REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    782 OF 2007

Monica Bedi  …Appellant

Versus

State of A.P. …Respondent WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    784 OF 2007

Shaik Abdul Sattar  …Appellant

Versus

State of A.P. …Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   783 OF 2007

D. Gokari Saheb  …Appellant Versus

State of A.P. …Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1357 OF 2007

Mohd. Yunis  …Appellant Versus

State of A.P. …Respondent

JUDGMENT

B. Sudershan Reddy, J :

1. These criminal appeals which are to be disposed of by a  

common order are directed against the common judgment of  

the High Court  whereunder the High Court confirmed the  

conviction  of the appellants under Section 120-B, 419 and  

420 IPC and other  provisions  including under Section 13  

(1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  

We shall later notice in detail the conviction and sentence as  

awarded by the courts below.  

2. The Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, Hyderabad,  

laid  charge  sheet  against  altogether  10  accused  persons  

before  the  Special  Judge  for  C.B.I.  cases,   Hyderabad  in  

which Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari @ Abu Salem(A-1),  

Sameera Jumani w/o  Abu Salem(A-2), Monica Bedi (A-3),  

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Chamundi  Abdul  Hameed (A-6)  and Faizan Ahmed Sultan  

(A-10)  were  shown  as  absconders.  The  learned  Special  

Judge took the charge sheet on file as C.C. No. 3 of 2005  

and issued non-bailable warrants against A-1, A-2, A-3, A-6  

and A-10. Case against A-1, A-2, A-6 and A-10 came to be  

separated and case proceeded against A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-

8 and A-9.

3. The  learned Special  Judge upon consideration  of  the  

material  made  available  framed  the  following  charges  

against the accused persons:  

i) for the offence under Section 120-B IPC against A-3 to  

A-5, A-7 to A-9;  

ii) for the offence under Section 419 IPC against A-3;  

iii) for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC against  

A-4, A-5 and A-7 to A-9;  

iv) for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-5;  

v) for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-8;  

vi) for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-7;  

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vii) for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of  

the Prevention of Corruption Act against A-4, A-5, A-7  

and A-8;  

viii) for the offence under Section 12 of the Passports Act,  

1967 against A-3;  

ix) for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-3;  

x) for the offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC against  

A-4, A-5, A-7 to A-9.  

4. The prosecution in  order  to substantiate  the charges  

examined  altogether  38  witnesses  and  proved  79  

documents.  Exhibit  D-1  to  Exhibit  D-4  were  marked  on  

behalf of the defence.  

5. The  learned  trial  judge  upon  appreciation  of  the  

evidence and material available on record found Monika Bedi  

(A-3 ) guilty of the offences  punishable under Sections 120-

B,  419  and  420  IPC  but  acquitted  of  the  charge  under  

Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967; Shaik Abdul Sattar  

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(A-5) guilty of the offences under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w  

109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC and Sections 13(1) (d) r/w 13  

(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; Mohammed Yunis  

(A-7) guilty  of  the offence under Section 468 IPC and D.  

Gokari  Saheb  (A-8)  guilty  of  the  offences  under  Section  

120B, 420, 419 r/w 109 IPC, 420 r/w 109 IPC and under  

Sections  13  (1)  (d)  r/w  13  (2)  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption  Act.  A-3  was  accordingly  sentenced  to  suffer  

rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of  

Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment  for one  

month  for  the  offence  under  Section  120-B IPC;  rigorous  

imprisonment  for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-  

in default,  to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for  

the offence under Section 420 IPC; rigorous imprisonment  

for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to  

suffer  simple  imprisonment  for  one  month  and  for  the  

offence  under  Section  419  IPC;  A-5  to  suffer  rigorous  

imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-,  

in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for  

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the offence under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment  

for three years and  to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to  

suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence  

under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for  

three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-,  in default,  to  

suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence  

under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for  

three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-,  in default,  to  

suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence  

under Section 468 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for one  

year and to pay a fine of  Rs.  500/-,  in default,  to suffer  

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under  

Sections  13  (1)  (d)  r/w  13  (2)  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption Act. A-7 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three  

years and to pay a  fine  of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer  

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under  

Section 468 IPC; A-8  to suffer rigorous imprisonment for  

three  years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to  

suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence  

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under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment  for three  

years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer  

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under  

Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three  

years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer  

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under  

Section 420 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three  

years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer  

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under  

Section 420 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year and  

to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.  500/-,  in  default,  to  suffer  simple  

imprisonment for one month for the offence under Sections  

13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. All  

the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.  

6. On appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upon re-

appreciation of evidence available on record confirmed the  

conviction of A-3 for the offences  punishable under Sections  

120-B,  419  and  420  IPC  but  reduced  the  sentence  from  

three years  rigorous imprisonment  to two years rigorous  

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imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 120B  

IPC, from five years rigorous imprisonment  to three years  

rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  offence  punishable  under  

Section  420  IPC  and   from  three  years  rigorous  

imprisonment  to  two years  rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  

offence punishable under Section 419 IPC while maintaining  

the fine imposed by the trial  court.   The High Court  also  

confirmed  the  conviction  of  A-5  under  each  count  but  

reduced the quantum of imprisonment from three years to  

one year for offences under each count under Sections 120-

B,  419  r/w  109,  420  r/w  109,  468  IPC.   However,  his  

conviction and sentence imposed for the offences punishable  

under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention  

of  Corruption  Act  was  confirmed.  That  so  far  as   A-7  is  

concerned the High Court while partly allowing the appeal  

modified the conviction from Section 468 IPC to that of one  

under Section 465 IPC and accordingly  sentenced to suffer  

rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of  

Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three  

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months.   That so far as A-8 is  concerned the High Court  

confirmed his conviction under all counts but reduced  the  

quantum of  imprisonment from three years to one year for  

offences under  each count under Section 120-B, 420, 419  

r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC.  However, his conviction and  

sentence imposed for the offences punishable under Section  

13(1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was  

confirmed.   Hence, these appeals.  

Case of Prosecution:

7. In  order  to  consider  as  to  whether  the  High  Court  

committed  any  error  in  convicting  and  sentencing   the  

appellants  as  noted  herein  above,  it  may  be  just  and  

necessary to briefly notice the case of the prosecution.  The  

allegation  against  Accused  No.  3  (appellant  in  Criminal  

Appeal  No.  782/2007)  is  that  she  obtained  a  second  

passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal from the  

Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad by submitting false  

documents like residence certificate, educational certificate  

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with the help of A-4 to A-9.  She used the passport to travel  

Lisbon,  Portugal.   The  owner  of  M/s.  Faizan  Enterprises,  

Mumbai  (A-10)  is  involved  in  the  business  of  recruiting  

people for jobs in foreign countries.  He gave 10 passport  

size  photographs  of  A-1  to  A-3  and  fake  names  and  

documents to A-9 to secure passports falsely showing them  

as residents of Kurnool in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  A-9  

has relatives in Kurnool.  He visited Kurnool in the month of  

March, 2001 and entrusted the work of securing passports of  

A-1 to A-3, to A-6 an unauthorized passport agent.  At the  

instance  of  A-6,  A-7  Mohammed  Yunis,  Mandal  Revenue  

Inspector of Mandal Revenue Office, Kurnool issued a false  

residential  certificates in the assumed names intended for  

the  benefit  of  A-1  to  A-3.  A-6  procured  fake  transfer  

certificates  purported  to  have  been  issued  by  the  

Headmaster, Zila Parishad High Court, Peddapadu, Kurnool  

District  in  the  name  of  Ramil  Kamil  Malik  and  two  fake  

memorandum of marks sheets in the names of  Neha Asif  

Jafari and Sana Malik, purported to have been issued by the  

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Headmaster, Higher Elementary School, Kurnool, as a proof  

in support of date of birth.  One Abdul Gaffar (PW-1) filled  

up three passport applications of A-1 to A-3 at the instance  

of A-6 and they were accordingly submitted in the Regional  

Passport Office, Secunderabad.  The authorities accordingly  

sent the particulars mentioned in the forms to the  office of  

Superintendent of Police, Kurnool which were received in the  

office on 16.5.2001 vide exhibit P-28 covering letter.  A-5  

(appellant  in Criminal  Appeal  No.  784/07) at the relevant  

time  was  working  as  Writer-Head  Constable  in  special  

branch.  He submitted fake verification reports along with  

statements  of  six  persons  in  support  of  character  and  

conduct of A-1 to A-3 by portraying them as if they were the  

neighbours  of  A-1  to  A-3.  On  receipt  of  reports,  A-4  

despatched them to Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad.  

It  is  on  the  basis  of  these  reports,  passports  were  

accordingly issued to A-1 to A-3 in their assumed names and  

they  were  despatched  by  speed  post  to  their  respective  

address  at  Kurnool   as  indicated  in  the  passport  

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applications.  The passports were received at the Head Post  

Office, Kurnool through speed post. On 23.8.2001 two speed  

post articles addressed to the assumed names of A-2 and A-

3 were entrusted to PW-11 Babu Miah, a postman of Beat 2,  

for delivery of the same to the addressees.  A-8 (D. Gokari  

Saheb appellant in criminal appeal no.  783/07) Postman,  

Head  Post  Office,  Kurnool,  approached  PW-11  Babu  Miah  

and  collected  the  two  speed  post  articles  by  giving  his  

acknowledgement  on  the  delivery  slip  list  falsely  

representing  that  he  knew  the  addresses  and  he  would  

personally deliver the articles.  On 27.8.2001 another speed  

post article containing passport in the assumed name of A-1  

was entrusted to A-8 for delivery who in turn delivered it to  

one Aslam Khan, Cashier of Hotel Elite, Kurnool where A-6  

was also working.  A-6 sent two covers to A-9 on 23.8.2001  

and 27.8.2001 in courier service.  

8. We  shall  notice  further  details  only  so  far  as  the  

appellants before us are concerned.   Exhibit P1 is the index  

card  of  Sana  Malik  Kamal.  (  assumed  name  for  Monika  

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Bedi).  PW-1  is  the  author  of  exhibit  P1.   PW-1  filled  up  

exhibit P1 at the request of C.A. Hameed (A-6). PW-4 is the  

Superintendent  in  the  Regional  Passport  Office,  

Secunderabad.  He speaks of issuance of the passports in  

pursuance  of   passport  application  in  the  name  of  Sana  

Malik.  PW-5  P.  Krishna  Mohan  Reddy  was  the  Mandal  

Revenue  Officer,  Kurnool  Mandal  who  issued   residence  

certificate dated 9.4.2001 in the name of Sana Malik Kamal  

based  on  false  verification  reports  submitted  by  A-7  

Mohammad  Yunis.   That  as   per  exhibit  P9  residence  

certificate,  Sana  Malik  Kamal  (assumed  name  of  Monica  

Bedi)  is  stated  to  be  residing   at  Babu  Gounda  Street,  

Kurnool. PW-6 at the relevant time was working as Deputy  

Educational  Officer,   Nandyal,  Kurnool  District  who stated  

that  there  was  no  school  by  name  of  Hanuman  Higher  

Elementary School, Kurnool wherein Sana Malik Kamal  was  

alleged to have studied. PW-7 M. Lakshminarayana  at the  

relevant time was the Junior Assistant in the District Police  

Office, Kurnool and he speaks of receiving applications for  

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verification of contents therein.  According to him, A-4 ( G.  

Srinivas) who attended to passport  inquiries,  received the  

passport application of Sana Malik Kamal.  After receipt of  

exhibit P15 enquiry report along with exhibits P16 and P17  

statements submitted by A-5 S.A. Sattar, A-4 prepared the  

relevant  report  and  forwarded  the  same  to  the  Regional  

Passport  Office,  Secunderabad.   Exhibit  P18  is  the  letter  

addressed by the Superintendent of Police to the Regional  

Passport Office, Secunderabad reporting no objection for the  

grant of passport to the applicant. Rest of evidence relates  

to handing over of speed post articles relating to Babu Miah  

as  per  the  instructions  of  the  Head  Post  Master,  Kurnool  

from whom A-8 Gokari Saheb took the speed post articles  

from him for being delivered to the addressees.  PW-13 is  

the owner of the residential apartment wherein  Monica Bedi  

(A-3)  is alleged to have resided as tenant during the years  

1995-1997.  Rest  of  the  details  are  not  required  to  be  

noticed.  

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9. The learned Special judge for C.B.I. on a careful and  

meticulous appreciation of the evidence and material made  

available on record convicted the appellants as noted herein  

above.  The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence  

confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence as noted  

herein above.  

Submissions:

10. Now  we  shall  proceed  to  consider  the  submissions  

made  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  Shri  K.T.S.  Tulsi  

appearing on behalf of the appellant -  Monica Bedi (A-3).  

The learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant has  

been tried and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction  

at  Lisbon  for  being  in  possession  of  fake  passport  and,  

therefore, her trial and conviction for possessing the same  

passport before the C.B.I. Court at Hyderabad amounts to  

double  jeopardy  and  in  violation  of  Article  20(2)  of  the  

Constitution of India and as well under Section 300 Cr.P.C.  

The learned senior counsel further submitted that there is no  

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evidence  of  appellant’s  involvement  in  any  of  offence  

whatsoever.  His further submission was that the appellant  

has been denied the benefit of Section 428 of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure,  in  as  much  as  she  has  neither  been  

given the benefit of the period of sentence undergone by her  

in  Portugal  nor  has  she  been  given  the  benefit  of  the  

complete period pursuant to sentence in Portugal i.e. after  

18th September, 2004, which she is legally entitled to.  

11. We have also heard the learned counsel  appearing on  

behalf of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5), Mohd. Yunis (A-7) and D.  

Gokari Saheb (A-8).

12. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General  

and  Shri  I.  Venkata  Narayana,  learned  senior  counsel  

supported  the  impugned  judgment.  Both  of  them  have  

submitted that Article 20 (2) has no application whatsoever  

to the facts on hand.  

Double Jeopardy

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13. Now we shall take up the first contention of Shri Tulsi  

as to whether the appellant’s guaranteed fundamental right  

under Article 20 (2) has been infringed?  Article 20 (2) of  

the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted  

and punished for the same offence more than once.  

14. Article 20 (2) embodies a protection against a second  

trial and conviction for the same offence. The fundamental  

right guaranteed is the manifestation of a long struggle by  

the mankind for human rights. A similar guarantee is to be  

found in  almost  all  civilised  societies  governed by rule  of  

law.  The  well  known  maxim  ‘nemo  delset  bis  vexari  pro  

eadem causa’  embodies the  well  established common law  

rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same  

offence.  BLACKSTONE referred to this universal maxim of  

the common law of England that no man is to be brought  

into  jeopardy  of  his  life  more  than  once  for  the  same  

offence.  

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15. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2)  

has its roots in common law maxim  nemo debet bis vexari -  

a man  shall not be  brought into danger for  one and the  

same offence more than once.  If a person is charged again  

for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence,  

his former  conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take  

the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common  

law principle.  The corresponding provision in the American  

Constitution is enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment  

which declares that no person shall be subject for the same  

offence  to  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb.   The  

principle has been recognised in the existing law in India and  

is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897  

and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.  This  

was the inspiration and background for incorporating sub-

clause (2)  into Article 20 of the Constitution.  But the ambit  

and content of the guaranteed fundamental right are much  

narrower than those of the common law in England or the  

doctrine of ‘double jeopardy’ in the American Constitution.  

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16. In Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay1,  this  

Court  explained  the  scope  of  the  right  guaranteed  under  

Article 20 (2) and as to  what is incorporated  in it as “within  

its  scope  the  plea  of  autrefois  convict  as  known to   the  

British  jurisprudence or  the  plea  of  double  jeopardy as it  

known  to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by  

providing that there should be not only a prosecution but  

also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as  

a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same  

offence.”   That in order  for the protection of Article 20 (2)  

to  be  invoked  by  a  person  there  must  have  been  a  

prosecution  and  as  well  as  punishment  in  respect  of  the  

same offence before a court of law of competent jurisdiction  

or  a  tribunal,  required  by  law  to  decide  the  matters  in  

controversy  judicially  on  evidence.  That  the  proceedings  

contemplated  therein  are  in  the  nature  of  criminal  

proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and  

the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or  

1 (1953) SCR 730

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starting  of  the  proceedings  of  a  criminal  nature  in  

accordance  with  the  procedure  prescribed  in  the  statute  

which creates the offence and regulates the procedure.  This  

principle  is  reiterated  in  S.A.  Venkataraman vs.  The  

Union of India & Anr.,2 wherein this Court observed that  

the  words  “prosecuted  or  punished”  are  not  to  be  taken  

distributively  so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both  

the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the  

clause may be attracted.”

17. What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20  

(2) “for the same offence”?  What is prohibited under Article  

20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for  

the same offence.  If the offences are distinct, there is no  

question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable.  

In  Leo  Roy  Frey  vs. Superintendent  District  Jail,  

Amritsar3, petitioners  therein  were  found  guilty  under  

Section  167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and the  goods  

recovered from their possession were confiscated and heavy  

2 (1954) SCR 1150 3(1958) SCR 822

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personal  penalties  imposed  on  them  by  the  authority.  

Complaints thereafter were lodged by the authorities before  

the Additional District Magistrate under Section 120B of the  

Indian  Penal  Code  read  with  provisions  of  the  Foreign  

Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 and the Sea Customs Act.  

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court for quashing  

of  the  proceedings  pending  against  them in  the  court  of  

Magistrate  inter  alia  contending  that  in  view  of  the  

provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution they could not  

be prosecuted and punished twice over for the same offence  

and the proceedings pending before the Magistrate violated  

the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) of the  Constitution.  

This Court rejected the contention and held  that criminal  

conspiracy is  an offence under Section 120B  of the Indian  

Penal Code but not so under the Sea Customs Act, and the  

petitioners were not and could not be charged with it before  

the Collector of Customs.  It is an offence separate from the  

crime which it may have for its object and is complete even  

before the crime is attempted or completed, and even when  

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attempted  or  completed;  it  forms  no  ingredients  of  such  

crime.  They  are,  therefore,  quite  separate  offences.   The  

Court  relied on the view expressed by the United States,  

Supreme Court in United States vs. Rabinowith4.  In The  

State of Bombay  vs. S.L. Apte5, this Court laid down the  

law  stating  that  if  the  offences  were  distinct  there  is  no  

question of the rule as to double jeopardy as embodied in  

Article 20 (2) of the Constitution being applicable. It was the  

case where the accused were sought to be  punished  for the  

offence under Section 105,  Insurance Act, after their trial  

and  conviction  for  the  offence  under  Section  409,   Penal  

Code,   this  Court  held  that  they  were  not  sought  to  be  

punished  for  the  same  offence  twice  but  for  two  distinct  

offences constituted or made up of different ingredients and  

therefore  the bar  of  Article  20  (2)  of  the  Constitution  or  

Section  26  of  the  General  Clause  Act,  1897,  was  not  

applicable.  This Court made it clear that the emphasis is not  

on the facts “alleged in the two complaints but rather on the  

4 (1915) 238US 78. 5 (1961) 3 SCR 107  

22

ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a  

person is charged.”  The ratio of the case is apparent from  

the following:  

“To operate as a bar the second  prosecution  and the consequential  punishment thereunder,  must  be  for  ‘the  same  offence’.   The  crucial  requirement therefore for attracting the Article  is  that  the  offences  are  the  same,  i.e.,  they  should  be  identical.  If,  however,  the  two  offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that  the  allegations  of  fact  in  the  two  complaints  might be substantially  similar,  the  benefit  of  the  ban  cannot  be  invoked.   It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  analyse  and  compare  not  the  allegations  in  the  two  complaints  but  the  ingredients of the two offences and see whether  their identity is made out.”

That the test to ascertain is whether two offences are the  

same and not the identity of the allegations but the identity  

of the ingredients of the offences.

It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to  

different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event  

the protection afforded by Article 20 (2)  is not available.  It  

is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished  

more than once even on substantially same facts provided  

the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and  

23

they did not form the same offence.  In Bhagwan Swarup  

vs. State of Maharashtra6, the accused was convicted with  

regard to a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in  

respect  of  the funds of  one Jupiter  company.  There was  

another prosecution against the accused for the conspiracy  

to lift the funds of another company, though its object was  

to  cover  the  fraud  committed  in  respect  of  the  Jupiter  

company.  This Court held that the defalcations made in the  

Jupiter may afford a motive for new conspiracy, but the two  

offences are distinct ones.  Some accused may be common  

to both of them, “some of the facts proved to establish the  

Jupitor conspiracy may also have to be proved to support  

the  motive  for  the  second  conspiracy.    The  question  is  

whether that in itself would be sufficient to make the two  

conspiracies the one and the same offence.  The ingredients  

of both the offences are totally different and do not form the  

same offence within   the meaning of Article 20 (2) of the  

Constitution and, therefore, that Article has no relevance.”

6 AIR 1965 SC 682

24

18. In State of Rajasthan  vs.   Hat Singh & Ors.7, this  

Court held that the Rajasthan Sati  (Prevention) Act, 1987  

provided  for  different  offences  and  punishment  for  

glorification  of  sati  and  for  violation  of  prohibitory  order  

against glorification of sati. They are not the same offences.  

While Section 5 of the said Act makes the commission  of an  

act  an  offence  and  punishes  the  same;  the  provisions  of  

Section 6 are preventive in nature and make provision for  

punishing contravention of prohibitory order so as to make  

the prevention effective.   The two offences have different  

ingredients.  This Court held:  

“It is, therefore, concluded that in a given case,  same set of facts may give rise to an offence  punishable under Section 5 and Section 6 (3)  both.   There  is  nothing  unconstitutional  or  illegal about it.”

19. This appears to be the consistent view of the Supreme  

Court of the United States. In T.W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J.  

Devine @ Ollie Devine8,  the U.S. Supreme Court observed  

that   the  court  has  settled  that  the  test  of  identity  of  

7 (2003) 2 SCC 152 8 (1915) 237 U.S. 1153

25

offences is whether the same evidence is required to sustain  

them; if not, then the fact that both charges relate to and  

grow out of  one transaction does not make a single offence  

where two are defined by the statutes.

20. In United States vs. Vito Lanza9, it is held that an act  

with respect to intoxicating liquor which is denounced as a  

crime by both the National and State sovereignties may be  

punished  under  the  law  of  each  sovereignty  without  

infringing the provision of the 5th Amendment to the Federal  

Constitution against double jeopardy for the same offence. It  

is observed:

“An act denounced as a crime by both National  and  State sovereignties is an offence against  the  peace  and  dignity  of  both,  and  may be  punished  by  each  …..   We  have  here  two  sovereignties,  deriving  power  from  different  sources,  capable  of  dealing  with  the  same  subject matter within the same territory.  Each  may, without interference by the other, enact  laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation  that  no  legislation  can  give  validity  to  acts  prohibited  by  the  Amendment.  Each  government, in determining what shall be an  offence  against  its  peace  and  dignity,  is  

9(1922)  260 U.S. 314

26

exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the  other.”  

21.  Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned  senior counsel in the present  

case before us mainly contended that the facts  based on  

which  the  appellant  (Monica  Bedi)  was  prosecuted  and  

punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and  

the  facts  based  on  which  prosecution  has  been  initiated  

resulting  in  conviction  are  the  same  and,  therefore,  the  

conviction of the appellant is in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of  

the Constitution and Section 300 of the  Code of Criminal  

Procedure.   The  submission  is  not  well  founded  for  the  

simple  reason  that  the  same  set  off  facts  can  constitute  

offences under two different laws.  An act or an omission  

can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at  

the same time constitute an offence under any other law.  It  

needs no restatement that the bar to the punishment to the  

offender twice over for the same offence  would arise only  

where the ingredients of both the offences are the same.    

27

22. The question that falls for our consideration is, whether  

the appellant can be said to have satisfied all the conditions  

that are necessary to enable her to claim the protection of  

Article 20 (2) of the Constitution.  The charges upon which  

the appellant has been convicted now, for the charges under  

the  Indian  Penal  Code,  we  will  presume  for  our  present  

purpose that the allegations upon which these charges are  

based, proved, resulting in conviction and punishment of the  

appellant  are  substantially  the  same  which  formed  the  

subject matter of prosecution and conviction under the penal  

provisions of Portugal law. But we have no doubt to hold  

that the punishment  of  the appellant  is  not  for  the same  

offence.  

23. Be that as it may, there is no factual foundation laid as  

such by the appellant taking this plea before the trial court.  

Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to any of  

the  witnesses  that  she  is  sought  to  be  prosecuted  and  

punished  for  the  same  offence  for  which  she  has  been  

28

charged and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction  

at Lisbon.  She did not even make any such statement in her  

examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  It is true that the  

fundamental  right  guaranteed  under  Article  20 (2)  of  the  

Constitution  is  in  the  nature  of  an  injunction  against  the  

State prohibiting it to prosecute and punish any person for  

the same offence more than ones but the initial burden is  

upon the accused to take the necessary plea and establish  

the same.   

24. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume-IX,  

the  law  is  succinctly  summarised  on  this  aspect  of  the  

matter as:

“If  the  defendant  pleads   autrefois  convict  or  autrefois  acquit, the  prosecution  replies  or  demurs. If the prosecution replies, which is the  usual course, a jury is sworn to try the issue(x).  The onus of proving the plea is on the defendant  (a).  He  may  prove  it  by  producing  a  certified  copy of the record or proceedings of the alleged  previous conviction or acquittal (b), and showing  by  such copy or by other evidence, if necessary,  that he has been convicted or acquitted of the  same, or practically the same, offence as that on  which  he  has  been  arraigned  (c),  or  that  he  

29

might on his former trial have been convicted of  the offence on which he has been arraigned (d).  The question for the jury on the issue is whether  the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in  respect of the charge on which he is arraigned  (e), for the rule of law is that a person must not  be put in peril twice for the same offence.  The  test  is  whether  the  former  offence  and  the  offence now charged have the same ingredients  in the sense that the facts constituting the one  are sufficient to justify a  conviction of the other,  not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the  same in the two trials (f). “

25. However,  having  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  

guaranteed right we have examined the judgment passed by  

a Constitutional Court, Lisbon ( a typed copy of the same  

made  available  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellant – Monica Bedi which we believe to be a true copy)  

does  not  support  the  plea  of  the  appellant.   The  

Constitutional  Court  while  considering  the  issue  of  

extradition  of  the  appellant  and  the  nature  of  the  trial  

undergone by her in Portugal observed:

[ * ]

“It is a fact that the appellant has been trialled  in Portugal for committing an offence provided  and punishable under article 256 of the penal  

30

code.  However,  should  any  facts  be  found in  that process and in that trial that would release  her of any guilt regarding offences based upon  which she is  wanted by the requesting state,  then  it  is  not  acceptable  by  means  of  a  restrictive  and  formal  interpretation  of  a  principle  which  is  deemed  to  assume  wider  configurations to authorize  her extradition to  trial her for facts strongly linked and which may  even coincide with those same offences.

In  other  words,  it  is  not  acceptable  and  it   cannot be admitted that the appellant has been  trialled  and  convicted  in  Portugal  for  the  commission  of  the  offence  of  use  of  forged  documents,  namely  in  a  decision  which  revealed in the analysis of the facts regarding  the  attainment  of  such  documents  (allegedly  subsumed by India in the offences of corruption  and  association)  that  the  appellant  was  not  involved in those fact.  Furthermore,  it  cannot  be admitted that her extradition is authorized in  order to trial her for committing such act.

Extradition  process  which  brings  in  contact  a  variety of legal systems and different forms of  legal  classification  and  of  behaviour  punishments,  but  which does not  allow going  deeper in those laws, as well as in the evidence  based upon which the requests for extradition  were made requires  a wider  interoperation of  the principle of ne bis idem.”

It is further observed:

31

“The  Indian  Union  claims  extradition  of  the  appellants to trial her for the commission of an  offence of criminal conspiracy. We consider that  this offence has no correspondence in our legal  and penal system and that it is not the object  of an autonomous incrimination. As a matter of  fact,  it  constitutes  a  from  that  could  be  classified as joint authorship;

…As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  consider  that  such  arguments  have  no  legal  basis.  Because  the  requesting  state  wants  at  any  cost  the  appellants  extradition,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  justifying  its  request  by  stating  that  criminal  conspiracy as opposed to what the person to be  extradited  claims  constitutes  an  autonomous  incrimination.

However, careful analysis of the original version  of  article  120  B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (included in the records, but attached herewith  as  documents  no.  1  and  which  is  incorrectly  translated  into  Portuguese)  allows  one  to  conclude,  with  safety,  that  the  type  of  conspiracy  described  therein  as  being  the  conduct  of  someone who commits  an offence  associated with someone else (complicit), is not  coincident  with  the  incorporation  of  a  stable  organization,  hierarchically  defined and whose  object is the commission of offences.

…Given  that  our  judiciary  authorities  are  convinced that the question under consideration  is  the  charge  against  the  appellant  regarding  offence  subsumable  under  an  offences  of  criminal association which does not correspond  to the Indian charges.

32

…it  is  not  up  to  the  constitutional  court  to  interpret  and  set  out  the  meaning  of  any  provisions contained in the Indian Penal Code  and  establish  on  a  final  basis  the  scope  of  criminal  conspiracy,  given  that  this  would  transcend  the  object  of  constitutional  rules  control.

Taking into consideration the reasons stated in  the appealed decision,  one cannot  accept  the  argument  that  the  appealed  courts  interpretation of article 31, no. 2 of law 144/99  of 31st August was in the sense that the judge  is  not  obliged to  substantiate  and explain  (in  the decision to extradite someone claimed for  the  commission  of  offences  which  do  no  fall  within the range of offences provided under our  legal  system)  the  reasons  why  the  offence  should  be  appealed  decision,  the  appellant   could  not  have  raised  this  unconstitutionality   based on the different of legal qualification of  the offences that the was charged with by both  legal  systems in  concurrence.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  question  under  consideration  is  the  charge with different offences, one should note  that, besides the fact that this statement does  not  faithfully  reproduce  what  is  said  in  the  summary  decision,  the  two  subsequent  paragraphs demonstrate that the real problem  does  not  involve  the  facts  but  rather  the  different legal classification thereof.”

[* There are number of typographical errors and mistakes in  construction of sentences and we did not correct the same  and extracted as it is from the copy supplied.]

33

26. In the light of these findings and conclusions reached  

by  the  Constitutional  Court  at  Lisbon  and  on  a  careful  

consideration  of  the  entire  matter  and  the  facts  placed  

before  us,  we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  the  

appellant’s plea of double jeopardy is wholly untenable and  

unsustainable.   This point is accordingly answered against  

the appellant.  

Merits:

27. Now we shall  proceed to consider  as to whether the  

courts  below  committed  any  error  in  convicting  and  

sentencing the appellant for the charged offences? Is there  

no  evidence  against  the  appellant  as  contended  by  the  

learned senior counsel?  It is fairly settled that this Court in  

exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  normally  does not  interfere  with the  

concurrent findings of facts arrived at  by the courts below  

on proper appreciation of evidence.  It is not the function of  

this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the  

34

findings  for  that  of  the  courts  below  unless  it  is  clearly  

established that the findings and the conclusions so arrived  

at  by  the  courts  below  are  perverse  and  based  on  no  

evidence.  

28. The  simple  case  of  the  prosecution  is  that  all  the  

appellants  entered  into  a conspiracy  in  order  to secure  a  

passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal, for the  

benefit of Monica Bedi so as to enable her to utilize the same  

to  leave  the  country  and  travel  abroad.   There  is   no  

controversy whatsoever  that  Monica Bedi  travelled  abroad  

on  the  strength  of  the  passport  secured  by  her  in  the  

assumed  name.  She  entered  Portugal  with  the  aid  of  

passport  standing  in  the  name  of  Sana Malik  Kamal  for  

which she has to face the prosecution and suffer conviction  

and sentence in Portugal.  

29. It is evident from the record that the involvement of  

the appellants is at two stages. Stage one  is where Monica  

Bedi (A-3) and Mohd. Yunis (A-7) are involved in the pre-

35

passport  application at the threshold and even before the  

preparation  of  application  seeking  the  passport  in  the  

assumed name. Stage two is the involvement of Monica Bedi  

(A-3), Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8)  

after  the  submission  of  passport  application  before  the  

authorities. Exhibit P2 is the passport application submitted  

in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal which contains  

the  photograph  of  Monica  Bedi  (A-3).   Essential  

requirements  for  obtaining the passport  are: (1) passport  

application;  (2)  proof  of  residence  and  (3)  date  of  birth  

certificate as spoken to by PWs. 2, 3, 21 and 31.  How these  

documents are obtained for the benefit of Monica Bedi has  

been  clearly  brought  on  record  through  a  number  of  

witnesses  whose  evidence  remained  unimpeached.  It  is  

Mohd.  Yunis  (A-7),  the  Mandal  Revenue  Inspector  who  

verified the residence particulars of Sana Malik Kamal on the  

instructions of PW-5, Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool and  

submitted a false verification report based on which exhibit  

P9  residence  certificate  was  issued  by  PW-5.   PW-17  on  

36

requisition from C.B.I officials once again got verified and  

issued exhibit P30 certificate to the effect that no person by  

name  Sana  Malik  Kamal  resides  in  the  house  as  earlier  

submitted by Mohd. Yunis (A-7).  PW-37 is the Investigating  

Officer  who  in  his  evidence  stated  that  he  verified  the  

particulars of occupants of the said house in the presence of  

PW-27 (D.V. Ratnamaiah), Assistant Superintendent of Post  

Offices,  Kurnool   and  found no such  person named Sana  

Malik  Kamal   ever  resided   therein.  It  is  based  on  this  

evidence the trial court and appellate court came to the right  

conclusion that the prosecution established its case that it is  

Mohd.  Yunis  (A-7)  who  gave  false  verification  based  on  

which exhibit P9 residence certificate was issued by PW-5 in  

the  name of  Sana Malik  Kamal.  The  trial  court  convicted  

Mohd. Yunis (A-7)  for the offence under Section 468 IPC  

which reads as under:  

“468.  Forgery  for  purpose  of  cheating.  –  Whoever  commits  forgery,  intending  that  the  document or electronic record forged shall  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  cheating,  shall  be  

37

punished  with  imprisonment  of  either  description  for  a  term  which  may  extend  to  seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

Section 463 defines forgery, which reads as under:  

“463.  Forgery.-   Whoever  makes  any  false  documents or false electronic record or part of a  document  or  electronic  record,  with  intent  to  cause damage  or injury, to the public or to any  person, or to support any claim or title, or to  cause any person to part with property, or to  enter into any express or implied contract,  or  with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may  be committed, commits forgery.”

30. The  High  Court  came  to  the  conclusion  that  in  

submitting  the  false  verification  report  in  respect  of  

residence of Sana Malik Kamal he may not  have been aware  

and knew that the certificate so obtained would be used for  

the purpose of securing  the passport in the assumed name  

of Sana Malik Kamal. At any rate there is no evidence on  

that aspect of the matter.  The High Court also came to the  

conclusion that by the time Mohd. Yunis (A-7) submitted a  

false  verification  there is  nothing  on record that  he was  

hand in  glove  with  the  other  accused  for  the  purpose  of  

38

cheating.  Be  it  noted  that  the  High  Court  confirmed  the  

acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section 120B IPC.  The  

High Court, accordingly, found that the proper offence made  

against  him  would  be  one  for  making  forged  document  

simplicitor  punishable  under  Section  465  IPC.   In  our  

considered  opinion,  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  

convicting Mohd. Yunis (A-7) at all for it had found no case  

against the appellant made out under Section 120B IPC and  

further found that there is no evidence to assume that he  

was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of  

cheating.  That there is no evidence that A-7 prepared false  

document  with  intent  to  cause  damage  or  injury,  to  the  

public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to  

cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any  

express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud.  

The ingredients of Section 463 are not satisfied.  In such an  

event the conviction of the appellant under Section 465 IPC  

is unsustainable.  

39

31. That  so  far  as  D.  Gokari  Saheb  (A-8)  is  concerned  

there  is  a  clear  evidence  which  has  been  properly  

appreciated by the courts below that he who took the article  

(envelop contained the passport) addressed to   Sana Malik  

Kamal from PW-11 representing that he knew the addressee  

and  deliver  the  same.   The  said  article  was  actually  

entrusted to PW-11  for its delivery but  D. Gokari Saheb (A-

8)  took  the same from PW-11 for delivery to Sana Malik  

Kamal – assumed name of Monica Bedi (A-3).  The courts  

below found that D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) was aware of the  

contents of the article.  It is under those circumstances the  

courts  below  came  to  the  right  conclusion  that  evidence  

available on record clearly establish that he participated in  

the conspiracy in securing the passport for Monica Bedi in  

the  assumed  name  of  Sana  Malik  Kamal.   Thus  the  

conviction  of  D.  Gokari  Saheb  (A-8)   for  the  charged  

offences is accordingly upheld.   We do not find any reason  

whatsoever  to  interfere  with  the  view taken  by  the  High  

Court.  However,  the  sentence  of  one  year  rigorous  

40

imprisonment under each count awarded while maintaining  

the fine imposed by the trial court is reduced to that of 6  

months  rigorous  imprisonment  under  each  count  while  

maintaining the fine amount.  

32. Shaik  Abdul  Sattar  (A-5)  is  the Head Constable  who  

submitted exhibit  P15 report.  PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 are  

the  material  witnesses  examined  by  the  prosecution  to  

prove the  accusations leveled against  A-5.  PW-7 at the  

relevant  time  was  Junior  Assistant  in  the  District  Police  

Office,  Kurnool  who  speaks  about  entrustment  of  the  

verification  of  the  passport  application  in  respect  of  Sana  

Malik Kamal to A-5. He also speaks about A-5 submitting  

Exhibit  P15  inquiry  report  together  with  statements  of  

persons purported to have been recorded by him in exhibit  

P16  and  P17.   There  is  absolutely  nothing  on  record  to  

disbelieve the evidence of PW-7 who stated in his evidence  

that  A-5 submitted exhibit  P15 report  knowing it  to be a  

false one apart from certifying that Sana Malik Kamal was  

residing  at  that  particular  house  in  Kurnool  and  was  not  

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involved  in  any  civil  and  criminal  cases  and  there  was  

nothing adverse against her. PW-8 was working as Inspector  

of  Police,  District  Special  Branch,  Kurnool  who  prepared  

exhibit P18 letter on the basis of exhibit P15 inquiry report  

submitted  by  A-5.   PW-14  is  the  Sub-Inspector,  District  

Special  Branch,  Kurnool  who  testified  that  A-5  submitted  

exhibit P15 report and it bears signature of A-5.  The courts  

below held that the evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 is  

cogent and  consistent which in clear and categorical terms  

prove  the  fact  that  A-5  is  the  person  who  verified  the  

passport  application  particulars  of  Sana  Malik  Kamal  and  

submitted exhibit P15 inquiry report along with exhibit P16  

and  exhibit  P17  enclosures.   There  cannot  be  any  doubt  

whatsoever  that  A-5  submitted  a  false  report  in  order  to  

enable Monica Bedi to secure a passport for herself in the  

assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal.  His conviction for the  

charged  offences  is  accordingly  upheld.   The  High  Court  

however, reduced the sentence awarded by the trial court to  

one  year  rigorous  imprisonment  under  each  count  while  

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maintaining  the  fine  imposed  by  the  trial  court.  The  

sentence awarded under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of  

Prevention of Corruption Act  has been confirmed.  Having  

regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case,  

we  however,  reduce  the  sentence  to  that  of  six  months  

rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining  

the fine imposed by the trial court and the sentence to suffer  

imprisonment, in default, of payment of fine. Sentences are  

directed to run concurrently.  

Case of Monica Bedi – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.  

782/2007:

33. So far as the appellant - Monica Bedi  is concerned she  

is involved in the conspiracy as proved at both stages i.e.  

pre-passport application stage and post-passport application  

stage.  The conspiracy itself has been hatched only with a  

view to secure a passport for Monica Bedi in the assumed  

name of Sana Malik Kamal.  We do not find any merit in the  

submission of Shri Tulsi, learned senior counsel that there is  

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no evidence whatsoever against  Monica Bedi to prove her  

involvement for the offence punishable under Sections 120B,  

419 and 420 IPC.  The sequence of events as unfolded by  

the evidence,  which  we do not  want  to  recapitulate  once  

again as we have noticed the same in detail in the preceding  

paragraphs,  clearly  prove  the  charges  levelled  against  

Monica Bedi.  It is for her benefit that the entire conspiracy  

has  been  hatched  involving  more  than  one  individual  in  

order to secure a passport for her benefit enabling her to  

travel abroad in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal.  

There is no material based on which this Court is to differ  

with the findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by  

the courts below.  

Shri Tulsi, however, reiterated the submission which he  

made before the High Court that exhibit P50 is a Photostat  

copy of the passport in the name of Sana Malik Kamal and  

the same is inadmissible document as it is not authenticated  

by  legal  keeper  as  provided  under  Section  78  (6)  of  the  

Indian  Evidence  Act.   The submission  was  that  based on  

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such  inadmissible  document  no  prosecution  could  be  

launched and once it is to be held that the said document is  

not admissible the whole case of the prosecution collapses  

like  a  pack  of  cards.  The  High  Court  after  elaborate  

consideration of the matter came to the right conclusion that  

Section 78 (6) of the Evidence Act, 1872 deals with public  

document of any other class in a foreign country.  In the  

present  case,  the  original  of  exhibit  P50  is  the  passport  

issued  by  the  competent  authorities  in  this  country  and,  

therefore, Section 78 (6) has no application whatsoever to  

the facts of this case.  The issuance of original of exhibit P50  

passport  is  clearly  proved.   It  is  based  on  that  passport  

Monica Bedi travelled abroad and entered Portugal for which  

she  has  to  face  a  prosecution  and  suffer  conviction  and  

sentence.   The prosecution cannot be held to be vitiated.  

We  accordingly  reject  the  contention  and  uphold  the  

conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under  

Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC.  The High Court, however,  

reduced  the  sentence  of  imprisonment  imposed  on  the  

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appellant – Monica Bedi (A-3) as noticed in the preceding  

paragraphs.  The High Court also held that she is entitled for  

set off of the periods of detention suffered by her in Lisbon  

i.e.  from  18.9.2004  to  4.6.2005  and  3.11.2005  to  

10.11.2005.  

However, having regard to the facts and circumstances  

of the case  and the fact that she had undergone more than  

2 ½ years of sentence, we consider it appropriate to reduce  

the  sentence  to  that  of  already  undergone  by  her  while  

maintaining fine amount imposed  by the courts below.  

34. In the view we have taken it is not necessary to go into  

the question as to the interpretation of Section 428 Cr.P.C  

and her entitlement to set off against the sentence imposed  

on her.  

Conclusion:  

35. Criminal Appeal NO. 782 of 2007 ( Monica Bedi –  

A-3)

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For all the aforesaid reasons, we confirm the conviction  

of Monica Bedi (A-3) under Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC.  

The  sentence  awarded  under  each  count  directed  to  run  

concurrently  is  reduced  to  that  of  the  period  already  

undergone  by  her  while  maintaining  the  sentence  of  fine  

awarded  by  the courts  below.  The  bail  bonds  shall  stand  

cancelled.  

The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.   

Criminal Appeal NO.  784 of 2007 ( Shaik Abdul Sattar  

– A-5)

The conviction of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) under  

Sections 120B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and  

as  well  as  under  Section  13  (1)  (d)  r/w  13(2)  of  the  

Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  is,  accordingly,  upheld.  

However, the sentence awarded under each count is reduced  

to  that  of  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment  while  

maintaining the fine imposed by the courts below. Sentences  

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are directed to run concurrently.  He shall surrender before  

the trial court to serve the remaining sentence, if any.  

The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.  

Criminal Appeal NO.   1357 of 2007 ( Mohd. Yunis – A-

7)

Mohd.  Yunis  (A-7) is  acquitted for  the offence under  

Section 465 IPC and sentence awarded is set aside. The bail  

bonds shall stand cancelled.  

The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.  

Criminal Appeal NO.  783 of 2007 ( D. Gokari Saheb –  

A-8)

The  conviction  of   D.  Gokari  Saheb  (A-8)  under  

Sections 120B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and  

as  well  as  under  Section  13  (1)  (d)  r/w  13(2)  of  the  

Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  is,  accordingly,  upheld.  

However, the sentence awarded under each count is reduced  

to  that  of  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment  while  

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maintaining the fine imposed by the courts below. Sentences  

are directed to run concurrently.  He shall surrender before  

the trial court to serve the remaining sentence, if any.  

The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.   

….………………………… ……..J.

(B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

……………………………………J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

New Delhi, November  09, 2010.

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