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PETITIONER: MOHSIN ALI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/04/1975

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1518            1975 SCR  240  1975 SCC  (2) 122

ACT: Sovereign  grants-Construction of-Surrounding  circumstances as aid of construction-Occasion   of   grant   as   aid   of construction.

HEADNOTE: By Firman of 1934, the then ruler of Bhopal in  appreciation of  long and distinguished service of Sir Liyaqat  Ali  gave him,  in addition to the grant of pension,  the  residential house  in question and a sum of Rs. 400/- per month  out  of the Privy Purse of the Ruler. Liaqat  Ali died in March 1947 without leaving any issue  or widow.  In May, 1947, Syed Mohammed Ali, an heir  of  Liaqat Ali, who was residing in the said house was forcibly ejected by the Government of Bhopal. In 1957, the present appellants being the heirs of Syed Mohammed Ali filed the present  suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh for the recovery of  the possession  of  this  house on the ground  that  the  Firman gifted the house absolutely to Liaqat Ali and that they were entitled to inherit the house. The suit was resisted by  the respondent  on  the ground that the ruler’s Firman  did  not confer  absolute  title  on  Liaqat Ali,  but  only  a  life interest in the house. The Firman inter-alia stated "and you are  granted your residential house situated at  Bara  Mahal Shahjahanabad  as a gift." The Trial Court decreed the  suit on the ground that the suit house was gifted by the ruler to Liaqat  Ali absolutely.  The High Court on  appeal  reversed the  finding  and held that on a true  construction  of  the Firman Liaqat Ali was given only a life estate. On     appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellants :- 1.   The last sentence of the Firman declares in unambiguous terms that the grant of the house is an out and out gift. 2.   Since the grantor and the grantee are Muslims, the gift would  under Mohammedan Law have the effect of conveying  an absolute heritable estate. 3.   In  a  letter   addressed by  the  Chief  Engineer  and Secretary  to       the P.W.D., Bhopal, issued in  the  year 1938, it was mentioned that the building in question was  in the possession and ownership of this Liaqat Ali. It was contended by the respondents 1.   The grant of the house is not to be disassociated  from

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the pensionary grants. 2.   The Firman represents a grant made by an absolute ruler in  favour of his subject was not a hiba made by one  Muslim to another Muslim under Mohammedan Law. 3.   The  grant being a sovereign grant has to be  construed strictly  against  the  guarantee and  imperfection  in  the language  of the Firman had to be resolved in favour of  the Government  by  reading it as a whole in the  light  of  the surrounding circumstances. Dismissing the appeal, HELD   :   In   case  of   sovereign   grants,   where   two interpretations are possible, that which is most  favourable to the sovereign is to be preferred. [244B-C] HELD  FURTHER-The  Firman  does not convey  in  precise  and unequivocal  terms full and absolute ownership of  the  suit house to the grantee.  The Firman does not use the word like heritable  estate or that the grant would take  effect  from generation  to  generation or grant to the grantee  and  his heirs. [246F]                             241 Held  further-The  Firman  has to be read as  a  whole.   It cannot be dissected into three water-tight compartments.  It is permissible to consider the surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which this grant was made as legitimate aids to construction of the Firman.  The Firman confers threefold benefits;  pension,  Rs.  400/-  per  month  and  beneficial interest in the residential house.  The object of conferring these  benefits  was  the same, namely,  to  secure  to  the retiring  servant  a handsome  maintenance  and  comfortable residence  for  the  rest  of  his  life.   The  surrounding circumstances.  namely.  the grantee had no issue  nor any near  relation and was already residing at the  suit  house, also confirm this interpretation. [246G, 247A-B]. HELD FURTHER-The grant is not a hiba made in accordance with Mohammedan Law.  It was a grant made by an absolute ruler to his subject. [248D-E].

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1968. From  the judgment and decree dated 5th September,  1962  of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No.1 of 1956. Hardayal Hardy and S. S. Hussain for the appellants. Ram  Panjwani,  H.   S. Parihar and I. N.  Shroff,  for  the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.--By a firman, dated October 25, 1934, Nawab Sir Hamidullah  Khan,  the  then  Ruler  of  Bhopal  State,   in appreciation  of the long and distinguished services of  Sir Liaqat Ali, gave to the latter, in addition to the grant  of pensions,  the  residential  house in  question  as  "inayat ataa".   Sir Liaqat who was already residing in this  house, continued therein till he died, issueless and widowless,  in March  1947.  One Syed Mohammed Ali who was the son  of  Sir Liaqat’s father’s sister, also used to reside in this  house with the deceased.  After Sir Liaqat’s death, Syed  Mohammed Ali continued in occupation of this house as one of the nine heirs of the deceased, till he was "forcibly and unlawfully" ejected  in  May  1947 by the  then  Government  of  Bhopal. Paying a "deaf-ear" to the repeated demands of Syed Mohammed Ali for restoration of possession, the Government "persisted in the act of trespass" and continued in illegal  possession of the house.  After his ouster, Syed Mohammed Ali also died sometime in 1947.

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On April 30, 1947, the Nawab of Bhopal signed the  Agreement of  Merger  and the State of Bhopal was taken  over  by  the Chief  Commissioner on behalf of the Government of India  on June 1, 1949.  Thereafter, on November 1, 1956 the territory of the former Bhopal State became a part of the re-organised State of Madhya Pradesh. On August 21, 1957, after serving a notice under s. 80, Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs 1 to 3, who are the  son, daughter  and  widow, respectively, of  Syed  Mohammed  Ali, instituted the suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh  for recovery  of  possession of the house, on the  footing  that under  the  firman , it had been gifted  absolutely  by  the Nawab  to  Sir Liaqat Ali who died possessed of it  as  full owner,  and on the donee’s death, it was inherited  by  Syed Mohammed Ali who, in turn, was succeeded by the  plaintiffs. It was further pleaded 242 that  Syed  Mohammed  Ali  was  "forcibly  and   unlawfully" dispossessed by the Government in May, 1947. The suit was resisted by the defendant State on the  ground, inter alia, that the Ruler’s firman "did not confer absolute title  on late Liaqat Ali", but only a life-interest in  the house. The Additional District Judge who tried the suit, found on a construction of the firman (Ex-P-1), that the suit house had been gifted by the Ruler to late Sir Liaqat Ali, absolutely, and,  in  consequence,  decreed  the  suit.   On  appeal,  a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh  reversed that  finding and held that "on a true construction  of  the Firman (Ex.P-1), the grantee, the late Sir Syed Liaqat  Ali, was given only an estate for life in the suit property,  and the  plaintiffs as his heirs had no right to inherit it  as his property.  In the result, the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed. On  a certificate granted by the High Court under  Art.  133 (1)  (a) of the Constitution read with Sections 109 and  110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have now come in appeal to this Court. The main issue framed by the trial court was in these  terms : "Was the house in dispute given by the Ruler to Shri  Liaqat Ali deceased absolutely or for life only." The decision of this issue turns on an interpretation of the Firman  (Ex.P-1), dated October 24, 1934 whereby  the  Ruler gave this house to the deceased. The original Firman is in Urdu.  As rendered into English by the courts below, it reads:   "Hon’ble  Motamid-u-Sultan Nasir-ul-Mulk Syed Sir  Liyaqat Ali".               "Looking  into considerations  with  gratitude               your valuable services and faithful sacrifices               which you have rendered for more than 30 years               and considering the economic condition of  the               State you have served without remuneration for               the  last  2  years,  your  application   (for               pension)   is   granted.   You   are   granted               permission to retire in lieu of your  valuable               services  from 1st October 1934.   You  should               hand  over charge of Musbir-ul-Mubami  Rubkari               Khas to Honourable Shoeb Qureshi.               Besides  that  pension  you  are  entitled  to               receive  under the Pension Rules of the  State               Treasury,  you are also entitled to receive  a               sum of Rs. 400/- as monthly pension from Trea-               sury of Deodhi in lieu of valuable services of

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             Deodhi Khas and you are (further) granted your               residential  house  situated  at  Bara   Mahal               Shahjahanabad, as gift." 243 The  original  of  the  crucial  sentence,  which  has  been underlined, reads : "Aur  aapka  sakoonti makan waqya Bara  Mahal  Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa kiya jata hai." The  Firman was by order published in the Bhopal  Government Gazette,  dated 31-10-1934, under the Heading : ’Pension  to Aali  Mortabat  Sir Syed Liaqat Ali Saheb’.   Rendered  into English, its material part runs thus :               "Now the said Hon’ble again requests for grant               of  his  previous application  on  account  of               rendering service for more than thirty  years.               Hence His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal  Khuld-               Allah-Mulkahum   considering   his    valuable               services  and his faithful sacrifices that  he               had  served without remuneration for the  last               two years, taking into consideration the  eco-               nomic  condition  of the  State.   Considering               (all  his  valuable services)  with  gratitude               (His  Highness the Ruler of State) grants  him               permission  to retire from 1st November,  1934               and  also  grants him  his  residential  house               situated at Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad as gift.               His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal State further               orders that Hon’ble Syed Sir Liaqat Ali  Saheb               be  paid  Rs.  400/monthly  pension  from  the               Treasury of Deodhi Khas in respect of services               of  Deodhi  Khas besides his  regular  pension               under  the  Rules of the  State  Treasury  for               which  he  is  entitled to  receive  from  the               Treasury of State". The  original  of the underlined sentence,  in  the  Gazette Notification reads : ‘aur  unko  sakoonti makan waqya  Bara  Mahal  Shahjahanabad inayat marhmat pharmate hain." It  is  to be noted that the disposition  evidenced  by  the Firman, Ex. P-1, is a tripartite grant made by an autocratic ruler  to  his subject in recognition of  long,  meritorious services rendered by the latter.  This grant belongs to  the category of disposition, which under the English Common  Law are known as "Crown grants". "  The  tenor and language of the Firman,  particularly  the words  aapko Inayat Kiya Jata Hai" unmistakably mark it  out as  a  Sovereign grant.  According  to  Steingass’  Persian- English  Dictionary "inayat" (Noune) signifies a  favour,  a gift,  a  present, a bounty"; and "Ataa"  (Verb)  means  "to give,  to confer a benefit or present with",  "Ataa"  (Noun) implies "Giving, a present, gift, donation, favour, a grant, endowment, concession; consideration".  In the widest sense, grant’  may comprehend everything that is granted or  passed from  one  to  another by deed.  But commonly  the  term  is applied to rights created or transferred by the Crown, e.g., grants  of pensions, patents, charters franchise  (See  Earl Jowtt’s Dictionary of English Law). 244 In  England,  contrary to the ordinary  rule  applicable  to grants  by,  a  subject, grants by  the  Crown  are  usually construed  most favourably for the Crown.  The rule in  case of  Royal  Grants  is  that  general  words  will  not  pass prerogative rights by implication. This   general  rule  is,  however,  capable  of   important relaxations  in favour of the subject.  If the intention  of

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the Sovereign is obvious from the document which in precise, unequivocal  terms  defines  the extent and  nature  of  the benefit  conferred,  it must take effect.   No  question  of seeking  extrinsic aid to its construction arises.   If  the grant  is  for valuable consideration it must  be  construed strictly  in favour of tile grantee, for the honour  of  the Sovereign  and  where two constructions  are  possible,  one valid  and the other void, that which is valid ought  to  be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be  more regarded  than the Sovereign’s profit.  Where, however,  two interpretations may be given to the grant, both of which are good, that which is most favourable to the Crown is in  many cases  preferred  (see Halsbury’s Laws of England,  3rd  Ed. Vol. 7, Paragraphs 669 and 670 pages 314316). These rules of interpretation have been applied to Sovereign grants in India, also (see Raja Rajinder Chand v.  Sukhi(1), Gulabdas  jivandas v. Collector of Surat(2),  Sheikh  Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmoddin(3), Azziz-un-nissa v. Tasadduq Husain Khan(4), Ram Narayan Singh v. Ram Saran Lal(5). It  is in the light of the above principles that we have  to determine  whether  by  the  Firman,  Ex.   P-1,  the  Ruler intended to grant a life estate or an absolute estate in the suit house. Mr. Hardy, learned Counsel for the appellants contends  that the  disposition  in  dispute  would  not  fall  within   an exception to the general rule according to which a Sovereign grant  is  construed  in favour of  the  Sovereign,  because firstly, the last sentence of the Firman, the interpretation of  which  alone is in question, declares  in  plain,  self- contained  and unambiguous terms that the grant of house  is an  out  and  out gift to the  grantee,  and  secondly,  the grantor  and  the grantee, being Muslims,  the  gift  would, under  Mohammedan  Law,  have the  effect  of  conveying  an absolute heritable estate.  In this connection, support  has been  sought from certain observations of the Privy  Council in Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan v. Sardar Ali Raza(6), which are as follows :               "In  general, Muslim Law draws no  distinction               between real and personal property, and  their               Lordships    know    of    no    authoritative               work.........  which affirms that  Muslim  Law               recognizes  the splitting up of  ownership  of               land into estates, (1)[1956] SCR 889 as per S. K. Das J. at p. 902, (2)  6 I.A.5.4 (3)  30 I.A. 50. (4)28 I.A. 65. (5)  ILR 46 Cal. 683 (P.C.). (6)  75 I.A. 62 at 77.                             245               or   in  point  of  quality  like  legal   and               equitable  estates,  or in point  of  duration               like estates in fee sample in tail, for  life,               or   in  remainder.   What  Muslim  Law   does               recognize  and insist on, is  the  distinction               between  the  corpus of  the  property  itself               (ayn)   and  the  usufruct  in  the   property               (manafi).  Over the corpus of the property the               law   recognizes   only   absolute   dominion,               heritable  and unrestricted in point of  time,               and where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose               a  condition inconsistent with  such  absolute               dominion   the   condition  is   rejected   as               repugnant,  but interest limited in  point  of               time  can  be created in the usufruct  of  the

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             property  and  the dominion  over  the  corpus               takes  effect  subject  to  any  such  limited               interests."        (emphasis added) Mr.  Hardy refers to the letter, dated 29-6-1938 (Ex.   P-3) of  the Chief Engineer and Secretary, P.W.D.,Bhopal  whereby two  maps  of  the  house, Nawab Manzil  were  sent  to  the grantee.   The portions shown in light red colour  in  these maps  were referred to in this letter as in the  "possession and  ownership"  of  the grantee according  to  the  Gazette Notification No. 7, dated 31st October, 1934. As against the above, Mr. Panjwani, learned Counsel for  the Respondent submits that the grant of the house is not to  be dissociated  from the pensionary grants; that even the  last sentence  of the Firman, read in the context along with  its preamble reasonably bears only one construction viz., that a right of residence for life, to be conveyed by the Ruler  to the grantee.  Stress has been laid on to be conveyed by  the Ruler  to the grantee.  Stress has been laid or,.  the  fact that  there  are  no  words  such  as,  nasalan-dar-nasalan, pushatdar-pushat etc. in the language of the Firman  showing that  absolute.  heritable  rights  in  the  property   were conferred  on the grantee.  Counsel further  maintains  that the Firman represents a grant made by’ an absolute Ruler  in favour  of  his  subject on the  occasion  of  the  latter’s retirement from service and that it was not a mere hiba made by  one  Muslim  under Mohammedan  Law  to  another  Muslim. Reference  to Mohammedan Law, proceeds the argument, has  no relevance.   It  is urged that the grant being  a  Sovereign grant, had to be construed strongly against the grantee, and imperfections  in  the  language of the  Firman  had  to  be resolved  in  favour of the Government, by reading it  as  a whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances and even the  subsequent  conduct of the then  Bhopal  Government  in ejecting,  Syed  Mohammad Ali from the house in  May,  1947. That  ejectment,’  according  to the  Counsel,  amounted  to resumption of the grant-(by’ the grantor) who was then alive and  was still the absolute Ruler of Bhopal state.   Counsel has  referred  to several authorities in support,  of  these contentions. We  are not persuaded to accept the  appellant’s  contention that  the Firman conveys, in precise and unequivocal  terms, full  and  absolute  ownership  of the  suit  house  to  the grantee. in our opinion, the, language of the last  sentence of  the  Firman,  which  is  the  sheet-:  anchor  of   this contention, ’even by itself, does not indubitably and                             246 unequivocally  indicate that the intention of the Ruler  was to  grant an absolute estate.  The Firman is conspicuous  by the  non-employment of any words declaring that  thenceforth the  grantee would have a heritable estate in the  house  or that  the  grantor  had transferred all his  rights  in  the property, absolutely in favour of the grantee.  There is  no use  of  such  words that the grant  would  take  effect  as "nasalan-darnasaln",   "from   generation   to   generation" "towarsan,  kaiam u qaman" "to grantee and his  heirs"  etc. pointing  towards the creation of a heritable estate.   Even the  use  of such terms by itself, has been held  to  be  an inconclusive indication of the grantor’s intention to confer absolute, heritable rights.  Thus, in Gulabdas Jagjivandas’s case  (supra)  despite  a  reference in  the  sanad  to  the children  or  descendants’  of  the  grantee,  the  Judicial Committee  held  that the grant bad not been made  on  terms which would make them hereditary". Again,   in  Sheikh  Sultan  v.  Shekh   Ajmoddin   (supra), delivering  the  judgment of the Board, Lord  Hannen  quoted

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with  approval,  a minute dated 15-3-1922, recorded  by  Sir Thomas  Munro  in  which he states that the  terms  in  such documents (sanads) ’for ever’ from generation to  generation or  in Hindu grants, ’while the sun and moon  endure’,  ’are mere forms of expression’, and were never supposed either by the  donor or receiver to convey the durability  which  they imply  or  any  beyond the will of the  Sovereign.   On  the authority of another minute recorded by Sir Thomas Munro, it was  further  observed "that while the  seizure  of  private property  by the native princes would have  been  considered unjust by the country, Jagir grants were not regarded by the people in the light of private property". It  is not necessary to multiply authorities with regard  to the  construction  of  such  customary  terms  which   could possibly be indicative of the grantor’s intention to make  a heritable grant, because the Firman Ex.  P-1, is benefit  of all  such  terms.   It will be sufficient to  say  that  the language  of  the Firman does not in clear  and  unambiguous terms  express an intention to create an absolute estate  in favour  of  the  grantee  and his  heirs.   The  Firman  has therefore  to  be  construed in accordance  with  the  well- established  rule  of construction applicable  to  Sovereign grant. Another cardinal canon of interpretation to be borne in mind is  that  in order to ascertain the real  intention  of  the grantor, the Firman has to be read as a whole.  It will  not be  correct as the appellants want us to do to  dissect  the Firman  into three water-tight compartments or to read  last sentence of the Firman out of the context.  It is also  per- missible  to consider the surrounding circumstances and  the occasion on which this grant was made, as legitimate aids to construction  of  The Firman (see  Gulabdas  Jagjivandas  v. Collector of Surat (supra). The occasion for the grant as apparent from the preamble  of the Firman, Ex.P-1, (reproduced in the Notification  Ex-P-2) was  that the grantee, Sir Liaqat Ali, having  attained  the age  of superannuation, was retiring with the permission  of the  grantor,  after putting in  "valuable"  and  "faithful" service for more than thirty years, including two years  for which he served without remuneration, in view of the                             247 poor  economic condition of the State.  An analysis  of  the Firman will show that it confers three-fold benefits on  the grantee.   Firstly, it rants him such pension as  would  be admissible under the Service Rules.  This he would draw from the State Treasury.  Secondly, in addition to the first,  it grants him pension at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month  which the  pensioner  would be entitled to draw  from  the  Deodhi Treasure  i.e., the Privy Purse of the Ruler.   Thirdly,  it grants  him a beneficial interest in the residential  house, in these terms : "Aur aapka sakoonti makan waqya Bara  Mahal Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa kiya jata hai". As is indicated in the Firman (Ex.P-1) (P-2) Notification in making  this  tripartite  grant the Ruler  was  actuated  by consideration   of  gratitude  for  the  valuable   services rendered  by  the grantee.  The object of  conferring  these three-fold  benefits was the same, namely, to secure to  the retiring  servant  a handsome  maintenance  and  comfortable residence for the rest of his life.  In other words, all the three  benefits  granted  under  this  Firman  were  cognate benefits,  arising out of the same occasion, and  made  with the same object in view viz., to enable the grantee to  live comfortably in retirement.  These related benefits could  be compendiously described as "retirement benefits".  The first two  benefits were indisputably pensionary benefits  enuring

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only for the lifetime of the grantee.  All the three kindred benefits,  including  the one in  question,  were  expressly meant for the person of the grantee.  This is clear from the word ’apko’ which means "to you" in the phrase "apko  inayat ataa  kiva  jata  hai" The conjunction "aur"  (and)  at  the commencement of the last sentence of the Firman inextricably links  the grant of interest in the residential house,  with the pensionarybenefits conferred in the foregoing parts  of the Firman.  In short, allthe    three-fold     benefits granted under this Firman are, off spring ofthe same genus. The language of the Firman relating directly to thegrant in  question therefore takes its colour from  the  preceding parts  of  the Firman relating to  the  pensionary  benefits conferred  on  the grantee for life.  Thus  if  the  crucial words quoted above, are construed in the context of the akin grants, and-according to the general tenor of the Firman  as a  whole, it becomes clear that the intention of  the  Ruler was  to grant only a right of residence limited to the  life time of the grantee-and not an absolute estate in the house. The    surrounding    circumstances   also    confirm    the interpretation  adopted by us.  The first such  circumstance was.  that  at  the time of the grant, the  grantee  had  no issue, nor any near relation.  Indeed, he died widowless and issue-less.   In this context, coupled with the omission  of any   words   such  as  to  "grantee  and  his   heirs"   or "nasalan-dar-nasalan" indicating the grant to be  heritable, it  would be reasonable to hold that the grant was  intended to be for life only. There  is yet another circumstance which points towards  the same  conclusion.  It is that at the time of the  grant  the grantee  was  already residing in the suit house.   In  this context, the word "sakoonti" (’residential) in the last part of  the  Firman  used in association  with  ’makan’  (house) assumes significance.  It suggests that the intention of the 10 SC/75-17                             248 grantor was to convey to the grantee no more than a right of residence  in  the  house  which  the  latter  was   already enjoying. The letter Ex.P-3 written by the Chief Engineer on 29-6-1938 is  of  hardly any assistance in construing the  grant  made three  or  four years earlier.  It could not be  treated  as contemporaneous  conduct of the grantor or his agent,  which could legitimately be taken into consideration in construing the grant. On  parity of reasoning, it is doubtful whether the fact  of eviction of Syed Mohammed Ali from the suit house, about two months  after  the death of the grantee and about  15  years after  the  grant, could justifiably be called in aid  as  a "surrounding circumstance" to interpret the Firman dated 24- 10-1939.   The High Court has taken this  circumstance  also into  account.  We need only say that even  after  excluding this  circumstance,  there  remains  sufficient  and   sound foundation   in   the  language  of  the  Firman   and   the contemporaneous  surrounding  circumstances,  including  the common  genus, the same occasion and purpose of  the  three- seeded  grant, to hold that the Ruler had conferred  only  a limited estate in the suit property for the life-time of the grantee. The  argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that  the grant  in  question  was a ’hiba’ made  in  accordance  with Mohammendan  Law by one Muslim to another, has  been  stated only  to be rejected. To all intents and purposes, it was  a rant  made  by  an absolute Ruler to  his  subject  who  had rendered  long  meritorious  services, on  the  eve  of  his

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retirement.    Reference   to   Muslim   law   is   herefore misconceived.   We  may, however, say in passing  that  even according  to the observations of the Privy  Council  relied upon  by  the Counsel, creation of an  interest  limited  in point  of  time,  in the usufruct of  the  property  is  not necessarily repugnant to Muslim Law. Mr.  Panjwani has advanced an alternative argument also,  to support  the decision of the High Court.  The contention  is that even if it is assumed that the house had been given  to Sir  Liaqat Ali absolutely, then also the grant had come  to an  end on resumption of the possession of the house by  the Government  of  Bhopal  in 1947, and  thereafter  the  grant continued  to  be non-est because after the  merger  of  the State  of Bhopal on 1-6-1949, it was not recognised  by  the Government  of  India  or by the new  Government  of  Madhya Pradesh  after Bhopal became a part of that State  on  1-11- 1951.   Rather, as per Ex.P-6, the new Government after  the disappearance of Bhopal State from the scene, repudiated the grant.   In  these circumstances, submits the  Counsel,  the appellants  did not carry with them the right, if any,  they had under the grant as subjects of the Ex-Sovereign Ruler of Bhopal  and  after the extinction of Bhopal  State  and  its Ruler,  they  had  only  such  rights  as  were  granted  or recognised by the new Sovereign i.e. the Central Government. According  to  the Counsel, the plaintiffs’  claim  was  not enforceable  in  the municipal courts.   Reliance  has  been placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat  v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwale(1). 1[1964] 6 S.C.R. 461 at 551. 249 There is no foundation for the plea either in the  pleadings or in the issues.  We therefore do not allow it to be raised for the first time in this Court. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, P.H.P.                           Appeal dismissed. 250