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PETITIONER: MOHINDER SINGH GILL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CHIIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/12/1977

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  851            1978 SCR  (3) 272  1978 SCC  (1) 405  CITATOR INFO :  R          1979 SC1725  (25)  R          1979 SC1803  (7)  R          1979 SC1918  (14)  R          1980 SC 882  (7)  R          1980 SC1362  (10A,50)  R          1981 SC 136  (7,10)  RF         1981 SC 547  (7)  R          1981 SC 818  (19,22,28,33,34,39)  RF         1981 SC 873  (65)  RF         1982 SC1413  (38)  E          1984 SC 921  (16,21)  R          1985 SC1233  (25)  RF         1985 SC1416  (100)  R          1986 SC 111  (16)  D          1987 SC1109  (26)  RF         1988 SC  61  (6)  RF         1988 SC 157  (8)  F          1989 SC1038  (4)  R          1990 SC1402  (23)  RF         1991 SC1216  (7)  RF         1992 SC2219  (139)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950-Arts. 324 and  329(b)-Scope  of Counting  of  votes  in many segments  of  the  constituency completed-Before  declaration of final result ballot  papers and  ballot  boxes  of  some  segments  destroyed  in,   mob violence--Election  Commission ordered repoll of the  entire constituency--Election  Commission,  if competent  to  order repoll of entire constituency. Article  226--Election Commission’s order for fresh poll  in entire  constituency--If  could  be  challenged  in  a  writ petition. Representation   of   the  People  Act,  1950-Ss.   80   and 100(1)(d)(iv)--Scope of. Natural  justice--Issue  of notice to affected  parties  and opportunity  to  hear  before passing an  order  under  Art. 329(b)--If  necessary--Notice,  if should be  given  to  the whole constituency. Words and phrases--"Civil consequence"--Election "called  in question" meaning of.

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HEADNOTE: Article   329(b)   of   the   Constitution   provides   that notwithstanding anything in   the  Constitution no  election to either House of Parliament or to the House, or either House  of  the  Legislature of a State shall  be  called  in question except by  an  election petition presented to  such authority and in such manner as may be  provided  for by  or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. Section  100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of  the  People Act, 1951 provides that if the High Court is of the  opinion that  the  result of the election so far as  it  concerns  a returned candidate has been materially affected by any  non- compliance  with  the provisions of the Constitution  or  of this  Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act  the High  Court  shall  declare the  election  of  the  returned candidate to be void. The  appellant and the third respondent were candidates  for election  in  a Parliamentary constituency.   The  appellant alleged  that when at the last hour of counting it  appeared that  he  had all but won the election, at the  instance  of respondent  no. 3 mob violence broke out and  postal  ballot papers  and  ballot boxes from  certain  Assembly  segments, while  being  brought for counting, were destroyed  and  the Returning officer was forced to postpone the declaration  of the result.  The Returning Officer reported the happening by wireless to the Chief Election Commissioner.  An officer  of the Election Commission who was deputed to be an observer at the  counting stage gave a written report to the  Commission in  addition  to an oral report about  the  incidents  which marred  the last stages of the counting.  The appellant  met the Chief Election Commissioner and requested him to declare the   result.   Eventually,  however,  the  Chief   Election Commissioner issued a notification stating that the counting in the constituency was seriously disturbed by violence  and that ballot papers of some of the assembly segments had been destroyed by violence, as a consequence of which it was  not possible   to  complete  the  counting  of  votes   in   the constituency  and  declare  the result with  any  degree  of certainty.  The notification further stated that taking  all circumstances  into  account, the Commission  was  satisfied that  the  poll had been vitiated to such an  extent  as  to affect  the  result  of the election.  In  exercise  of  the powers  under Art. 324 of the Constitution it cancelled  the poll  already  held  and ordered a  re-poll  in  the  entire constituency. In  a  petition  under  Art. 226  of  the  Constitution  the appellant  alleged  that the action of  the  Chief  Election Commissioner  in ordering repoll in the  whole  constituency was arbitrary and violative of any vestige of fairness.  The respondents  in  reply  urged that the  High  Court  had  no Jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in view of  Art. 329(b) and that the Commission’s action was well within  its powers under Art. 324. 273 The  High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that  it had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.  Yet  on merits it held that Art. 324 does not impose any  limitation on  the  function  contemplated  under  that  article;  that principles of natural justice were not specifically provided for in that article but were totally excluded while  passing the  impugned  order  and that even  if  the  principles  of natural justice were impliedly to be observed before passing

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the  impugned order the appellant was heard not only  before the  issue  of the notification but in any  case  after  the notification. In  the repoll the appellant did not participate though  his name  appeared  on  the  ballot and  respondent  no.  3  was declared elected. On  the  question of application of  principles  of  natural justice  it was contended on behalf of the respondents  that the  tardy  process of notice and hearing would  thwart  the conducting  of  elections  with  speed  that  unless   civil consequences ensued, hearing was not necessary and that  the right  accrues  to  a candidate only  when  he  is  declared elected  and lastly the decision of the Election  Commission is  only  provisional and that it is he the  election  court which is the final authority on the subject. HELD: The catch-alljurisdiction   under  Art.  226   cannot consider the correctness, legality or otherwiseof     the direction for cancellation integrated with repoll. [269 D] 1(a) Article 329(b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenge to  electoral  steps taken by the  Election  Commission  for carrying forward the process of election to its  culmination in the formal declaration of the result. [322 D]  (b) The sole remedy for an aggrieved party, if he wants  to challenge  any  election,  is an  election  petition.   This exclusion  of  all other  remedies  includes  constitutional remedies like Art. 226 because of the non-obstante clause in Art.  329(b).   If what is impugned is an election  the  ban operates  provided the proceeding "calls it in question"  or puts it ’m issue : not otherwise. [289 E-F] (c)Part  XV  of  the Constitution is  a  Code  in  itself, providing the entire groundwork for enacting the appropriate laws  and  setting up suitable machine for  the  conduct  of elections.   Articles 327 and 328 take- care of the  set  of laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relating  to  or  in connection  with  elections.   Election disputes are also to be provided for by laws made under Art. 327.  ’Be Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a  self- contained  enactment  so  far as  elections  are  concerned. Section  80 which speaks substantially the same language  as Art.  329(b)  provides that no election shall be  called  in question  except  by  an  election  petition  presented   in accordance  with the provisions of Part IV of the Act.   The Act provides for only one remedy and that remedy being by an election  petition  to be presented after  the  election  is over, there is no remedy provided at any of the intermediate stages. [292 C-D; F-G 293 B-C] Smt.  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1976] 2 SCR 347,  504-505 referred to. (d)The  compendious expression "election"  commences  from the  initial notification and culminates in the  declaration of  the return of a candidate.  The paramount policy of  the Constitution-framers in declaring that no election shall  be called in question except the way it is provided for in Art. 329(b)  and  the  Representation of  the  People  Act,  1951 necessitates  the  reading of the Constitution and  the  Act together as an integral scheme.  The reason for  postponment of  election litigation to the post-election stage  is  that elections shall not unduly be protracted or obstructed. [294 D-E] (e)No  litigative  enterprise in the High Court  or  other court  should be allowed to hold up the  on-going  electoral process  because  the parliamentary representative  for  the constituency   should  be  chosen  promptly.   Article   329 therefore covers "electoral matters". [294 F] (f)The plenary bar of Art. 329(b) rests on two  principles

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:  (1) the peremptory urgency of prompt engineering  of  the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal Proceedings challenging the 274 steps  and  stages  in  between  the  commencement  and  the conclusion; and (2) the provision of a special  jurisdiction which can be invoked by an aggrieved party at the end of the election  excludes other forms, the right and  remedy  being creatures of statutes and controlled by the Constitution. [295 H, 296 ] Durga Shankar Mehta [1955] 1 SCR 267 referred to. (g)If  the  regular poll for some reasons  has  failed  to reach  the  goal  of  choosing  by  plurality  the  returned candidates  and to achieve this object a fresh poll  (not  a new  election)  is  needed, it may still be a  step  in  the election.[296 E-F] (h)A  writ petition challenging the  cancellation  coupled with  repoll  amounts  to  calling in  question  a  step  in ’election’ and is, therefore, barred by Art. 329(b). [296 G] (i)Knowing the supreme significance of speedy elections in our  system  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  have,   by implication,  postponed  all election disputes  to  election petitions and tribunals.  In harmony with this scheme s. 100 has  been  designedly  drafted to  embrace  all  conceivable infirmities  which may be urged.  To make the project  fool- proof s. 100(1)(d)(iv) has been added to absolve  everything left  over.   Section 100 is exhaustive  of  all  grievances regarding  an  election.   What is banned  is  not  anything whatsoever  ,done or directed by the  Election  Commissioner but  everything  he does or directs in  furtherance  of  the election, not contrarywise. [297 B, C, D] (j)It  is perfectly permissible for the Election Court  to decide  the question as one falling under s.  100(1)(d)(iv). The Election Court has all the powers necessary to grant all or  only any of the reliefs set out in s. 98 and  to  direct the Commissioner to take such ancillary steps as will render complete justice to the appellant. [319 C, E] (k)It is within the powers of the Election Court to direct a  repoll of particular polling stations to be conducted  by the  specialised  agency under the Election  Commission  and report the results and ballots to the Court.  Even a  repoll of postal ballots can be ordered In view of the wide ranging scope of implied powers of the Court, the appellant’s claims are within the Courts powers to grant. [322 A-B] 2(a) Article 324 does not exalt the Election Commission into a law unto itself.  The Article is wide enough to supplement the  powers under the Act subject to the several  conditions on its exercise. [300 A-B] (b)The  Election Commissioner’s functions are  subject  to the  norms of fairness and he cannot act  arbitrarily.   The Constitution has made comprehensive provision in Art. 324 to take  care  of surprise situations.  That power  has  to  be exercised in keeping with the guidelines of the rule of  law without   stultifying  the  Presidential   notification   or existing legislation.  It operates in areas left  unoccupied by legislation and the words "Superintendence, direction and control"  as well as "conduct of all elections" are  in  the broadest terms.[299 A, B-C] (c)If  imparting the right to be heard will  paralyse  the process,  the  law  will  exclude it.  In  any  case  it  is untenable  heresy  to lockjaw the victim or act  behind  his back by invoking urgency, unless the clearest case of public injury  flowing  from  the  least  delay  is  evident.   The Election Commission is an institution of central  importance and enjoys far-reaching powers and the greater the power  to

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affect  other’s rights or liabilities the more necessary  is the need to hear. [304 D, G-H, 305 B-C] (d)It  is  well-established that when a  high  functionary like  the Commissioner is vested with wide powers,  the  law expects him to act fairly and legally.  Discretion vested in a  high  functionary may be reasonably trusted  to  be  used properly,  not perversely.  If it is misused  certainly  the Court has power to strike down the act. [299 D-E] Virendra  [1958] SCR 308 and Harishankar [1955] 1  1104  SCR referred to. (e)Article 324 vests vast functions which may be powers or duties,  essentially  administrative  and  marginally   even judicative or legislative. _ [302 H] 275 (f)The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions  vis  a  vis the doctrine of  natural  justice  is presumably obsolescent after Kraipak which marks the  water- shed in the application of natural justice to administrative proceedings.  The rules of natural justice are rooted in all legal  sys-tems,  and are not any ’new theology.   They  are manifested in the twin principles of nemo index in sua causa and  audi alteram partem.  It has been pointed out that  the aim  of natural justice is to secure justice, or, to put  it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.  These  rights can  operate  only in areas not covered by any  law  validly made;  they  do  not  supplant  the  law  of  the  land  but supplement  it.   The  rules  of  natural  justice  are  not embodied  rules.   What particular rule of  natural  justice should  apply to a given case must depend to a great  extent on  the facts and circumstances of that case, the  framework of  the  law  under  which  the  inquiry  is  held  and  the constitution  of the tribunal or body of per-sons  appointed for  that  purpose.  Whenever a complaint is made  before  a court  that  some  principle of  natural  justice  has  been contravened, the court has to decide whether the observation of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the  facts of  that case.  Further, even if a power is given to a  body without  Specifying that rules of natural justice should  be observed  in  exercising it, the nature of the  power  would call for its observance. [300 F-G, 301 B-D, 303-D] Kraipak  [1970] 1 SCR 457, In re: H.K. (an infant) [1967]  2 Q.B. 617 and Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 referred to. (g)Even  where  the decision has to be reached by  a  body acting judicially, there must be a balance between the  need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to  the defendant  to see the material against him.  There might  be exceptional  cases where to decide a case exparte  would  be unfair  and  it would be the duty of the  Tribunal  to  take appropriate  steps  to  eliminate unfairness.   Even  so  no doctrinaire  approach  is desirable but the  court  must  be anxious   to  salvage  the  cardinal  rule  to  the   extent permissible in a given case. [307 D, E] 3(a)  Civil  consequences  cover infraction  of  not  merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations    and   non-peciiniary   damages.    In    its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in  his  civil  life  inflicts  a  civil  consequence.   The interest  of  a  candidate  at  an  election  to  Parliament regulated by the Constitution and the laws comes within  its gravitational orbit.  A democratic right, if denied inflicts civil  consequences.  Every Indian has a right to elect  and he  elected  and this is a constitutional  as  distinguished from  a common law right, and is entitled to  cognizance  by courts subject to statutory regulation. [308 F, 309 C, E] (b)A  vested  interest  in the  prescribed  process  is  a

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processual right, actionable if breached.  The appellant has a  right  to have the election conducted  not  according  to humour  or  hubris  but according to law  and  justice.   So natural justice cannot be stumped out on the score.  In  the region  of  public, law locus-standi and  person  aggrieved, right and interest have a broader import. [309 G, H] (c)In the instant case the Election Commission claims that a hearing had. been given but the appellant retorts that all that he had was vacuous meeting where nothing was disclosed. But in law degrees of difference may at a, substantial stage spell difference in kind or dimensions. [309 H, 310 A] (d)The  case of Subhash Chander in which this  Court  held that  it  was not necessary to give an  opportunity  to  the candidates   for  an  examination  as  to  why   the   whole examination should not be cancelled because the  examination was  vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a  mass  scale. But  the ratio of that decision has no application  to  this case.   The  candidates in an election who have  acquired  a very vital stake in the polling going on properly stand on a different  footing  from  the electorate  in  general.   The interest of the electorate is too remote and recondite,  too feeble  and attenuate to be taken note of in a  cancellation proceeding.   What  really  marks  the  difference  is   the diffusion  and dilution.  The candidates in an election  are really  the  spearheads,  the  combatants.   They  have  set themselves up as nominated candidates organised the campaign and galvanised the electorate for the polling and  counting. Their interest and claim are not indifferent but  immediate. They are the 5-1114SCI 77 276 parties in the electoral dispute.  In this sense they  stand on a better footing and cannot be deniedthe right to be heard.  In Ghanshyamdas Gupta in which the examinationresult of  three  candidates  was  cancelled  this  Court  imported principles ofnatural  justice.   This  case  may  have   a parallel in electoral situations. if the Election Commission cancelled  the poll it was because it was satsfied that  the procedure  adopted  had  gone awry  on  a  wholesale  basis. Therefore,  it  all  depends on  the  circumstances  and  is incapable  of  generalisation.   In  a  situation  like  the present  it is a far cry from natural justice to argue  that the whole constituency must be given a hearing. [310 F, H, 311 G-H, 312 A, D, E,] Col.   Singhi [1971] 1 SCR 791, Binapani [1967] 2  SCR  625, Ram  Gopal [1970] 1 SCR 472; Subhash Chander Singh [1970]  3 SCR 963 field inapplicable. Ghanshyam  Das Gupta [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 36 followed. 4(a)  Whether  the  action of  the  Election  Commission  in ordering repoll beyond certain segments of the  constituency where  the ballot boxes were destroyed was really  necessary or  not  is for the Election Court to  assess  when  judging whether  the impugned order was arbitrary, whimsical or  was arrived at by extraneous considerations. [316 H, 317 A-B] (b)  Independently  of  natural  justice,  judicial   review extends  to  an  examination of the order as  to  its  being perverse,  irrational, bereft of application of the mind  or without any evidentiary backing.  If two views are possible, the Court cannot interpose its view.  If no view is possible the Court must strike down. [317 B] (c)The philosophy behind natural justice is  participatory justice  in the process of democratic rule of law.   In  the vital  area  of  election  where  people’s  faith  in   the, democratic  process is hypersensitive it is realism to  keep alive audi alteram even in emergencies.  Hearing need not be an  elaborate ritual.  In situations of quick  despatch,  it

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may be minimal, even formal.  Fair hearing is a postulate of decision  making, although fair abridgement of that  process is  permissible.   It  can  be fair  without  the  rules  of evidence or forms of trial. [316 D-F] (d)The  silence  of  a statute has  no  exclusionary  effect except  where it flows from necessary implication.   Article 324 vests a wide power and where some direct consequence  on candidates  emanates  from  its  exercise  this   functional obligation must be read into it. [316 F] Observations (a)When  a statutory functionary makes an order  based  on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the  reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons  in the  shape of affidavit or otherwise.  Otherwise,  an  order bad  in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court  on account of a challenge, gets validated by additional grounds later brought out. [283 B-C] (b)An   obiter  binds  none,  not  even  the  author   and obliteration  of  findings rendered in  supererogation  must allay the appellant’s apprehensions.  The High Court  should have abstained from its generosity. [284 C] (Per Goswami and Shinghal, JJ. concurring) (1)  The appellants’ argument that since Art. 324(6)  refers to "functions" and not "powers", there can be no question of the  Election  Commission exerrising any  power  under  that Article,  is without force.  The term  "functions"  includes powers as well as duties.        It is incomprehensible that a  person  or  body  can  discharge  any  functions  without exercising  powers.  Powers and duties are  integrated  with functions. [330 D-E] 2(a) It is well-established that an express statutory  grant of  power or the imposition of a definite duty carrie-  with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to  employ all the means that are usually employed and  that are   necessary  to  the  exercise  of  the  power  or   the performance  of the duty.  That which is clearly implied  is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed. [331  E- F] 277 (b)In  a  democratic set up power has to be  exercised  in accordance with law.  Since the conduct of all elections  is vested  under  Art. 324(1) in the Election  Commission,  the framers  of the Constitution took care to leaving scope  for exercise  of residuary power by the Election Commission,  in the infinite variety of situations that may emerge from time to  time.  Yet, every contingency could not be foreseen  and provided for with precision.  The Commission may be required to  cope with some situation, which may not be provided  for in  the  enacted laws and rules.  The  Election  Commission, which  is  a  high-powered  and  independent  body,   cannot exercise  its functions or perform its duties unless it  has an  amplitude  of  powers.   Where  a  law  is  absent,  the Commission is not to look to any external authority for  the grant of powers to deal with the situation but must exercise its power independently and see that the election process is completed  in a free and fair manner.  Moreover,  the  power has to be exercised with promptitude.[330 G, H, 331 A-B,  C- E, G] N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Nanakkal  Constituency and Others, [1952] SCR 218 followed. (c)  Section  19A  of  the  Act, in  terms,  refers  to  the functions  not only under the Representation of  the  People Act, 1950 and representation of the People Act, 1951 or  the rules  made  thereunder, but also  under  the  Constitution. Apart  from the several functions envisaged by the two  Acts

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and  the  rules,  the Commission  is  entitled  to  exercise certain powers under Art. 324 itself on its own right in  an area not covered by the Acts and rules. [332 A-B] (d)Whether  an  order  passed is wrong,  arbitrary  or  is otherwise  invalid,  relates to the mode of  exercising  the power and does not touch upon the existence of the power  in an  authority  if it is there either under the  Act  or  the rules or under Art. 324(1). [331 G] 3(a)  The  contention that the Election  Commission  had  no power to make the impugned order for a repoll in the  entire constituency. is without substance. [332 H] (b) Both under s.58 and under s. 64A the poll that was taken on  a particular polling station can be voided and  a  fresh poll  can  be ordered, by the  Commission.   These  sections cannot  be  said to be exhaustive.  It cannot be  said  that they rule out the making of an order to deal with a  similar situation  if  it  arises in  several  polling  stations  or sometimes  as  a general feature in  a  substantially  large area.   Although  these  two  sections  mention  "a  polling station"  or  "a  place fixed for the poll"  it  may,  where necessary embrace multiple polling stations. [332 G-H] (c)The Election Commission is competent, in an appropriate case, to order repoll of an entire constituency.  If it does that it will be an exercise of power within the ambit of its functions  under Art. 324.  Although in cxercise  of  powers under  Art. 324(1) the Election Commission cannot  do  some- thing impinging upon the power of the President in making  a notification under s. 14 of the Act, after the  notification has  been  issued  by the President,  the  entire  electoral process is in the charge of the Commission.  The  Commission is  exclusively responsible for the conduct of the  election without  reference  to  any outside agency.   There  are  no limitations under Art. 324(1). J333 C-E] 4.The  writ  petition  is not  maintainable.   Since  the election covers the entireprocess from the issue of  the notification under s. 14 to the declaration of theresult under  s.66 of the Act, when a poll that has  already  taken place has been cancelled and a fresh poll has been  ordered, the  order  is passed as an integral part of  the  electoral process.  The impugned order has been passed in exercise  of the power under Art. 324(1) and s. 153 of the Act.  Such  an order  cannot be questioned except by an  election  petition under the Act. [333 G-H, 334 A] 5(a)  There  is  no  foundation for  a  grievance  that  the appellants  will  be  without  any  remedy,  if  their  writ application is dismissed.  If during the process of election at an intermediate or final stage. the entire poll has  been wrongly cancelled and a fresh poll has been wrongly ordered, that is a matter which can be agitated after the declaration of the result on the basis of the 278 fresh poll, by questioning the election in the  appropriate, forum.   The  appellants  will not be without  a  remedy  to question every step in the electoral process and every order that has been passed in the process of the election  includ- ing the countermanding of the earlier poll.  The Court  will be  able  to entertain their objection with  regard  to  the order of the Election Commission countermanding the  earlier poll and the whole matter will be at large. [334 B-F] (b)The   Election   Commission  has   passed   the   order professedly under Art. 324 and s. 153 of the Act.  If  there is  any illegality in the exercise of the power  under  this Article  or  under  any provision of the Act,  there  is  no reason  why  s. 100(1)(d)(iv) should not be  attracted.   If

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exercise  of power is competent either under the  provisions of the Constitution or under any other provision of law, any infirmity  in  the exercise of that power is on  account  of noncompliance with the provisions of law, since law  demands exercise,  of power by its repository in a proper,  regular, fair and reasonable manner. [335 B-D] Durga  Shankar  Mehra v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh  and  others, [1955] 1 SCR 267 referred to. (c)The  writ petition is barred under Art. 329 (b) of  the Constitution and the High Court has rightly dismissed it  on that ground.  Both Art. 329(b) and s. 80 of the Act  provide that  no election shall be called in question except  by  an election petition.  All reliefs claimed by the appellant  in the  writ petition can be claimed in the  election  petition and  the  High Court is competent to  give  all  appropriate reliefs to do complete justice between the parties.  It will be  open to the High Court to pass any ancillary  or  conse- quential  order to enable it to grant the  necessary  relief provided under the Act. [335 D-G] 6.It will not be correct for this Court, in this  appeal, to pronounce its judgment finally on merits either on law or on  facts.   The  pre-eminent  position  conferred  by   the Constitution  on  this  Court  under  Article  141  of   the Constitution  does not envisage that this Court  should  lay down the law, in an appeal like this, on any matter which is required  to  be decided by’ the election court  on  a  full trial  of the election petition, without the benefit of  the opinion  of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which has  the exclusive  jurisdiction under s. 80A of the Act to  try  the election petition. [335 H, 363 A]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1297 of 1977. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated 25th  of  April 1977 of the Delhi High Court in  Civil  Writ Petition No. 245 of 1977. P.  P.  Rao,  A.  K.  Ganguli  and  Ashwani  Kumar  for  the appellant. Soli  J.  Sorabjee,  Additional  Solicitor  General,  E.  C. Agarwala, B.   N.  Kripal and Girish Chandra for  Respondent No. 1. M.N. Phadke, S. S. Bindra, Hardev Singh & R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 3. The followiug Judgments of the Court were delivered by KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-What troubles us in this  appeal,  coming before  a  Bench of 5 Judges on a  reference  under  Article 145(3)  of  the  Constitution,  is  not  the  profusion   of controversial facts nor the thorny bunch of lesser law,  but the   possible   confusion  about   a   few   constitutional fundamentals, finer administrative normae and jurisdictional limitations   bearing  upon  elections.   What   are   those fundamentals  and  limitations?  We will state  them,  after mentioning  briefly what the writ petition, from which  this appeal, by special leave, has arisen, is about, 279 The basics Every significant case has an unwritten legend and indelible lesson.   This appeal is no exception, whatever  its  formal result.   The  message,  as we will see at the  end  of  the decision, relates to the pervasive philosophy of  democratic elections  which Sir Winston ChurchiU vivified in  matchless words :               "At  the  bottom  of  all  tributes  paid   to

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             democracy  is the little man, walking  into  a               little  booth, with a little pencil, making  a               little  cross  on  a little  bit  of  paper-no               amount  of rhetoric or  voluminous  discussion               can   possibly   diminish   the   overwhelming               importance of the point."               If we may add, the little, large Indian  shall               not  be hijacked from the course of  free  and               fair  elections  by  mob  muscle  methods,  or               subtle perversion of discretion by men dressed               in little, brief authority.  For ’be you  ever               so high, the law is above you. The moral may be stated with telling terseness in the  words of   William  Pitt:  ’Where  laws  end,   tyranny   begins’. Embracing both these mandates and emphasizing their combined effect  is  the  elemental law and politics  of  Power  best expressed by Benjamin Dizreeli:               "I  repeat that all power is a  trust-that  we               are  accountable for its  exercise-that,  from               the  people and for the people,  all  springs,               and all must exist."               (Vivien Grey, BK.  VI.  Ch. 7) Aside  from these is yet another, bearings on the,  play  of natural  justice, its nuances,  non-applications,  contours, colour and content.  Natural Justice is no mystic  testament of  judge-made juristics but the pragmatic, yet  principled, requirement of fairplay in action as the norm of a civilised justice-system  and minimum of good  government-crystallised clearly  in our jurisprudence by a catena of cases here  and elsewhere. The conspectus of facts The  historic elections to Parliament, recently held  across the  ,country, included a constituency in Punjab called  13- Ferozepore Parliamentary constituency.  It consisted of nine assembly  segments and the polling took place on  March  16, 1977.   According to the calendar notified by  the  Election Commission,  the  counting  took place in  respect  of  five assembly segments on March 20, 1977 and the, remaining  four on  the  next day.  The appellant and the  third  respondent were  the  principal  contestants.   It  is  stated  by  the appellant  that when counting in all the  assembly  segments was completed at the respective segment headquarters, copies of  the results were given to the candidates and  the  local tally  telephonically communicated to the returning  officer (respondent 2).  According to the scheme the postal  ballots are  to  arrive at the returning officer’s  headquarters  at Ferozepore where they are to be counted.  The final tally is made when the ballot boxes 280 and the returns duly reach the Ferozepore headquarters front the  various  segment headquarters.  The poll  proceeded  as ordained, almost to the very last stages, but the completion of   the  counting  at  the  constituency  headquarters   in Ferozepore  was  aborted  at the final hour  as  the  postal ballots were being counted-thanks to mob violence  allegedly mobilised  at  the instance of the  third  respondent.,  The appellant’s version is that he had all but won on the  total count  by  a margin of nearly 2000 votes when  the  panicked opposite party havoced and halted the consummation by muscle tactics.   The  postal ballot papers were  destroyed.   The, ballot  boxes from the Fazilka segment were also  done  away with en route, and the returning officer was terrified  into postponing the declaration of the result.  On account of  an earlier complaint that the returning officer was a  relation of  the  appellant,  the  Election  Commission  (hereinafter

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referred  to as Commission) had: deputed an officer  of  the Commission-Shri IKK Menon-as observer of the poll process in the  constituency.  He was present as the returning  officer who  under  compulsion had postponed the concluding  3  p.m. onwards.  Thus the returning officer had the company of  the observer   with   him   during  the   crucial   stages   and controversial  eruptions  in  the  afternoon  of  March  21. Shortly after sunset, presumably, the returning officer  who under  compulsion had postponed the concluding part  of  the election, reported the happenings by wireless massage to the Election  Commission.  The observer also reached  Delhi  and gave a written account and perhaps an oral narration of  the untoward events which marred what would otherwise have  been a smooth finish Lo, the election. Disturbed  by the disruption of the declaratory part of  the election, the appellant, along with a former Minister of the State,  met  the  Chief  Election  Commissioner  (i.e.   the Commission)  at  about 10.30 A.M. on March  22nd,  with  the request  that  he  should direct the  returning  officer  to declare the result of the election.  Later in  the day,  the Commission  issued an order which has been characterised  by the appellant as a law-less and precedentless  cancellation, of  the  whole  poll,  acting by  hasty  hunch  and  without rational appraisal of facts.  By the 22nd of_March, when the Election Commission made the impugned order, the bulk of the electoral  results  in  the  country  bad  beamed  in.   The gravamen of the grievance of the appellant is that while  he had, in all probability, won the poll, he has been  deprived of  this  valuable  and hard-won victory  by  the  arbitrary action  of the Commission going contrary to fairplay and  in negation of the basic canons of natural justice.  Of  course the  Commission  did  not stop  with  the  cancellation  but followed  it up a few days later with a direction to hold  a fresh  poll_for  the whole constituency, involving  all  the nine  segments, although there were no complaints about  the polling  in any of the constituencies and the ballot  papers of  eight  constituencies  were available  intact  with  the returning  officer  and only Fazilka segment  ballot  papers were  destroyed  or demanded on the way,  (plus  the  postal ballots).  It must also, be mentioned here that a demand was made, according to the version, of the third respondent, for recount in one segment which was,, 281 unreasonably,  turned down.  The observer, in his report  to the Election Commission, also mentioned that in two  polling stations  divergent  practices  were adopted  in  regard  to testing  valid and invalid votes.  To be more pracise,  Shri IKK  Menon mentioned’ in his report that at polling  station no.  8, the presiding officer’s seal on the tag as  well  as the paper seal of one box was broken.  But the ballot papers contained  in  that box were below 300 and  would  not  have affected  the result in the normal course.  In another  case in  Jalalabad  assembly  segment,  the  assistant  returning officer had rejected a number of ballot papers of a  polling station  on  the  score that they were  not  signed  by  the presiding officer.  In yet another case it was reported that the  ballot papers were neither signed nor stamped but  were accepted  by the assistant returning officer as  valid,  al- though  the factum was not varified by Shri Menon  with  the assistant  returning  officer.  Shri Menon, in  his  report, seems  to  have broadly authenticated the story of  the  mob creating  a  tense situation leading to the  military  being summoned.   According  to  him only  the  ballot  papers  of Fazilka  assembly segment were destroyed, not of the.  other segments.   Even  regarding Fazilka,  the  result-sheet  had

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arrived.   So, far as Zira assembly segment  was  concerned, some  documents (not the, ballot papers) had  been  snatched away  by  hooligans.  The observer had asked  the  returning officer  to  send  a  detailed report  over  and  above  the wireless message.  That report, dated March 21, reached  the Commission  on  March  23, but,  without  waiting  for  the, report  we  need  not probe the reasons  for  the  hurry-the Commission issued the order cancelling the poll.  The  Chief Election Commissioner has filed a laconic affidavit  leaving to the Secretary of the Commission to go into the details of the  facts,  although the Chief Election  Commissioner  must himself have had them within his personal ken.  This  aspect also  need not be examined by us and indeed cannot  be,  for reasons which we will presently set out. Be that as it may, the Chief Election Commissioner  admitted in his affidavit that the appellant met him in his office on the  morning  of March 22, 1977 with the  request  that  the returning  officer  be directed to declare the  result.   He agreed  to  consider and told him him off,,  and  eventually passed an order as mentioned above.  The then Chief Election Commissioner  has  mentioned  in  his  affidavit  that   the observer  Shri  Menon  had  apprised  him  of  "the  various incidents  and developments regarding the counting of  votes in  the  constituency"  and also  had  submitted  a  written report.   He has also admitted the receipt of  the  wireless message,  of  the  returning  officer.   He  concludes   his affidavits  ’that after taking all these  circumstances  and information  including  the oral representation of  the  1st petitioner  into account on "2nd Much, 1977 itself I  passed the  order  cancelling the poll in  the  said  Parliamentary constituency.  In my view this was the only proper course to adopt  in the circumstances of the case and with a  view  to ensuring  fair and free elections, particularly when even  a recount  bad  been  rendered impossible  by  reason  of  the destruction  of  ballot papers.’ The order of  the  Election Commission, resulting in the demolition of the poll  already held, may be read at this stage. 282 "ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA                                          New Delhi                                  Dated 22 March, 1977                                Chaitra 1, 1899 (SAKA)              NOTIFICATION S.O.-Whereas  the Election Commission has  received  reports from  the Returning Officer of  13-Ferozepore  Parliamentary Constituency  that  the  counting  on  21  March,  1977  was seriously  disturbed by violence; that the ballot papers  of some   of  the  assembly  segments  of   the   Parliamentary constituency  have  been destroyed by violence;  that  as  a consequence  it is not possible to complete the counting  of the  votes  in the constituency and the declaration  of  the result cannot be made with any degree of certainty: And  whereas  the Commission is satisfied  that  taking  all circumstances into account, the poll in the constituency has been  vitiated to such an extent as to effect the result  of the election; Now,  therefore, the Commission, in exercise of  the  powers vested in it under Article 324 of the Constitution,  Section 153  of the, Representation of the People Act, 1951 and  all other powers enabling it so to do, cancels the poll  already taken  in  the  constituency and extends the  time  for  the completion of the election up to 30 April, 1977 by  amending its  notification  No. 464/77, dated 25  February,  1977  in respect of the above election as follows :- In clause (d) of item (i) of the said notification, relating

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to the completion of election-               (a)   in  the  existing item  (i),  after  the               words "State of Jammu and Kashmir", the  words               "and  13-Ferozepur Parliamentary  constituency               in the State of Punjab" shall be inserted; and               (b)   The   existing   item  (ii)   shall   be               renumbered as item (iii), and before the  item               (iii)  as  so renumbered, the  following  item               shall be inserted, namely :-                "(iii)  30 April 1977 (Saturday) as the  date               before  which the election shall be  completed               in "13Ferozepur Parliamentary constituency  in               the State of Punjab." [464/77]                                            By order                                            Sd/- A. N. Sen,                                            Secretary The Commission declined to reconsider his decision when  the appellant pleaded for it.  Shocked by the liquidation of the entire  poll, the latter moved the High Court under  Article 226 and sought to void the order as without jurisdiction and otherwise   arbitrary  and  violative  of  any  vestige   of fairness.   He was met by the objection, successfully  urged by the respondents  1 and 3, that the High Court               283 -had  no  jurisdiction  in view of  Article  329(b)  of  the Constitution  and the Commission had acted within  its  wide power under Article 324 and fairly.  Holding that it had  no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. the High  Court never-the-less ]proceeded to enter verdicts on.the merits of all   the  issues  virtually  exercising  even  the   entire ,jurisdiction  which  exclusively belonged to  the  Election Tribunal.   The  doubly damnified appellant has come  up  to this Court in appeal by special leave. Meanwhile,  pursuant to the, Commission’s direction,  a  re- poll  was held.  Although the appellant’s name  lingered  on the  ballot  he  did  not participate  in  the  re-poll  and respondent  3 won by an easy plurality although  numerically those  who voted were less than half of the, previous  poll. Of  course, if the Commission’s order for re-poll  fails  in law, the second electoral exercise has to be dismissed as  a stultifying  futility.  Two things fall to be  mentioned  at this stage, but, in passing, it may be stated that the third respondent had complained to the Chief Election Commissioner that the assistant returning officer of Fazilka segment  had declined  the request for recount unreasonably and  that  an order  for  re-poll of the Fazilka assembly part  should  be made  ’after giving personal hearing’.  Meanwhile, runs  the request  of  the  third respondents  ’direct  the  returning officer  to withhold declaration of result of 13  Ferozepore parliament constituency’.  We do not stop to make  inference from  this  document but refer to it as  a  material  factor which  may be considered by the tribunal which,  eventually, has to decide, the factual controversy. The second equally relevant matter is that when a  statutory functionary  makes  an order based on certain  grounds,  its validity  must  be judged by the reasons  so  mentioned  and cannot  be  supplemented by fresh reasons in  the  shape  of affidavit  or  otherwise.  Otherwise, an order  bad  in  the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought ,out.   We  may here draw attention to the  observations  of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji (1)               "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise  of               a  statutory authority cannot be construed  in               the  light of explanations subsequently  given

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             by  the  officer making the order of  what  he               meant,  or of what was in Ms mind, or what  he               intended to, do. Public orders made by  public               authorities  are meant to have  public  effect               and  are  intended to effect the  actings  and               conduct  of those to whom they  are  addressed               and   must  be  construed   objectively   with               reference  to the language used in  the  order               itself." Orders  are not like old wine becoming better as  they  grow older: A Caveat. We must, in limine, state that-anticipating our decision  on the  blanket  ban  on  litigative  interference  during  the process  of the election, clamped down by Article 329(b)  of the  Constitution-we  do  not propose  to  enquire  into  or pronounce upon the factual complex or the (1) A.I.T. 1952 S.C. 16. 284 lesser  legal  tangles,  but  only  narrate  the   necessary circumstances of the case to get a hang of the major  issues which  we intend adjudicating.  Moreover, the scope  of  any actual  investigation in the event of controversion  in  any petition under Article 226 is ordinarily limited and we have before  us  an  appeal  from the  High  Court  dismissing  a petition  under  Article  226  on  the  score  that  such  a proceeding is constitutionally out of bounds for any  court, having  regard to the mandatory embargo.  in  Article329(b). We  should not,except in exceptional  circumstances,  breach the recognised, though not inflexible, boundaries of Article 226 sitting in appeal, even assuming the maintainability  of such  a petition.  Indeed, we should have expected the  High Court  to  have considered the  basic  jurisdictional  issue first,  and not last as it did, and avoided  sallying  forth into  a discussion and decision on the merits,  self-contra- dicting its own holding that it had no jurisdiction even  to entertain the petition.  The learned Judges observed :               "It is true that the submission at serial  No.               3  above  in fact relates to  the  preliminary               objection urged on behalf of respondents 1 and               3  and should normally have been dealt with  &               St but since the contentions of the parties on               submission  No.  1 are  inter-mixed  with  the               interpretation   of  Article  329(b)  of   the               Constitution,  we  thought it proper  to  deal               with them in the order in which they have been               made." This  is  hardly a convincing alibi for  the  extensive  per incuriam  examination of facts and law gratuitously made  by the  Division  Bench of the High Court,  thereby  generating apprehensions  in the appellant’s mind that not only is  his petition not maintainable but he has been damned by damaging findings on the merits.  We make it unmistakably plain  that the  election court hearing the dispute on the same  subject under section 98 of the R.P. Act, 1951 (for short, the  Act) shall  not be moved by expressions of opinion on the  merits made  by  the  Delhi High Court while  dismissing  the  writ petition.   An obiter binds none, not even the  author,  and obliteration  of  findings rendered in  supererogation  must alley  the  appellant’s apprehensions.  This Court is  in  a better position than the High Court, being competent,  under certain  circumstances, to declare the law by virtue of  its position  under Article 141.  But, absent such authority  or duty,  the  High  Court  should  have  abstained  from   its generosity.   Lest  there  should  be  any  confusion  about

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possible  slants inferred from our synoptic  statements,  we clarify that nothing projected in this judgment is  intended to  be  an expression of our opinion even  indirectly.   The facts have been set out only to serve as a peg to hang three primary  constitutional  issues which we  will  formulate  a little later. Operation Election Before we proceed further, we had better have a full glimpse of tie, constitutional scheme of elections in our system and the   legislative  follow-up  regulating  the   process   of election.   Shri  Justice Mathew in lndira  Nehru  Gandhi(1) summarised skeletal fashion, this scheme (1)  [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347 285 following   the  pattern  adopted  by  Fazal  Ali,   J.   in Ponnuswami. 1952 SCR 218.  He explained :               "The concept of democracy as visualised by the               Constitution presupposes the representation of               the    people   in   Parliament   and    state               legislatures by the method of election.   And,               before  an election machinery can  be  brought               into  operation,  there are  three  requisites               which  require to be attended to, namely,  (1)               there should be a set of laws and rules making               provisions   with  respect  to   all   matters               relating to, or in connection with, elections,               and it should be decided as to how these  laws               and rules are to be made; (2). there should be               an executive charged with the duty of securing               the  due conduct of elections; and  (3)  there               should  be  a judicial tribunal to  deal  with               disputes arising out of or in connection  with               elections.  Articles 327 and 328 deal with the               first  of these requisites, article  324  with               the  second  and article 329  with  the  third               requisite  (see N. P. Ponnuswami v.  Returning               Officer,  Nanmakkal Constituency &  Ors.  1952               SCR 218, 229).  Article 329 (b) envisages  the               challenge  to an election by a petition to  be               presented to such authority as the  Parliament               may,  by  law, prescribe.  A law  relating  to               election   should   contain   the    requisite               qualifications  for candidates, the method  of               voting, definition of corrupt practices by the               candidates  and  their  election  agents,  the               forum  for adjudication of  election  disputes               and other cognate matters.  It is on the basis               of  this law that the question  determined  by               the   authority  to  which  the  petition   is               presented.   And, when a dispute is raised  as               regards  the  validity of the  election  of  a               particular candidate, the authority  entrusted               with  the task of resolving the  dispute  must               necessarily  exercise,  a  judicial  function,               for, the process consists of ascertaining  the               facts  relating to the election  and  applying               the law to the facts so ascertained." A short description of the legislative project in some  more detail may be pertinent, especially touching on the  polling process  in the booths and the transmission of ballot  boxes from  the  polling  stations  to  the  returning   officer’s ultimate  counting  station and  the  crucial  prescriptions regarding  annuoncements and recounts and declarations.   We do not pronounce upon the issues regarding the stage for and right of recount. the validity of votes or other factual  or

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legal disputes since they fall for decision by the  Election Court where the appellant has filed an election petition  by way of abundant caution. A free and fair election based on universal adult  franchise is  the  basic;  the  regulatory  procedures  vis-a-vis  the repositories   of   functions  and   the   distribution   of legislative,  executive  and judicative roles in  the  total scheme, directed towards the holding of free elections,  are the  specifics.   Part  XV  of  the  Constitution  plus  the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (for short, the  1950 Act)  and  the Representation of the People Act,  1951  (for short,  the  Act), Rules framed  there  under,  instructions issued and exercises prescribed, constitute the package of 286 electoral  law  governing  the  parliamentary  and  assembly elections  in  the  country.   The  super-authority  is  the Election  Commission, the kingpin is the returning  officer, the  minions  are  the presiding  officers  in  the  polling stations and the electoral engineering is in conformity with the elaborate legislative provisions. The  scheme is this.  The President of India (Under  Section 14)  ignites  the  general elections across  the  nation  by calling upon the People, divided into several constituencies and  registered  in  the electoral rolls,  to  choose  their representatives  to  the Lok  Sabha.   The  constitutionally appointed authority, the Election Commission, takes over the whole conduct and supervision of the mammoth enterprise  in- volving a plethora of details and variety of activities, and starts off with the notification of the time table for  the, several  stages of the election (Section 30).  The  assembly line operations then begin.  An administrative machinery and technology  to  execute these enormous and diverse  jobs  is fabricated by the Act, creating officers, powers and duties, delegation  of functions and location of  polling  stations. The  precise  exercise following upon the calendar  for  the poll,  commencing  from presentation of  nomination  papers, polling  drill  and telling of votes,,  culminating  in  the declaration  and report of results are covered  by  specific prescriptions in the Act and the rules.  The secrecy of  the ballot,  the authenticity of the voting paper and its  later identifiability   with  reference  to   particular   polling stations, have been thoughtfully provided for.  Myriad other matters necessary for smooth elections have been taken  care of by several provisions of the Act. The  wide canvas so spread need not engage  us  sensitively, since  such  diffusion may weaken concentration on  the  few essential  points concerned in this case.  One  such  aspect relates  to repoll.  Adjournment of the poll at any  polling station  in certain emergencies is sanctioned by section  57 and  fresh  poll  in specified  vitiating  contingencies  is authorised   by  section  58.   The  rules  run  into   more particulars.  After the votes are cast comes their counting. Since the simple plurality of votes clinches the verdict, as the critical moment approaches, the situation is apt to  hot up,  disturbances erupt and destruction of ballots  disrupt. If  disturbance  or destruction demolishes the  prospect  of counting  the  total  votes,  the  number  secured  by  each candidate and the ascertainment of the will of the majority, a re-poll confined to disrupted polling stations is provided for.   Section 64A chalks out the conditions for and  course of such repoll, spells out the power, and repository thereof and provides for kindred matters.  At this stage we may make a   closer   study  of  the  provisions   regarding   repoll systematically and stagewise arranged in the Act.  It is not the  case  of either side that a total repoll of  an  entire

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constituency  is specificated in the sections or the  rules. Reliance is placed for this wider power upon Article 324  of the  Constitution-by  the Commission in its  order,  by  the first respondent in his affidavit, by the learned Additional Solicitor   General  in  his  argument  and  by  the   third respondent  through his counsel.  We may therefore  have  to study the scheme of. article 324 and the provisions of  the, Act together since they are integral to each other.  Indeed, if  we may mix metaphors for emphasis, the legislation  made pursuant  to Article 327 and that part of  the  Constitution specially devoted to elections must be 287 viewed   as  one  whole  picture,  must  be  heard   as   an orchestrated piece and must be interpreted as one package of provisions   regulating  perhaps  the  most  stressful   and strategic  aspect  of  democracy-in-action so  dear  to  the nation and so essential for its survival. The lis and the issues Two prefatory points need to be mentioned as some  reference was  made to them at the bar.  Firstly, an election  dispute is  not like an ordinary lis between private  parties.   The entire  electorate is vicariously, not inertly,  before  the court. (See 1959 SCR 611, 616, 622).  We may, perhaps,  call this  species of cases collective litigation where  judicial activism assures justice to the constituency, guardians  the purity  of  the  system  and  decides  the  rights  of   the candidates.   In this class of cases, where the  common  law tradition  is  partly  departed from, the  danger  that  the active judge may become, to some extent, the prisoner of his own prejudices exists; and so, notwithstanding his powers of initiative,  the  parties’ role in the  formulation  of  the issues  and  in the presentation of  evidence  and  argument should be substantially maintained and- care has to be taken that  the circle does not become a vicious one,  as  pointed out  by J.A. Jolowicz in.  ’Public Interest Parties and  the Active Role of the Judge in Civil Litigation’ (ss. p.  276). Therefore,  it is essential that courts,  adjudicating  upon election  controversies,  must play a  verily  active  role, conscious  all the time that every decision rendered by  the Judge transcends private rights and defends the constituency and the democracy of the country. Secondly, the pregnant problem of power and its  responsible exercise  is one of the perennial riddles of many  a  modern constitutional order.  Similarly, the periodical process  of free  and  fair  elections.  uninfluenced  by  the  caprice, cowardices or partisanship of hierarchical authority holding it and unintimidated by the threat, tantrum or vandalism  of strong-arm   tactics,  exacts  the  embarrassing  price   of vigilant   monitoring.   Democracy  digs  its  grave   where passions,  tensions and violence, on an overpowering  spree, upset results of peaceful polls, and the law of elections is guilty  of  sharp practice if it hastens to  legitimate  the fruits of lawlessness.  The judicial branch has a  sensitive responsibility  her  to  call to  order  lawless  behaviour. Forensic non-action may boomerang, for the court and the law are  functionally  the  bodyguards  of  the  People  against bumptious power, official or other. We  now  enter  the  constitutional  zone  relating  to  the controversy   in  this  case.   Although  both  sides   have formulated the plural problems with some divergence, we  may compress them into three cardinal questions :               1.Is  Art.  329(b) a blanket  ban  on  all               manner  of questions which may have impact  on               the  ultimate result of the election,  arising               between two temporal termini viz., the notifi-

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             cation  by  the  President  calling  for   the               election and the declaration of the result  by               the  returning  officer  ? Is  Art.  226  also               covered by this embargo and. if so, is s.  100               broad  enough  to accommodate  every  kind  of               objection,  constitutional, legal or  factual,               which  may have the result of invalidation  of               an               288               election and the declaration of the petitioner               as  the  returned  candidate  and  direct  the               organisation  of any steps necessary  to  give               full relief ?               2.Can  the  Election  Commission,  clothed               with the comprehensive functions under Article               324 of the Constitution, cancel the whole poll               of a constituency after it has been held,  but               before  the formal declaration of  the  result               has been made, and direct a fresh poll without               reference  to the guidelines under ss. 58  and               64(a) of the Act, or other legal  prescription               or legislative backing.  If such plenary power               exists, is it exercisable on the basis of  his               inscrutable ’subjective satisfaction’ or  only               on  a reviewable objective assessment  reached               on the basis of circumstances vitiating a free               and fair election and warranting the  stoppage               of declaration of the result and directions of               a fresh poll not merely of particular  polling               stations but of the total constituency ?               3.Assuming   a   constitutionally   vested               capacity tinder Art. 324 to direct re-poll, is               it exercisable only in conformity with natural               justice and geared to the sole goal of a free,               popular  verdict  if frustrated on  the  first               occasion  ?  Or, is  the  Election  Commission               immune  to the observance of the  doctrine  of               natural  justice on account of any  recognised               exceptions  to  the application  of  the  said               principle  and  unaccountable for  his  action               even before the Election Court ? The  juridical  aspect of these triple questions  alone  can attract judicial jurisdiction.  However. even if we  confine ourselves  to  legal problematics, eschewing  the  political overtones, the words of Justice Holmes will haunt the  Court :  "We  are  quiet  here, but it is the  quiet  of  a  storm centre."  The judicature must, however. be illumined in  its approach  by a legal sociological guidelines and  a  princi- pled-pragmatic  insight  in resolving, with jural  tool  and techniques s ,ind techniques.  ’the various crises of  human affairs’ as they reach the forensic stage and seek  dispute- resolution  in  terms of the rule of law.   Justice  Cordozo felicitously set the perspective               "The  great generalities of  the  Constitution               have  at  content and significance  that  vary               from age to age."               Chief   Justice   Hidayatullah    perceptively               articulated the insight               "One  must,  of  course,  take  note  of   the               synthesized authoritative content or the moral               meaning  of the underlying’ principle of  the,               prescriptions  of  law, but  not  ignored  the               historic revolution of the, law itself or  how               it  was connected in its changing  moods  with               social requirements of a particular age.

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             (Judicial Methods, B. N. Rau Memorial Lecture) The  old articles of the supreme lex meet new challenges  of life, the old legal pillars suffer new stresses.  So we have to  adopt  the law and develop its  latent  capabilities  if novel situations, as here, are encountered.  That is why  in the reasoning we have adopted and the 289 perspective  we have projected, not literal nor lexical  but liberal  and visional is our interpretation of the  Articles of  the  Constitution and the provisions of the  Act.   Lord Denning’s words are instructive               "Law   does   not  stand  still.    It   moves               continually.  Once; this is recongnised,  then               the  task  of  the Judge is put  on  a  higher               plane.  He must consciously seek to mould  the               law  so as to serve the needs of the time.  He               must  not be a mere, mechanic, a mere  working               mason, laying brick on brick, without  thought               to  the overall design.  He must be an  archi-               tect-thinking  of  the structure  as  a  whole               building for society a system of law which  is               strong,  durable and just.  It is on his  work               that civilised society itself depends." The invulnerable barrier of Art.329 (b). Right at the forefront stands in the way of the  appellant’s progress the broad-spectrum ban of Article 329(b) which,  it is  claimed  for the respondents, is  imperative  and  goal- oriented.   Is  this  Great  Wall of  China,  set  up  as  a preliminary bar, so impregnable that it cannot be by  passed even  by  Art. 226 ? That, in a sense, is the  key  question that  governs the fate of this appeal.  Shri P. P.  Rao  for the appellant contended that, however, wide Art. 329(b)  may be, it does not debar proceedings challenging, not the steps promoting   election  but  dismantling  it,  taken  by   the Commission  without the backing of legality.  He also  urged that his client, who had been nearly successful in the  poll and  had been deprived of it by an illegal  cancellation  by the Commission, would be left in the cold without any remedy since the challenge to cancellation of the completed poll in the  entire constituency was not covered by s. 1 00  of  the Act.   Many  subsidiary pleas also were put forward  but  we will  focus on the two inter-related submissions bearing  on Art.  329(b)  and  s. 100 and search for  a  solution.   The problem  may seem prickly but an imaginative application  of principles  and liberal interpretation of  the  constitution and  the Act will avoid anomalies and assure justice. if  we may  anticipate our view which will presently be  explained, section 100 (1 ) (d) (iv) of the Act will take care of  the, situation  present here, being broad enough, as  a  residual provision, to accommodate, in  expression  ’non-compliance’, every  excess, transgression, breach or omission.   And  the spen of the, ban under Art. 329(b) is measured by the  sweep of s. 100 of the Act. We have to proceed heuristically now.  Article 329(b) reads Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution                 "(b) no election to either House of Parliament               or  to  the  House  or  either  House  of  the               Legislature  of  a State shall  be  called  in               question   except  by  an  election   petition               presented to such authority and in such manner               as  may  be Provided for by or under  any  law               made by the appropriate Legislature." Let  us  break  down  the  prohibitory  provision  into  its components.   The sole remedy for an aggrieved party, if  he wants  to challenge any election, is an  election  petition.

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And this exclusion of all other remedies 290 includes  constitutional remedies like Art. 226  because  of the nonobstante clause.  If what is impugned is an  election the  ban  operates  provided the  proceeding  ’calls  it  in question’  or puts it in issue: not otherwise.  What is  the high  policy  animating  this  inhibition’?   Is  there  any interpretative  alternative which will  obviate  irreparable injury  and permit legal contests in between?  How  does  S. 100 (1) (d) (iv) of the Act integrate into the scheme?   Let us read s. 100 here :               "Subject to the provisions of sub-section  (2)               if the High Court is of opinion-               x                 x                  x               (d)that  the result of the election, in  so               far  as it concerns a returned candidate,  has               been materially affected-               x                x                  x                (iv) by    any   non-compliance   with    the               provisions  of the Constitution or of the  Act               or of any rules or orders made under this  Act               the  High Court shall declare the election  of               the returned candidate to be void.               The companion provision, viz., s. 98 also  may               be extracted at this,star, :               "At the conclusion of the trial of an election               petition the               High Court shall make an order-               (a)   dismissing the election petition; or               (b)   declaring the election all or any of the               returned candidates to be void; or               (e)   declaring the election of all or any  of               the  returned  candidates to be void  and  the               petitioner or any other candidate to have been               duly elected." Now  arises the need to sketch the scheme of s. 1 00 in  the setting   of   Art.329(b).  The   troublesome   word   ’non- compliance’  holds  in its fold a  teleologic  signification which  resolves  the riddle of this case in, a way.   So  we will  address,  ourselves  to the meaning  of  meanings  the values  within the words and the ’project  unfolded’.   This will be taken up one after the other. At the first blush we get the comprehensive impression  that every  calling in question of an election save, at the  end, by  an election petition, is forbidden.  What, then,  is  an election  ? What is ’calling in question ? Every  step  from start to finish of the total process constitutes ’election’, not merely the conclusion or culmination.  Can the cancella- tion of the entire poll be called a step in the process  and for the progress of an election, or is it a reverse step  of undoing what has been done in the progress of the  election, non-step  or  anti-step setting at nought the  process  and, therefore,  not a step towards the goal and hence  liberated from  the  coils of Art. 329(b) ? And, if this act  or  step were to be shielded by the constitutional provision, what is an  aggrieved  party to do 9 This takes us  to  the  enquiry about the ambit of S. 100 of the Act and the object of  Art. 329  (b)  read with Art. 324.  Such is the  outline  of  the complex issue projected before us. 291 ’The election philosophy and the principle in Ponnuswami Democracy  is government by the people.  It is  a  continual participative   operation,  not  a   cataclysmic,   periodic exercise.   The  little man, in his multitude,  marking  his vote at the poll does a social audit of his Parliament  plus

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political choice of his proxy.  Although the full flower  of participative   Government  rarely  blossoms,  the   minimum credential  of  popular government is appeal to  the  people after  every term for a renewal of confidence.  So. we  have adult  franchise  and general  elections  as  constitutional compulsions.  ’The right of election is the very essence  of the  constitution’  (Junius).  It needs little  argument  to hold that the heart of the Parliamentary system is free, and fair elections periodically held, based on adult  franchise, although social and economic democracy may demand much more. Ponnuswami  is  a landmark case in election laws  and  deals with the scope, amplitude, rationale and limitations of Art. 329(b).  its  ratio has been consistently followed  by  this Court in several rulings through Durga Shankar Mehta (1) and Hari  Vishnu Kamath and Khare (2) down to Indira  Gandhi(3). The factual setting in that case may throw some light on the decision itself.  The appellant’s nomination for election to the   Madras  Legislative  Assembly  was  rejected  by   the Returning  Officer  and  so he hurried  to  the  High  Court praying  for  a  writ of certiorari to quash  the  order  of rejection,  without waiting for the entire elective  process to  run  its  full course and, at the end of  it,  when  the results  also were declared, to move the  election  tribunal for  setting  aside  the result of  the  election  conducted without his participation.  He thought that if the  election proceeded  without him irreparable damage, would  have  been caused and therefore sought to intercept the progress of the election  by  filing  a  writ  petition.   The  High   Court dismissed  it  as unsustainable, thanks to Art.  329(b)  and this court in appeal, affirmed that holding.  Fazal Ali,  J. virtually  spoke for the Court and explained  the  principle underlying  Art.  329(b).  The ambit and spirit of  the  bar imposed by the Article was elucidated with reference to  the principle  that ’it does not require much argument  to  show that  in a country with a democratic constitution  in  which the legislatures have to play a very important role, it will lead  to  serious consequences if the elections  are  unduly protracted  or  obstructed.’  In the view  of  the,  learned Judge, immediate individual relief at an intermediate  stage when  the  process  of  election is  under  way  has  to  be sacrificed  for the paramount public good of  promoting  the completion of elections.  Fazal Ali, J. ratiocinated on  the ineptness  of. interlocutory legal bold-ups.  He  posed  the issue and answered it thus :               "The  question now arises whether the  law  of               elections  in this country  contemplates  that               there   should  be  two  attacks  on   matters               connected with election proceedings, one while               they   are   going   on   by   invoking    the               extraordinary  jurisdiction of the High  Court               under  article  226 of-the  Constitution  (the               ordinary               (1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 267               (2)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104.               (3)   [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347.                6-1114SCI/77               292               jurisdiction   of  the  courts   having   been               expressly  excluded), and another  after  they               have  been completed by means of  an  election               petition.   In  my opinion, to affirm  such  a               position  would be contrary to the  scheme  of               Part   XV   of  the   Constitution   and   the               Representation of the People Act, which, as  I               shall  point out later, seems to. be that  any

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             matter  which has the effect of  vitiating  an               election  should  be brought up  only  at  the               appropriate  stage  in an  appropriate  manner               before  a special tribunal and should  not  be               brought  up at an ’intermediate  stage  before               any  court.   It seems to me  that  under  the               election law, the only significance which  the               rejection  of a nomination paper has  consists               in the fact that it can be used as a ground to               Call the election in question.  Article 329(b)               was apparently enacted to describe the  manner               in  which end the stage at which this  ground,               and  other grounds which may be  raised  under               the  law  to call the  election  in  question,               could  be  urged.   I  think  it  follows   by               necessary  implication  from the  language  of               this  provision that those grounds  cannot  be               urged in any other manner, at any other  stage               and before any other court.  If the grounds on               which  an election can be called  in  question               could  be  raised  at  an  earlier  stage  and               errors, if any are rectified, there will be no               meaning  in enacting a provision like  Article               329(b)  and in setting up a special  tribunal.               Any  other meaning ascribed to the words  used               in the article would lead to anomalies,  which               the Constitution could not have  contemplated,               one  of them being that conflicting views  may               be  expressed  by the High Court at  the  pre-               polling  stage and by the  election  tribunal,               which  is to be an, independent body,  at  the               stage when the matter is brought before it. Having  thus explained the raison d’etre of  the  provision, the Court proceeded to interpret the concept of election  in the   scheme  of  Part  XV  of  the  Constitution  and   the Representation  of the People Act, 1951.  Articles  327  and 328 take care of the act of laws and rules making provisions with  respect  to all matters relating to or  in  connection with, elections.’ Election disputes were also to be provided for  by laws made under Article 327.  The  Court  emphasised that  Part  XV  of the Constitution was  really  a  code  in itself,  providing the entire ground work for  enacting  the appropriate  laws and setting up suitable machinery for  the conduct  of  elections.  The scheme of the Act  enacted-  by Parliament was also set out by Fazal Ali, J.’               "Part   VI  deals  with   disputes   regarding               elections  and  provides  for  the  manner  of               presentation   of  election   petitions,   the               constitution  of  election tribunals  and  the               trial of election petitions part VII  outlines               the  various  corrupt  and  illegal  practises               which may affect the elections, and  electoral               offences.    Obviously,  the  Act   is   self-               contained  enactment so far as  elections  are               concerned,  which means that whenever we  have               to ascertain the    true position in regard to               any  matter  connected made  thereunder.   The               provisions  of the Act which are  material  to               the  present discussion are sections 60,  100,               105 and with elections, we   have only to look               at the Act and the rules               293               170, and the provisions of Chapter 11 of  Part               IV dealing with the form of election petitions               , their contents and the reliefs which may  be

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             sought in them.  Section 80, which is               drafted in almost the same language as article               329(b)  provides  that ,no election  shall  be               called  in  question  except  by  an  election               petition  presented  in  accordance  with  the               provisions of this Part’.  Section 1 00, as we               have already seen, provides for the grounds on               which  an election may be called in  question,               one  of which is the improper rejection  of  a               nomination paper, Section 105 says that ’every               order  of  the Tribunal made  under  this  Act               shall  be final and conclusive.   Section  170               provides  that  ’no  civil  court  shall  have               jurisdiction  to question the legality of  any               action  taken or of any decision given by  the               Returning  Officer  or  by  any  other  person               appointed under this Act in connection with an               election.  " There  have  been  amendments to these  provisions  but  the profile remains substantially the same.  After pointing  out that  the  Act,-  in section 80, and  the  Constitution,  in article  329(b), speak substantially the same  language  and inhibit  other  remedies  for  election  grievances   except through the election tribunal, the Court observed               "That  being  so, I think it will  be  a  fair               inference   from   the   provisions   of   the               Representation of the People Act to state that               the  Act  provides for only one  remedy,  that               remedy  being  by an election petition  to  be               presented  after  the election  is  over,  and               there   is   no   remedy   provided   at   any               intermediate stage." There   is  a  non-obstante  clause  in  Article  329   and, therefore, Article 22.6 stands pushed out where the  dispute takes the form of calling in question an election, except in special  situations  pointed  out  but  left  unexplored  in Ponnuswami. The  heart  of the matter is contained  in  the  conclusions summarised by the Court thus :               "(1) Having regard to the important  functions               which  the  legislatures have  to  perform  in               democratic  countries,  it  has  always   been               recognised to be a matter of first  importance               that elections should be concluded as early as               possible  according to time schedule  and  all               controversial matters and all disputes arising               out  of  elections should  be  postponed  till               after  the  elections are over,  so  that  the               election   proceedings  may  not   be   unduly               retarded or protracted.               (2)In  conformity with this principle,  the               scheme of the election law in this country  as               well  as  in England is that  no  significance               should be attached to anything which does  not               affect    the   "election";   and    if    any               irregularities  are committed while it  is  in               progress  and they belong to the  category  or               class which, under the law by which  elections               are   governed,  would  have  the  effect   of               vitiating the "election" and enable the person               effected  to call it in question, they  should               be  brought  so before a special  tribunal  by               means of an election petition               294               and  not  be  made the subject  of  a  dispute

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             before  any  court while the  election  is  in               progress."               After elaborately setting out  the history  in               England and in India election legislation vis-               a-vis dispute-resolution, Fazal Ali J. stated               "If  the  language used in article  329(b)  is               considered against this historical background,               it  should  not be difficult to  see  why  the               framers of the Constitution framed that provi-               sion  in  its  present  form  and  chose   the               language  which had been consistently used  in               certain  earlier  legislative  provisions  and               which bad stood the test of time." Likewise  the  Court  discussed the, connotation  ,  of  the expression election’ in Article 329 and observed :               "That  word  has by long usage  in  connection               with  the  process  of  selection  of   proper               representatives  in  democratic  institutions,               acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning.  In               the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final               selection of a candidate which may embrace the               result of the poll when there is polling or  a               particular candidate being returned  unopposed               when  there is no poll.  In the  wide,  sense,               the word is used to connote the entire process               culminating  in  a  candidate  being  declared               elected.   it  seems  to  me  that  the   word               "election  " has been used in Part XV  of  the               Constitution in the wide sense, that to say to               connote  the  entire  procedure,  to  be  gone               through   to   return  a  candidate   to   the               legislature.  That the word  "election"  bears               this wide meaning wheneverwe   talk    of               elections  in a democratic country,  is  borne               out bythe fact that in most of the  books               on  the subject and in several  cases  dealing               with  the matter, one of the questions  mooted               is,   when the election begins The  rainbow  of  operations,  covered  by  the  compendious expression   election,  thus  commences  from  the   initial notification and culminates   in  the  declaration  of   the return  of  a  candidate,.  The  paramount  policy  of   the Constitution-framers in declaring that no election shall  be called  in  question except the way it is  provided  for  in Article  329 (b) and the Representation of the  People  Act, 1951,  compels  us  to  read,  as  Fazal  Ali,  J.  did   in Pannuswami,  the  Constitution and the Act  together  as  an integral  scheme.  The reason for postponement  of  election litigation  to.  the post-election stage is  that  elections poll  not unduly be protracted or obstructed. The speed  and promptitude  in getting due representation for the  electors in  the- legislative bodies is the real reason suggested  in the course of judgment. Thus  for everything is clear. No litigative  enterprise  in the  High Court or other court should be allowed to hold  up the  on-going  electoral process because  the  parliamentary representative   for  the  constituence  should  be   chosen promptly. Article 329 therefore covers "electoral  matters". One   interesting   argument,  urged  without   success   in Ponnuswami  elicited  a reasoning from the Court  which  has some bearing on the question in the present appeal.     That argument was that if nomina- 295 tion  was part of election a dispute as to the  validity  of the nomination was a dispute relating to election and  could

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be  called  in question, only after the whole  election  was over,  before  the election tribunal.  This meant  that  the Returning  Officer could have no jurisdiction to decide  the validity  of  a nomination, although section 36 of  the  Act conferred  on  him  that jurisdiction.   The  learned  Judge dismissed this argument as without merit, despite the  great dailectical ingenuity in the submission.  In this connection the learned Judge observed               "Under section 36 of the Representation of the               People  Act,  1951,  it is  the  duty  of  the               Returning Officer to scrutinize the nomination               papers  to  ensure that they comply  with  the               requirements  of,  the  Act  and  decide   all               objections  which be made to  any  nomination.               It   is  clear  that  unless  this   duty   is               discharged properly, any number of  candidates               may stand for election without complying  with               the provisions of the Act and a great deal  of               confusion  may  ensue.   In  discharging   the               statutory  duty imposed on him, the  Returning               Officer   does  not  call  in   question   any               election.   Scrutiny of nomination  papers  is               only  a stage, though an important  stage,  in               the  election  process.   It  is  one  of  the               essential  duties to be performed  before  the               election  can be completed, and anything  done               towards   the  completion  of   the   election               proceeding  can by no stretch of reasoning  be               described  as  questioning the  election.  The               fallacy  of  the argument lies in  treating  a               single   step  taken  in  furtherance  of   an               election  as  equivalent  to  election.    The               decision  of this appeal however turns not  on               the   construction   of   the   single    word               "election",  but  on the construction  of  the               compendious  expression-no election  shall  be               called  in  question"  in  this  context   and               setting with due regard to the scheme of  Part               XV of the Constitution and the  Representation               of  the  People  Act,  1951.   Evidently,  the               argument  has  no, bearing on this  method  of               approach to the question posed in this appeal,               which appears to me the only correct method." What  emerges from this perspicacious reasoning, if  we  may say  so with great respect, is that any decision sought  and rendered  will  not  amount  to  ’calling  in  question’  an election  if it subserves the progress of the  election  and facilitates the completion of the election.  ’Ale should not slur  over the quite essential observation  "-Anything  done towards the completion of the election proceeding can by  no stretch  of  reasoning  be  described  as  questioning   the election.   Likewise,  it is fallacious to treat  ’a  single step  taken in furtherance of an election as  equivalent  to election’. Thus,  there  are  two  types of  decisions,  two  types  of challenges.    The  first  relates  to   proceedings   which interfere  with  the progress of the election.   The  second accelerates  the  completion  of the election  and  acts  in furtherance  of an election.  So, the short question  before us,   in  the  light  of  the  illumination   derived   from Ponnuswami,  is as to whether the order for re-poll  of  the Chief  Election Commissioner is "anything done  towards  the completion  of  the  election proceeding’  and  whether  the proceedings  before the High Court facilitated the  election process  or halted its progress.  The  question  immediately

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arises as to whether 296 the  relief  sought  in, the writ petition  by  the  present appellant  amounted  to calling in  question  the  election. This,  in turn, revolves round the point as to  whether  the cancellation of the poll and the reordering of fresh poll is ’part  of  election’ and challenging it is  ’calling  it  in question. The  plenary bar of Art. 329 (b) rests on two  principles  : (1)  The  peremptory urgency of prompt  engineering  of  the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages in between  the  commencement  and  the  conclusion.  (2)   The provision of a special jurisdiction which can be invoked  by an aggrieved party at the end of the election excludes other form,  the right and remedy being creatures of statutes  and controlled by the Constitution.  Durga Shankar Mehta(1)  has affirmed this position and supplemented it by holding  that, once  the Election Tribunal has decided, the prohibition  is extinguished  and  the  Supreme Court’s  over-all  power  to interfere  under  Art. 136 springs into,  action.   In  Hari Vishnu(2) this Court upheld the rule in Ponnuswami excluding any proceeding, including one under Art. 226, during the on- going  process of election, understood in the  comprehensive sense  of  notification  down to  declaration.   Beyond  the declaration  comes  the election petition,  but  beyond  the decision  of  the Tribunal the ban of Art. 329(b)  does  not bind. If ’election’ bears the larger connotation, if ’callinng  in question’  possesses a semantic sweep in plain  English,  if policy  and  principle  are  tools  for  interpretation   of statutes,    language   permitting   the    conclusion    is irresistible’  even  though  the argument  contra  may  have emotional  impact and ingenious appeal, that  the  catch-all jurisdiction under Art. 226 cannot consider the correctness, legality  or  otherwise of the  direction  for  cancellation integrated  with re-poll.  For, the prima facie  purpose  of such  a re-poll was to restore a detailed Poll  process  and to, complete it through the salvationary effort of a repoll. Whether in fact or law, the order is validly made within his powers or violative of natural justice can be examined later by   the  appointed  instrumentality,  viz.,  the   Election Tribunal.   That  aspect will be  explained  presently.   We proceed  on the footing that re-poll in one polling  station or  it  many polling stations for good reasons,  is  lawful. This  shows  that  re-poll in many  or  all  segments,  all- pervasive   or  isolated,  can  be  lawful.   We   are   not considering  whether the act was bad for other reasons.   We are concerned only to say that if the regular poll, for some reasons,  has  failed  to  reach the  goal  of  choosing  by plurality the returned candidate and to achieve this  object a fresh poll (not a new election) is needed, it may still be a step in the election.- The deliverance of Dunkirk is  part of  the  strategy  of counter-attack.   Wise  or  valid,  is another matter. On the assumption, but leaving the question of the  validity of  the direction for re-poll soon for determination by  the Election Tribunal, we hold that a writ petition  challenging the cancellation coupled with re-poll amounts to calling  in question  a step in ’election! and is there, fore barred  by Art.  329(b).   If no re-poll had been  directed  the  legal perspective  would  have  been  very  different.   The  mere cancel- (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267. (2)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104.

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297 lation  would have then thwarted the course of the  election and different considerations would have come into play.   We need not chase a hypothetical case. Our  conclusion  is not a matter of  textual  interpretation only  but a substantial assurance of justice by  reading  s. 100 of the Act as covering the whole basket of grievances of the  candidates.   Sri P. P. Rao contended  that  the  Court should  not deny relief to a party in the area of  elections which  are the life-breath of democracy and people’s  power. We agree. This dilemma does not arise in the wider view we take of  s. 100 (1) (d) (iv) of the Act.  Sri Rao’s attack on the  order impugned  is  in substance based on  alleged  non-compliance with  a provision of the Constitution viz., Art. 324 but  is neatly  covered  by the  widely-worded,  residual  catch-all clause of s. 100. knowing the supreme significance of speedy elections  in  our system the framers  of  the  Constitution have,  by  implication, postponed all election  disputes  to election  petitions  and tribunals.  In  harmony  with  this scheme  s.  100 of the Act has been  designedly  drafted  to embrace all conceivable infirmities which may be urged.   To make  the  project fool-proof s. 100(1) (d)  (iv)  has  been added  to  absolve everything left over.  The Court  has  in earlier rulings pointed out that s. 100 is exhaustive of all grievances regarding an election.  But what is banned is not anything whatsoever done or directed by the Commissioner but everything  he  does  or  directs  in  furtherance  of   the election,   not  contrariwise.   For  example,   after   the President  notifies the nation on the holding  of  elections under s. 15 and the Commissioner publishes the calendar  for the  poll  under  s.  30, if  the  latter  orders  returning officers  to accept only one nomination or only those  which come  from one party as distinguished from other parties  or independents,  is that order immune from  immediate  attack. We  think  not.  Because the Commissioner is  preventing  an election,  not  promoting it and the courts review  of  that order  will  facilitate  the  flow,  not  stop  the  stream. Election,  Wide or narrow be its connotation,  means  choice from a possible plurality monolithic politics not being  our genius  or reality, and if that concept is crippled  by  the Commissioner’s act, he holds no election at all. A poll is part-a vital part-of the election but with the end of the poll the whole election IS not over.  Ballots have to be assembled, scrutinised, counted recount claims considered and   result  declared.   The  declaration  determines   the election.  The conduct of the election thus ripens into  the elector’s   choice   only  when  processed,   screened   and sanctified, every escalatory step upto the formalised finish being unified in purpose, forward in movement, fair and free in  its temper.  Article 329(b) halts judicial  intervention during  this  period, provided the act  possesses  the  pre- requisites of ’election’ in its semantic sweep.  That is  to say, immunity is conferred only if the act impeached is done for  the  apparent  object of furthering  a  free  and  fair election  and  the protective armour drops down if  the  act challenged is either unrelated to. or thwarts or taints  the course of the election. Having   held  against  the  maintainability  of  the   writ petition, we should have parted with the case finally.   But counsel for both the 298 candidates  and, more particularly, the  learned  Additional Solicitor  General, appearing for the  Election  Commission, submitted that the breadth, applitude and implications,  the

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direction  and depth of Article 324 and, equally  important, the question of natural justice raised under Article 324 are of such public importance and largely fallow field going  by prior pronouncements, and so strategic for our democracy and itspower process that this Court must decide the issue  here and now.  Article  141 empowers and obligates this Court  to declare  the law forthe country when the occasion  asks  for it.   Counsel, otherwise opposing one  another,  insistently concurred  in  their  request that for the  working  of  the electoral  machinery  and understanding of  the  powers  and duties  vested in the functionaries constituting the  infra- structure, it is essential to sketch the ambit and import of Art.  324.  This point undoubtedly arises before us even  in considering  the  prohibition under Art. 329  and  has  been argued  fully.  In any view, the Election Triburial will  be faced with this issue and the law must be laid down so  that there  may  be  no  future error  while  disposing  of  the, election  petition or when the Commission is called upon  to act  on later occasion.  This is the particular  reason  for our proceeding to decide what the content and parameters  of Art.  324 are, contextually limited to situations  analogous to the present. We  decide  two questions under the  relevant  article,  not argued,  but as substantive pronouncements on  the  subject. They are :               (a) What in its comprehensive connotation does               the  conduct’ of elections mean or,  for  that               matter,  the  superintendence,  direction  and               control’ of elections ?               (b)   Since  the  text  of  the  provision  is               silent about hearing               before  acting,  is it permissible  to  import               into  Art.  324(1)  an obligation  to  act  in               accord with natural justice ? Article  324,  which we have set out earlier, is  a  plenary provision vesting the whole responsibility for national  and State  elections  and, therefore, the  necessary  powers  to discharge that function.  It is true that Art. 324 has to be read in the light of the constitutional scheme and the  1950 Act  and the 1951 Act.  Sri Rao is right to the  ex-tent  be insists   that  if  competent  legislative  is  enacted   as visualized  in  Article  327  the  Commission  cannot  shake himself free from the enacted prescriptions.  After all,  as Mathew, J. has observed in Indira Gandhi : (supra)               "In   the  opinion  of  some  of  the   judges               constituting  the majority in  Bharati’s  case               (supra),  Rule of Law is a basic structure  of               the Constitution apart from democracy.               The  rule of law postulates the  pervasiveness               of  the  spirit of law  throughout  the  whole               range of government in the sense of  excluding               arbitrary official action in any sphere."               (p. 523)               299 And  the supremacy of valid law over the  Commission  argues itself.    No  one  is  an  imperium  in  imperio   in   our constitutional  order.   It is reasonable to hold  that  the Commissioner  cannot  defy  the  law  armed  by  Art.   324. Likewise, his functions are subject to the norms of fairness and he cannot act arbitrarily.  Unchecked power is alien  to our system. Even  so,  situations may arise which enacted  law  has  not provided for.  Legislators are not prophets but pragmatists. So  it  is  that the  Constitution  has  made  comprehensive provision  in Art. 324 to take care of surprise  situations.

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That  power itself has to be exercised, not  mindlessly  nor mala  fide,  nor  arbitrarily nor  with  partiality  but  in keeping  with  the  guidelines of the rule of  law  and  not stultifying  the  Presidential  notification  nor   existing legislation.   More  is not necessary to  specify;  less  is insufficient  to  leave unsaid.  Article 324, in  our  view, operates  in  areas left unoccupied by legislation  and  the words  ’superintendence, direction and control’ as  well  as ’conduct  of all elections’ are the broadest terms.   Myriad maybes,  too mystic to be precisely presaged, may  call  for prompt  action to reach the goal of free and fair  election. It  has been argued that this will create  a  constitutional despot  beyond the pale of accountability; a  Frankenstein’s monster   who  may  manipulate  the  system   into   elected despotism--instances  of  such phenomena are  the  tears  of history.   To  that  the retort may  be  that  the  judicial branch,  at the appropriate stage, with the potency  of  its benignant  power  and within the leading  strings  of  legal guidelines, can call the bluff, quash the, action and  bring order  into  the  process.  Whether we  make  a  triumph  or travesty  of democracy depends on the man as much as on  the Great National Parchment.  Secondly, When a high functionary like  the  Commissioner is vested with wide powers  the  law expects  him  to  act fairly and legally.   Article  324  is geared  to  the accomplishment of free  and  fair  elections expeditiously.    Moreover,  as  held  in  Virendra(1)   and Harishankar(2)  discretion vested in a high functionary  may be reasonably trusted to be used properly, not.  perversely. If  it is misused, certainly the Court has power  to  strike down  the act.  This is well-established and does not it  is useful to remem-               "But  the electorate lives in the hope that  a               sacred power will not so flagrantly be  abused               and the moving finger of history warns of  the               consequences   that   inevitably   flow   when               absolute power has corrupted absolutely.   The               fear of perversion is no test of power."               lndira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain(3). The  learned  Additional Solicitor General  brought  to  our notice  rulings of this Court and of the High  Courts  which have  held that Art. 324 was a plenary power  which  enabled the  Commission  to  act even in  the  absence  of  specific legislation  though  not  contrary  to  valid   legislation. Ordering a re-poll for a whole constituency under compulsion of  circumstances  may  be  directed  for  the  conduct   of elections (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 308. (2)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380. (3)  [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347 at 657. 300 and  can  be  saved by Aft. 324-provided  it  is  bona  fide necessary  for  the vindication of the free verdict  of  the electorate  and  the abandonment of the  previous  poll  was because it failed to achieve that goal.  While we repel  Sri Rao’s  broadside attack on Art. 324 as confined to what  the Act  has conferred, we concede that even Art. 324  does  not exalt  the  Commission  into  a  law  unto  itself.    Broad authority 3    does not bar scrutiny into specific  validity of the particular order. Our  conclusion on this limb of the contention is that  Art, 324  is wide enough to supplement the powers under the  Act, as  here,  but  subject to the  several  conditions  on  its exercise we have set out. Now we move on to a close-up of the last submission  bearing on  the  Commission’s duty to function  within  the  leading

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strings of natural justice. Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular  law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life.  It  has many  colours  and shades, many forms and shapes  and,  save where  valid  law  excludes,  it  applies  when  people  are affected  by acts of Authority.  It is the bone  of  healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a  mystic testament  of  judge-made law.  Indeed, from  the  legendary days  of Adam-and of Kautilya’s Arthasastra-the rule of  law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it  social justice.   We need not go into these deeps for  the  present except  to indicate that the, roots of natural  justice  and its  foliage  are  noble  and  not  newfangled.   Today  its application must be sustained by current legislation,  case- law  or  other  extant principle, not the  hoary  chords  of legend  and history.  Our jurisprudence has  sanctioned  its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. The  dichotomy  between  administrative  and  quasi-judicial functions  vis  a  vis the doctrine of  natural  justice  is presumably   obsolescent  after  Kraipak(1)  in  India   and Schmit(2) in England. Kraipak  marks  the  watershed, if we may  say  so,  in  the application    of   natural   justice   to    administrative proceedings.  Hegde, J., speaking for a bench of five judges observed,  quoting for support Lord Parker in In re  :  H.K. (an infant) (3) "It is not necessary to examine these decisions as there  is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject.  The  horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding." (p. 467) "The  aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure  jus- tice  or  to  put it negatively to  prevent  miscarriage  of justice. (1)  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457. (2)  [1969] 2 Ch. 149. (3)  [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, 630. 301 These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly  made.  In other words they do not supplant the  law of the land but supplement it." (p. 468) "The validity of that limitation is not questioned.  If  the purpose  of  the  rules of natural  justice  is  to  prevent miscarriage  of  justice one fails to see  why  those  rules should  be  made inapplicable to  administrative  inquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that  demarcates administrative  enquiries  from  quasi-judicial   enquiries. Enquiries  which were considered administrative at one  time are  now  being considered as quasi-judicial  in  character. Arriving  at  a  just decision is the  aim  of  both  quasi- judicial  enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.  An               unjust  decision in an administrative  enquiry               may  have more far reaching effect than a  de-               cision   in  a  quasi-judicial  enquiry.    As               observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy  George               v.  The University of Kerala(") the  rules  of               natural justice are not embodied rules.   What               particular  rule  of  natural  justice  should               apply  to a given case must depend to a  great               extent on the facts and circumstances of  that               case, the framework of the law under which the               enquiry  is held and the constitution  of  the               Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that               purpose.   Whenever,.  a  complaint  is   made

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             before a court that some principle of  natural               justice had been contravened the court has  to               decide whether the observance of that rule was               necessary for a just decision on the facts  of               that case." (p. 469) It  is an interesting sidelight that in America it has  been held  to be ’but fundamental fairness that the tight  to  an administrative hearing is given. (See Boston University  Law Review Vol. 53 p. 899). Natural justice is being given access to the United  Nations (See American Journal of International Law Vol. 67 p.  479). It-is  no-table  that Mathew, J. observed in  Indira  Gandhi (supra)               "If   the  amending  body   really   exercised               judicial  power  that power was  exercised  in               violation of the principles of natural justice               of  audi alteram partem.   Even if a power  is               given  to a body without specifying  that  the               rules  of natural justice should be,  observed               in  exercising  it, the nature of  the,  power               would call for its observance."               (p. 513)               Lord  Morris  of Borthy-Gest  in  his  address               before the Bentham :club concluded :               "We can, I think, take pride in what has  been               done in recent periods and particularly in the               field of administrative               (1)   11969] 1 S.C.R. 317.               302               law   by  invoking  and  by   applying   those               principles which we broadly classify under the               designation of natural justice.  Many  testing               problems as to their application yet remain to               be  solved.   But   affirm that  the  area  of               administrative action is but one area in which               the  principles are to be deployed.   Nor  are               they  to  be  invoked  only  when   procedural               failures  are  shown.   Does  natural  justice               qualify  to  be  described  as  a   "majestic"               conception?         I believe it does.  Is  it               just a rhetorical but vague phrase which can I               be  employed, when needed, to give a gloss  of               assurance  ?  I believe that it is  very  much               more.   If it can be summarised as being  fair               play  in action-who could wish that  it  would               ever  be out of action ?  It denotes that  the               law is not only to be guided by reason and  by               logic  but  that  its  purpose  will  not   be               fulfilled    if   it   lacks   more    exalted               inspiration."               (Current Legal Problems 1973, Vol. 26 p. 16) It  is  fair  to hold  that  subject  to  certain  necessary limitations  natural justice is now a brooding  omnipresence although varying in its play. Once  we  understand  the soul of the rule  as  fairplay  in action-and  it is so’-We must hold that it extends  to  both the fields.  After all, administrative power in a democratic set-up   is   not  allergic  to  fairness  in   action   and discretionary  executive  justice  cannot  degenerate   into unilateral injustice.  Nor is there ground to be  frightened of  delay,  inconvenience and expense,  if  natural  justice gains access.  For fairness itself is a flexible:  pragmatic and   relative   concept,  not  a  rigid,   ritualistic   or sophisticated abstraction.  It is not a bull in a china shop

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nor  a bee in one’s bonnet.  Its essence is good  conscience in  a given situation: nothing more- but nothing less.   The ’exceptions’ to the rules of natural justice are a  misnomer or  rather are but a shorthand form of expressing  the  idea that  in  those  exclusionary cases nothing  unfair  can  be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or  meet a  case.  Text-book excerpts and ratios from rulings can  be heaped,  but they all converge to the same point  that  audi alteram partem is the justice of the law without, of course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating  or plainly contrary to the commonsense of the situation. Let  us  look  at the  jurisprudential  aspects  of  natural justice,  limited to the needs of the present case,  as  the doctrine has developed in the Indo-Anglian systems.  We  may state  that  the  question of nullity does  not  arise  here because  we  are  on the construction  of  a  constitutional clause.   Even otherwise, the rule of natural justice  bears upon  construction  where a statute is silent save  in  that category  where  a legislation is charged with the  vice  of unreasonableness and consequential voidness. Article  324, on the face of it, vests vast functions  which may  be  powers or duties,  essentially  administrative  and marginally  even judicative or legislative.  All Party  Hill Leaders  Conference,  Shillong  v.  Capt.   W.  A.   Satigma Ors.(1). We are not fascinated by the logo- (1)  [1978] 1 S.C.R. 393. 303 machic  exercise  suggested  by  Sri  P.  P.  Rao,   reading ’functions’  in  contradistinction to ’powers’  nor  by  the trichotomy  of diversion of powers, fundamentally sound  but flawsome  in several situations if rigidly  applied.   These submissions merely serve to draw the red-herring across  the trial.  We will now zero-in on the crucial issue of  natural justice  vis  a  vis Article 324 where the  function  is  so exercised that a candidate is substantially prejudiced  even if  be  has not acquired a legal right nor  suffered  ’civil consequence’, whatever that may mean. We  proceed on the assumption that even if the  cancellation of  the poll in this case were an administrative  act,  that per se does not repel the application of the natural justice principle. Kraipak nails the contrary argument. Nor did  the learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  contend  that  way, taking  his stand all through, not on  technicalities,  easy victories  or  pleas  for reconsideration of  the  good  and progressive  rules  gained through this Court’s  rulings  in administrative  law but on the foundational thesis that  any construction that we may adopt must promote and be geared to the  great  goal of expeditious, unobstructed,  despatch  of free and fair elections and leaving grievances to Ice  fully sorted out and solved later before the election tribunal set out  by  the  Act.   To  use  a  telling  word  familiar  in officialese; ’Election Immediate’. So  now we are face to face with the naked issue of  natural justice  and its pro tem exclusion on grounds  of  necessity and  non-stultification  of  the  on-going  election.    The Commission  claims  that  a  direction  for  re-poll  is  an ’emergency’  exception.   The rules of natural  justice  are rooted in all legal systems, not any ’new theology’, and are manifested in the twin principles of nemo judes in sua caues and audi alteram partem.  We are not concerned here with the former since no case of bias has been urged.  The  grievance ventilated  is  that  being  condemned  unheard.    Sporadic applications  or  catalogue of instances cannot make  for  a scientific  statement  of the law and so we  have  to  weave consistent  criteria  for  application  and  principles  for

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carving  out  exceptions.   If the rule  is  sound  and  not negatived by statute, we should not devalue it nor  hesitate to  hold every functionary who effects others’ right to  it. The  audi alteram partem rule has a few facets two of  which are (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain.  Let us study how far the situation on hand can co- exist with canons of natural justice.  When natural  justice is   universally   respected,  the   standards   vary   with situations,  contracting into a brief, even  post-decisional opportunity, or expanding into trial-type trappings. Ridge  v. Baldwin(1) is a leading case which restored  light to  an  area ’benighted by the narrow conceptualism  of  the previous  decade  to borrow  Professor  Clark’s  expression. (Natural Justice; Substance and Shadow-’Public Law’  Joumal- Spring  1975).   Good  administration  demands  fairplay  in action  and this simple desideratum is the fount of  natural justice.   We have already said that the  classification  of functions as judicial’ or ’administrative’ is a  stultifying shibboleth, discarded in India as in England.  Today, in our jurisprudence, the (1)  [1964] A.C. 40. 304 advances  made by natural justice far exceed  old  frontiers and  if judicial creativity belights penumbral areas  it  is only  for improving the quality of government  by  injecting fairplay into its wheels. The  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  welcomed   the dramatic  pace of enlargement in the application of  natural justice.   But  he  argued for inhibiting  its  spread  into forbidden  spaces  lost  the basic values  of  Art.  329  be nullified.  In short, his point is that where utmost  promp- titude is needed-and that is the raison d’etre of  exclusion of  intermediate  legal  proceedings  in  election  matters- natural  justice may be impractical and may  paralyse,  thus balking  the  object  of expeditious  completion.   He  drew further  inspiration  from another factor  to  validate  the exclusion of natural justice from the Commission’s  actions, except  where  specifically  stipulated  by  statutes.    He pointed out what we have earlier mentioned-that an  election litigation is one in which the whole constituency of several lakhs of people is involved and, if the Election  Commission were  under an obligation to hear affected parties  it  may, logically,  have to give notice to lakhs of people  and  not merely to candidates.  This will make an ass of the law and, therefore,  that is not the law. This reductio  ad  absurdum also has to be examined. Law cannot be divorced from life and so it is that the  life of  the  law  is  not logic  but  experience.   If,  by  the experiential  test,  importing the right to  be  heard  will paralyse the process, law will exclude it.  It has been said that no army can be commanded by a debating society, but  it is  also true that the House of Commons did  debate,  during the  days of debacle and disaster, agony and crisis  of  the Second World War, the life-and-death aspects of the  supreme command by the then British Prime Minister ’to the  distress of  all our friends and to the delight of all our  foes’-too historic  to be lost on jurisprudence.  Law lives not  in  a world of abstractions but in a cosmos of concreteness and to give up something good must be limited to extreme cases.  If to condemn unheard is wrong, it is wrong except where it  is overbome  by  dire social or  haphazardsolutions  should  be eschewed. Normally, natural    justice   involves    the    irritating inconvenience  for men in authority, of having to hear  both sides since notice and opportunity are its very marrow.  And

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this  principle is so integral to good government, the  onus is on him who urges exclusion to make out why.  Lord Denning expressed the paramout policy consideratlon behind this rule of  public  law (while dealing with the nemo  judex  aspect) with expressiveness.  "Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking ’the judge was biased’."We may adapt it to the audi alteram  situation by the altered statement : "Justice  must be  felt to be just by the community if democratic  legality is  to  animate  the  rule of law.   And  if  the  invisible audience sees a man’s case disposed of unheard, a chorus  of ’noconfidence’ will be heard to say, ’that man had no chance to  defend his stance’." That is why Tuckor LJ in Russol  v. Duke of Norfolk(1) (1)  (1949) 1 All E.R. 109,118. 305 emphasised  that  ’whatever standard of natural  justice  is adopted,  one  A,  essential is that  the  person  concerned should  have  a  reasonable opportunity  of  presenting  his case’.  What is reasonable in given circumstances is ’in the domain  of  practicability; not formalised  rigidity.   Lord Upjohn in Fernando(1) observed that ’while great urgency may rightly limit such opportunity timeously : perhaps  severely there  can  never  be a denial of that  opportunity  if  the principles  of  natural  justice  are  applicable’.   It  is untenable heresy, in our view, to look jaw the victim or act behind  his back by tempting invocation of  urgency,  unless the  clearest case of public injury flowing from  the  least delay is selfevident.  Even in such cases a remedial hearing as  soon as urgent action has been taken is the  next  best. Our   objection  is  not  to  circumscription  dictated   by circumstances, but to annihilation as an easy escape from  a benignant,  albeit inconvenient obligation.  The  procedural pre-condition  of fair hearing, however minimal, even  post- decisional,  has  relevance to administrative  and  judicial gentlemanliness.  The Election Commission is an  institution of central importance and enjoys far-reaching powers and the greater the power to affect others’ right or liabilities the more necessary the need to hear. We may not be taken to say that situational modifications to notice and hearing are altogether impermissible.  They  are, as   the  learned  Additional  Solicitor   General   rightly stressed.   The glory of the law is not that sweeping  rules are  laid down but that it tailors principles  to  practical needs,  doctors remedies to suit the patient  promotes,  not freezes.  Life’s processes, if we may mix metaphors.  Tucker L.J.  drove home this point when he observed in the Duke  of Norfolk case (supra)               "There  are  no words which are  of  universal               application to very kind of inquiry......  The               requirements of natural justice must depend on               the  circumstances of the case, the nature  of               the   inquiry,  the  rules  under  which   the               tribunal is acting the subject-matter that  is               being dealth with, and so forth". This  circumstantial  flexibility of fair bearing  has  been underscored  in Wiseman v. Borneman(1) by Lord Reid when  he said  he  would be "sorry to see  this  fundamental  general principle degenerate into a series of hard-and-fast rules." Lord Denning, with lovely realism and principled pragmatism, set out the rule in Selvaraien(3)               "The fundamental rule is that, if a person may               be  subjected  to pains or  penalties,  or  be               exposed  to  prosecution  or  proceedings.  or               deprived  of remedies or redress, or  in  some

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             such    way   adversely   affected   by    the               investigation  and report, when he  should  be               told the case made against him and be afforded               a  fair  opportunity  of  answering  it.   The               investigation body is, however, the master  of               its own procedure.  It need not               (2)   [1971] A.C. 297.               (3) [1976] 1 All E.R. 12,19.               306               hold  a  hearing.  It  can  do  everything  in               writing.  It need not allow  lawyers.,It  need               not  put  every detail of the case  against  a               man.  Suffice  it  if the  broad  grounds  are               given. It neednot name its informants.  It can               give the substance only.  Moreover it need not               do everything itself. It can employ secretaries               and assistants to do all the preliminary  work               and leave much to them.  But, in the end,  the               investigating body itself must come to its own               decision and make its own report." Courts  must be tempered by the thought while compromise  on principle  is  unprincipled, applied administrative  law  in modern  complexities  of  government  must  realistic,   not academic.   The myriad maybes and the diverse urgencies  are live   factors.    Natural  justice   should   not   destroy administrative order by insisting on the impossible. This   general  discussion  takes  its  to   four   specific submissions   made  by  the  learned  Additional   Solicitor General.   He  argued that the Election Commission,  a  high constitutional  functionary,  was  charged  with  conducting elections  with celerity to bring the new House  into  being and  the  tardy process of notice and hearing  would  thwart this  imperative.   So  no natural  justice.   Secondly,  be submitted  that  there  was no final  determination  to  the prejudice  of  any party by directing a  re-poll  since  the Election  Court  had the last word  on  every  objectionable order and so the Commission’s order was more or less  provi- sional.   So  no natural justice.  Thirdly, he took  up  the position that no candidate could claim anything more than an expectation  or apes and no right having  crystallised  till official  declaration of the result, there was no  room  for complaint  of civil consequence.  WI-tat was  condemned  was the  poll,  not  any  candidate.   So  no  natural  justice. Finally, he reminded us of the far-flung futility of  giving a   hearing  to  a  numerous  constituency  which  too   was interested  in proper elections like the candidates.  So  no natural justice. Schmidt was relied on and Wisemen(1) as well as Pearlberg(2) were cited in support of these propositions.  We may add  to these weighty rulings the decision of the House of Lords  in Pearlberg.   The  decision of this Court in  the  ruling  in Bihar  School  Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra  Sinha  & Ors.   (3),  where  a  whole  university  examinations   was cancelled without hearing any of the candidates but was  up- held against the alleged vice of non-hearing, was relied on. We  must  admit  that the law, in  certain  amber  areas  of natural  justice., has been unclear.  Vagueness haunts  this zone but that is no argument to shut down.  If it is twilit, we  must delight.  So we will play down the  guidelines  but guard  ourselves against any decision on the facts  of  this case.   That is left for the Election Court in the light  of the law applicable. (1)  [1967] 3 All E.R. 1945. (2)  [1971] 1 W.L.R. 728. 307

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Nobody  will  deny  that  the  Election  Commission  in  our democratic   scheme   is  a  central  figure  and   a   high functionary.   Discretion vested in him will  ordinarily  be used  wisely, not rashly, although to echo Lord Camden  wide discretion is fraught with tyrannical potential even in high personages, absent legal norms and institutional checks, and relaxation   of   legal  canalisation  on   generous   ’VIP’ assumptions may boomrang.  Natural justice is one such check on exercise of power.  But the chemistry of natural  justice is  confused in certain aspects., especially in relation  to the fourfold exceptions put forward by the respondents. So  let  us  examine  them each.   Speed  in  action  versus soundness of judgment is the first dilemma.  Ponnuswamy  has emphasised what is implicit in Article 329(b) that once  the process   of  election  has  started,  it  should   not   be interrupted  since  the tempo may slow down  and  the  early constitution  of  an  elected  parliament  may  be   halted. Therefore,  think  twice before obligating a  hearing  at  a critical stage when a quick repoll is the call. The point is well  taken.   A  fair hearing with fun notice  to  both  or others   may   surely  protract;  and   notice   does   mean communication of materials since no one can meet an  unknown ground.  Otherwise hearing becomes hollow, the right becomes a  ritual.   Should the cardinal principle of  ’hearing’  as condition  for decision-making be martyred for the cause  of administrative, immediacy ? We think not.  The full  panoply may not be there but a manageable minimum may make-do. In   Wiseman  v.  Bornenwn(1)  there  was  a  hint  of   the competitive  claims of hurry and hearing.  Lord Reid said  : ’Even where the decision has to be reached by a body  acting judicially,  there  must be a balance between the  need  for expedition  and  the need to give fall  opportunity  to  the defendant to see material against him (emphasis added).   We agree that the elaborate and sophisticated methodology of  a formalised  hearing  may  be  injurious  to  promptitude  no essential  in  ,in  election under way.   Even  so,  natural justice  is  pragmatically  flexible  and  is  amenable   to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of  circumstances. To  burke  it  altogether may not be a  stroke  of  fairness except  in very exceptional circumstances.  Even in  Wiseman where all that was sought to be done was to see if there was a  prima  facie  case  to proceed with  a  tax  case  where, inevitably,  a fuller bearing would be extended at  a  later stage of the proceedings, Lord Reid.  Lord Morris of Borthy- Gest  and  Lord Wilborforce suggested "that there  might  he exceptional cases where to decide upon it ex-parte would  be unfair,  and  it would be the duty of the tribunal  to  take appropriate steps to eliminate unfairness "(Lord Denning  M. R., in Manward v. Bornenam(2) summarised the observations of the  law  Lords in this form).  No doctrinaire  approach  is desirable  but  the  Court must be anxious  to  salvage  the cardinal  rule  to the extent permissible in a  given  case. After  all,  it  is not obligatory that  counsel  should  be allowed  to appear nor is it compulsory that  oral  evidence should  be adduced.  Indeed, it is not even imperative  that written  statements should be called for Disclosure of  the, prominent circumstances and asking for an immediate (1)  [1967] 3 All F.R. 1945. (2)  [1974] 3 W.L.R. 660. 7    -1114 SCI/77 308 explanation  orally  or  otherwise may,  in  many  cases  be sufficient  compliance.   It  is even  conceivable  that  an urgent  meeting  with the concerned parties summoned  at  an hours  notice,  or in a crisis even a  telephone  call,  may

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suffice.   If  all that is not possible as in the cue  of  a fleeing  person whose passport has to be impounded lest  he, should evades the course of justice or a dangerous  nuisance needs immediate abatement, the action may be taken  followed immediately  by a hearing for the purpose of  sustaining  or setting  aside  the action to the extent  feasible.   It  is quite  on the cards that the Election Commission if  pressed by circumstances, may give a short hearing.  In any view, it is  not easy to appreciate whether before further steps  got under  may  he  could not have afforded  an  opportunity  of hearing  the parties,and revoke the earlier directions.   We do  not wish to disclose our mind on what, in  the  critical circumstances,  should  have been done, for a  fair-play  of fair hearing.  This is a matter pre-eminently for the  elec- tion  tribunal  to  judge, having before  him  the  vivified totality of all the factors.  All that we need emphasize  is that the content of natural justice is a dependent variable, not an easy casualty. The  learned  Additional Solicitor General urged  that  even assuming that under ordinary circumstances hearing should be granted,  in the scheme of Art. 324 and in the situation  of urgency  confronting  the  Election Commission  it  was  not necessary. Here  we must demur.  Reasons follow.  It was argued,  based on  rulings relating to natural justice, that  unless  civil consequences  ensued,  hearing was not necessary.   A  civil right  being  adversely affected is a sine qua non  for  the invocation of the audi alteram partem rule.  This submission was  supported  by observations in Rain  Gopal(1)  and  Col. Sinha  (2).   Of  course, we agree that  if  only  spiritual censure   is  the  penalty,  temporal  laws  may  not   take cognisance of such consequences since human law operates  in the material field although its vitality vicariously depends on  its morality.  But what is a civil consequence,  let  us ask  ourselves,;  by  passing  verbal  boobytraps  ?  ’Civil consequence’  undoubtedly  cover infraction  of  not  merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations    and   non-pecuniary   damages.     In    its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Civil is defined by Black (Law Dictionary 4th Edn.)at p.311.               "Ordinally,  pertaining  or appropriate  to  a               member   of  a  civitas  of   free   political               community;  natural  or proper to  a  citizen.               Also,  relating  to the community, or  to  the               policy  and  government of  the  citizens  and               subjects of a state.               The word is derived from the Latin civilie,  a               citizen.    In    law,    it    has    various               significations."               (1)   [1970] 1 S.C.R. 472.               (2) [1971]  1 S.C.R. 791.                309               ’Civil  Rights’  are such as belong  to  every               citizen  of  the State or country,  or,  in  a               wider  senes, to all its inhabitants, and  are               not   connected  with  the   organisation   or               administration  of government.   They  include               the rights of property, marriage protection by               the laws, freedom of contract, trial by  jury,               etc.  Or, as otherwise defined,  civil  rights               are rights appertaining to a person in  virtue               of  his citizenship in a state  or  community.               Rights capable or being enforced or  redressed               in  a  civil action.  Also a term  applied  to

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             certain  rights  secured to  citizens  of  the               United States by the thirteenth and fourteenth               amendments to the constitution, and by various               act,-, of congress made in pursuance  thereof.               (p. 1487-Blacks Legal Dictionary) The  interest  of a candidate at an election  to  Parliament regulated by the Constitution and the laws comes within this gravitational   orbit.   The  most  valuable  right   in   a democratic  policy  is  the ’little  man’s’  little  pencil- marking,  assenting  or  dissenting,  called  his  vote.   A democratic  right, if denied, inflicts  civil  consequences. Likewise,  the  little  man’s right,  in  a  representative, system  of  government, to rise to  Prime,  Ministersbip  or Presidentship by use of the right to be candidate, cannot be wished  away  by calling it of no civil moment.   If  civics mean   anything   to   a   self-governing   citizenry,    if participatory democracy is not to be scuttled by the law, we shall not be, captivated by catchwords.  The straightforward conclusion is that every Indian has a right to elect and  be elected and this is a constitutional as distinguished from a common  law  right and is entitled to cognizance  by  courts subject  to  statutory regulation.  We may also  notice  the further refinement urged that a right accrues to a candidate only  when  he  is declared returned and until  then  it  is incipient inchoate and intangible for legal assertion-in the twilight  zone of expectancy, as it were.. This too, in  our view,  is  legicidal  sophistry.  Our  system  of  ’ordered’ rights  cannot disclaim cognizance of orderly  processes  as the right means to a right end.  Our jurisprudence is not so jejune  as to ignore the concern with the means as with  the end with the journey as with the destination.  Every  candi- date,  to  put it cryptically, has an interest or  right  to fair  and free and legally run election.  To draw  lots  and decide who wins, if announced as the electoral  methodology, affects his right, apart from his luckless rejection at  the end.  A vested interest in the prescribed process is a  pro- cessual  right  actionable  if  breached,  the  Constitution permitting.   What is inchoate, viewed from the end, may  be complete,  viewed  midstream.   It is a  subtle  fallacy  to confuse  between the two.  Victory is still  an  expectation qua mwde is a right to the statutory procedure.  The  appel- lant  has  a  right  to  have  the  election  conducted  nor according  to  humour  or hubris but according  to  lay  and justice.   And so natural justice cannot be stumped  out  on this  score.  In the region of public law locus  standi  and person aggrieved, right and interest have a broader  import. But.  in the present case, the Election Commission  contends that a hearing has been given although the appellant retorts that  a vacuous mecting where nothing was disclosed  and  he was  summarily told off would be strange electoral  justice. We express no opinion on the factum or 310 adequacy of the hearing but hold that where a candidate  has reached  the end of the battle and the whole poll is  upset, he  has a right to notice and to be heard, the  quantum  and quality   being   conditioned  by   the   concatenation   of circumstances. The  rulings  cited,  bearing on  the  touchstone  of  civil consequences, do not contradict the view we have propounded. Col.  Sinha merely holds-and we respectfully agree-that  the lowering  of  retirement age does not deprive  a  government servant’s  rights, it being clear that every servant has  to quit on the prescribed age being attained.  Even Binapani(1) concedes  that  the  State has the  authority  to  retire  a servant on superannuation.  The situation here is different.

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We  are  not  in  the province  of  substantive  rights  but procedural   rights   statutorily   regulated.     Sometimes processual  protections are too precious to  be  negotiable, temporised with or whittled down. Ram  Gopal for the same reason is inapplicable.  A  tempoary servant  has  only  a temporary  tenure  terminable  legally without injury.  Even he, if punished, has procedural rights in the zone of natural justice, but not when the contract of employment is legally extinguished.  Interest and right  are generous  conceptions  in  this,  jurisdiction,  not  narrow orthodoxies as in traditional systems. We  move  on  to  a consideration  of  the  argument  prolix plurality   making  hearing  impracticable   and   therefore expendable.     Attractively   ingenious    and    seemingly precedented,  but,  argumentum  ab  inconvenienti  has   its limitations  and  cannot  override  established   procedure. Maybe,  argumentum ab impossibili has greater  force,.   But here  neither  applies for it is a misconception  to  equate candidates  who  have fought to the bitter  finish,with  the hundreds  of  thousands  of voters  who  are  interested  in electoral  proprieties.   In  law  and  life,,  degrees   of difference may, at a substantial stage, spell difference  in kind or dimensions.  Is there an. impossible plurality which frustrates   the  feasibility  of  notice  and  hearing   if candidates alone need be notified ? In  Subhash Chander Sinha(2) Hidayatullah, CJ, speaking  for the  Court repelled the plea of natural justice when a whole examination  was  cancelled  by  the  concerned   university authorities.   The  reasons  given  are  instructive.    The learned  Judge said that "the mention of fairplay  does  not come very well from the respondents who were grossly  guilty of  breach  of  fairplay themselves  at  the  examinations." The   court  examined  the  grounds  for   cancellation   of examinations  and satisfied itself that there was  undoubted abundance  of evidence that students generally  bad  outside assistance in answering questions.  The teamed Judge went on further to say :               "This   is  not  a  case  of  any   particular               individual who is being charged with, adoption               of unfair means but of the conduct of all  the               examinees or at least a vast majority of  them               at  a  particular  centre.  If  it  is  not  a               question of charging anyone individually  with               unfair means but to condemn the examination as               ineffective for the purpose it was hold, must               (1)   [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625.               (2)   [1970] 3 S.C.R. 963.                311               the  Board  give  an opportunity  to  all  the               candidates to represent their cases?  We think               not.   It was not necessary for the  Board  to               give  an opportunity to the candidates if  the               examinations as a whole were being  cancelled.               The Board had not charged any one with  unfair               means  so  that  he  could  claim  to   defend               himself.   The  examination  was  vitiated  by               adoption of unfair means on a mass scale.   In               these  circumstances  it  would  be  wrong  to               insist  that  the Board must hold  a  detailed               inquiry  into  the  matter  and  examine  each               individual case to satisfy itself which of the               candidates had not adopted unfair means.   The               examination as a whole had to, go. " (967-968)               x              x              x              x               x

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             If  at  a centre the whole  body  of  students               receive   assistance  and  manage  to   secure               success  in  the neighbourhood  of  100%  when               others at other centres are successful only at               an  average  of 50%, it is  obvious  that  the               university  or the Board must do something  in               the matter.  It cannot hold a detailed  quasi-               judicial  inquiry with, a right to its  alumni               to  plead  and lead evidence etc.  before  the               results  are  withheld  or  the   examinations               cancelled.  If there is sufficient material on               which   it  can  be  demonstrated   that   the               university  was right in its  conclusion  that               the  examinations ought to be  cancelled  than               academic    standards   require    that    the               university’s appreciation of the problem  must               be  respected.  It would not do for the  Court               to  say that he should have examined  all  the               candidates or even their representatives  with               a  view  to  ascertaining  whether  they   had               received assistance or not.  To do this  would               encourage, indiscipline if not also  perjury."               (968-969) These  propositions are relied on by the learned  Additional SolicitorGeneral  who  seeks  to  approximate  the   present situation of cancellation of the poll to the cancellation of an examination.  His argument is that one has to launch on a public  enquiry  allowing  a  large  number  of  people   to participate  in the hearing if the cancellation of the  poll itself  is to be subjected to natural justice.   He  further said  that no candidate was condemned but the  poll  process was  condemned.  He continued to find a parallel by  stating that  like  the university being responsible  for  the  good conduct   of  examinations,  the  Election  Commission   was responsible  for the proper holding of the poll.  We do  not consider the ratio in Subhash Chander (supra) as applicable. In  fact,  the  candidates concerned stand  on  a  different footing from the electorate in general.  They have  acquired a very vital stake in polling going on properly to a  prompt conclusion.  And when that is upset there may be a vicarious concern for the constituency, why, for that matter, for  the entire  country, since the success of democracy  depends  on country-wide elections being held periodically and properly. Such  interest is too remote and recondite, too  feeble  and attenuated.  to be taken note of in a cancellation  proceed- ing.  What really marks the difference is the diffusion  and dilution.  The 312 candidates.  on  the  other hand, are  the  spearheads,  the combatants,  the  claimants  to  victory.   They  have   set themselves up as nominated candidate organised the  campaign and  galvanised  the electorate for the crown in-  event  of polling  and  counting.  Their interest and  claim  are  not indifferent  but  immediate, not weak but vital.   They  are more  than the members of the public.  They are  parties  to the  electoral  dispute.   In this sense, they  stand  on  a better footing and cannot be denied the right to be heard or noticed.  Even in the case of university examinations it  is not  a  universal  rule  that  notice  need  not  be  given. Ghanshyam Das Gupta’s(1) case illustrates this aspect.  Even there,  when an examination result of three  candidates  was cancelled the, Court imported natural justice.  It was  said that even if the enquiry involved a large number of persons, the  committee  should  frame  proper  regulations  for  the conduct  of  such enquiries but not  deny  the  opportunity.

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That   case  was  distinguished  in  Subhash   Chander   the differentia  being that in one case the right exercised  was of  the examining body to cancel its own examinations  since it  was  satisfied  that the examination  was  not  properly conducted.  It may be a parallel in electoral situations  if the  Election  Commission  cancels  a  poll  because  it  is satisfied  that  the procedure adopted has gone  away  on  a wholesale  basis.   Supposing wrong ballot papers  in  large numbers  have been supplied or it has come to the notice  of the Commission that in the constituency counterfeit  ballots had  been copiously current and used on a large scale,  then without  reference  to  who among the  candidates  was  more prejudiced,  the  poll might have been set  aside.   It  all depends  on  the circumstances and is incapable  of  natural justice to argue that the whole constituency must be given a hearing.  That is an ineffectual over-kill. Lastly, it was contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General,  taking  his  cue from Wiseman  that  the  Election Commission’s direction for a re-poll has only a  provisional consequence since the election court was the ultimate matter of  the  destiny  of the poll, having power  to  review  the decision  of the Commission.  It is true that Wiseman  deals with  the assessment of the evidence at a preliminary  state merely  to  ascertain whether there is a prima  facie  case. The  proceeding  bad still later stages where  the  effected party would enjoy a full opportunity. Lord Reid said plainly that there was a difference :               "It is very unusual for there to be a judicial               determination of the question whether there is               a prima facie case there is nothing inherently               unjust  in reaching such a decision  (i.e.,  a               prima  facie decision) in the absence  of  the               other party." Lord  Wilberforce  however took the view that there  was  ’a residual  duty  of fairness’.  Lord Denning in  Pealberg  v. Party,(2) added in parenthesis               "Although the tribunal. in determining whether               there  is  a prima facie case, is  itself  the               custodian   of  fairness,   nevertheless   its               discretion is open to review." (PP.-737-738)               (1)   [1962] Supp 3 S.C.R. 236.               (2)   [1971] 1 W.L.R. 720,737.                313               Buckley,  L.J.  made the point  about  natural               justice and administrative action.               "I  do  not forget the fact that it  has  been               said,  that the rules of natural  justice  may               apply  to cases where the act in  question  is               more properly described as administrative than               or  quasi-judicial : See Ridge  v.  Baldwin(1)               and t v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs."               (p. 747) The  Indian  parallel would be an argument  for  notice  and hearing  from  a  police officer when  he  investigated  and proceeded  to  lay a chargesheet because he thought  that  a case  to  be  tried by the court had  been  made  out.   The present  case stands on a totally different  footing.   What the Election Commission does is not the ascertain whether  a prima  facie  case exists or an ex parte order,  subject  to modification  by  him  is  to be  made.   If  that  were  so Pearlberg  would have been an effective answer.   For,  Lord Denning luminously illustrates the effect               "I would go so far with him as to say that  in               reaching  a prima facie decision, there  is  a               duty  on  any  tribunal  to  act  fairly;  but

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             fairness depends on the task in hand.  Take an               application  to a court by statute, or by  the               rules, or, as a matter of practice, is made ex               parte.   The  Court itself is a  custodian  of               fairness.  If the matter is so urgent that  an               order should be made forthwith, before hearing               the  other side, as in the case of an  interim               injunction  or a stay of execution  the  court               will  make the order straight away.  We do  it               every day, we are always ready, of course,  to               hear the other side if they apply to discharge               the  order.  But still the order is  made  ex-               parte  without  bearing them.  It is  a  prima               facie  decision.   I agree  that  before  some               other tribunal a prima facie decision may be a               little  different.  The party affected  by  it               may  not  be able to apply to set  it  aside,.               The case must go forward to a final  decision.               Here,  again, I think the tribunal  itself  is               under  what  Lord Wilberforce described  as  a               residual duty of fairness."               (1971 A-C. 297, 320) When  Pearlberg(3) reached the House of Lords the Law  Lords considered  the  question  again.   Lord  Hailsham  of   St. Marylebone L.C. observed :               "The  third factor which affects mind  is  the               consideration  that the decision,  once  made,               does  not make any final determination of  the               rights of the taxpayer.  It simply enables the               inspector   to,   raise  an   assessment,   by               satisfying  the  commissioner that  there  are               reasonable grounds for suspecting loss of  tax               resulting  from  neglect,  fraud,  or   wilful               default, that is               (1)   (1964) A.C. 40.               (2)   (1969) 2 Ch. 149               (3)   (1972) 1 W.L.R. 534.                314               that  there is a prima facie probability  that               there  has  been neglect, etc., and  that  the               Crown   may  have  lost  by  it.    When   the               assessment  is made,, the taxpayer can  appeal               against it, and, on the appeal, may raise  any               question  (inter alia) which would  have  been               relevant on the application for leave,  except               that the leave given should be discharged."               (p.539) x x x x x               "The  doctrine of natural justice has come  in               for increasing consideration in recent  years,               and the courts generally, and your  Lordships’               House  in particular, have, I  think  rightly,               advanced  its frontiers considerably.  But  at               the same time they have taken an  increasingly               sophisticated  view  of what  it  requires  in               individual cases."               (p. 540)               Viscount Dilhorne observed in that case               "I agree with Lord Donovan’s view (Wiseman  v.               Borneman (1971) A.C. 297, 316) that it  cannot               be  said that the rules of natural justice  do               not  apply to a judicial determination of               the  question whether there is a  prima  facie               case,  but I do not think they apply with  the               same  force  or as much force as  they  do  to               decide decisions which determine the rights of

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             persons."               (p. 546)               Lord Pearson’s comment ran thus               "A tribunal to whom judicial or quasi-judicial               functions   are  entrusted  is  held   to   be               required,   to  apply  those   principles   in               performing  those functions unless there is  a               provision  to  the contrary.  But  where  some               person or body is entrusted by Parliament with               administrative or executive functions there is               no   presumption  that  compliance  with   the               principles  of  natural justice  is  required,               although,  as ’Parliament’ not to be  presumed               to  act unfairly’, the courts, may be able  in               suitable  cases (perhaps always) to  imply  an               obligation  to act with  fairness.   Fairness,               however,   does  not  necessarily  require   a               plurality  of bearings or representations  and               counter-representations.   If there  were  too               much  elaboration  of  procedural  safeguards,               nothing  could be done simply and quickly  and               cheaply.     Administrative    or    executive               efficiency  and  economy  should  not  be  too               readily  sacrificed.   The disadvantage  of  a               plurality  of  hearings even in  the  judicial               sphere   was  cogently  pointed  out  in   the               majority  judgment  in Cozens v.  North  Doven               Hospital Management Committee(1). (p. 547)               (1)   (1966) 2 Q.B. 330, 343, 346-347.                315               Lord Salmon put the matter pithily               "No one suggests that it is unfair to launch a               criminal prosecution without first hearing the               accused."               (p. 550)               Indeed,  in  Malloch(1)  E.  Lord  Wilberforce               observed :                "A  limited  right  of appeal  on  the  merits               affords no argument against the existence of a               right to a precedent hearing, and, if that  is               denied, to have the. decision declared void."               (Foot note 30, Public Law Spring 1975  Stevens               p.  50  from  Natural  Justice  Substance  and               Shadow by D. H. Clark). After  all, the Election Court can exercise only  a  limited power  of  review and must give regard to  the  Commission’s discretion.   And the trouble and cost of  instituting  such proceedings  would  deter  all but the  most  determined  of parties aggrieved, and even the latter could derive no  help from legal principle in predicting whether at the end of the day the court would not condone their summary treatment on a subjective  appraisal of the demerits of the case  they  had been denied the opportunity to present.  The public interest would be ill-served by judicially fostered uncertainty as to the value to be set upon procedural fair play as a canon  of good  administration.   And further the  Wiseman  law  Lords regarded  the cutting out of ’hearing’ as quite  unpalatable but  in  the  circumstances  harmless  since  most  of   the assessees  know  the grounds and their-declaration  was  one mode of explanation. We  consider  it a valid point to insist  on  observance  of natural  justice  in the area  of  administrative  decision- making  so  as  to avoid devaluation of  this  principle  by ’administrators   already  alarmingly  insensitive  to   the rationale of audi alteram partem’:

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             "In  his lecture on "The Mission of  the  Law’               Professor  H. W. R. Wade takes  the  principle               that no man should suffer ’without being given               a hearing as a cardinal example of a principle               ’recognised   as   being   indispensable    to               justice,, but which (has) not yet won complete               recognition      in     the      world      of               administration.........     The    goal     of               administrative  justice can never be  attained               by  necessarily  sporadic and  ex  post  facto               judicial review.  The essential mission of the               law  in  this field is to  win  acceptance  by               administrators of the principle that to hear a               men before he is penalised is an integral part               of the decision-making process.  A measure  of               the  importance  of  resisting  the  incipient               abnegation by the courts of the firm rule that               branch of audi alteram partem invalidates,  is               that if it gains ground the mission of the law               is doomed to fail to the detriment of all."               (P.   60    :   Public   Law    Spring    1975               Stevens--Natural   Justice  :  Substance   and               shadow) Our  constitutional order pays more than lip-service to  the rule  of reasonable administrative process.  Our  people-are not yet conscious of (1)  (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1570, 1598. 316 their  rights; our administrative apparatus has a  hard  of- hearing  heritage.  Therefore a creative play  of  fairplay, irksome  to some but good in the long run, must be  accepted as  part of our administrative law.  Lord Hailsham  L.C.  in Pearlbeg presaged :               "The  doctrine of natural justice has come  in               for increasing consideration in recent  years,               and  the courts generally, and (the  House  of               Lords)   in  particular,  have  advanced   its               frontiers considerably.  But at the same  time               they have taken an increasingly  sophisticated               view of what is required in individual cases.               (P. 63, Public Law Spring 1975 supra) And  in  India this case is neither the  inaugural  nor  the valedictory of natural justice. Moreover,  Sri Rao’s plea that when the Commission  cancels, viz.,  declares the poll void it is performing more than  an administrative  function merits, attention, although  we  do not pause to decide it.  We consider that in the vital  area of  elections  where the people’s faith  in  the  democratic process  is hypersensitive it is republican realism to  keep alive  audi  alteram even in emergencies, ’even  amidst  the clash of arms’.   Its protsan shades apart we recognise that ’hearing’  need  not  be an elaborate  ritual  and  may,  in situations  of  quick  despatch, be  minimal,  even  formal, nevertheless  real.  In this light, the Election Court  will approach  the problem.  To scuttle the ship is not  to  save the cargo; to jettison may be. Fair   hearing  is  thus  a  postulate  of   decision-making cancelling a poll, although fair abridgement of that process is  permissible.   It  can  be fair  without  the  rules  of evidence or forms of trial.  It cannot be fair if  apprising the  affected and appraising the representations is  absent. The  philosophy  behind natural justice is,  in  one  sense, participatory  justice in the process of democratic rule  of law. We have been told that wherever the Parliament has  intended

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a  hearing  it  has said so in the Act  and  the  rules  and inferentially  where it has not specificated it  is  otiose. There is no such sequitur.  The silence of a statute has  no exclusionary  effect  except where it flows  from  necessary implication.   Art.  324 vests a wide power and  where  some direct consequence on candidates emanates from its exercise, we must read this functional obligation. There  was much argument about the; guidelines in S. 58  and 64A  being  applicable  to an  order  for  constituency-wide repoll.   It  may be wholesome to be guided; but it  is  not illegal not to do so, provided homage to natural justice  is otherwise  paid.  Likewise, Shri P. P. Rao pressed that  the Chief Election Commissioner’ was arbitrary in ordering a re- poll beyond Fazilka segment or postal ballots.  Even the 3rd respondent had not asked for it; not was there any  material to  warrant  it  since  all the ballots  of  all  the  other segments   were  still  available  to  be  sorted  out   and recounted.  A whole re-poll is not a joke.  It is almost  an irreparable   punishment   to  the  constituency   and   the candidates.   The sound and fury, the mammoth campaigns  and rallies, the whistle-story, 317 speeches and frenzy of slogans, the white-heat of  tantrums, the expensiveness of the human resources and a hundred other traumatic consequences must be remembered before an easy re- poll  is  directed, urges Shri Rao.  We note the  point  but leave its impact open for the Election Court to assess  when judging  whether the, impugned orders was scary,  arbitrary, whimsical or arrived at by omitting material considerations. Independently of natural justice, judicial review extends to an  examination  of  the order as  to  its  being  perverse, irrational, bereft of application of the mind or without any evidentiary  backing.  If two views are possible, the  Court cannot interpose its view.  If no view is possible the Court must strike down. We have projected the panorama of administrative law at this length  so  that the area may not be befogged at  the  trial before  the Election Court and for action in future  by  the Election Commission.  We have held that Art. 329(b) is a bar for  intermediate legal proceedings calling in question  the steps  in  the election outside the machinery  for  deciding election disputes.  We have further held that Art. 226  also suffers  such eclipse.  Before the notification under s.  14 and  beyond  the  declaration  under r.  64  of  Conduct  of Election  Rules, 1961 are not forbidden ground.  In  between is, provided, the step challenged is taken in furtherance of not to halt or hamper the progress of the election. We  have clarified that what may seem to be counter  to  the match  of the election process may in fact be one  to  clear the  way to a free, and fair verdict of the electorate.   It depends.   Taking the Election Commission at his  word  (the Election Court has the power to examine the validity of  his word), we proceed on the prima facie view that writ petition is  not  sustainable.  If it turned out that  the,  Election Commission acted bizarre fashion or in indiscreet haste,  it forebodes ill for the Republic.  For if the salt lose  their savour,  wherewith shall they be salted ? Alan Barth in  his ’Prophets  with  Honor’, quotes  Justice  Felix  Frankfurter regarding the standard for a judicial decision thus :               "Mr.   Doolay’s the Supreme Court follows  the               iliction   returns’,  expressed  the  wit   of               cynicism,  not  the demand  of  principle.   A               Court which yields to the popular will thereby               licensee  itself  to practice  despotism,  for               there can be no assurance that it will not  on

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             another occasion indulge its own will.  Courts               can   fulfil   their   responsibility   in   a               democratic  society  only to the  extent  that               they  succeed  in shaping their  judgments  by               rational standards, and rational standards are               both impersonal and communicable."               (Quotation from American Federation of  Labour               v.  American  Sash and Door Co.’335  U.S.  538               (1949) P. 15 of Alan Berth’s book published by               Light & Life Publishers, New Delhi) The  above observation would equally apply to  the  Election Commission. Many  incidental  points were debated but  we  have  ignored those  micro-questions  and  confined  ourselves  to  macro- determinations.   It is for the Election Court, not for  us, to rule on those variegated matters. 318 Certain  obvious questions will claim the  Election  Court’s attention.   Did the Commission violate the election,  rules or  canons of fairness ?  Was the play, in short,  according to  the script or did the dramatis personae  act  defiantly, contrary  to the text ? After all, democratic elections  may be likened to a drama, with a solemn script and  responsible actors,  officials and popular, each playing his part,  with roles  for heroes but not for villains, save where the  text is travestied and unscheduled anti-heroes intervene  turning the  promising  project for the smooth registration  of  the collective will of the people into a tragic plot against it. Every  corrupt  practice, partisan  official  action,  basic breach  of  rules  or  deviance  from  the  fundamental   of electoral  fairplay  is  a danger signal  for  the  nation’s democratic destiny.  We view this case with the  seriousness of John Adams’ warning :               "’Remember’,  said  John  Adams,   ’remember’,               democracy  never lasts long.  It soon  wastes,               exhausts and murders itself.  There never  was               a democracy that did not commit suicide."               (Quoted from M. Hidayatullah in "Democracy  in               India  and  the Judicial Process"  Lajpat  Rai               Memorial Lectures : P. 16) Only  one issue remains.  Is, the provision in S.  100  read with s. 90 sufficient to afford full relief to the appellant if  the finding is in violation or mat-exercise  of,  powers under Art. 324 ? Sri Rao says ’NO’ while the opposition says ’YES’. Lot  us follow the appellant’s apprehension for a  while  to test  its tenability.  He says that the Commissioner has  no power  to  cancel  the election  to  a  whole  constituency. Therefore, the impugned order is beyond his authority and in excess  of his functions under Art. 324.  Moreover, even  if such   power  exists  it  has  been   exercised   illegally, arbitrarily  and in violation of the implied  obligation  of audi  alteran  partem. In substance, his complaint  is  that under  guise of Art. 324 the Commissioner has  acted  beyond its  boundaries, in breach of its content and  oblivious  of its   underlying  duties.   Such  a   mal-exercise   clearly tantamounts to non-adherence to the norms and limitations of Art.  324  and,  if true, it is a  noncompliance  with  that provision  of the Constitution.  It falls within  s.  100(1) (d)  (iv).  A generous, purposeoriented, literally  informed statutory   interpretation  spreads  the  wings   of   ’non- compliance’  wide  enough to bring  in  all  contraventions, excesses, breaches and subversions. We  derive support for this approach from Durga Mehta.   The Court there considered the same words, in the same sections,

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in the same statute.  Section 100(2) (c) interpreted in that case re-incamates as s,. 100(1) (d) (iv) later.   Everything is identical.  And Mukherjee, J. explained.               "It is argued on behalf of the respondent that               the  expression  "non-compliance’ as  used  in               sub-section  (2)(c) would suggest the idea  of               not  acting according to any rule  or  command               and   that   the  expression  is   not   quite               appropriate  in  describing  a  mere  lack  of               qualification.  This, we think, would               319               be a narrow way of looking at the thing.  When               a  person  is incapable of being chosen  as  a               member   of   a  State  Assembly   under   the               provisions of the Constitution itself but  has               nevertheless  been  returned  as  such  at  an               election,  it can be said without  impropriety               that  there has been non-compliance  with  the               provisions  of  the  Constitution   materially               affecting  the result of the election.   There               is   no  material  difference  between   "non-               compliance"  and "non-observance" or  "breach"               and this item in clause (c) of sub-section (2)               may   be  taken  as  a   residuary   provision               contemplating  cases  where  there  has   been               infraction   of   the   provisions   of    the               Constitution or of the Act but which have  not               been  specifically  enumerated  in  the  other               portions of the clause."               Lexical  significations are not the last  work               in statutory construction.  We hold that it is               perfectly  permissible for the Election  Court               to decide the question as one falling under s.               1  00 ( 1 ) (d) (iv) A presumatic view of  the               Act  and  Art. 324 helps  discern  an  organic               synthesis.  Law sustains, not fails.               A  kindred matter viz., the scope of sec.  100               and sec. 98 has to be examined, parties having               expressed  anxious difference on  the  implied               powers of the Election Court.  Indeed, it is a               necessary part of our decision but we may deal               with it even here.  Sri Rao’s consternation is               that, if his writ petition is dismissed as not               maintainable  and  his  election  petition  is               dismissed  on  the ground  that  the  Election               Court had no power to examine the cancellation               of poll now that a fresh poll has taken place,               he  will be in the unhappy position of  having               to  forfeit  a  nearvictory  because  a  gross               illegality  triumphs  irremediably.   If  this               were  true the hopes of the rule of  law  turn               into  dupes  of  the people.   We  have  given               careful thought to this tragic possibility and               are  convincedindeed,  the  learned  Solicitor               General   has   argued  for   upholding,   not               subverting the rule of law and agrees-that the               Election Court has all the powers necessary to               grant  all  or any of the reliefs set  out  in               sec. 98 and to direct the Commissioner to take               such  ancillary steps as will render  complete               justice to the appellant.               Section  98,  which  we  have  read   earlier,               contemplates   three  possibilities  when   an               election  petition is tried.  Part VI  of  the               Act  deals  with  the  complex  of  provisions

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             calculated  to resolve election  disputes.   A               match  past  this Part discloses the  need  to               file   an  election  petition  (S.   60)   the               jurisdiction  to  try which is vested  in  the               High  Court (80A).  Regulatory of the  further processes on presentation of a petition are sees. 81 to  96. If  a  candidate  whose  return is  challenged  has  a  case invalidating  the  challenger’s election he may  set  it  up subject to the provision in sec. 97.  Then comes the  finale in  sec.  98.  The High Court has three options  by  way  of conclusive determinations.  It may (a) dismiss the  petition (b) declare the election void; and (c) go further to declare the petitioner duly elected.  Side-stepping certain  species of orders that may be passed under s. 99 we have to  explore the gamut of implied powers when the grant of power is  wide and  needs incidental exercises to execute  the  substantive power.               320               A few more sections exist which we may omit as               being not germane to the present controversy.               What  is that controversy ? Let us project  it               with  special reference to the present  case,.               Hero  the,  poll  proceeded  peacefully,   the               counting was almost complete, the, ballots  of               most  stations are available and postal  votes               plus the votes of one, or two polling stations               may alone be missing.  Sri P. P. Rao asks  and               whenever  counsel  in court or  speaker  on  a               podium asks rhetorical questions be sure he is               ready  with an answer in his favour :  If  the               court  holds  that  the  cancellation  by  the               Commissioner of the whole poll is illegal what               relief  can it give me since a fresh  election               based  on  that demolition  has  been  already               held’?  If the court holds that since most  of               the  ballots are intact, repoll at one or  two               places  is enough how can even the court  hold               such  limited repoll.  If the Court  wants  to               grant  the  appellant the relief that  lie  is               duly elected how can the intervening processes lying   within  the  competence  of  the   Commissioner   be commandered  by the Court ? The solution to this  disturbing string of interrogations is simple given a creative  reading of implied powers writ invisibly yet viably into the  larger jurisdiction  under sec. 98.  Law transcends  legalism  when life is baffled by surprise situations.  In this larger view end  in  accordance with the  well-established  doctrine  of implied  powers  we think the Court  contend  if  justified, shall-do,  by its command, all that is necessary  to  repair the  injury and make the remedy realisable.  Courts are  not luminous  angels beating by their golden wings in  the  void but  operational authority sanctioning everything to  fulfil the  trust  of  the  rule of law.   That  the  less  is  the inarticulate  part  of the larger is  the  jurisprudence  of power.   Both  Sri  Sorabjee and Sri Phadke  agree  to  this proposition  and  Sri  Rao, in the  light  of  the  election petition filed and is pending, cannot but assent to it.   By way  of  abundant caution or otherwise,  the  appellant  has challenged, in his election petition, the declaration of the 3rd respondent as the returned candidate.  He has also rayed for his being declared the duly elected candidate.  There is no  dispute- there cannot be.--that the cornerstone  of  the second constituency-wide poll High Court for any good reason then  the second poll falls and the 3rd respondent too  with it.   This question of the soundness of the cancellation  of

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the  entire poll is within the court,s power under s. 98  of the  Act. All are agreed on this.In that eventuality,   what are  the follow-up steps? Everything necessary to  resurrect reconstruct and lead on  to   a  consummation  of   the originalprocess. Maybe, to give effective relief by-way of completion of the broken election the Commissioner may  have to  be directed to hold fresh poll and report back  together with  the ballots.  A recount of all or some may perhaps  be required.   Other steps suggested by other developments  may be  desired.   If  anything integrally linked  up  with  and necessitated  by the obligation to grant full relief has  to be  undertaken  or  ordered  to  be  done  by  the  election machinery,  all  that is within the orbit  of  the  Election Court’s power. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the proposition thus               "Implied  powers are such as are necessary  to               make  available  and carry into  effect  those               powers which are expressly                321               granted or conferred, and which must therefore               be presumed to have been within the  intention               of the constitutional or legislative grant.               (p. 1334 Black’s Legal Dictionary 4th Edn.) This  understanding accords with justice and reason and  has the support of Sutherland.  The learned Additional Solicitor General also cited the case in Metajog Dobey v. H. C.  Bhari [1955]  2 SCR 925 at p. 937 and Commissioner  of  Commercial taxes,& Ors v. R. S. Jhaver & ors. etc. [1968] 1 SCR 148  at p.  154/155 to substantiate his thesis that the doctrine  of implied powers clothes the Commissioner with vast incidental powers.  Hi illustrated his point by quoting from Sutherland (Frank E. Horack Jr., Vol. 3)               "Necessary implications.               Where  a statute confers powers or  duties  in               general   terms,   all   powers   and   duties               incidental   and   necessary  to   make   such               legislation   effective   are   included    by               implication.   Thus  it has been  stated,  "An               express  statutory  grant  of  power  or   the               imposition of a definite duty carries with  it               by   implication,   in  the   absence   of   a               limitation, authority to employ all the  means               that   are  usually  employed  and  that   are               necessary to the exercise of the power or  the               performance  of  the duty..... That  which  is               clearly implied is as much a part of a law  as               that  which is expressed." The  reason  behind               the  rule  is  to be found in  the  fact  that               legislation  is enacted to establish broad  or               general  standards.  Matters of  minor  detail               are   frequently  omitted   from   legislative               enactments,   and  "if  these  could  not   be               supplied   by  implication  the  drafting   of               legislation  would be an interminable  process               and the true intent of the legislature  likely               to be defeated.               The  rule whereby a statute,, is by  necessary               implication extended has been most  frequently               applied in the construction of laws relegating               powers  to public officers and  administrative               agencies.   The powers thus granted involve  a               multitude  of functions that are  discoverable               only through practical experience.               x                x               x               A  municipality,  empowered,  by  statute   to

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             construct  sewers for the preservation of  the               public  health, interest and convenience,  was               permitted  to construct a protecting wall  and               pumping  plant  which were necessary  for  the               proper   working  of  the  sewer.   but   were               essential to public health.  A country  school               superintendent,  who  was  by  statute   given               general  supervisory  power  over  a   special               election,  was  permitted to  issue  absentee,               ballots.  The power to arrest has been held to               include  the power to take finger prints,  and               take  into  custody  non-residents  who   were               exempted  from the provisions of  a  licensing               statute."               322 Having   regard  to  statutory  setting  and   comprehensive jurisdiction of the Election Court we are satisfied that  it is  within  its powers to, direct a  re-poll  of  particular polling  stations to be conducted by the specialised  agency under  the  Election Commission and report the  results  and ballots  to  the Court.  Even a re-poll of  postal  ballots, since  those names are known, can be ordered taking care  to preserve  the  secrecy  of  the vote.   The  Court  may,  if necessary,  after  setting aside the election of  R.  3  (if there  are  good grounds therefore keep  the  case  pending, issue directions for getting available votes, order  recount and  or partial re-poll, keep the election petition  pending and pass final orders holding the appellant elected  if-only if-valid  grounds  are  established.  Such  being  the  wide ranging scope of implied powers we are in agreement with the learned  Additional Solicitor General that all  the  reliefs the appellant claims are within the Court’s powers to  grant and Sri Rao’s alarm is unfounded. Diffusion, even more elaborate discussion, tends to blur the precision of the conclusion in a judgment and so it is  meet that  we,  synopsize  the  formulations.   Of  course,   the condensed  statement  we make is for  convenience,  not  for exclusion  of  the relevance or attenuation of  the  binding impact  of  the detailed argumentation.   For  this  limited purpose, we set down our holdings               1  (a)  Art.  329(b)  is  a  blanket  ban   on               litigative challenges to electoral steps taken               by  the Election Commission and  its  officers               for  carrying forward the process of  election               to  its culmination in the formal  declaration               of the result.               (b)   Election,  in this context, has  a  very               wide    connotation   commencing   from    the               Presidential  notification  calling  upon  the               electorate  to  elect and culminating  in  the               final declaration of the returned candidate..               (a) The Constitution, contemplates a free  and               fair   election   and   vests    comprehensive               responsibilities                            of               superintendence, direction and control of  the               conduct   of   elections   in   the   Election               Commission.   This  responsibility  may  cover               powers,  duties and functions of  many  sorts,               administrative  or  other,  depending  on  the               circumstances.               (b)   Two limitations at least are laid on its               plenary  character  in the  exercise  thereof.               Firstly,   when   Parliament  or   any   State               Legislature has made valid law, relating to or               in  connection with elections, the  Commission

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             shall act in conformity with, not in violation               of  such  provisions  but where  such  law  is               silent  Art. 324 is a reservoir of  power  to,               act  for the avowed purpose of,  not  divorced               from pushing forward a free and fair  election               with  expedition.   Secondly,  the  Commission               shall  be responsible to the rule of law,  act               bona  fide  and be amenable to  the  norms  of               natural  justice in so- far as conformance  to               such  canons can reasonably and  realistically               be  required of it as fairplay-in-action in  a               most  important  area  of  the  constitutional               order, viz., elections.  Fairness does  import               an obligation to see that no               323                  wrongdoer  candidate benefits  by  his own-               wrong.   To  put  the  matter  beyond   doubt,               natural  justice enlivens and applies  to  the               specific  case  of  order  for  total  repoll,               although.  not  in full penoply but   in  full               penoply   but  in   flexible   practicability.               Whether it has been compiled with is left open               for the  Tribunal’s adjudication.               3.    The conspectus of provisions bearing  on               the subject of elections clearly expresses the               rule  that there is a remedy for  every  wrong               done during the election in progress  although               it is postponed to the post election stage and               procedure as predicated in Art. 329(b) and the               1951  Act.  The Election Tribunal  has,  under               the  various  provisions  of  the  Act,  large               enough  powers  to give relief to  an  injured               candidates  if  he makes out a case  and  such               processual  amplitude  of  power  extends   to               directions to the Election Commission or other               appropriate agency to hold a poll, to bring up               the  ballots or do other thing  necessary  for               fulfilment   of  the  jurisdiction   to   undo               illegality  and  injustice  and  do   complete               justice  within  the  parameters  set  by  the               "existing law. In  sum, a pragmatic modus vivendi between the  Commission’s paramount constitutional responsibility vis-a-vis  elections and  the  rule  of law vibrant with  fair  acting  by  every authority and remedy for every right breached, is reached. We  conclude stating that the bar of Art. 329(b) is as  wide as  the door of. s. 100 read with s. 98.  The writ  petition is  dismissible but every relief (given factual  proof)  now prayed for in the pending election petition is within reach. On this view of the law ubi jus ibi remeditum is vindicated, election  injustice  is  avoided, and  the  constituency  is allowed   to  speak  effectively.   In  the  light  of   and conditioned  by  the law we have laid down, we  dismiss  the appeal.   Where the dispute which spirals to this  Court  is calculated to get a clarification of tile legal calculus  in an area of national moment, the parties are the occasion but the  people are the beneficiaries, and so costs must not  be visited  on t particular person.  Each party Will  bear  his own costs. A  word of mood for counsel.  Shri Soli Sorabjee, did,  with imaginative,  yet  emphatic,  clarity  and  pragmatic,   yet persuasive,  advocacy,  belight the  twilit  yet  sensitive, zones of the electoral law; Shri P. P. Rao did, with feeling for   justice  and  wrestling  with  law,  drive  home   the calamities  of our system if right did not speak to  remedy;

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and Shri Phadke did, without overlapping argument, but  with unsparing vigour, bringing out the, legal dynamics of  quick elections  and  comprehensive corrections.   We  record  our appreciation  to the bar whose help goes a long way for  the bench to do justice, GOSWAMI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the  judgment  of the Delhi High Court dismissing  the  writ application  of  the  appellant under  Article  226  of  the Constitution. 8-1114SCI/77 324 By  a notification of February 10, 1977, made under  section 14  of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,  (briefly the  Act),  the  President  called  upon  the  Parliamentary Constituencies to elect members to the House of the  People, in  accordance with the provisions of the Act and the  rules and orders made thereunder.  Simultaneously, a  notification was  issued  by  the  Chief  Election  Commissioner  with  a calendar of dates for different Parliamentary Constituencies in  the country.  In this appeal we are concerned  with  No. 13-Ferozepore  Parliamentary  Constituency in the  State  of Punjab where the poll was scheduled to be held on March  16, 1977,  and March 23 was fixed as the date before  which  the election  shall  be completed.  Counting, according  to  the schedule,  was  to  commence  on March ,  20,  1977  and  it actually  continued on March 21, 1977.   This  Parliamentary Constituency  consisted  of  nine  Assembly   Constituencies including the Fazilka and Zira Assembly segments. We  may now briefly state the appellants’ case so far as  it is material : The  poll  in  the  entire  Parliamentary  Constituency  was peacefully  over  on  March  16,  1977.   Counting  in  five Assembly  segments was completed on March 20, 1977,  and  in the  remaining  four  it was completed  on  March  21.   The Assistant  Returning  Officers made entries  in  the  result sheets in form 20 and announced the number of votes received by  each candidate in the Assembly segments.  No  recounting was  asked for by any candidate or his polling agent in  any segment.  Copies of the result sheets in Form 20 were handed over  to  the candidates or to their  polling  agents.   The ballot papers and the result sheets of all the nine Assembly segments   were  transmitted  by  the  Assistant   Returning Officers   concerned  to  the  Returning  Officer   at   the Headquarters.  According to the result sheets the appellant, who  was  the Congress candidate,  secured  1,96,016  votes, excluding  postal  ballots, as ’against  his  nearest  rival candidate  respondent No. 3, belonging to the  Akali  Party, who  secured 1,94,095 votes, excluding postal ballots.   The margin  of votes between the appellant and respondent No.  3 at that stage was 1921.  There were 769 postal ballots,.  As per programme, counting of postal ballot papers was  started by the Returning Officer (respondent No. 2) at 3.00 P.M.  on March 21. 248 ballot papers out of 769 were rejected in  the counting.   At this stage, it is said, respondent No. 3  and his son incited an unruly mob of his supporters to raid  the office of the Returning Officer as a result of which a grave situation  was  created  in  which  many  officers  received injuries.   ’The  Returning  Officer  was  abused  and   was threatened  that  his son and other members  of  his  family would  be  murdered.  All the postal ballot  papers,  except those  which had been rejected, were destroyed by  the  mob. Some ballot papers of Fazilka Assembly segment are also said to  have  been destroyed by the mob in the course  of  their transit  to  the  office  of  the  Returning  Officer.   The Assistant Returning Officer of the Zira Assembly segment, on

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his way to the office of the Returning Officer, was attacked by  the  mob  and some of the  envelopes  containing  ballot papers, paper seal accounts and presiding Officers’  diaries were  snatched away from him.  However the result sheets  in Form 20 of all the Assembly segments in which the 325 counting  had  been completed by March 21,  1977,  could  be preserved  and  were  deposited  in  Gorvernment   Treasury, Ferozepore.  In view of the violent situation created in the office  of  the  Returning Officer, be  was  prevented  from ascertaining  the  result of the postal  ballot  papers  and declaring the result of the election.  He was made to sign a written  report about the happenings to the  Chief  Election Commissioner (respondent No. 1).  The above, briefly, is the version of the appellant. Deputy  Commissioners  are  usually  appointed’as  Returning Officers  and  originally Shri G. B. S. Gosal, who  was  the Deputy Commissioner, was nominated as the Returning  Officer of  the  aforesaid constituency, as per  notification  dated January  29,  1977.  It appear s on February 8,  1977,  Shri Gosal  was  transferred and Shri Gurbachan  Singh,  a  close relation  of  the  appellant, was appointed  as  the  Deputy Commissioner  in place of Shri Gosal.  Shri Gurbachan  Singh (respondent No. 2) thus became the Returning Officer.  There were complaints and allegations against him and after  being apprised  of  the same the Chief  Election  Commissioner  of (respondent  No.  1) appointed Shri I. K.  K.  Menon,  Under Secretary, Election Commission, as an Observer to be present at Ferozepore from March 16 till March 21 on which date  the result was expected to be declared. On March 22, 1977, the Chief Election Commissioner  received a  wireless message from the Returning Officer which may  be quoted               "Mob  about sixteen thousand by over  powering               the  police attacked the counting  hall  where               postal  ballot  papers  were  being   counted.               Police  could  not control the mob  being  out               numbered.    Part  of  postal  ballot   papers               excepting  partly rejected ballot  papers  and               other election material destroyed by the  mob.               Lot   of  damage  to  property   done.    ’The               undersigned was forced under duress to give in               writing  the following : ’The counting  of  13               Parliamentary Ferozepore Constituency has been               adjourned  due to certain circumstances  which               have   been  mentioned  in   the   application               presented  by  Shri Mohinder  Singh  Sayanwala               regarding  repoll of the constituency  and  on               the polling station in which the ballot               boxes  have been r to be tampered with.   This               will   be  finally  decided  on   receipt   of               instructions from the Election Commission ’and               the  result  will  be  announced  thereafter’.               Counting  adjourned and result postponed  till               receipt of further instructions from  Election               Commission.  Incident happened in the presence               of Observer at Ferozepore.  Mob also destroyed               the ballot papers and other election  material               and  steel trunks of Fazilka Assembly  segment               at  Ferozepore  after  the  counting  part  of               election material of Zira Assembly segment was               also  snatched  and destroyed by  the  mob  at               Ferozepore". On  the same day the Chief Election Commissioner received  a written report from the Observer.  The Observer also "orally

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apprised  the  Chief Election Commissioner  of  the  various incidents at the time of 326 poll  and counting in various Assembly segments".  No  other report from the Returning Officer was, however, received  on that day. On  the materials mentioned above which he could  gather  on March  22, 1977, the Chief Election Commissioner passed  the impugned order on the same day.  It may even be  appropriate to quote the same :               "Election Commission of India                                                   New Delhi                                        Dated 22 March, 1977                                      Chaitra, 1, 1899 (SAKA)                                            NOTIFICATION S.O.  Whereas the Election Commission has  received  reports from  the  Returning Officer of  13-Ferozepur  Parliamentary Constituency  that  the  counting  on  21  March,  1977  was seriously  disturbed by violence; that the ballot papers  of some   of  the  assembly  segments  of   the   parliamentary constituency  have  been destroyed by violence,  that  as  a consequence  it is not possible to complete the counting  of the  votes  in the constituency and the declaration  of  the result cannot be made with any degree of certainty; And  whereas  the Commission is satisfied  that  taking  all circum’stances  into account, the poll in  the  constituency has been vitiated to such an extent as to effect the  result of the election; Now,  therefore, the Commission, in exercise of  the  powers vested in it under article 324 of the Constitution,  Section 153  of the Representation of the People Act, 1951  and  all other  powers  enabling it so. to do, cancels  poll  already taken  in  the  constituency and extends the  time  for  the completion of the election upto 30 April, 1977...... x              x            x                 x            x The appellant approached the Chief Election Commissioner  to revoke  the impugned order and to declare the result of  the election,  but  without  success.   That  led  to  the  writ application in the High Court with prayer to issue-               (1)   a  writ of certiorari calling forth  the               records  for  the  purpose  of  quashing   the               impugned order; and               (2)   ’a writ of mandamus directing the  Chief               Election   Commissioner  and   the   Returning               Officer to declare the result of the election;               (3)   alternatively,   a  writ   of   mandamus               directing  the Chief Election Commissioner  to               act strictly in accordance with the  provision               of   section   64A(2)   thus   confining   its               directions  in regard to postal ballot  papers               only. The appellant made three contentions before the High Court. Firstly, that the Election Commission had no jurisdiction to order 327 re-poll of the entire Parliamentary Constituency.  Secondly, the  impugned  order  was violative  of  the  principles  of natural justice as no opportunity of a hearing was  afforded to  the appellant before passing the  order.   Thirdly,’that the  High  Court under Article 226 of the  Constitution  was competent   to  go  into  the  matter  notwithstanding   the provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution. The   application  was  resisted  by  the   Chief   Election Commissioner  (respondent  No. 1) and respondent No  3,  the rival candidate.

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A  preliminary  objection was raised by respondents 1  to  3 with regard to the maintainability of the writ  ’application on the ground that Article 329(b) of the Constitution was  a bar  to the High Courts entertaining it.  Another  objection was  taken  that the writ petition was not  maintainable  in view  of  the  amended  provisions of  Article  226  of  the Constitution.    The   High   Court   dismissed   the   writ application.   The High Court held that Article 324  confers "plenary  executive powers" on the Election  Commission  and there  were no limitations on the functions contemplated  in Article  324.  The High Court observed that the  law  framed under  Article 327 or Article 328 was in aid of the  plenary powers  already conferred on the Election  Commission  under Article 324, and where the law so made under Article 327  or Article  328  omitted  to provide for  a  contingency  or  a situation,  the  said plenary executive  power  relating  to conduct of elections conferred upon the Election  Commission by Article 324(1) of the Constitution would become available to it and the, Election Commission would be entitled to pass necessary orders in the interest of free and fair elections. The  High Court also held that the Returning  Officer  could not  deprive  the  candidates  of  the  rights  of   recount available to them tinder rule 63 of the Conduct of  Election Rules,  1961, and after going into the facts  observed  that "it  became impossible for the Returning Officer  to  comply with the provisions of rules 63(2) to 63(6)".  Repelling the contention  of the appellant that the Commission  could  not travel beyond the Act and the rules by simply relying on its powers under the Constitution, the High Court observed "that calling  upon of the parliamentary constituencies  to  elect members  has to be in accordance with the provisions of  the Act  and the Rules but it does not mean that the conduct  of elections  by the Commission has to be held only  under  the Act  or  the Rules.  The Election Commission who  is  vested with the power of conducting the elections has still to hold the  elections in accordance with the Act and the  Rules  as well  as  under the Constitution".  The High  Court  further held  that  the  principles  of  natural  justice  were  not specifically  provided for in Article 324 but were  "totally excluded while passing the impugned order".  The High  Court further  observed  that even if the  principles  of  natural justice  were  impliedly to be observed before  passing  the impugned order the appellant was "heard not only before  the issue  of  the  notification  but  in  any  case  after  the notification".   The  High Court also ’held that it  bad  no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in view. of  the bar contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution. This   appeal   has  come  up  for  hearing   before   this’ Constitution  Bench on a reference by a Two-Judge  Bench  as substantial questions of 328 law   have   arisen  as  to  the,  interpretation   of   the Constitution,  in particular Article 324 and Article  329(b) of  the  Constitution.  We should,.  therefore,  immediately address ourselves to that aspect of the matter. What  is  the  scope  and  ambit  of  Article  324  of   the Constitution ?  The Constitution of our country ushered in a Democratic  Republic  for  the free people  of  India.   The founders  of the Constitution took solemn care to  devote  a special chapter to Elections niched safely in Part XV of the Constitution.   Originally there were only six  articles  in this Part opening with Article 324.  The penultimate Article in  the chapter, as it stands, is Article 329 which  puts  a ban on interference by courts in electoral matters.  We  are not  concerned in this appeal with the newly  added  Article

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329A which is the last Article to close the’ chapter. Elections  supply  the visa viva to a  democracy.   It  was, therefore,  deliberately  and  advisedly thought  to  be  of paramount  importance that the high ’and independent  office of  the  Election  Commission should be  created  under  the Constitution  to  be  in  complete  charge  of  the   entire electoral   process  commencing  with  the  issue   of   the notification, by the ’President to the final declaration  of the  result.  We are not concerned with the other duties  of the Election Commission in this appeal. Article  324 came to the notice of this Court for the  first time  in  N. P. Ponnuswami v.  Returning  Officer,  Namakkal Constituency and Others(1).  This Court observed               "Broadly   speaking,   before   an    election               machinery can be brought into operation, there               are  three  requisites  which  require  to  be               attended  to, namely, (1) there should  be  ’a               set  of laws and rules making provisions  with               respect  to  all matters relating  to,  or  in               connection with,, elections, and it should  be               decided as to how these laws and rules are  to               be  made;  (2) there should  be  an  executive               charged  with  the duty of  securing  the  due               conduct of elections; and (3) there should  be               a     judical  tribunal to deal with  disputes               arising   out  of  or  in   connection    with               elections.  Articles 327 and 328 deal with the               first  of these requisites, article  324  with               the  second  and article 329  with  the  third               requisite".               Further below this Court observed as follows               "Obviously,   the  Act  is  a   self-contained               enactment  so far as elections are  concerned,               which means that whenever we have to ascertain               the  true  position in  regard  to  any-matter               connected with elections, we have only to look               at the Act and the rules made thereunder".               Lower down this Court further observed               "It is now well-recognised that there a  right               or  liability  is created by a  statute  which               gives a special remedy for               (1)[1952] S.C.R. 218.                329               enforcing  it,  the remedy  provided  by  that               statute only must be availed of".               x                       x                    x               x               the Representation of the People Act to  state               that  the  Act provides for only  one  remedy,               that  remedy being by an election petition  to               be  presented after the election is over,  and               there   is   no   remedy   provided   at   any               intermediate stage". Ponnuswami’s case (supra) had to deal with a matter  arising out of rejection of a nomination paper which was the subject matter  of  a  writ application under  Article  226  of  the Constitution which the High Court bad dismissed. With  regard  to the construction of Article 329(b)  it  was held that "the more reasonable view seems to be that article 329  covers all electoral matters"’.  This Court  put  forth its conclusions in that decision as follows :-               "(1) Having regard to the important  functions               which  the  legislatures have  to  perform  in               democratic  countries,  it  has  always   been               recognised to be a matter of first  importance

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             that elections should be concluded as early as               possible  according to time schedule  and  all               controversial matters and all disputes arising               out  of  elections should  be  postponed  till               after  the  elections are over,  so  that  the               election   proceedings  may  not   be   unduly               retarded or protracted.               (2)   In  conformity with this principle,  the               scheme of the election law in this country  as               well  as  in England is that  no  significance               should be attached to anything which does  not               affect  the  ’election’; and  if  any  irregu-               larities are committed while it is in progress               and  they  belong  to the  category  or  class               which,  under the law by which  elections  are               governed,  would have the effect of  vitiating               the ’election’ and enable the person  affected               to call it in question, they should be brought               up  before a special tribunal by means  of  an               election petition and not be made the  subject               of  a  dispute  before  any  court  while  the               election is in progress".               This  Court also explained the connotation  of               the  word  "election" in very  wide  terms  as               follows:-               "  It seems to me that the word ’election’ has               been  used in Part XV of the  Constitution  in               the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the               entire procedure to be gone through to  return               a  candidate to the legislature.  The  use  of               the   expression  ’conduct  of  election’   in               article  324 specifically points to  the  wide               meaning,  and  that meaning can also  be  read               consistently  into the other provisions  which               occur in Part XV including article 328(b)".               330               This Court further observed that-               been appropriately used with reference to  the               entire  process  which  consists  of   several               stages and embraces many steps. some of  which               may have an important bearing on the result of               the process.               x              x             x               x               x               If  the  grounds on which an election  can  be               called  in  question  could be  raised  at  an               earlier   stage  and  efforts,  if  any,   are               rectified,   there  will  be  no  meaning   in               enacting a provision like article 329 (b)  and               in  setting up a special tribunal.  Any  other               meaning  ascribed  to the words  used  in  the               article  would  lead to anomalies,  which  the               Constitution could not have contemplated,  one               of  them being that conflicting views  may  be               expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling               stage  and by the election tribunal, which  is               to  be an independent body, at the stage  when               the matter is brought up before it." The above decision in locus-classicus on the subject and the parties before us seek to derives support from it for  their contentions. The  important question that arises for consideration is  as to  the amplitude of powers and the width of  the  functions which the Election Commission may exercise under Article 324 of  the  Constitution.  According to Mr. Rao,  appearing  on

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behalf of the appellants, there is no question of exercising any  powers under Article 324 of the Constitution which,  in terms,  refers to "functions’ under sub--Article  (6),.   We are   however,  unable  to  accept  this  submission   since functions  include  powers as well as duties  (see  Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, p. 1196).  It is incomprehensible, that a  person  or  body  can  discharge  any  functions  without exercising  powers.  Powers and duties are  integrated  with function. Article   324(1)  vests  in  the  Election  Commission   the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the  electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all  elections to  Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and  of elections to the offices of the President and Vice-President held under the Constitution.  Article 324(1) is thus pattern of our polity, isto be exercised in accordance with  law. That is why Articles 327 and328  provide  for  making   of provisions   with respect to all matters relating to  or  in connected with elections for the Union Legislatures and  for the State Legislatures respectively.  When appropriate  laws are  made under Article 327 by Parliament as well  as  under Article 328 by the State Legislatures, the Commission has to act  in  conformity  with those laws  and  the  other  legal provisions made thereunder.  Even so, both Articles 327  and 328  are  " subject to the provisions" of  the  Constitution which include Article 324 and Article 329.   Since       the conduct  of all elections to the various legislative  bodies and  to the offices of the President and the  Vice-President is vestedunder  Article 324(1) in the Election  Commission, the framers 331 of the Constitution took care to leaving scope for  exercise of residuary power by the Commission, in its own right, as a creature  of  the Constitution, in the infinite  variety  of situations that may emerge from time to time in such a large democracy as ours.  Every contingency could not be foreseen, or  anticipated  with precision.  That is why  there  is  no hedging  in Article 324.  The Commission may be required  to cope  with some situation which may not be provided  for  in the  enacted  laws  and the rules.  That to  be  the  raison d’etre for the opening clause in Articles 327 and 328  which leaves  the exercise of powers under Article  324  operative and effective when it is reasonably called for in a  vacuous area.   There  is,  however, no doubt  whatsoever  that  the Election  Commission  will have to conform to  the  existing laws  and rules in exercising its powers and performing  its manifold-duties for the conduct of free and fair  elections. The  Election Commission is a high-powered  and  independent body  which is irremovable from office except in  accordance with  the  provisions of the Constitution  relating  to  the removal  of Judges of the Supreme Court and is  intended  by the  framers of the Constitution to be kept completely  free from  any  pulls and pressures that may be  brought  through political  influence  in a democracy run  on  party  system. Once the appointment is made by the President. the  Election Commission remains insulated from extraneous influences, and that cannot be achieved unless it has an amplitude of powers in the conduct of elections-of course in accordance with the exising  laws.   But  where  these are  absent,  and  yet  a situation has to be tackled, the Chief Election Commissioner has  not  to  fold  his hands and pray  to  God  for  divine inspiration  to enable him to exercise his functions and  to perform his duties or to look to any external authority  for the  grant  of powers to deal with the situation.   He  must lawfully  exercise his power independently, in  all  matters

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relating  to  the conduct of elections, and  see,  that  the election  process is completed properly, in a free and  fair manner.   "An  express  statutory  grant  of  power  or  the imposition  of a definite duty carries with it  by  implica- tion,  in the absence of a limitation, authority  to  employ all  the  means  that  are usually  employed  and  that  are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the  duty.  That which is clearly implied is as much a  part of a law as that which is expressed."(1) The Chief Election commissioner has thus to pass appropriate orders on receipt of reports from the returning officer with regard to any situation arising in the course of an election and  power  cannot  be denied to  him  to  pass  appropriate orders.   Moreover,  the  power has  to  be  exercised  with promptitude.  Whether an order passed is wrong. arbitrary or is otherwise invalid, relates to the mode of exercising  the power and does not touch upon the existence of the power  in him if it is there either under the Act or the rules made in that behalf, or under Article 324(1). Apart  from the several functions envisaged by the two  Acts and the rules made thereunder, where the Election Commission is  required  to make necessary orders  or  directions,  are there  any other functions or the Commission ?  Even if  the answer to the question may be found 332 elsewhere, reference may be, made to section 19A of the  Act which,  in  terms, refers to functions not  only  under  the Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1950   and   the Representation  of the People Act, 1951, or under the  rules made  thereunder,  but  also under  the  Constitution.   The Commission  is,  therefore,  entitled  to  exercise  certain powers  under  Article 324 itself, on its own right,  in  an area not covered by the Acts and the rules. Whether     the power is exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner   is a completely different question. Mr. Rao     submits, referring to sections 58 and 64A of the Act, that the  Chief Election Commissioner has no power to cancel the poll in the entire  constituency.   He submits that this is  a  case  of complete  lack of power and not merely illegal or  irregular exercise  of  power.  He points out that there  is  a  clear provision under section 58 of the Act for reordering of poll at a polling station.  Similarly under section 64A there  is provision  for declaring the poll at a polling station  void when  the  Election Commission is satisfied  that  there  is destruction  or loss etc. of ballet papers before  counting. Counsel  submits that while law has provided for  situations specified  in section 58 with regard to loss or  destruction of  ballot boxes and under section 64A with regard  to  loss and  destruction of ballot papers before counting of  votes, no  provision has been made for such an unusual exercise  of power  as  the  cancellation  of  the  poll  in  the  entire constituency after it has already been completed peacefully. It  is therefore has argued that this is a case of  complete lack of power of the Commission to pass the impugned order. It  is clear even from section 58 and section 64A  that  the legislature envisaged the necessity for the cancellation  of poll  and ordering of repoll in particular polling  stations where  situation may warrant such a course.  When  provision is  made  in the Act to deal with situations  arising  in  a particular polling stage it cannot be said that if a general situation arises whereby numerous polling stations may  wit- ness  serious  mal-practices  affecting the  purity  of  the electoral process, that power can be denied to the  Election Commission to take an appropriate decision.  The fact that a particular  Chief  Election Commissioner  may  take  certain

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decisions unlawfully, arbitrarily or with ulterior motive or in  mala fide exercise of power, is not the test in  such  a case.  The question always relates to the existence of power and not the mode of exercise of power.  Although section  58 and  section  64A mention "a polling station"  or  "a  place fixed  for  the  poll"  it  may,  where  necessary,  embrace multiple polling stations. Both  under section 58 and under section 64A the  poll  that was taken at a particular polling station can be voided  and fresh  poll  can be ordered by the  Commission.   These  two sections  naturally  envisage a particular  situation  in  a polling station or a place fixed for the poll and cannot  be said  to be exhaustive.  The provisions in sections 5 8  and 64A  cannot therefore be said to rule out the making  of  an order  to  deal  with a similar situation if  it  arises  in several  polling  stations or even sometimes  as  a  general feature in a substantially large area.  It  is,   therefore, not  possible  to accept the contention  that  the  Election Commission  has  no power to make the impugned order  for  a repoll in the entire constituency. 333 Mr. Rao submits that once the Presidential notification  has been  made,  it is left to the President alone to  amend  or alter  the notification and power, in an  appropriate  case, may  be exercised by the President in which case the  action of the President wilt be on the advice of the Cabinet  which will be responsible to the Legislature.  He submits that  it was  not  the intention of the Constitution  makers  in  the entire scheme of the electoral provisions to entrust such an extraordinary power to the Election Commission.  He, further submits  that in an appropriate case the President may  also promulgate   an  ordinance  under  Article  123(i)  of   the Constitution cancelling the poll in the entire constituency. The contention that the President can revoke, alter or amend the notification under section 14 of the Act or that he  can promulgate  an  ordinance in an appropriate  case  does  not however  answer the question.  The question will have to  be decided on the scope and ambit of power under Article 324(1) of the Constitution which vests the conduct of elections  in the  Election  Commission.  It is true that in  exercise  of powers  under Article 324(1) the Election Commission  cannot do  something impinging upon the power of the  President  in making  the notification under section 14 of the  Act.   But after the notification has been issued by the President, the entire  electoral process is in the charge of  the  Election Commission and the Commission is exclusively responsible for the  conduct  of  the, election  without  reference  to  any outside  agency.  We do not find any limitation  in  Article 324(1)  from  which it can be held that where the  law  made under Article 32 / or the relevant rules made thereunder  do not  provide  for the mechanism of dealing  with  a  certain extraordinary   situation,   the  hands  of   the   Election Commission  are tied and it cannot independently decide  for itself  what to do in a matter relating to an election.   We are  clearly  of  opinion that the  Election  Commission  is competent  in  an  appropriate case to order  repoll  of  an entire constituency where necessary. it will be an  exercise of  power within the ambit of its functions  tinder  Article 324, The submission that there is complete lack of power  to make  the  impugned  order under Article 324  is  devoid  of substance. The  ancillary  question which arises for  consideration  is that  when the Election Commission amended its  notification and  extended  the time for completion of  the  election  by ordering  a fresh poll, is it an order during the course  of

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the process of ’election’ as that term is understood ? As  already  pointed out, it is well-settled  that  election covers the entire process from the issue of the notification under  section  14 to the declaration of  the  result  under section  66 of the Act.  When a Poll that has already  taken place has been cancelled and a fresh poll has been  ordered, the  order therefor, with the amended date is passed  as  an integral  part  of  the  electoral  process.   We  are   not concerned  with the question whether the impugned  order  is right  or wrong or invalid on any account.  Even if it is  a wrong  order  it does not cease to be an order passed  by  a competent  authority charged with the conduct  of  elections with  the  aim  and  object  of  completing  the  elections. Although  that  is not always decisive, the  impugned  order itself  shows  that it has been passed in  the  exercise  of power under Article 324 (1) and 334 section 153 of the Act.  That is also the correct  position. Such an order, relating, as it does, to election within  the width of the expression  as   interpreted  by  this   Court, cannot  be questioned except by an election  petition  under the Act. What  do  the  appellants seek in  the  writ  application  ? Oneof  their prayers is for declaration of the  result  on the basis of thePoll which has been cancelled.  This  is nothing short of seeking to establish the validity of a very important  stage in the election process, namely,  the  poll which  has taken place, and which was countermanded  by  the impugned order.  If the appellants succeed, the result  may, if possible, be declared on the basis-of that poll, or  some other suitable orders may be passed.  If they fail, a  fresh poll  will take place and the election will be  declared  on the  basis of the fresh poll.  This is, in effect,  a  vital issue which relates to questioning of the election since the election  will be complete only after the fresh poll on  the basis  of which the declaration of the result will be  made. In other words, there are no two elections as there is  only one  continuing process of election.  If, therefore,  during the process of election, at an intermediate or final  stage, the entire poll has been wrongly cancelled and a fresh  poll has  been  wrongly ordered, that is a matter  which  may  be agitated after declaration of the result on the basis of the fresh  poll, by questioning the election in the  appropriate forum  by means of an election petition in  accordance  with law.  The appellants, then, will not be without a remedy  to question every step in the electoral process and every order that has been passed in the process of the election  includ- ing the countermanding of the earlier poll.  In other words, when the appellants question the election after  declaration of  the result on the basis of the fresh poll, the  election court will be able to entertain their objection with  regard to  the order of the Election Commission countermanding  the earlier  poll, and the whole matter will be at  large.   If, for example, the election court comes to the conclusion that the earlier poll has been wrongly cancelled, or the impugned order  of the Election Commission is otherwise  invalid,  it will  be entitled to set aside the election on the basis  of the fresh Poll and will have power to breathe life into  the countermanded  poll and to make appropriate  directions  and orders  in  accordance with law.  There  is,  therefore,  no foundation  for  a  grievance that the  appellants  will  be without  any remedy if their writ application is  dismissed. It has in fact been fairly conceded by counsel for the other side  that  the  election court will be able  to  grant  all appropriate  reliefs  and  that the dismissal  of  the  writ

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petition will not prejudice the appellants. Indeed  it has been brought to our notice that  an  election petition  has  been filed by the  appellants,  ex  abundanti cautela,   in  the  High  Court  of  Punjab   and   Haryana, challenging  the election which has since been completed  on the  basis of a fresh poll ordered by the  Election  Commis- sion.   The High Court of Punjab and Haryana will  therefore be free to decide that petition in accordance with law. It  is submitted by Mr. Rao that in Ponnuswami  (supra)  the question was of improper rejection of nomination paper which is clearly covered by section 100(1)(c) of the Act.  Counsel submits’ that 335 the  only  ground  which can be said to  be  raised  in  the election  petition, in the, present case, is section  100(1) (d) (iv), namely, non-compliance with the provisions of  the Constitution  or  of the Representation of the  People  Act, 1951,  or of any rules or orders made under that  Act.   Ac- cording to counsel, there is no non-compliance with  Article 324  of the Constitution as the Election Commission  has  no power  whatsoever to pass the impugned order  under  Article 324  of  the Constitution.  That, according to him,  is  not "non-compliance  with  the provisions of  the  Constitution" within the meaning of section 100(1)(d)(iv).  We are  unable to accept this submission for the reasons already given.  We Election  Commission has passed the order professedly  under Article  324  and section 153 of the Act.  We  have  already held that the order is within the scope and ambit of Article 324 of the Constitution. It, therefore. necessarily  follows that if there is any illegality intile   exercise  of   the power under Article 324 or under any provision ofthe   Act, there  is no reason why section 100(1)(d)(iv) should not  be attracted to it. If exercise of a power is competent  either underthe  provisions of’ the Constitution or under  any other  provision  of law, any infirmity in the  exercise  of that  power  is,  in  truth and  substance,  on  account  of noncompliance with the provisions of law, since law  demands of  exercise  of power by its repository, as in  a  faithful trust,  in a proper. regular, fair reasonable  manner.  (See also  Durga  Shankar  Mehta v. Thakur  Raghueraj  Singh  and Others) (1). The above being the legal position, Article 329(b) rules out the maintainability of the writ application.  Article 329(b) provides    that   ,.notwithstanding   anything   in    this Constitution......   no   election  to   either   house   of Parliament......  shall be called in question except  by  an election  petition presented to such authority and  in  such manner  as may be provided for by or under any law  made  by the  appropriate  Legislature."  It is  undisputed  that  an election can be challenged only under the provisions of  the Act.   Indeed  section  80  of the  Act  provides  that  "no election  shall be called in question except by an  election petition  presented  in accordance with the  provisions  of" Part  VI  of  the Act.  We find  that  all  the  substantial reliefs  which the appellants seek in the writ  application, including the declaration of the election to be void and the declaration  of appellant No. 1 to be duly elected,  can  be claimed  in  the election petition.  It will be  within  the power of the High Court. as the election court, to give  all appropriate  reliefs  to  do complete  justice  between  the parties.   In doing so it will be open to the High Court  to pass  any ancillary or consequential order to enable  it  to grant the necessary relief provided under the Act.  The writ application is therefore barred under Article 329(b) of  the Constitution and the High Court rightly dismissed it on that

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ground. In  view  of  our  conclusion that the  High  Court  had  no jurisdiction to entertain the writ application under Article 226  of the Constitution’ it will not be correct for us,  in an  appeal  against  the order of the  High  Court  in  that proceeding,  to  enter into any other  controversy,  on  the merits, either on law or on facts, and to pronounce  finally on  the  same.  The pre-eminent position  conferred  by  the Constitution on 336 this  Court under Article 141 of the Constitution  does  not envisage  that  this Court should lay down the  law,  in  an appeal  like  this, on any matter which is  required  to  be decided  by  the  election  court on a  full  trial  of  the election petition, without the benefit of the opinion of the Punjab  and  Haryana,  High Court which  has  the  exclusive jurisdiction  under  section  80A  of the  Act  to  try  the election petition.  Moreover, a statutory right to appeal to this  Court has been provided under section 1 1 6A,  on  any question,  whether of law or fact, from every order made  by the High Court in the dispute. So, in view of the scheme, of Part VI of the Act, the  Delhi High Court could not haveembarked  upon an  enquiry  on any part of  the merits of the dispute. Thus  it  could not have examined the question whether the impugnedorder was  made by the Election Commission in breach of a rule  of natural justice.  That is a matter relating to the merits of the  controversy  and it is appropriately for  the  election court to try and decide it after recording any evidence that may be led at the trial.  It may be that if we pronounce  on the  question  of the applicability of the rule  of  natural justice, the High Court will be relieved of its duty to that extent.   But  it  has to be remembered that  even  for  the purpose of deciding that question, the parties may choose to produce evidence, oral or documentary, in the, trial  court. We  therefore  refrain from expressing any opinion  in  this appeal  on  the  question of the violation of  any  rule  of natural  justice by the Election Commission in  passing  the impugned order. At  the same time we would like to make it quite clear  that any  observation, on a question of law or fact made ’in  the impugned  judgment of the Delhi High Court, bearing  on  the trial  of  the election petition pending in the  Punjab  and Haryana High Court, will stand vacatted and will not come in the way of that trial.  That High Court will thus be free to decide  the  petition according to the law.  We  would  also like to make it quite clear, with all respect to the learned Judges  who have delivered a separate judgment, that we  may not be taken to have agreed with the views expressed therein about  the  applicability of audi alteram partem or  on  the applicability  of the guidelines in sections 58 and  64A  to the  facts and circumstances of this case, or the  desirabi- lity of ordering a repoll in the whole constituency, or  the ordering of a repoll of postal ballots etc.  Election, is  a long,  elaborate and complicated process and, as far  as  we can see, the rule of audi alteram partem, which is in itself a  fluid  rule,  cannot be placed  in  a  strait-jacket  for purposes of the instant case.  It has also to be  remembered that the impugned order of the Election Commission could not be  said  to be a final pronouncement on the rights  of  the parties  as  it was in the nature of an  order  covering  an unforeseen eventuality which bad arisen at one stage of  the election.   The  aggrieved party had all along  a  statutory right to call the entire election in question, including the Commission’s order, by an election petition under section 80

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of  the Act, for the trial of which an  elaborate  procedure has  been laid down in the Act.  Then, as has  been  stated, there  is  also  a  right of  appeal  under  the  scales  in considering  at the trial of the election  petition  whether there  may not be sufficient justification to  negative  the existence  of  337 any  implied  duty on the part of the  Commission,  at  that stage, to hear any party before taking its decision to order or  not  to order a report.  We do not  therefore  think  it necessary or desirable to foreclose a controversy like  this by  any general observations and will leave any  issue  that may arise from it for trial and adjudication by the election court. Being   not  altogether  certain  of  all  the   facts   and circumstances that may be made available, in the appropriate forum, it may be a premature exercise by this Court even  to lay  down guidelines when there is no hide-boand formula  of rules of natural justice to operate in all cases and at  all times when a decision has to be made.  Justice and fair play have often to be harmonised with exigencies of situations in the  light  of accumulated totality of  circumstances  in  a given case having regard to the question of prejudice not to the mere combatants in an electoral contest but to the  real and  larger  issue of completion of free and  fair  election with rigorous promptitude.  Not being adequately informed of all  the facts and circumstances, this Court will  not  make the task of the election court difficult and embarrassing by suggesting guidelines in a rather twilight zone. As we find no merit in this appeal, it is dismissed but,  in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as  to the costs in this Court. P.B. R.                            Appeal dismissed. 338