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PETITIONER: MOTI  RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SURAJ BHAN & OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR  655            1960 SCR  (2) 896  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1963 SC 499  (6)  D          1968 SC1336  (6)  RF         1984 SC1164  (14)  RF         1988 SC1060  (6)

ACT:        Rent  Control-Ejectment-Statute  Permitting  ejectment   for        reconstruction  of building-Subsequent amendment  making  of        Provision more stinget-Whether retrospective-Statute  making        appellate order final-Before making of order statute amended        by providing revision to High Court-If amendment applies  to        Pending  appealed  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act,  1949        (E.P.  3  Of 949, SS. 13(3)(a)(iii)  and  14(4)-East  Punjab        Urban  Rent Rcstriction (Amendment) Act, 1956. (Punj. 29  Of        1956). SS. 2 and 3.

HEADNOTE: On  August  28, 1956 the respondent i applied  to  the  Rent Controller  for  the eviction of the appellant from  a  shop under  S. I3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act, 1949, inter alia on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the  shop.   On  the  date, s. 13(3)  (a)(iii)  of  the  Act provided  that a landlord may apply for the eviction of  his tenant if he required the building f or reconstruction or  f or its re placement by another building or for the  erection of  other building.  Section 15 provided for an appeal  from the  order  of the Rent Controller and sub-s. (4) Of  s.  15 provided  that the decision of the appellate authority,  and subject  only to such decision, the order of the  Controller shall be final.  By Amending Act 29 Of 1956, which came into force  on September 24, 1956, ss. 13(3)(a)(iii) and 15  were amended; amended S. 13(3)(a)(iii) permitted ejectment if the landlord  required it to carry out any building work at  the instance  of  the  Government  or  Local  Authority  or  any Improvement  Trust  under some  improvement  or  development scheme  or  if  It  had become unsafe  or  unfit  for  human habitation  ;  and new s. 15(5) introduced by  the  amending Act,  gave to the High Court power to call for  and  examine the  records relating to any order passed under the Act  for satisfying  itself as to the legality or propriety  of  such order.   The application for eviction was dismissed  by  the

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Rent  Controller  and an appeal to the  appellate  authority also  failed.   Respondent  i  went to  the  High  Court  in revision  and the High Court decreed eviction  holding  that the shop was required for 897 reconstruction  within  the  meaning  of  the  unamended  s. 13(3)(a) (iii). The appellant contended that the amended provisions of S.    15  which  permitted a  revision  to  be filed  before the High Court were inapplicable as  the  case was  governed  by the law as it stood on the date  when  the application for ejectment was made and that Respondent i was not  entitled to the decree as the case did not fall  within the  provisions  of amended s. 13(3)(a)( ...  )  which  were retrospective and were applicable to the case. Held,  that the revision application before the  High  Court was  competent  and  the  High  Court  had  jurisdiction  to interfere.   Finality could be attached to the  decision  of the appellate authority only after the decision was made and not  before.  But at the time when the  appellate  authority decided the matter in the present case the amending  section had come into force and the appellate order could not  claim finality under the earlier provision. Indira  Sohanlal  v. Custodian of  Evacuee  Property  Delhi. [1955] 2 S.C.R. III7, followed. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commis- sioner,  (1924) L.L.R. 9 Lah. 284; Colonial  Sugar  Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369, and Garikapatti Veeraya v. N.     Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] S.C.R. 488, referred to. Held,   further   that   the  provisions   of   amended   s. 13(3)(a)(iii)  were not retrospective and did not  apply  to the  present case.  The amendment was in regard to a  matter of substantive law as it affected the substantive rights  of the  landlord.   An amendment which affected  vested  rights operated  prospectively  unless it  was  made  retrospective expressly or by necessary implication. Ram Parshad Halwai, Ludhiana v. Mukhtiay Chand, I.L.R. 1958 Pun. 1553, approved.

JUDGMENT:        Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 524 of 1959.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        August 7,1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision No.        613 of 1958, arising out of the Judgment and order dated the        August  19,1958  of the District Judge,  Gurgaon,  in  Civil        Appeal No. 14/14 of 1958.        N.   S. Bindra and P. C. Aggarwala, for the appellant.        Achhru Ram and K. P. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.        1960 February 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises  from        ejectment  proceedings  taken by Suraj Bhan  (respondent  1)        against the appellant Moti Ram in respect of a shop situated        in the urban area of             898        Gurgaon which has been in the occupation of the   appellant        as  a  tenant for more than twenty years  on       a monthly        rental  of Rs. 20. Respondent 1 purchased the shop  on  June        15,  1956,  and  soon  thereafter he  applied  to  the  Rent        Controller for the eviction -of the appellant  under  s.        13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of        1949)  (hereinafter  called the Act). This  application  was        based on four grounds.   it was urged that the appellant was        a  habitual defaulter and was in arrears of rent,  that  the        return of the money invested by respondent 1 in the purchase

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      of the shop was not adequate, that respondent 1   apprehended        that  the godown and the shop of which he was in  possession        as a tenant would be sold off and  he  may  be  dispossessed        therefrom,  that  is why he would require the  shop  in  the        present proceedings for his personal use and that respondent        I  wanted  to  reconstruct  the  shop  for  which  necessary        sanction  had  been  obtained  by  him  from  the  Municipal        Committee  of Gurgaon and the plan prepared in  that  behalf        had  been  duly  approved. This claim was  resisted  by  the        appellant  who disputed the correctness and the validity  of        all the pleas taken by respondent 1. The Rent     Controller        upheld the contentions of the appellant and rejected all the        pleas  made by respondent 1. In regard to the plea that  the        respondent   wanted  to  reconstruct  the  shop   the   Rent        Controller  found that the evidence adduced by respondent  1        in  support  of  the  said  plea  "had  been  created  as  a        camouflage  and  that the said plea was a false  pretext  to        obtain the eviction of the appellant. On these findings  the        application made  by respondent I for evicting the appellant        was dismissed.        Respondent I then appealed to the District Court against the        said  decision.  His  appeal,  however,  failed  since   the        appellate court confirmed all the findings made by the  Rent        Controller. In respect of the last plea raised by respondent        I  about  the  rebuilding of the shop  the  appellate  court        observed that respondent I had got the plan approved and had        also got  the  sanction from the Municipal Committee to  re-        construct the building so as to be able to make a        899        ground for getting the appellant ejected from the shop.        This  appellate decision was challenged by respondent  I  by        his  revisional application in the High Court of  Punjab  at        Chandigarh.   The High Court confirmed the findings  of  the        courts  below on the first three pleas raised by  respondent        1. The last plea raised by respondent 1, however, was upheld        by  the  High  Court with the  result  that  the  revisional        application  preferred by respondent I was allowed  and  his        claim  for evicting the appellant was decreed.  It  is  this        decree which is challenged before us by the appellant in the        present appeal.        Before dealing with the contentions raised by Mr. Bindra  on        behalf  of  the  appellant it is necessary  to  mention  one        material  fact.  The application for ejectment was  made  on        August 28, 1956.  Before the written statement was filed  by        the  appellant on November 14, 1956, the Act was amended  by        amending  Act  29  of 1956 on September 24,  1956.   In  the        present appeal we are concerned with amendments made in  ss.        13  and  15 of the Act.  Section 13(1) provides  inter  alia        that  a  tenant  in possession of a building  shall  not  be        evicted  therefrom except in accordance with the  provisions        of  this section, or in pursuance of an order made under  s.        13  of  the  Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction  Act,  1947  as        subsequently  amended.  Section 13, sub-s. (2) provides  for        an  application to be made by a landlord who seeks to  evict        his tenant for a direction in that behalf.  It then proceeds        to  prescribe  conditions  on the satisfaction  of  which  a        decree  for  ejectment  can  be  passed  in  favour  of  the        landlord.  We are not concerned with these conditions in the        present  appeal.   Section 13(3)(aXiii) as it stood  at  the        date of the application made by respondent I provided that a        landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  directing        the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case  of        any  building  if he requires it for the  reconstruction  of        that building or for its .replacement by another building or        for  the erection of-other buildings.  By the  amending  Act

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      this proviision -has, been substantially. modified.  Section        13(3)(a) (iii))as amended reads thus "In the casee of any        900        building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out  any        building work at the instance of the Government   or   Local        Authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or        development  scheme  or it has become unsafe  or  unfit  for        human  habitation."  One of the questions which we  have  to        consider  in this appeal is whether this  amended  provision        applies to the present proceedings.        The  other relevant section is s. 15, sub-s. (4).  Under  s.        15, sub-s. (4) as it stood on the date when the  application        was  filed  provided  that the  decision  of  the  appellate        authority,  and subject only to such decision, an  order  of        the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to  be        called in question in any court of law whether in a suit  or        any other proceeding by way of appeal or revision.  This has        been  subsequently  amended by deleting the last  clause  in        sub-s.  (4) and substituting in its place the words  "except        as provided in sub-s. (5) of this section." Sub-s. (5) which        has been added reads thus:        "The High Court may, at any time, on the application of  any        aggrieved party or on its own motion,, call for and  examine        the  records  relating to any order  passed  or  proceedings        taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as        to  the legality or propriety of such order  or  proceedings        and  may pass such order in relation thereto as it may  deem        fit."        On  behalf of the appellant it is urged before us that  this        amended provision which permits a revisional application  to        be  filed  before  the High Court  is  inapplicable  to  the        present proceedings.        Let us first deal with the point about the competence of the        revisional application.  The appellant’s case is that  under        s.  15, sub-s. (4) as it stood at the time when the  present        proceeding   commenced,  the  decision  of   the   appellate        authority was final, and it could not be questioned in  suit        or other proceedings by way of appeal or revision.  In other        words,  a  revisional  application  against  the   appellate        decision  was expressly excluded.  If at the time  when  the        present proceedings commenced the decision of the  appellate        authority was final in the eyes of law the        901        subsequent  amendment by which a revisional application  has        been  allowed  cannot  affect that  position.   It  was  the        appellant’s right as a party to the proceedings to claim the        benefit of the finality of the appellate order so far as the        present proceedings are concerned.  Put in a different  form        the   contentions  that  the  provision  for  a   revisional        application  which  has now been made by  the  amending  Act        cannot  retrospectively  affect the proceedings  which  were        pending at the time when the amending Act was passed.        Unfortunately  for the appellant this point is concluded  by        the decision of this Court in the case of Indira Sohanlal v.        Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi (1).  In that case  the        appellant  who  was a displaced person from Lahore  was  the        owner of a house there and had arranged to have it exchanged        with  certain  lands  in a village in  the  State  of  Delhi        belonging to an evacuee ’M’.  On February 23, 1948, the said        owner  made  an application to the Additional  Custodian  of        Evacuee  Property (Rural) Delhi for the confirmation of  the        transaction  of  exchange under s. 5-A of  the  East  Punjab        Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 as  amended        in  1948 and applied to the State of Delhi.  Under s.  5  of        the  said  Act  an  order if  passed  by  the  Custodian  or

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      Additional  Custodian was not subject to appeal or  revision        and  was  to  become final  and  conclusive.   However,  the        application in question was not disposed of until March  20,        1952, on which date the Additional Custodian passed an order        confirming the exchange.  Meanwhile the relevant  provisions        of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act  XXXI        of  1950  was passed which, among  other  things,  conferred        revisional  powers  on the Custodian-General by s.  27.   In        exercise  of these revisional powers  the  Custodian-General        after   hearing   the  parties  set  aside  the   order   of        confirmation   and  directed  that  the  matter  should   be        reconsidered  by the Custodian.  The appellant urged  before        this Court that the order of confirmation originally  passed        was not open to revision on the ground that at the date when        she filed the application in 1948 she got a vested right  to        have it deter-        (1)  [1955) 2 S.C.R. 1117,        902        mind  under  s.  5-A  with the  attribute  of  finality  and        conclusiveness  under s. 5-B attaching  such  determination.        Her argument was that the subsequent repeal and  reenactment        of the said provisions cannot affect such a right in view of        s. 6 of the General Clauses  Act and s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of        1950.  This contention was rejected and the revisional order        impugned  by the appellant was confirmed.  It is  true  that        the decision of this court was founded on two grounds.   The        first of these related to the effect of the provisions of s.        6  of the General Clauses Act read in the light of s.  58(3)        of Act XXXI of 1950.  The other ground, however, was one  of        general importance and it is clear that it is on this latter        ground  that  this Court based its decision.   According  to        this  decision then the finality prescribed by s.  5-B  came        into operation after the order in question was made and  not        before.  " Even if there be in law any such right at all  ",        observed  Jagannadhadas  J.,  who  delivered  the  unanimous        opinion  of the Court, " it can in no sense be a  vested  or        accrued  right.  It does not accrue until the  determination        is in fact made when alone the right to finality becomes  an        existing right as in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.  Ltd.        v. Income tax Commissioner (I-).  We are, therefore, of  the        opinion  that the principle of Colonial Sugar  Refining  Co.        Ltd. v. Irving (2) cannot be invoked in support of the  case        of  the  kind we are dealing with ". Having regard  to  this        decision it is impossible to accede to Mr. Bindra’s argument        that the finality of the appellate decision could be invoked        by  the  appellant before the said  appellate  decision  was        actually  recorded.  If no finality could be claimed  at  an        earlier  stage  it  is  clear that  at  the  time  when  the        appellate authority decided the matter the amending  section        had  come  into  force  and when  the  appellate  order  was        actually  passed it could not claim the finality  under  the        earlier  provision.  We may incidentally point out that  the        said principle laid down in the case of Indira Sohanlal  (3)        has  been cited by this Court in Garika_patti Veeraya v.  N.        Subbiah  Choudhury  (4) and it has been  observed  that  the        question  which  was left open by the court on  the  earlier        occasion fell to be considered in the case of        (1)  (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah 284.        (3)  [1955) 2 S.C.R. 1117        (2)  (19O5) A.C. 369        (4)  [19571 S.C.R. 488        903        Garikapatti  Veeraya  (1)  and was in  fact  considered  and        decided.   Mr. Achru Ram, for the respondent, has  suggested        that  the  very passage in the case of Indira  Sohanlal  (2)

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      which  enunciated the principle appears to have  been  cited        with  approval.   However that may be, we are bound  by  the        decision  of this Court in the case of Indira Sohanlal (2  )        and  that decision is clearly against the contention of  the        appellant   that  the  amended  provision  in   respect   of        revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was inapplicable.        That  takes  us  to the other contention  that  the  amended        provision of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) applies.  There is no  doubt        that  if this amended provision applied to the present  case        respondent  I  would not be entitled to obtain an  order  of        ejectment.   It is plain that by the  amendment  Legislature        has  imposed rigorous limitations on a landlord’s  right  to        recover  possession  in the case of any building  or  rented        land.  The question is whether this amendment can be said to        be retrospective in operation.  It is clear that the  amend-        ment made is not in relation to any procedure and cannot  be        characterized as procedural.  It is in regard to a matter of        substantive  law since it affects the substantive rights  of        the  landlord.  It may be conceded that the Act is  intended        to  provide  relief to the tenants and in that  sense  is  a        beneficial  measure  and  as such its  provision  should  be        liberally  construed;  but  this  principle  would  not   be        material  or  even relevant in deciding the question  as  to        whether  the new provision is retrospective or not.   It  is        wellsettled  that where an amendment affects  vested  rights        the  amendment  would  operate prospectively  unless  it  is        expressly made retrospective or its retrospective  operation        follows as a matter of necessary implication.  The  amending        Act   obviously  does  not  make  the   relevant   provision        retrospective  in terms and we see no reason to  accept  the        suggestion that the retrospective operation of the  relevant        provision  can  be  spelt  out  as  a  matter  of  necessary        implication.  We ought to add that Mr. Bindra has not argued        that   the   initial  provision  in  s.   13(1)   which   is        retrospective is        (1) [1957] S.C.R. 448.      (2) [1955] S.C.R. 1117.        I15        904        attracted in interpreting the amended provision in s.  13(3)        (a)  (iii).   Stich a contention would of course  be  wholly        untenable.        There  is another consideration to " which reference may  be        made.     If   the   new   provision   is   held    to    be        retrospective in its operation what would be the consequence        ? Inevitably all pending actions in which landlords may have        applied  for  possession of their buildings let out  to  the        tenants  under  the provisions of s. 13(3) (a) (iii)  as  it        stood before the amendment would automatically fail  because        they  would  not satisfy the tests imposed  by  the  amended        provision.   If  such  a  drastic  consequence  was   really        intended  by  the Legislature it would certainly  have  made        appropriate  provisions  in express terms  in  that  behalf.        Where   the  Legislature  intends  to   rriake   substantive        provisions  of law retrospective in operation  it  generally        makes  its  intention clearly expreress provisions  in  that        behalf.  We are, therefore satisfied that s. 13(3) (a) (iii)        as  amended cannot apply to proceedings which  were  pending        either  before the Controller or the appellate authority  at        the  time when the, amendment was made.  In this  connection        we  ought  to add that when the  revisions  application  was        argued the High Court it was admitted by the appellant  that        it was the old law which was in force before the date of the        amendment that applied to the case.  Even so we have allowed        Mr.  Bindra  to  raise the point before us  but  we  see  no        substance  in  it.  This point has been  considered  by  the

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      Punjab High Court in Ram Parshad Halwai Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar        Chand  (1)  and it appears that the Punjab  High  Court  has        taken the same way about the effect of the amendment made in        s.   13(3) (a) (iii).        There is one more point which remains to be considered.   Mr        Bindra has argued that the High Court was in error in coming        to  its  own conclusion as to whether the  retirement  of  s        13(3)  (a)  (iii) has been satisfied.  As  we  have  already        pointed  out  the finding of the Rent  Controller-  and  the        appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent  I        that lie        (1)  I.L.R, (1958) Punjab 1553        905        required  the shop for the purpose of reconstuction was  not        bona fide.  The High Court has reversed this conclusion  and        Mr.  Bindra challenges the correctness or the  propriety  of        the  said conclusion.  The revisional power  conferred  upon        ’the High Court under s. 15(5) is wider than that  conferred        by s.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Under s. 15(5)  the        High  Court  has  jurisdiction to examine  the  legality  or        -propriety  of  the  order under  revision  and  that  would        clearly  justify  the examination of the  propriety  or  the        legality  of  the  finding made by the  authorities  in  the        present case about the requirement of the landlord under  s.        13(3)(a)  (iii).  The High Court no doubt has  accepted  the        appellant’s  argument that the requirement in question  must        be  bona  fide but it has observed that there was  no  legal        evidence  on  which  it could be said  that  the  landlord’s        requirement  was not bona fide.  Indeed it is  obvious  that        the  tests  applied  both by the  Rent  Controller  and  the        appellate authority in dealing with the question were  based        on the assumption that the amended provision of s.  13(3)(a)        (iii) applied to the present proceedings.  Otherwise it  was        irrelevant  to enquire whether the property in question  had        become  unsafe  or unfit for human habitation as  they  have        done.  All the relevant evidence available on the record  on        this point clearly sustains the view taken by the High Court        that the -case made by the landlord under s. 13(3) (a) (iii)        was bona fide.  Soon after he purchased the house he decided        to reconstruct the building, moved the Municipality with his        plan  and  obtained  its  sanction.   It  is  difficult   to        understand  how  on these facts it would be  permissible  to        hold  that  the landlord is acting mala fide.  That  is  the        view  which the High Court took and we see no  substance  in        the  argument that in ’taking the said view the  High  Court        has acted either irregularly or improperly.        In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.        Appeal dismissed,        906