23 March 1988
Supreme Court
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MOHAN LAL Vs JAI BHAGWAN

Bench: MUKHARJI,SABYASACHI (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 50 of 1980


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PETITIONER: MOHAN LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAI BHAGWAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/03/1988

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1034            1988 SCR  (3) 345  1988 SCC  (2) 474        JT 1988 (2)    61  1988 SCALE  (1)675  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1989 SC1841  (5)

ACT:      Haryana Urban  (Control of  Rent &  Eviction) Act, 1973 Section 13(2)(ii)(b)-Tenant-Eviction  of-Use of building for purpose other than for which leased.      Landlord-Renting out  shop-Tenant-To  run  business  of English Liquor  Vend-Do sale  of liquor-Liquor  licence  not renewed-Tenant doing business of general merchandise-Whether change in user.      Statutory    Interpretation:     Statutes-Words     and expressions-Meaning must be found in the felt necessities of the time.

HEADNOTE: %      The appellant-tenant  took on  rent the  suit  premises from the respondent-landlord on a monthly rent of Rs.120 and executed a  rent note  in his  favour on  19th April,  1975. Clause 4  of the  rent note  provided that the tenant was to run the  ’business of  English Liquor  Vend, and  do sale of liquor in the shop.’      The respondent  filed a  petition  for  eviction  under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973  against the  appellant on the ground of ground of rent from 1st April, 1979 to 31st August, 1979 and change of user  from   liquor  vend   business  to   that  of  general merchandise.      The appellant  tendered the  entire arrears  of rent at the first  date  of  hearing,  and  contested  the  eviction petition by filing a written statement contending that after March, 1979 the licence of liquor-vend in his favour was not renewed, and he had to discontinue that business at the suit premises,  and   had  to   start  the  business  of  general merchandise. It  was, further, contended that the purpose of user still  remained commercial and that there was no clause in the  rent note prohibiting the appellant to change to any other business.      The Rent Controller held that the appellant had changed the user  of the  shop in dispute and that he was liable for eviction under the Act.

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346      The Appellate  Authority dismissed the appeal. The High Court also dismissed the Civil Revision and upheld the order of eviction.      Allowing the Appeal, this Court, ^      HELD: 1.  The business purposes must be adjudged in the light of  the purposes  of the Rent Act in question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom. [349C]      2. In  the expanding  concept of  business nowadays and the growing  concept of  departmental stores,  it cannot  be said that  there was any change of user in the instant case, when the  tenant converted  the use  of  the  building  from liquor vend  business to  that of  general merchandise.  The building was  rented  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  a business. It  was used  for another business which would not in any way impair the utility or damage to the building, and the business  could be  conveniently carried  on in the said premises. No  nuisance was  also created.  The  case  would, therefore, not  attract the  mischief  of  s.  13(2)(ii)(b). [349D, 350E]      3. So  far as the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held in the  Full Bench  decision in  Sikander Lal  v. Amrit Lal, (1984 Punjab  Law Reporter 1) that allied business would not amount to  change of  user but  for a  business which is not allied for  the business  for which  it was  let  out  would amount to  change of user come within the mischief of clause (b) of  section 13(2)(ii)  of the Act, the same must be read with reservation. [348H, 349A]      4. When  Parliament legislates  to remedy a defect or a lacuna in  the existing  law, and  the judiciary  interprets them, it  has to  be borne  in mind  that the  meaning of an expression must  be found  in the  felt necessities of time. [349G-H, 350C-D]      Duport Steels  Ltd. & others v. Sirs and others, [1980] 1 All.E.R. 529 at 541. referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No.  50 of 1988.       From  the Judgment  and order  dated  14.8.87  of  the Punjab &  Haryana High  Court in  Civil Revision No. 2836 of 1982.       Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the Petitioner. 347      A.B. Rohtagi,  Mukul Rohtagi,  Atul Tewari and Ms. Bina Gupta for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against  the judgment  of the  High Court of Punjab and Haryana  dated 14th  August, 1987. The appellant took on rent the  premises in  dispute  from  the  respondent  at  a monthly rent  of Rs.  120 and  executed a  rent note  in his favour on  19th April,  1975. Clause 4 of the said rent note provided, inter alia, as follows:           "That the  tenant will run the business of English           Liquor Vend in the shop-will do sale of Liquor."      The landlord,  respondent herein filed a petition under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act,  1973   (hereinafter  called  ’the  Act’)  against  the appellant on  the ground of arrears of rent from 1.4.1979 to 31.8.1979 and  change of  user from  Liquor Vend business to that of  general merchandise  at the  shop in dispute by the

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appellant.      The appellant  tendered the  entire arrears  of rent at the first  date of  hearing and  thereafter he  contested by filing written statement. The appellant submitted that after March, 1979,  the licence  of liquor-vend  in his favour was not renewed  and he  had to  discontinue  that  business  of liquor-vend at  the shop  in dispute  and had  to start  the business of  general merchandise. According to the appellant the purpose of the user still remains commercial and that in the rent  note there was no clause prohibiting the appellant to change any other business in the shop in dispute.      The Rent Controller held that the appellant had changed the user  of the  shop in  dispute and  he  was  liable  for eviction under the Act. There was an appeal to the Appellate Authority and  the Appellate  Authority dismissed  the  said appeal. The  appellant went  in civil  revision to  the High Court of  Punjab and  Haryana. The  High Court dismissed the civil revision and upheld the eviction. Hence this appeal.      The question is, whether a ground for eviction was made out under  clause (b)  of section  13(2)(ii) of the Act. The said Act  was passed  to control  the increase  of  rent  of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas, and the eviction of the 348 tenants therefrom.  Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act reads as follows:           "13(2) A  landlord who  seeks to  evict his tenant           shall apply  to the  Controller, for  direction in           that behalf.  If the  Controller, after giving the           tenant a  reasonable opportunity  of showing cause           against the application is satisfied:           (i) XX         XX        XX           (ii) that  the tenant  has after  commencement  of           1949 Act,  without  the  written  consent  of  the           landlord           (a) XX         XX        XX           (b) used the building or rented land for a purpose           other than that for which it was leased."      The High  Court of  Punjab and  Haryana has relied on a Full Bench  decision of  the said High Court in Sikander Lal v. Amrit  Lal, [1984] Punjab Law Reporter 1. That was a case under the  East Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction Act of 1949. The Full  Bench of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the facts and  circumstances of  that case  held that  it was  a common ground  that the  premises was  originally leased for the business  of handlooms. Thereafter it was used for small carding machine  not occupying a space of more than 4 feet x 4 feet  which converted  cloth into thread. It was held that there was  no change  of  user.  The  Full  Bench,  however, observed that  it emerged  from the long line of authorities that where  the subsequent  use of  the premises  is  merely ancillary to  the specific  original purpose  then it  would imply no  change of  user within the meaning of the statute. If by custom or convention or on the finding of the Court it could be  held that  the  added  use  of  the  premises  was ancillary to  the main  original purpose  then in the eye of law it  would be deemed to have been within the terms of the original lease.  It was  further held that both on principle and on  binding precedent  it  emerged  that  the  specified original purpose  could not be, according to the Full Bench, extended by  adding to it any and every purpose thereto, and the same  must be  confined within  the limitation  of being either a  part or  parcel of,  or ancillary to, the original purpose.  There   the  Court   was  concerned  with  section 13(2)(ii)(b) of  the Act  which is an identical provision as

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the present  one. So far as the High Court held in that case that allied  business would not amount to change of user but for a  business which  is not  allied for  the business  for which it was let out would amount to change 349 of user  come within  the mischief  of clause (b) of section 13(2)(ii)  of   the  Act,   the  same   must  be  read  with reservation.      Our attention  was drawn to a decision of this Court in Maharaj Kishan  Kesar v.  Milkha Singh  and  others,  (Civil Appeal No.  1086 of  1964 decided on 10th of November, 1965. That was  a  decision  under  the  East  Punjab  Urban  Rent Restriction Act,  1949. There  on the  facts the Court found that selling  petrol was  an allied business of the workshop and as  such it  is a  part of  the business. The Court held that there is no evidence to show that in the trade a petrol pump is  not regarded  as a part of motor workshop business. The sale  of petrol  is an  allied business  and  would  not amount to  conversion to  a different  business or change of user. There is nothing in the said decision which would give any assistance  to the respondent in this case. The business purposes must  be adjudged  in the  light of the purposes of the Rent Act in question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom.  In the  expanding  concept  of  business now-a-days and  the growing  concept of departmental stores, we are  of the opinion that it cannot be said that there was any change  of user  in the  facts of  this case which would attract  the   mischief  of   the  provisions   of   section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The building was rented for purpose of carrying on a business, using it for another business, it will not  in any  way  impair  the  utility  or  damage  the building and this business can be conveniently carried on in the said premises. There was no nuisance created.      Our attention  was drawn  to the  observations of  Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. and others v. Sirs and others, [1980] 1 All.E.R. 529 at 541. That was a decision in respect of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. Lord Diplock said:           "My Lords,  at a  time when  more and  more  cases           involving the  application  of  legislation  which           gives effect  to policies  that are the subject of           bitter public  and parliamentary  controversy,  it           cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British           Constitution, though  largely unwritten, is firmly           based on  the  separation  of  powers:  Parliament           makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When           Parliament legislates  to remedy what the majority           of its members at the time perceive to be a defect           or a lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the           written law  enacted by  existing statutes  or the           unwritten common  law as  it has been expounded by           the judges  in decided  cases), the  role  of  the           judiciary is  confined to  ascertaining  from  the           words that Parliament 350           has approved as expressing its intention what that           intention was,  and to  giving effect to it. Where           the meaning  of the  statutory words  is plain and           unambiguous it  is not  for the  judges to  invent           fancied ambiguities  as an  excuse for  failing to           give effect  to its  plain  meaning  because  they           themselves consider that the consequences of doing           so  would   be  inexpedient,  or  even  unjust  or           immoral. In  controversial  matters  such  as  are           involved in industrial relations there is room for           differences of  opinion as  to what  is expedient,

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         what is  just and  what  is  morally  justifiable.           Under our  constitution it is Parliament’s opinion           on these matters that is paramount.      While respectfully  agreeing with the said observations of Lord  Diplock, that  the Parliament  legislates to remedy and the judiciary interpret them, it has to be borne in mind that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt necessities of  time. In  the background  of the  purpose of rent legislation  and in  as much as in the instant case the change of the user would not cause any mischief or detriment or impairment of the shop in question and in one sense could be called  an allied  business in  the expanding  concept of departmental stores,  in our opinion, in this case there was no change  of user  which attract  the mischief  of  section 13(2)(ii)(b) of  the Act.  The High Court, therefore, was in error.      In that  view of  the matter this appeal is allowed and the order of eviction is set aside. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 351