in a matter  of this  nature is  not whether  there was any one transaction which  resulted in  injuries to many but whether more than  one person  was injured, giving rise to more than one claim  or cause  of action,  even if  the injuries  were caused in the course of one single transaction. If more than one  person  is  injured  during  the  course  of  the  same transaction, each one of the persons meets with an accident. [873A-B]      6.  The   ambiguity  in   the  language   used  by  the legislature in  the opening  part of  section 95 (2) and the doubt arising  out of  the co-relation of that language with the words  ’in all’  which  occur  in  clause  (a)  must  be resolved by  having regard  to  the  underlying  legislative purpose of  the provisions, contained in Chapter VIII of the Act which  deals with third party risks. That is a sensitive process which  has to  accommodate the claims of the society as reflected in that purpose. [873 C]      7. In  the area  of legislative ambiguities courts have to fill  gaps, clear doubts and mitigate hardships. There is no  table   of  logarithms  to  guide  or  govern  statutory construction in  this area,  which leaves  a sufficient  and desirable discretion for the Judges to interpret laws in the light of  their purpose, where the language used by the law- makers does  not yield  to one  and one meaning only. lt is, therefore, appropriate  to hold  that the word "accident" is used in  the expression  any one accident" from the point of view of  the various  claimants, each of whom is entitled to make a  separate claim  for the accident suffered by him and not from the point of view of the insurer. [873 D, F-G]      8.  With   the  emergence   of  the  General  Insurance Corporation which  has taken over general insurance business of all  kinds, including  motor vehicle insurance, it should be  easy  to  give  statutory  recognition  to  the  State’s obligation  to   compensate  victims   of  road   accidents, promptly, adequately and without con test . [880 F] 863      Cabell v.  Markham, 148  F. 2d.  737, 739  [1945];  The South Staffordshire  Tramways Company  Ltd. v.  The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association Ltd., [1891]1 Q.B.D. 402; Forney v.  Dominion Insurance  Co. Ltd., [1969] 1 Weekly Law Reports, 928;  Manjusri Raha and Ors. v. B.L. Gupta and Ors. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 944, referred to.      Northern India  Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Amrawati, AIR  1966 Punjab  288, Jayalakshmi and Ors. v. The

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Ruby General  Insurance Company,  Madras and  Anr. AIR  1971 Madras 143; Sabita Pati and Ors. v. Rameshwar Singh and Anr. [1973] A.  C. J.  319; Sheikhupura  Transport  Co.  Ltd.  v. Northern  India  Transport  Co.,  [1971]  Suppl.  S.C.R.  20 distinguished.      Sanjiva Shetty  v. Anantha  and Ors. 1976 A.,C. J. 261, M/s. Construction  India and  Ors.  v.  Mahindra  Pal  Singh Ahluwalia and Ors 1975 A.C.J. 177, disapproved.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 801- 802 of 1978:      From the  judgment and  order dated the 30th September, 1976 of  the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in F.A. No. 696 of 1) 1971 and 1282 of 1969.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, I.N. Shroff and H.S. Parihar for the Appellant.      S.K. Dholakia and R.C. Bhatia for Respondent Nos. 3-6.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD, C.J.  These appeals  raise a  question  of some importance  from the point of Insurance Companies which insure motor vehicles against third party risks and more so, from the  point of  view of  the general  public  which,  by reason of  the increasing  hazards of indisciplined and fast moving traffic,  is driven  in despair  to lodge  claims for injuries suffered in motor vehicle accidents. In case of air accidents, the  injured and  the dependents  of the deceased receive, without  contest,  fairly  large  sums  by  way  of compensation from  the Air  Corporations. We  have still  to awaken to  the need to evolve a reasonably comparable method for compensating  those who  receive injuries or die in road or train  accidents. The  victims of road accidents or their dependents are  driven to  wage a  long and  unequal  battle against the  Insurance Companies, which deny their liability on every  conceivable ground  and indulge  in  an  ingenious variety of  factual disputations  from ’who  was driving the vehicle’ to  ’whose negligence  was the  sine qua non of the accident’. The delay in the final disposal of motor accident compensation cases, as in all 864 other classes of litigation, takes the sting out of the laws of  compensation   because,  an   infant  child   who  seeks compensation as a dependent of his deceased father has often to await  the attainment  of majority  in order  to see  the colour of the money. Add to that the monstrous inflation and the consequent  fall in the value of the rupee: Compensation demanded say,  ten years  ago, is  less than  quarter of its value when  it is  received  today.  We  do  hope  that  the Government will  apply itself seriously and urgently to this problem and  find a  satisfactory method of ameliorating the woes of victims of road accidents.      We have  just talked  of delay  and it  is just as well that we begin by saying that the accident out of which these proceedings arise  happened on February 1, 1966. A collision took place  between a  motor car,  No. GJY 4973, and a goods truck, No.  GTA 4123,  at about  8.30 P.M.  On Naroda  Road, Ahmedabad, as  a result  of which Ajit Sinh, who was driving the car  died instantaneously and Jadavji Keshavji Modi, who was travelling in the car, sustained injuries. The truck was insured against  third party  risk with  the appellant,  the Motor owners Insurance Co. Ltd.      The appellant  had then  an office  in Ahemdabad but it ultimately merged  with the  New India  Assurance Co.  Ltd.,

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Bombay. Respondents  1 (a)  to I  (g), who are the heirs and legal representatives  of the  deceased Ajit  Sinh, filed an application before  the  Motor  Accidents  Claims  Tribunal, Ahmedabad, under  section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 4 of 1939,  seeking compensation  in the sum of Rs. 30,000 for his death.  Jadavji Modi filed a separate application asking for compensation  of Rs. 10,000 for the injuries suffered by him. The  Tribunal dismissed  both  the  applications  by  a common judgment  dated June  2(, 1968  on  the  ground  that respondent No.  3 could not be said to have been driving the truck rashly and negligently  at the time of the accident.      Jadavji Modi  and respondents  I (a)  to  I  (g)  filed separate appeals in the Gujarat High Court from the Judgment of t  he Tribunal, being First Appeals Nos. 1202 of 1969 and 696 of  1971 respectively. These appeals were disposed of by the High  Court by  a common  judgment dated  September  30, 1976. The  hearing proceeded,  both before  the Tribunal and the High  Court, on  the basis  that the  truck was used for carrying goods. The High Court allowed the appeals, awarding a compensation of Rs. 19,125 to 865 respondents 1 (a) to 1 (g) with 6% interest from the date of application  until   realisation  of   the  amount   and   a compensation of  Rs. 10,000 with similar interest to Jadvaji Modi. These  appeals by  special leave  are directed against the judgment of the High Court.      This Court  by its  order dated  April 18, 1978 granted special leave  to the  appellant to appeal from the judgment of the  High Court,  limited to the question relating to the construction of  section 95  (2) of  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, ("the Act").      Chapter VIII  of the  Act bears the title "Insurance of motor  vehicles  against  third  party  risks".  Section  93 defines certain  terms while section 94 (1) provides for the necessity to  insure a vehicle against third party risks. By that section,  no person can use a Motor vehicle in a public place, except  as a  passenger, unless  there is in force in relation to  the use  of the  vehicle a  policy of insurance complying with  the requirements  of the chapter. Section 95 prescribes the  requirements of the insurance policy and the "limits   of liability"  thereunder. Broadly, by sub-section (1) of  section 95,  a policy  of insurance  must insure the person or  classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified  in sub-section  (2) against  any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or  bodily injury  to any person caused by or arising out of the  use of the vehicle in a public place. The proviso to sub-section (I) consists of three clauses by which, speaking generally, a  policy is  not required to cover (i) liability in respect  of the  death of  or  injuries  to  an  employee arising out  of and  in the  course of  his employment; (ii) liability in  respect of  the death  of or  bodily injury to persons carried  in the  vehicle except where the vehicle is used for  carrying passengers  for hire or reward; and (iii) any contractual liability.      That takes us to the provisions contained in section 95 (2) of  the Act,  the interpretation  of which  is the  sole question for  our consideration  in this  appeal. The  Motor Vehicles Act,  1939, save  for Chapter  VIII relating to the insurance of  motor vehicles  against third party risks, has been in force since July 1, 1939, in what were known as Part A and  Part States  and since  April 1, 1951 in Part States. Chapter VIII came into force on July 1, 1946.      Section 95 (2) of the Act originally read thus:      "95 (2) -Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a

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866           policy of  insurance  shall  cover  any  liability           incurred in  respect of  any one accident upto the           following limits, namely :-           (a)  where  the  vehicle  is  a  vehicle  used  or                adapted to be used for the carriage of goods,                a limit of twenty thousand rupees;           (b)  where the  vehicle  is  a  vehicle  in  which                passengers are  carried for hire or reward or                by reason  of or in pursuance of a a contract                of employment,  in respect  of persons  other                than passengers carried for hire or reward, a                limit  of  twenty  thousand  rupees;  and  in                respect  of  passengers  a  limit  of  twenty                thousand rupees  in all,  and  four  thousand                rupees in respect of an individual passenger,                if the  vehicle is  registered to  carry  not                more than six passengers excluding the driver                or two  thousand  rupees  in  respect  of  an                individual  passenger,   if  the  vehicle  is                registered to  carry more than six passengers                excluding the driver;           (c)  where the  vehicle is  a vehicle of any other                class, the amount of the liability incurred."                (emphasis supplied) Clause (a)  of sub-section  (2) was  substituted  by  a  new clause by  section 74 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 100 of 1956, with effect from February 16, 1957. The amended clause (a),  which was in force on February 1, 1966 when the Incident leading to these proceedings occurred, reads thus:      "95(2)(a)-Where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit                of twenty  thousand rupees  in all, including                the liabilities,  if any,  arising under  the                Workmen’s Compensation  Act, 1923, in respect                of  the   death  of,  or  bodily  injury  to,                employees (other than the driver), not 867                exceeding six in number, being carried in the                vehicle."                                          (emphasis supplied) Clauses (b)  and (c) of section 95 (2) remained as they were in 1939 and were not touched by the 1956 Amendment.      Section 95  (2) underwent  a further  amendment by  the Motor Vehicles  (Amendment) Act, 56 of 1969, which came into force on  March 2,  1970. As a result of that amendment, the section reads thus:      "95 (2)   -Subject to the proviso to sub-section (l), a                policy of insurance shall cover any liability                incurred in  respect of any one accident upto                the following limits, namely :- D                (a)  where the  vehicle is   goods vehicle, a                     limit of  fifty thousand  rupees in all,                     including  the   liabilities,   f   any,                     arising under the Workmen’s Compensation                     Act, 1923,  in respect  of the death of,                     or bodily  injury  to  employees  (other                     than the  driver), not  exceeding six in                     number, being carried in the vehicle;                (b)  where the  vehicle is a vehicle in which                     passengers  are   carried  for  hire  or                     reward or  by reason  of or in pursuance                     of a contract of employment-                (i)  in  respect   of  persons   other   than                     passengers carried for hire or reward, a                     limit of fifty thousand rupees in all;

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              (ii) in respect of passengers:                     (1)  a limit of fifty thousand rupees in                          all where the vehicle is registered                          to   carry    more   than    thirty                          Passengers; 868                     (2)  a limit  of  seventy-five  thousand                          rupees in  all where the vehicle is                          registered  to   carry  more   than                          thirty  but  not  more  than  sixty                          passengers;                     (3)  a limit  of one  lakh rupees in all                          where the  vehicle is registered to                          carry more  than sixty  passengers;                          and                     (4)  subject to the limits aforesaid ten                          thousand rupees for each individual                          passenger in any other case;           (c)  save as  provided in  clause (d),  where  the                vehicle is  a vehicle of any other class, the                amount of liability incurred;           (d)  irrespective of  the class  of the vehicle, a                limit  of  rupees  two  thousand  in  all  in                respect of  damage to any property of a third                party."                (emphasis supplied)      We are concerned only with clause (a) of section 95 (2) and that  too, as  it existed  on February  1, 1966 when the collision between  the car and the truck took place. We have extracted the  other clauses  of section  95 (2) in order to trace the  legislative history  of the  section and  to  see whether the  language used by the legislature in other parts of the  same section  affords  a  comparative  clue  to  the interpretation of the provision contained in clause (a).      Clause (a) as originally enacted in 1939, provides that the insurance  policy must cover the liability in respect of third party  risks upto the limit of twenty thousand rupees, where the  vehicle is  used or  adapted to  be used  for the carriage of  goods.  By  the  amendment  introduced  by  the Amendment Act  100 of  1956, the  words "in  all" were added after the  words "twenty  thousand rupees".  Clause (a) thus amended read  to say  that where  the  vehicle  is  a  goods vehicle, the  policy of  insurance shall cover the liability in regard  to third  party risks  upto the  limit of  twenty thousand rupees  in all.  Whereas clause (a) in its original form spoke  of a vehicle "used or adapted to be used for the carriage of goods", under the 869 amendment of  1956, the  clause was made applicable to cases where the  vehicle "is a goods vehicle". The other amendment introduced by  the Act of 1956 was that the overall limit of twenty  thousand   rupees  was   expressed  to  include  the liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 to the  extent mentioned  in the  amendment.  The  amendment introduced by  the Amendment  Act 56  of 1969  enhanced  the liability under  clause (a)  from twenty  thousand rupees to fifty thousand rupees in all.      Clause (b)  of section  95 applies to vehicles in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance  of a contract of employment. Under that clause as it stood originally in 1939, the liability was restricted to twenty  thousand rupees  in respect of persons other than passengers  carried  for  hire  or  reward;  and  to  twenty thousand  rupees  in  all  in  respect  of  passengers.  The Amendment Act of 1956 did not make any change in clause (b).

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But, the Amendment Act of 1969 enhanced the liability to the limit of  fifty thousand rupees in all in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward. In respect of  passengers,  the  liability  was  enhanced  from  twenty thousand rupees  to fifty  thousand rupees  in all, seventy- five  thousand  rupees  in  all  one  lakh  rupees  in  all, depending upon  the registered  capacity of  the vehicle  to carry passengers.      It  may   be  recalled  that  the  High  Court  awarded compensation in  the sum  of Rs. 19,125 to respondents 1 (a) to 1 (g) who are the heirs and legal representatives of Ajit Sinh who was driving the car, and Rs. 10,000 to Jadavji Modi who  was   travelling  in  the  car.  The  total  amount  of compensation awarded  to the  claimants thus  comes  to  Rs. 29,125 that  is to  say, it  is in excess of Rs. 20,000. The contention of  Shri Sorabjee  who appears  on behalf  of the appellant insurance-company  is, that under clause (a) as it stood at  the material  time, the  liability of  the insurer under the  statutory policy  taken by the owner of the goods vehicle is  limited to  twenty thousand  rupees in  all and, therefore, the  insurer cannot  be asked to pay compensation in excess  of that amount. The liability to pay the balance, viz. Rs.  9,125 must  according to  the learned  counsel, be fastened on  the owner  of the  goods vehicle  who would  be vicariously responsible  for the  negligence of his employee who was  driving the  goods  vehicle.  In  support  of  this submission counsel  relies strongly on the circumstance that the Amendment  Act of 1956 which came into force on February 16, 1957, introduced the words 870 "in all"  in clause  (a). It  is urged that these words were introduced advisedly  and deliberately in order to limit the overall liability  of the  insurer to twenty thousand rupees under the statutory policy. These words of limitation cannot be ignored  by asking  the appellant  to pay compensation in excess of  twenty thousand  rupees. Counsel  also  seeks  to derive support  to his  submission from the use of the words "in all" in clauses (b) and (d) of section 95 (2) as amended by Amendment  Act 56  of 1969 which came into force on March ". 1970.      Having  given   our  anxious   consideration  to  these contentions  of   Shri  Sorabjee,   which  are  not  without plausibility, we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the construction canvassed  by the  learned counsel will lead to great  injustice  and  absurdity  and  must,  therefore,  be eschewed since,  especially, the  words of  section  95  (2) cannot, in  the context  in which they occur, be regarded as plain and  unambiguous. We  with first demonstrate the harsh and  strange   consequences  which  will  flow  out  of  the construction pressed  upon us  and we  with then show why we consider That  the material  words of  the  section  are  of doubtful import.  If. for  example, two or three persons die in a  collision between a car and a goods vehicle and two or three others  are injured  as a  result of the negligence of the driver  of the  goods vehicle, the heirs of the deceased and the  injured persons will together be entitled to twenty thousand rupees  in all,  no matter how serious the injuries and how  grave the  hardship to  the heirs  ensuing upon the loss of  lives of  those who  perished in the collision. But there is  a more  flagrant injustice which one shall have to countenance if  one were  to accept the argument advanced on behalf of  the appellant  and it is this : If two persons of unequal  economic  status  die  in  the  kind  of  collision mentioned above,  the heirs  of  the  affluent  victim  will virtually monopolise  the compensation  by getting  a lion’s

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share in  it, thereby  adding insult to the injury caused to the heirs  of the  indigent victim. The purpose of law is to alleviate, not  augment, the sufferings of the people. It is well-known that  the award  of compensation  depends upon  a variety  of   factors,  including  the  extent  of  monetary deprivation  to   which  the   heirs  of  the  deceased  are subjected. Applying  that  criterion  as  one  of  the  many variable criteria  which are applied for fixing compensation in motor  accident cases,  the heirs  of the affluent victim may have  been awarded,  say, a  compensation of Rs. 90,000. The heirs  of the  other  victim  who  may  have  been  just managing to  keep his  body and  soul together will probably have received by that standard a compensation of, say, 871 ten thousand  rupees. The  compensation awarded to these two groups of  heirs shall  have to  be reduced  rateably in the proportion of  9: 1  in order  to ensure  it does not exceed rupees twenty  thousand "in all". The result of this will be that the  insurance company  will be  liable to pay a sum of Rs. 18,000 to the heirs of the affluent person and Rs. 2,000 to the  heirs of the other person. The icy band of death may have fallen  in one  stroke  on  two  victims  of  disparate economic status  but then,  the arithmetic of the appellants argument will  perpetuate the  gross inequality  between the two even  after their  death. We  must avoid  a construction which will  produce such  an unfair  result, if we can do so without doing  violence to  the language of the section. The owner of  the truck  will undoubtedly  be liable  to pay the balance but  common experience  shows that  the woes  of the injured and  of the  heirs of those who perish in automobile accidents begin  after they  embark upon  the  adventure  of execution proceedings.  There are proverbial difficulties in proving ownership  of goods  vehicles, particularly  if they are subject  to a  hire-purchase agreement  and truck owners are quite  known for the ease with which they proclaim their insolvency. It  is therefore  no consolation  that the left- over liability will fall on the insured.      Both  by   common  practice   and  the  application  of recognised   rules    of   statutory   construction,   harsh consequences  following   upon  an  interpretation  are  not considered as  the governing factor in the construction of a statute, unless  its language  is equivocal or ambiguous. If the language  is plain  and capable  of  one  interpretation only, we  will not be justified in reading into the words of the Act  a meaning  which does  not follow  natural from the language used by legislature. It therefore becomes necessary to consider  whether the language used by the legislature in section 95  (2) of the Act admits of any doubt or difficulty or is capable of one interpretation only.      If the  words used  by the legislature in clause (a) of section 95  (2) were  the sole  factor for  determining  the outside limit  of the  insurer’s liability, it may have been possible to  accept the  submission that the total liability of the  insurer arising out of the incident or occurrence in question cannot  exceed Rs. 20,000. Clause (a) qualifies the extent  of  the  insurer’s  liability  by  the  use  of  the unambiguous expression  "in all"  and since  that expression was specially introduced by an amendment, it must be allowed its full  play. The  legislature must  be presumed  to  have intended what  it has plainly said. But, clause (a) does not stand alone and is not 872 the only  provision to  be considered  for  determining  the outside limit  of the  insurer’s liability.  In fact, clause (a) does  not even  form a  complete sentence  and makes  no

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meaning by itself. Like the other clauses (b) to (d), clause (a) is  governed by  the opening  words of section 95 (2) to the effect  that "a  policy of  insurance  shall  cover  any liability incurred  in respect  of any one accident upto the following limits",  that is  to say, the limits laid down in clauses (a)  to (d).  We have  supplied emphasis in order to focus attention  on the  true  question  which  emerges  for consideration: What  is the  meaning of  the expression ’any one  accident"?   If  that   expression   were   plain   and unambiguous, and  its meaning  clear  and  definite,  effect would be  required to  be given  to it regardless of what we think of  its wisdom  or policy.  But as  we will  presently show, the  expression "any  one accident ’ does not disclose one meaning  conclusively according to the laws of language. It,  clearly,   is  capable   of  more   than  one  meaning, introducing thereby an ambiguity which has to be resolved by resorting  to   the  well-settled  principles  of  statutory construction.      The expression "any one accident" is susceptible of two equally  reasonable   meanings  or   interpretations.  If  a collision occurs  between a  car and  a truck  resulting  in injuries to  five persons,  it is  as much  plausible to say that five  persons were  injured in one accident as it is to say that  each of  the five  persons met with an accident. A by-stander looking  at the  occurrence objectively  will  be right in  saying that  the truck  and the  car met  with  an accident or that they were concerned in one accident. On the other hand, a person looking at the occurrence subjectively, like the  one who is injured in the collision, will say that he met  with an  accident. And  so will  each  of  the  five persons who were injured. From their point of view, which is the  relevant  point  of  view,  "any  one  accident"  means "accident to  any one’.  In matters  involving  third  party risks, it  is subjective  considerations which  must prevail and the  occurrence has  to be  looked at  from the point of view of  those who  are immediately  affected by  it. If the matter is  looked at  from an  objective point  of view, the insurer’s liability will be limited to Rs. 20,000 in respect of injuries  caused to  all the  five persons  considered en bloc as a single entity, since they were injured as a result of one single collision. On the other hand, if the matter is looked at  subjectively as  it ought  to be,  the  insurer’s liability will  extend to  a sum of Rs. 20,000 in respect of the injuries suffered by each one of the five persons, since each met with an accident, though during 873 the course  of the  same  transaction.  A  consideration  of preponderating importance  in a matter of this nature is not whether there  was any  one transaction  which  resulted  in injuries to  many but  whether  more  than  one  person  was injured, giving  rise to  more than  one claim  or cause  of action, even  if the  injuries were  caused in the course of one single  transaction. If  more than one person is injured during the  course of  the same transaction, each one of the persons has met with an accident.      We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ambiguity in the language  used by the legislature in the opening part of section 95  (2) and the doubt arising out of the co-relation of that  language with  the words  "in all"  which occur  in clause (a),  must  be  resolved  by  having  regard  to  the underlying legislative  purpose of  the provisions contained in chapter  VIII of  the Act  which deals  with third  party risks. That  is a sensitive process which has to accommodate the claims  of the  society as  reflected in  that  purpose. Indeed, it  is in  this  area  of  legislative  ambiguities,

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unfortunately not  receding, that  courts have to fill gaps, clear doubts  and mitigate  hardships. In the words of Judge Learned Hand:           "It is  one of  surest indexes  of  a  mature  and      developed jurisprudence..  to  remember  that  statutes      always have  some purpose or object to accomplish whose      sympathetic and  imaginative discovery  is  the  surest      guide to their meaning". (1) There is no table of logarithms to guide or govern statutory construction in  this area,  which leaves  a sufficient  and desirable discretion for the Judges to interpret laws in the light of  their purpose, where the language used by the law- makers  does   not  yield  to  one  and  one  meaning  only. Considering the  matter that way, we are of the opinion that it is  appropriate to  hold that the word "accident" is used in the  expression "any one accident" from the point of view of the various claimants, each of whom is entitled to make a separate claim for the accident suffered by him and not from the point of view of the insurer.      In The South Staffordshire Tramways Company Ltd. v. The Sickness and  Accident Assurance  Association Ltd.,  (2) the plaintiffs, a 874 tramcar company,  effected with  the defendants an insurance against claims  for personal  injury in respect of accidents caused by  vehicles upto  the amount of  250 "in respect of any one  accident’’. One  of the  vehicles specified  in the insurance policy  was overturned,  causing injuries to about forty persons,  as a  result of  which the plaintiffs became liable to pay to those persons compensation to the extent of  833.  The  question  before  the  Court  was  whether  the injuries  caused   to  each   of  the   said  forty  persons constituted a  separate accident  within the  meaning of the policy. The  Court of  Appeal answered  that question in the affirmative. Lord Esher, M.R., observed in his judgment that the claims  made  by  the  plaintiffs  were  in  respect  of personal injuries,  and each  person injured  claimed (’ for injuries in  respect of  an accident  to his  person by  the vehicle. "If  several persons were injured", said the Master of Rolls,  "upon the  true construction of the policy, there were several  accidents". Bowen,  L.J. took the same view of the matter by saying that the word "accident" may be used in either of  two  ways:  An  accident  may  be  spoken  of  as occurring to  a person.  Or as  occurring  to  a  train,  or vehicle, or  bridge. In  the  latter  case,  though  several persons were  injured who  were in the train, or vehicle, or on the  bridge, it  would be  an accident  to the  train, or vehicle, or bridge. In the former, "there might, however, be said  to  be  several  accidents,  to  the  several  persons injured". Fry,  L.J., concurred  in the  view taken  by  his Brethren,  and   observed  that  the  meaning  of  the  word "accident", as  used in  the policy  of insurance,  is  "any single  injury   to  the  person  or  property  accidentally caused."      In Forney  v.  Dominion  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  (1)  the plaintiff, a  solicitor, was  insured under  a  professional indemnity  policy  whereby  the  defendants,  the  insurers, agreed to  indemnify him in respect of loss arising from any claim or  claims which may be made upon him by reason of any neglect, omission  or error  committed in the conduct of his business, subject  to a  proviso that  the liability  of the insurers was  not to  exceed a sum of  3000, "in respect of any one  claim or  number of  claims arising out of the same occurrence’’.  The  Solicitor’s  assistant  gave  a  certain advice in  a motor  accident case which betrayed negligence.

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The  assistant  had  wrongly  allowed  a  person  to  become administratrix  of   her  late   husband’s  estate  and  the assistant also  failed to  issue writs  within the six-month limitation period.  A claim  was made  against the Solicitor for his  assistant’s negligence  for depriving the claimants of their right to be paid 875 damages.  The   court  assessed   the  quantum   of  damages differently for different claimants, which together exceeded the sum  of    3000.  It  was  held  that  the  Solicitor’s assistant was  negligent twice  and therefore there were two occurrences in  the  same  case  in  respect  of  which  the Solicitor became  liable  to  pay  damages  for  negligence. Accordingly,  the  insurance  company  was  held  liable  to indemify the  Solicitor in  respect of  the damages  awarded against him  upto  a  limit  of    3000  for  each  act  of negligence.      In Halsbury’s  Laws of  England, (1)  the  decision  in South Staffordshire  Tramways company is cited in support of the proposition that the word ’accident           "may fall  to be  construed from the point of view      of each individual victim, so as to produce, in effect,      as many  accidents (even  in a  single  occurrence)  as      there - are victims" .      The provisions  contained in  section 95 (2) of the Act arose for  consideration before  a Full  Bench of  the  High Court of Punjab in Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Amrawati, (2) a Full Bench of the High Court of Madras in  Jayalakshami & Ors. v. The Ruby General Insurance Company, Madras  & anr.,  (3) the High Court of Karnataka in Sanjiva Shetty  v. Anantha & Ors., (4) and the High Court of Orissa in Sabita Pati & Ors. v. Rameshwar Singh and anr. (5) and M/s  Construction India  & Ors.  v. Mahindra  Pal  Singh Ahluwalia &  ors. (6) The Punjab case arose under section 95 (2) (b),  while the  other cases  arose under section 95 (2) (a) of the Act.      In the  case before  the Madras  Full Bench,  a  person called Krishnaswami  who was  driving a car died as a result of a  collision between  his car  and a  goods vehicle.  The Claims Tribunal  dismissed the  claim of  the heirs  of  the deceased, but  a Division  Bench of  the High Court took the view that  compensation in  the sum  of Rs.  40,000 would be payable  to   them.  The   Division   Bench   referred   for consideration of  the Full  Bench the  question whether on a true construction 876 of clause  (a) of  section 95  (2),  the  liability  of  the Insurance company was limited to rupees twenty thousand. The Full Bench,  overruling a  previous decision  of a  Division Bench, answered  this question  in the  affirmative.  It  is important to  bear in  mind that  the case before the Madras High Court was in a material respect different from the case before us.  The High  Court had to consider the claim of one person only since, only one person had met with an accident. In the  case before  us,  more  than  one  person  has  been injured,  which   raises  the   question  as   regards   the construction of the words "any one accident’’ which occur in section 95  (2). That  question did  not arise in the Madras case  and  the  decision,  therefore,  does  not  touch  the question before us. Similarly, in the case before the Orissa High Court  in Sabita  Pati, only one person was involved in the collision between a jeep and a goods vehicle. Relying on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, the Orissa High  Court held  that the liability of the Insurance company was  limited to rupees twenty thousand under section

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95(2)(a) of  the Act.  The n  involvement of  more than  one person in  a single  occurrence raises  a different question for  consideration   under  section  95  (2)  (a)  than  the involvement of  a single  person in  a single occurrence. In the latter case, it may be true to say that the liability of the insurer  is limited  to rupees  twenty thousand  under a statutory policy.  In the  former, the interpretation of the words "any one accident’’ came into play and we have already expressed our view on the meaning of those words.      In the  case before the Karnataka High Court in Sanjiva Shetty, a  taxi and  a car met with a collision, as a result of which  two persons  travelling in the taxi, the driver of the car  and a boy called Bharatisha sitting on the roadside were injured.  Before the  High Court  was the  claim of the driver of  the car and the boy. A Division Bench of the High Court held that the total liability of the Insurance Company was limited  to rupees  twenty thousand  in respect  of  the injuries suffered  by them.  The High  Court apportioned the liability by  directing the  insurance company  to  pay  Rs. 18,730 to  the boy  and Rs. 1 ,270 to the driver of the car. In view of our judgment in the instant case, the decision of the Karnataka  High Court  cannot be  considered to  be good law. We  may add  that paragraph  22 of  the judgment of the High Court  says that  it was  "common ground"  between  the parties that  the limit of the liability of the insurers was only rupees  twenty thousand  in all.  The High  Court added "...... indeed, no argument was addressed to the contrary by any of the 877 parties". In  the case  before the  Orissa High Court in M/s Construction India,  two children travelling in a school bus belonging to  the Orissa  Government  died  in  a  collision between the  bus and a goods vehicle. Section 95 (2) (a) was held attracted and since more than one person was injured as a result  of a single occurrence, the same question arose as before us.  The orissa  High Court held that since the total compensation exceeded  rupees twenty thousand, the liability of the insurers was limited to rupees twenty thousand in all and that  the amount  payable to  the heirs  of the deceased children was  liable to  be apportioned.  This decision also cannot be  considered as  laying down  the correct  law  and there too,  as in  Sanjiva Shetty,  no argument was advanced before the  High Court  on the  construction of  clause (a), particularly in  reference to  the words  "any one accident" which occur in section 95 (2).      The case before the Punjab Full Bench in Northern India Transporters, arose  under the  old section  95 (2)  (b) and need not  really detain  us. Under that section, as it stood prior to  its amendment  in 1969,  a policy of insurance was required to  cover any  liability incurred in respect of any one accident  upto the  limit of  twenty thousand  rupees in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, where  the vehicle  was one in which passengers were carried for  hire or  for reward  or  by  reason  of  or  in pursuance  of  a  contract  of  employment.  In  respect  of passengers, there  was a  twofold  limit  on  the  insurer’s liability: "a  limit of  twenty thousand  rupees in all" and four thousand  rupees in  respect of an individual passenger if the  vehicle was  registered to  carry not  more than six passengers excluding  the driver,  or two thousand rupees in respect of  an  individual  passenger  if  the  vehicle  was registered to  carry more  than six passengers excluding the driver. A  passenger bus  was involved  in an  occurrence in which two  passengers were  killed. The High Court held that the straightforward  course was  to take the language of the

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Act as  it stood,  which left no doubt that in the case of a bus registered  for carrying  more than  six passengers, the limit of the liability was twenty thousand rupees in all and there was  a further  limit in  respect of  each  individual passenger in  the sum of two thousand rupees. The words "any one accident’  in the opening part of section 95 (2) made no difference to  this interpretation because, if more than one passenger  was  injured  in  a  single  occurrence,  no  one passenger was  entitled to  receive  more  than  rupees  two thousand or  four  thousand,  depending  on  the  registered capacity of the vehicle to carry passengers. 878      The judgment  of the  Punjab High  Court was brought in appeal to  this Court  in Sheikhupura  Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India  Transport Co.(1)  For reasons aforesaid, the judgment  in   that  case   is  not   an  authority  on  the interpretation of  clause  (a)  of  section  95  (2).  After setting out  the relevant  provisions of  section 95  (2) at pages 24 and 25 of the Report, Hegde J. speaking for himself and Jaganmohan Reddy, J. concluded:           "In the present case we are dealing with a vehicle      in which  more than  six passengers  were allowed to be      carried. Hence  the maximum  liability imposed under s.      95 (2) on the insurer is Rs. 2,000 per passenger though      the total liability may go upto Rs. 20,000.’’ Towards the  end of  the  judgment,  it  was  observed  that reading the  provision  contained  in  sections  95  and  96 together, "..  it is  clear that  the statutory liability of the insurer  to indemnify  the insured  is as  prescribed in Sec.  95,(2).   Hence  the  High  Court  was  right  in  its conclusion that  the liability of the insurer in the present case only extends upto Rs. 2,000 each, in the case of Bachan Singh and  Narinder Nath".  In vies  of  the  limit  on  the insurer’s  liability  in  respect  of  each  passenger,  the argument on the construction of the words "any one accident" had  no   relevance  and  was  therefore  neither  made  nor considered by  the Court. Different considerations may arise under clause  (b), as  amended by  Act 56 of 1969, but we do not propose  to make  any observations on that aspect of the matter, since it does not directly arise before us.      It was  suggested that  the interpretation which we are putting on  s. 95  (2) (a) will create difficulties in cases where the  insured also incurs liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to,  employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle. It is true that under section  95 (2)  (a), the liability of the insured and therefore the  insurer’s indemnity includes the liability of the aforesaid description under the Act of 1923. But that is a matter  of apportionment  which  may  require  a  rateable deduction to  be made  from the compensation payable to each victim, depending  upon the  quantum of compensation payable under the  Act of  1923 to  employees carried  in the  goods vehicle. 879      We cannot  part with  this case without impressing upto the A  Government, once again, the urgent need to provide by law for  the payment  of reasonable amounts of compensation, without contest,  to victims of road accidents. We find that road accidents  involving passengers  travelling by  rail or public  buses   are  usually   followed   by   an   official announcement of  payment  of  ex  gratia  sums  to  victims, varying between  five hundred and two thousand rupees or so. That is a niggardly recognition of the State’s obligation to its people  particularly so  when the frequency of accidents

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involving the  public transport  system has increased beyond believable limits.  The  newspaper  reports  of  August  and September 1981  regarding deaths and injuries caused in such accidents have  a sorry  story to  tell.  But  we  need  not reproduce  figures   depending  upon   newspaper  assessment because, the  newspapers of  September 18,  1981  carry  the report of  a statement  made by  the Union Minister of State for Shipping  and Transport  before  the  North  Zone  goods transport operators  ...that 20,000  persons were killed and 1.5 lakh  were injured  in highway accidents during 1980. We wonder whether  adequate compensation was paid to this large mass of  suffering humanity.  In  any  event,  the  need  to provide by  law for  the payment  of  adequate  compensation without contest  to such  victims can no longer be denied or disputed. It  was four  years ago  that this Court sounded a warning and a reminder (1):           "With the  emergence of  an ultra-modern age which      has led  to strides of progress in all spheres of life,      we have  switched from fast to faster vehicular traffic      which has  come as a boon to many, though some times in      the case  of some it has also proved to be a misfortune      The time  is ripe for serious consideration of creating      no-fault liability.  Having  regard  to  the  directive      principles of State policy, the poverty of the ordinary      run of  victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory      nature   of    insurance   of   motor   vehicles,   the      nationalisation of  general insurance companies and the      expanding  trends   towards  nationalisation   of   bus      transport, the  law of  torts based  on no-fault  needs      reform.           "....  it   is  only   just  and   fair  that  the      Legislature should  make a  suitable provision so as to      pay adequate  compensation by  properly evaluating  the      precious life of a 880      citizen in  its true  perspective rather than devaluing      human lives  on the basis of an artificial mathematical      formula. It  is common knowledge that where a passenger      travelling by  a plane  dies in  an accident, he gets a      compensation of  Rs. 1,00,000  or like  large sums, and      yet when  death comes  to him  not through  a plane but      through a  motor vehicle  he is  entitled only  to  Rs.      2,000. Does  it indicate  that the  life of a passenger      travelling  by   plane  becomes  more  precious  merely      because he  has chosen  a particular conveyance and the      value of his life is considerably reduced if he happens      to choose  a conveyance  of a lesser value like a motor      vehicle. Such  an invidious  distinction is  absolutely      shocking to  any judicial  or social conscience and yet      s. 95  (2) (d)  of the  Motor  Vehicles  Act  seems  to      suggest such  a distinction. We hope and trust that our      law makers  will give  serious attention to this aspect      of the  matter and  remove this serious lacuna in s. 95      (2) (d)  of the  Motor Vehicles Act. We would also like      to suggest  that instead  of limiting  the liability of      the Insurance  Companies to a specified sum of money as      representing the value of human life, the amount should      be left  to be  determined by  a Court  in the  special      circumstances  of   each  case.  We  further  hope  our      suggestions  will   be   duly   implemented   and   the      observations of the highest Court of the country do not      become a  mere pious wish. ’ (per Fazal Ali J, pp. 945,      946, 950, 951). These observations are still languishing in the cold storage of pious wishes. With the emergence of the General Insurance

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Corporation which  has taken over general insurance business of all  kinds, including motor vehicles insurance, it should be  easy  to  give  statutory  recognition  to  the  State’s obligation to compensate victims of road accidents promptly, adequately and without contest.      We are  happy to  note that  the Gujarat High Court, by its  judgment   under  appeal,  took  a  just,  correct  and realistic view  of the  matter by  holding that,  under  the statutory policy,  the appellant insurance company is liable to pay  the full  amount of compensation to the heirs of the driver of the car and to the passenger who was travelling in the car, each amount being less than Rs. 20,000. 881      In the  result the  appeals are dismissed with costs in separate sets  in favour  of respondents  1 (a) to 1 (g) who are the  heirs of  the deceased  Ajit Sinha and in favour of respondents 3  to 6  who are  the heirs  of Jadavji Keshavji Modi since deceased. N.V.K.                             Appeals dismissed. 882