15 July 2008
Supreme Court
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MOTI LAL Vs STATE OF M.P.

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,P. SATHASIVAM, , ,
Case number: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 4751 of 2006


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.               OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 4751 OF 2006)

Moti Lal …Appellant

Versus

State of M.P. …Respondent

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned

Single  Judge  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  at

Jabalpur  upholding the  conviction of  the appellant  for

offence punishable under Sections 450 and 376(1) of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and sentence

of  five  years  and  seven  years  rigorous  imprisonment

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respectively  and  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-  and  1,000/-

respectively  with  default  stipulation  as  recorded  and

imposed  by the Learned  Special  Judge  Chhattarpur in

Special Case No.33 of 2002.  Appellant (hereinafter also

referred to as an ‘accused’) was charged for commission

of  offences  punishable  under  Sections  450  and 376(1)

IPC and 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes  Prevention of  Atrocities  Act,  1989,  (in short  the

‘Act’).

3. Prosecution  version  as  unfolded  during  trial  was  as

follows:

On 17.1.2002 at 1735 hours prosecutrix lodged report at

police station Khajuraho to that effect that on the said date at

11 O’clock she was in the field of Hannu Gadariya at Bhusaur.

The said field was taken on share basis by her husband, in

which gram and wheat were sown.  As usual, she had gone to

the field for guarding. One hut was situated there, in which

she lives and cooks and eats food at that place.  At the said

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time she  was alone  in the hut.   Her  husband had gone to

village Rajnagar.  Accused Motilal Gadariya who was resident

of same village, came there and enquired from her about her

husband Barelal. She told him that he had gone to Rajnagar,

and he went away. She started sweeping with broom, inside

the hut.  After some time, Motilal forcibly entered her hut and

knocked her down on the floor. He pulled up her saree and

committed sexual intercourse. She kept shouting to break free,

but  there  was  no body.  Then  he  ran away.  Being  knocked

down by Motilal, her bangle on the right hand had broken and

ankle  had  bruised.  When  her  husband  returned  from

Rajnagar, she narrated the incident to him.  Then she and her

husband  went  to  Hannu  Pal  and  informed  him  about  the

incident. Report was lodged and on the basis of aforesaid facts

offences  were  registered  under  Sections  452,  376  IPC  and

Section  3  of  the  Act.  The  said  First  Information  Report  (in

short the ‘FIR’)  was recorded by Sub-Inspector-S.R. Rai (PW

7).

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The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination.  Dr.

Smt.  Rama  Parihar  performed  the  medical  examination  of

which the medical examination report is Ex.P.10.  The then

Sub-Divisional  Officer,  Police-S.S.  Chahal  (PW 11)  prepared

spot  map  Exb.P7  of  the  place  of  incident  during  the

investigation and from the place of incident, pieces of broken

bangles found were seized vide seizure Panchnama - Exb. P.5.

On  18.01.2002  the  statements  of  prosecutrix  her  husband

Parelal,  Habbu  and  Manua  were  recorded.   On  19.1.2002,

accused  was  arrested  vide  arrest  Panchnama –Exb.P.8  and

one of his used underwear which was bearing some stains was

seized vide Seizure Panchnama –Exb.P.6.  Accused was sent

for medical examination regarding his capability of performing

intercourse.   The  examination  report  is  Exb.P.11.   After

completion of investigation, chargesheet was produced before

Chief judicial Magistrate, Chhatarpur.  On 18.2.2002 the case

has  been  committed  from  the  said  court  to  the  Court  of

Sessions.   

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Considering  the  evidence  more  particularly  of  the

prosecutrix  conviction was  recorded.   Accused  preferred  an

appeal before the High Court.

  

The High Court on considering the evidence given by the

prosecution came to hold that the accused was guilty of the

offences  punishable  under  Sections  376  and  450  IPC.  The

appeal was accordingly dismissed.

4. In  support  of  the  appeal,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant submitted that the prosecution version has not been

established.  The  uncorroborated  version  of  the  prosecutrix

should not have been relied upon by the trial court and the

High  Court.  It  was  also  submitted  that  the  punishment  is

harsh.

5. Learned  counsel  for  the  State  on  the  other  hand

supported the judgments of the trial court and the High Court.

 

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6. In the Indian Setting refusal to act on the testimony of

the victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as

a rule,  is adding insult to injury.  A girl  or a woman in the

tradition  bound  non-permissive  society  of  India  would  be

extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is

likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would

be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society

and when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to

light,  there  is  inbuilt  assurance  that  the  charge  is  genuine

rather than fabricated. Just as a witness who has sustained

an injury, which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted, is

the  best  witness  in  the  sense  that  he  is  least  likely  to

exculpate  the  real  offender,  the  evidence  of  a  victim of  sex

offence  is  entitled  to great  weight,  absence  of  corroboration

notwithstanding.  A woman or a girl  who is  raped is not an

accomplice.  Corroboration  is  not  the  sine  qua  non  for

conviction in a rape case. The observations of Vivian Bose, J.

in  Rameshwar v.  The  State  of  Rajasthan (AIR  1952 SC 54)

were:  

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“The rule,  which according to the cases has  hardened  into  one  of  law,  is  not  that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction  but  that  the  necessity  of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where  the  circumstances  make  it  safe  to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge...”.

7. It is settled law that the victim of sexual assault is not

treated  as  accomplice  and  as  such,  her  evidence  does  not

require  corroboration from any other evidence including the

evidence of a doctor. In a given case even if the doctor who

examined the victim does not find sign of rape, it is no ground

to disbelieve the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In normal

course a victim of sexual assault does not like to disclose such

offence  even  before  her  family  members  much  less  before

public or before the police. The Indian women has tendency to

conceal such offence because it involves her prestige as well

as prestige of her family. Only in few cases, the victim girl or

the family members has courage to go before the police station

and lodge a case. In the instant case the suggestion given on

behalf of the defence that the victim has falsely implicated the

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accused does not appeal to reasoning. There was no apparent

reason for a married woman to falsely implicate the accused

after scatting her own prestige and honour.  

8. Of  late,  crime  against  women  in  general  and  rape  in

particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are

celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no

concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of

indifference  of  the  society  towards  the  violation  of  human

dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a

rapist  not  only  violates  the  victim's  privacy  and  personal

integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well

as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical

assault -- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the

victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a

rapist  degrades  the  very  soul  of  the  helpless  female.  The

Court, therefore, shoulders a great responsibility while trying

an accused  on  charges  of  rape.  They  must  deal  with such

cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the

broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor

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contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement

of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out

an  otherwise  reliable  prosecution  case.  If  evidence  of  the

prosecutrix  inspires  confidence,  it  must  be  relied  upon

without  seeking  corroboration  of  her  statement  in  material

particulars. If  for some reason the Court finds it difficult  to

place  implicit  reliance  on  her  testimony,  it  may  look  for

evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of

corroboration  required  in  the  case  of  an  accomplice.  The

testimony  of  the  prosecutrix  must  be  appreciated  in  the

background  of  the  entire  case  and the  trial  Court  must  be

alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with

cases  involving  sexual  molestations.   This  position  was

highlighted in State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh (1996 (2) SCC

384).   

9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with

an  accomplice.  She  is  in  fact  a  victim  of  the  crime.  The

Evidence  Act  nowhere  says  that  her  evidence  cannot  be

accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She

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is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and

her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to

an injured in cases of physical violence.  The same degree of

care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence

as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no

more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious

of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who

is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If

the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act

on the evidence of the prosecutrix.  There is no rule of law or

practice  incorporated  in  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  (in

short ‘Evidence Act’) similar to illustration (b) to Section 114

which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason

the  Court  is  hesitant  to  place  implicit  reliance  on  the

testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which

may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration

required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence

required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix

must necessarily  depend on the facts and circumstances  of

each  case.  But  if  a  prosecutrix  is  an  adult  and  of  full

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understanding the Court is  entitled to base a conviction on

her  evidence  unless  the  same  is  own to  be  infirm and not

trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on

the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not

have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the

Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her

evidence.  This  position  was  highlighted  in  State  of

Maharashtra v.  Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990 (1)

SCC 550).   

10. It  needs no emphasis that the physical scar on a rape

victim may heal up, but the mental scar will always remain.

When a  woman is  ravished,  what  is  inflicted  is  not  merely

physical injury but the deep sense of some deathless shame.

An  accused  cannot  cling  to  a  fossil  formula  and  insist  on

corroborative  evidence,  even  if  taken  as  a  whole,  the  case

spoken to by the victim strikes a judicial mind as probable.

Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by legal

jugglery.

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11. The  measure  of  punishment  in  a  case  of  rape  cannot

depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It

must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and

age of  the  sexually  assaulted  female  and the  gravity  of  the

criminal  act.  Crimes  of  violence  upon  women  need  to  be

severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race,

caste  or  creed  of  the  accused  or  the  victim  are  irrelevant

considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and

deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is

required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence.

The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all  relevant

facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence

and  proceed  to  impose  a  sentence  commensurate  with  the

gravity  of  the  offence.  Courts  must  hear  the  loud  cry  for

justice by the society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on

innocent helpless  girls of  tender years,  married women and

respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence

of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate

sentence by the Court. There are no extenuating or mitigating

circumstances  available  on  the  record  which  may  justify

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imposition of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum.

To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a

travesty  of  justice  and  the  plea  for  leniency  is  wholly

misplaced.  

12. The evidence on record is analysed on the basis of the

principles set out above. The inevitable conclusion is that the

accused has been rightly convicted and sentenced.  Impugned

judgment does not warrant any interference.

13. The appeal stands dismissed.

………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, July 15, 2008

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