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PETITIONER: MOHAN LAL SHAMLAL SONI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/02/1991

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1346            1991 SCR  (1) 712  1991 SCC  Supl.  (1) 271 JT 1991 (3)    17  1991 SCALE  (1)401

ACT:      Code    of   Criminal   Procedure   1973-Section    311 (Corresponding to section 540 of the old code)-Summoning  of person  as  witness-Recall  or re-examine  of  such  person- Juridiction of Court-To be dictated by exigency of situation and fair play.

HEADNOTE:      Appellant’s  business  and  residential  premises  were raided  by the Customs Department as a result  whereof  gold ingots  with  foreign marks, gold ornaments, silver  bricks, coins  and  a cash of Rs.79,000 was seized.   The  Assistant Collector of Customs filed two separate complaints  relating to  the  said  incident against  the  appellant  before  the Judicial  magistrate,  one for violating the  provisions  of Customs Act, 1962 and the other under the Gold Control  Act, 1968.   In  the trial, after the close of evidence  by  both sides, prosecution as also defence, arguments were  advanced on behalf of the accused appellant.  The prosecution at that stage before commencing its arguments filed two applications in  both  the  cases,  under Section 540  of  the  Old  Code (corresponding  to section 311 of the new  Code)  requesting the  trial  court to recall one witness  viz.,  the  Seizing officer,  and  issue  summons  to  two  more  witnesses  for examination  either  as prosecution witnesses  or  as  court witnesses.    The   trial  magistrate  rejected   both   the application  and  the revision petitions  preferred  by  the respondents  against that order failed before  the  Sessions Judge.  The Union of India thereupon preferred two  revision applications  before the High Court.  The State  of  Gujarat also  preferred  separate revision applications  before  the High  Court.  The High Court allowed the revision  petitions and directed examination of the three witnesses sought to be summoned.   Being  aggrieved the appellant has  filed  these appeals  after obtaining special leave against the  decision of the High Court, in the revision applications filed by the Union of India.  No appeal has been  filed against the order passed by the High Court in the revision applications  filed before it, by the State of Gujarat.  The main contention  of the  appellant is that the High Court erred in allowing  the second  revision  application in view of the  provisions  of

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section   397(3)  of  the  new  Code  thus  permitting   the prosecution to fill up the lacuna and plug the loopholes  in its case which is prejudicial to the appellant.                                                        713      Dismissing the appeals, this Court,      HELD: Though Section 540 (Section 311 of the new  Code) is,   in  the  widest  possible  terms  and  calls  for   no limitation,  either  with regard to the stage at  which  the powers  of the court should be exercised, or with regard  to the manner in which they should be exercised, that power  is circumscribed by the principle that underlines section 540, namely,  evidence to be obtained should appear to the  court essential  to a just decision of the case by getting at  the truth by all lawful means.  The aid of the section should be invoked  only with the object of discovering relevant  facts or obtaining proper proof of such facts for a just  decision of  the  case  and  it  must  be  used  judicially  and  not capricicously  or arbitrarily.  Due care should be taken  by the  court while exercising power under this section and  it must  not  be  used for filling up the lacuna  left  by  the prosecution or by the defence or to the disadvantage of  the accused or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of  the accused or to give an unfair advantage to the rival side and further the additional evidence should not be received as  a disguise  for a retrial or to change the nature of the  case against either of the parties. [721B-E]      Whenever  any additional evidence is examined or  fresh evidence  is admitted against the accused, it is  absolutely necessary  in  the  interests of justice  that  the  accused should  be  afforded a fair and  reasonable  opportunity  to rebut that evidence brought on record against him. [725E]      The Criminal court has ample power to summon any person as  a witness or recall and re-examine any such person  even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of  the court and must obviously be dictated by exigency  of the situation, and fair-play and good sense appear to be the only  safe guides and that only the requirements of  justice command the examination of any person which would depend  on the facts and circumstances of each case. [724C-D]      The  facts  and circumstances of the case  require  the examination of these three witnesses for a just decision  of the case as held by the High Court. [726G]      Jamatraj Kewalji Govni v. State of Maharashtra,  [1967] 3  SCR 415; Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P., [1978]  2  SCC 518;  State  of West Bengal v. Tulsidas  Mundhra,  [1963]  2 S.C.J.  204  at  207; Masalti v. State  of  U.P.,  AIR  1965 S.C.202; Rajeshwar Prasad Misra v. State of West Bengal  and Anr., [1966] 2 S.C.R. 178; R.B. Mithani v.                                                        714 Maharashtra, AIR 1971 S.C. 1630; Channu Lal v. R., AIR  1949 All 692; Rengaswami Naicker v. Muruga Naicker, AIR 1954  Mad 169; Shugan Chand v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 531 and The Queen v. Assanoolah, 13 SWR (Crl.) 15, referred to.      Mir  Mohd.  Omar and Others v. State  of  West  Bengal, [1989] 4 SCC 436, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 4 & 5 of 1979.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  21.3.1978  of  the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision Application Nos.  98 and 97 of 1978.      S.K. Kulkarani and P.C. Kapur (NP) for the Appellant.

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    Arun  Jetley,  Additional Solicitor General,  Ms.  Indu Malhotra, M.N.  Shroff, P. Parmeshwaran, Ms. A.  Subhashini, Ms. Ayesha Karim and P.K. Mullick for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      S.  RATNAVEL  PANDIAN  J.  These  criminal  appeals  by special leave granted under Article 136 of the  Constitution of  India  are preferred by the  appellant  questioning  the correctness  of  the judgment of the Gujarat High  Court  in Criminal Revision Application Nos. 98 and 97 of 1978 whereby the  High  Court  set aside the judgment  and  orders  dated 2.1.1978  of  the  Sessions Judge, Kutch  at  Bhuj  made  in Criminal  Revision  Application  Nos.  46  and  45  of  1976 confirming  the orders dated 19.6.76 passed by the  Judicial Magistrate,  First Class, Kutch in Application Exh. Nos.  94 and   98  in  Criminal  Case  Nos.  929  and  930  of   1973 respectively.  The factual matrix that have relevance to the questions,  raised  and  canvassed at  the  hearing  may  be briefly stated.      A  raid  conducted  by  the  officers  of  the  Customs Department  in the business-cum-residential premises of  the appellant   on  17.9.1971  resulted in the seizure  of  some gold  Lagadis  bearing  foreign marks,  primary  gold,  gold ornaments  and  silver bricks, coins etc. to  the  value  of about Rs.8,48,422.  During the said raid a sum of  Rs.79,000 was also seized.  In respect of this incident, the Assistant Collector  of  Customs  filed  two  separate  complaints  on 26.11.1973  against  the  appellant  in  the  court  of  the Judicial  Magistrage,  First Class,  Anjar,  being  criminal cases  Nos. 929 and 930 of 1973 for offences punishable  (1) under the                                                        715 provisions  of the Customs Act 1962 and (2) under  the  Gold Control  Act 1968.  After examination of the prosecution  as well   as  the  defence  witnesses  and  recording  of   the statements  of the appellants under Section 342 of  the  old Code  of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as  the Code’)   arguments   were   advanced  on   behalf   of   the appellant/accused.   The  prosecution at this  stage  before commencing  its  arguments filed two applications  both  the cases  under Section 540 of the old Code  (corresponding  to Section  311 of the new Code) requesting the Trial Court  to recall  Mr.  Mirchandani (the Seizing Officer)  for  further examination  and  to issue summons to  two  more  witnesses, namely, Mr. K.K. Das, Assistant Collector of Customs and the Deputy  Chief Officer (Assayer) of Mint Master,  Bombay  for examination  either  as prosecution witnesses  or  as  court witnesses  as  cotemplated under the  said  provision.   The learned Judicial Magistrate passed two orders rejecting  the applications  which orders, on revision by  the  respondents were confirmed by the session’s Judge on being aggrieved  by the  said revisional orders, the Union of India  (the  first respondent   herein)   preferred   two   Criminal   Revision Applications Nos. 97 and 98 of 1978.  The second respondent, namely,  the  State  of Gujarat  also  preferred  two  other Criminal Revision Application Nos. 124 and 125 of 1978.  The High Court by its Common Judgment, though heavily criticised the  conduct  of  the prosecution  for  its  deplorable  and lethargic attitude in not carefully and promptly  conducting the  proceedings allowed all the Criminal Revisions for  the reasons assigned therein holding thus:          "In  view of what has been stated above,  I  accept          the four petitions filed in this court by the Union          of India, and the State of Gujarat, and direct  the          Union  of  India  to examine  the  aforesaid  three          witnesses  within a period of fortnight  after  the

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        receipt  of  the order of this court to  the  trial          court.   After  the  Union of  India  examines  the          aforesaid three witnesses as aforesaid, it will  be          open  to  the  accused  to  cross-examine  all  the          witnesses examined by the Union of India before the          learned Magistrate.      Feeling  aggrieved by the judgment of the  High  Court, these  two appeals are preferred by the appellant.  In  this context, it is pertinent to note that the appellant has  not directed  any appeal against the judgment of the High  Court in allowing the two other Revision Application Nos. 124  and 126 of 1978 filed by the Gujarat Government which were  also allowed by the High Court.                                                        716      The   learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of   the appellant vigorously challenged the legality of the impugned judgment inter-alia  contending  that  the  High  Court  has gravely  erred  in allowing the  second  revision  petitions filed  by  the respondent by ignorning the  weighty  reasons given by the Trial Magistrate and the Section Judge  (before whom the first revision was filed) and thereby in permitting the  respondent-the  Union  of India-to  examine  the  three witnesses as prayed by it, notwithstanding that the case was pending  before the Trial Court for considerable  length  of time  and  the defence argument was concluded and  that  the High  Court,  by  the  impugned  order  has  permitted   the prosecution to bolster up its case by filling up the  lacuna and  plugging  the loopholes which if carried out  would  be detrimental and prejudicial to the appellant.      The  next  legal  submission  made  on  behalf  of  the appellant  is that the entertainment of the second  revision by  the High Court is in violation of sub-sections  (2)  and (3) of Section 397 of the new Code since the order passed by the  Magistrate  was an interlocutory order  and  that  even assuming that it was not so, the second revision by the same affected party is not entertainable.      Before adverting to the arguments advanced on behalf of the  appellant,  we would examine in general the  scope  and intent  of  Section 540 of the old  Code  (corresponding  to Section 311 of the new Code).      Section  540 was found in Chapter XLVI of the old  Code of  1898 under the heading "Miscellaneous’. But the  present corresponding  Sections 311 of the new Code is  found  among other  Sections in Chapter XXIV under the  heading  ’General Provisions  as to Enquiries and Trials’.  Section 311 is  an almost verbatim reproduction of Section 540 of the old  Code except  for  the insertion of the words ’to be’  before  the word ’essential’ occurring in the old Section.  This section is manifestly in two parts.  Whereas the word ’used’ in  the first  part  is ’may’ the word used in the  second  part  is ’shall’.  In consequence, the first part which is permissive gives  purely discretionary authority to the  Criminal  Code and  enables  it ’at any stage of enquiry’  trial  or  other proceedings’ under the Code to act in one of the three ways, namely,          (1) to summon any person as a witness or          (2) to examine any person in attendance, though not          summoned as a witness, or          (3)  to  recall and re-examine any  person  already          examined.                                                        717     The   second  part  which  is  mandatory   imposes   an obligation on the Court-          (1) to summon and examine, or          (2) to recall and re-examine any such person if his

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        evidence  appears  to  be  essential  to  the  just          decision of the case.      The  very usage of the words such as ’any  court’,  ’at any stage’, or ’of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ’any  person’ and ’any such person’ clearly spells out  that this  section is expressed in the widest possible terms  and do  not  limit  the  discretion of the  Court  in  any  way. However,  the  very width requires a  corresponding  caution that  the  discretionary  power should  be  invoked  as  the exigencies  of justice require and exercised judically  with circumpection  and consistently with the provisions  of  the Code.  The second part of the Section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the Court to take any of the  aforementioned  two steps if the fresh evidence  to  be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.      It  is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that  the best  available evidence should be brought before the  Court to  prove  a  fact or the points in issue. But  it  is  left either  for the prosecution or for the defence to  establish its respective case by adducing the best available  evidence and  the Court is not empowered under the provisions of  the Code  to  compel either the prosecution or  the  defence  to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their  sides. Nonetheless if either of the parties with-holds any evidence which   could  be  produced  and  which,  if  produced,   be unfavorable  to  the party withholding  such  evidence,  the court  can  draw  a presumption under  illustration  (g)  to Section  114  of the Evidence Act.  In such  a  situation  a question  that  arises  for  consideration  is  whether  the presiding  officer  of a Court should simply sit as  a  mere umpire  at a contest between two parties and declare at  the end  of combat who has won and who has lost or is there  not any  legal duty of his own, independent of the  parties,  to take an active role in the proceedings in finding the  truth and  administering  justice?   It is  a  well  accepted  and settled principle that a Court must discharge its  statutory functions-whether  discretionary or obligatory-according  to law in dispensing justice because it is the duty of a  Court not  only to do justice but also to ensure that  justice  is being  done.  In order to enable the Court to find  out  the truth and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of Section  540 of the Code (Section 311 of the New  Code)  are enacted whereunder any                                                        718 Court by exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of enquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any  person as a witness or examine any person in attendance though  not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine any person  in attendance  though not summoned as a witness or  recall  and re-examine  any person already examined who are expected  to be  able to throw light upon the matter in dispute;  because if judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and  speculative presentation of facts, the ends of  justice would be defeated.      There  are  various other provisions in  the  new  Code corresponding  to the provision of the old  Code  empowering the  court  specified  therein  to  recall  any  witness  or witnesses  already examined or summon any witness, if it  is felt necessary in the interest of justice at various  stages mentioned in the concerned specific provisions.      A  Judge under Section 236 (Section 310 old Code) or  a Magistrate under Section 248(3) (Section 251-A(13) and 255-A old  Code) is empowered to take evidence in respect  of  the previous  convictions of the accused person concerned if  he is  charged with the previous conviction  under  sub-section

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(7)  of  Section 211 and if he does not admit  the  previous conviction.   Under Section 367 (Section 375 old  Code)  if, when  sentence of death passed by the Court of  Sessions  is submitted  for confirmation to the High Court under  Section 366(1) (Section 374 of the old Code), the High Court  thinks that  a  further enquiry should be made into  or  additional evidence  taken  upon, any point bearing upon the  guilt  or innocence of the convicted  person, it may make such inquiry or  take  such evidence itself or direct it to  be  made  or taken by the Court of Session.      Under  Section  391  (Section  428  of  old  Code)  the Appellate Court while dealing with any appeal under  Chapter XXIX,  if  thinks additional evidence to be  necessary,  may after recording its reasons either take such evidence itself or direct it to be taken by a subordinate Court as the  case may be.  Under Section 463(2) (Section 533 old Code) if  any Court  of  Appeal,  Reference  and  Revision  before   which confession  or  other statement of an  accused  recorded  or purporting  to be recorded under Section 164 or Section  281 (Section  364  of  the old Code) is tendered,  or  has  been received  in evidence, finds that any of the  provisions  of either  such  sections have not been complied  with  by  the Magistrate   recording   the  statement,   the   Court   may notwithstanding  anything  contained in Section  91  of  the Indian  Evidence  Act take evidence in regard to  such  non- compliance and may, if satisfied that                                                        719 such  non-compliance  has  not injured the  accused  in  his defence  on the merits and that he duly made  the  statement recorded, admit such evidence.      Analogous  to  the  above provisions  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure there are various provisions in the civil Procedure  Code  also  enabling the civil  Court  to  summon witnesses  and  examine  them in the  interest  of  justice. Under Order X Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, the  Court at  the  first  hearing of the suit  or  at  any  subsequent hearing may examine any party appearing in person or present in Court or any person able to answer any material questions relating  to the suit by whom such party or his  pleader  is accompanied.  Under Order X Rule 14 the Court may of its own motion summon as a witness any person including the party to the  suit  for examination and the said Rule  is  under  the caption  "Court  may of its own accord summon  as  witnesses strangers  to  suit" and Order XVIII Rule  17  empowers  the Court  to recall any witness who has been examined  and  may subject  to Law of Evidence for the time being in force  put such  questions to him as it thinks fit.  The powers of  the Court under this Rule 17 are discretionary and very wide.      Besides  the  above specific provisions under  the  Cr. P.C. and C.P.C. empowering the criminal and civil courts  as the case may be, to summon and examine witnesses, a Judge in order  to discover or to obtain proof of relevant  facts  is empowered  under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence  Act  to exercise  all  the  privileges and  powers  subject  to  the proviso  to  that  section  which power  he  has  under  the Evidence  Act.  Section 540 of the old Code (Section 311  of the  new  Code) and Section 165 of the Evidence Act  may  be said  to be complementary to each other and as  observed  by this   Court  in  Jamatraj  Kewalji  Govani  v.   State   of Maharashtra,  [1967] 3 SCR 415 "these two  sections  between them  confer  jurisdiction  on the Judge to act  in  aid  of justice."      The  second part of Section 540 as pointed  out  albeit imposes  upon  the  Court  an  obligation  of  summoning  or recalling   and  re-examining  any  witness  and  the   only

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condition  prescribed  is  that the evidence  sought  to  be obtained must be essential to the just decision of the case. Though   any  party  to  the  proceedings  points  out   the desirability  some evidence being taken, then the Court  has to   exercise   its  power   under   this   provision-either discetionary   or  mandatory-depending  on  the  facts   and circumstances  of  each case, having in view that  the  most paramount principle underlying this provision is to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts in order to meet the                                                        720 requirements  of justice.  In this connection we would  like to quote with approval the following views of Lumpkin, J. in Epps v. S., 19 Ga, 118 (Am), which reads thus:          "............it is not only the right but the  duty          of the presiding judge to call the attention of the          witness to it, whether it makes for or against  the          prosecution;  his aim being neither to  punish  the          innocent  nor screen the guilty, but to  administer          the law correctly .................................          ...................................................          Counsel  seek only for their client’s success;  but          the judge must watch that justice triumphs."      The  law is clearly expounded in the case  of  Jamatraj Kewalji  Govani (referred to above) wherein Hidayatullah,  J as  he  then  was, while speaking for the  Bench  about  the unfettered  discretionary power of the court  as   envisaged under Section 540 of the Code has stated thus:          "It is difficult to limit the power under our  Code          to  cases  which  involve  something  arising   ex-          improviso  which no human ingenuity could  foresee,          in  the course of the defence.  Our Code  does  not          make this a condition of the exercise of the  power          and   it  is  not  right  to  embark  on   judicial          legislation.   Cases that go far are of course  not          quite right.  Indeed they could be decided on  fact          because  it  can  always be seen  whether  the  new          matter  is strictly  necessary for a just  decision          and not intended to give an unfair advantage to one          of the rival sides ................................          ...................................................          ...................................................          It would appear that in our criminal  jurisdiction,          statutory law confers a power in absolute terms  to          be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon  a          witness  or  examine  one present in  court  or  to          recall  a witness already examined, and makes  this          the  duty and obligation of the Court provided  the          just  decision  of the case demands it.   In  other          words,  where the court exercises the  power  under          the second part, the inquiry cannot be whether  the          accused   has   brought   anything   suddenly    or          unexpectedly  but  whether the court  is  right  in          thinking that the new evidence is needed by it  for          a  just  decision of the case.  If  the  court  has          acted without the requirements of a just  decision,          the                                                        721          action  is  open to criticism but  if  the  court’s          action  is  supportable as being in aid of  a  just          decision the action cannot be regarded as exceeding          the jurisdiction."      The  next  important question is  whether  Section  540 gives   the  court  carte-blanche  drawing   no   underlying principle  in the exercise of the extra-ordinary  power  and

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whether  the  said  Section is  unguided,  uncontrolled  and uncanalised.   Though  Section 540 (Section 311 of  the  new Code)  is,  in the widest possible terms and  calls  for  no limitation,  either  with regard to the stage at  which  the powers  of the court should be exercised, or with regard  to the manner in which they should be exercised, that power  is circumscribed by the principle that underlines Section  540, namely,  evidence to be obtained should appear to the  court essential  to a just decision of the case by getting at  the truth by all lawful means.  Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the aid of the section should be invoked only with the object of discovering relevant facts or obtaining proper proof  of such facts for a just decision of the case and  it must be used judicially and not capriciously or  arbitrarily because any improper or capricious exercise of the power may lead  to undesirable results.  Further it is incumbent  that due  care should be taken by the court while exercising  the power  under  this  section and it should not  be  used  for filling  up  the lacuna left by the prosecution  or  by  the defence  or to the disadvantage of the accused or the  cause serious  prejudice to the defence of the accused or to  give an  unfair  advantage  to the rival  side  and  further  the additional evidence should not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties.      Fazal  Ali,  J  in Rameshwar Dayal v.  State  of  U.P., [1978]  2  SCC  518 while expressing  his  views  about  the careful exercise of its power by the court has stated:          "It is true that under Section 540 of the  Criminal          Procedure  Code  the High Court has got  very  wide          powers to examine any witness it likes for the just          decision  of  the case, but this power  has  to  be          exercised  sparingly  and  only when  the  ends  of          justice  so demand.  The higher the power the  more          careful should be its exercise ....................          The words, "Just decision of the case" would become          meaningless  and  without  any  significance  if  a          decision  is  to be arrived at without a  sense  of          justice and fair play."      In  State of West Bengal v. Tulsidas Mundhra, [1963]  2 S.C.J. 204 at 207, it has observed:                                                        722          "It  would be noticed that this section confers  on          criminal  Courts very wide powers.  It is no  doubt          for  the Court to consider whether its power  under          this section should be exercised or not. But if  it          is  satisfied that the evidence of any  person  not          examined or further evidence of any person  already          examined  is essential to the just decision of  the          case,  it is its duty to take such  evidence.   The          exercise  of the power conferred by section 540  is          conditioned  by the requirement that such  exercise          would  be  essential to the just  decision  of  the          case."      At  the risk of repetition it may be said that  Section 540  allows  the court to invoke its inherent power  at  any stage,  as long as the court retains seisin of the  criminal proceeding,    without   qualifying   any   limitation    or prohibition.  Needless to say that an enquiry or trial in  a criminal proceeding comes to an end or reaches its  finality when the order or judgment is pronounced and until then  the court  has  power to use this section.  The  answer  to  the question like the one that has arisen in the present case is whether the court would be justified in exercising its power under  Section 540 is found in Kewalji’s case (albeit).   In

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that  case the appellant was prosecuted on two counts  under Section  135(a) and (b) of the Customs Act.   The  appellant did not lead any evidence on his behalf but filed a  written statement,  claiming  inter-alia that no  offence  had  been disclosed against him, since no witness had deposed that the contraband  had  been seized from him under the Act  in  the reasonable  belief that they were smuggled goods.   The  day after  the statement was filed, the prosecution applied  for examination  of the customs officer who was incharge of  the search  as a court witness in the interest of justice.   The Magistrate  ordered  the examination of  the  officer  under Section  540 of the Code rejecting the objections raised  by the  appellant.   Though  an opportunity was  given  to  the appellant  to  lead defence evidence, the  appellant  stated that he had nothing further to add and no evidence to  lead. The Trial Court convicted the appellant who being  aggrieved by  the judgment of the Trial Court preferred an  appeal  to the  High  Court which dismissed the  appeal.   Before  this Court it was contended that the evidence of the officer  was improperly  received.  That contention has been repelled  by this court observing "This power is exercisable at any  time and  the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly so  states"  and thereafter  concluded "it cannot be said that the Court  had exceeded  its  jurisdiction  in acting the  second  part  of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."      Gajendragadkar,  J. speaking for the Bench in  Tulsidas Mundhra                                                        723 (cited supra) has pointed out as follows:          "Section  540 in terms applies at any stage of  any          enquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code.          This section is wide enough to include a proceeding          under   section   207-A  and  so,   it   would   be          unreasonable to contend that the scheme of  section          207-A   makes  section  540  inapplicable  to   the          proceeding governed by section 207-A. The power  of          the  Court  under section 540 can be  exercised  as          much  in regard to cases governed by section  207-A          as  in regard to other proceedings governed by  the          other relevant provisions of the Code." (It  may  be  noted that section 207-A of the  old  Code  in Chapter XVIII under the caption "Enquiry into cases  triable by  the court of Session or the High Court" dealt  with  the procedures to be adopted in proceedings instituted on police report and this provision is omitted in the new Code.)      This Court in Kewalji’s case (albeit) held that Chapter XXI  of  Cr. P.C. (old) under the heading "Of the  Trail  of Warrant-cases  by Magistrates" does not restrict the  powers of criminal court under Section 540.      In Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 S.C. 202  wherein the  defence did not opt to examine some witnesses who  have been  left  out by the prosecution on the bona  fide  belief that  those witnesses had been won over and the  court  also after  due deliberation refused to exercise its power  under Section  540; this Court while examining a  submission  that the  Trial  Court  should have  exercised  its  power  under Section  540  and  examined those  witnesses  expressed  its opinion that "that is one aspect of the matter which we have to  take  into account"-that is in considering  whether  the accused were prejudiced or not.      It has been held by this Court in Rajeswar Prasad  Mora v.  State  of  West Bengal & Anr.,[1966]  1  SCR  178  while dealing  with the ample power and jurisdiction of the  court in taking additional evidence as follows:          "Additional evidence may be necessary for a variety

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        of reasons which it is hardly necessary (even if it          was  possible) to list here.  We do not propose  to          do what the Legislature                                                        724          has  refrained  from  doing,  namely,  to   control          discretion of the appellate Court to certain stated          circumstances.   It  may,  however,  be  said  that          additional  evidence must be necessary not  because          it  would be impossible to pronounce  judgment  but          because  there would be failure of justice  without          it.  The power must be exercised sparingly and only          in suitable cases.  Once such action is  justified,          there  is  no restriction on the kind  of  evidence          which  may  be  received.   It  may  be  formal  or          substantial."      The  above view has been reiterated in R.B. Mithani  v. Maharashtra, AIR 1971 S.C. 1630.      The  principle  of  law that  emerges  from  the  views expressed  by this court in the above decisions is that  the Criminal  Court  has ample power to summon any person  as  a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court  must  obviously  be  dictated  by  exigency  of   the situation,  and  fair-play and good sense appear to  be  the only  safe guides and that only the requirements of  justice command and examination of any person which would depend  on the facts and circumstances of each case.      What falls for determination now is whether the  person indicated  should  be  given an  opportunity  to  rebut  the evidence  of the witness or witnesses summoned and  examined under Section  540.  This question came for determination in Rameshwar Dayal’s case and this court answered that question thus:          "It was argued by counsel for the State that  there          is  no  provision in the  Criminal  Procedure  Code          which requires the court to allow the appellant  an          opportunity  to  rebut the  evidence  of  witnesses          recommended   under  Section  540  Cr.  P.C.   This          argument,  in  our opinion, is based on  a  serious          misconception  of  the  correct  approach  to   the          cardinal  principles of criminal justice.   Section          540 itself incorporates a rule of natural  justice.          The accused is presumed to be innocent until he  is          proved  guilty.   It is, therefore,  manifest  that          where  any fresh evidence is admitted  against  the          accused  the presumption of innocence  is  weakened          and the accused in all fairness should be given  an          opportunity  to rebut that evidence.  The right  to          adduce   evidence  in  rebuttal  is  one   of   the          inevitable steps in the defence of a case by                                                        725          the  accused and a refusal of the same amounts  not          only  to  an infraction of the  provisions  of  the          Criminal Procedure Code but also of the  principles          of  natural  justice and offends the  famous  maxim          audi alteram partem ...............................          ...................................................          A  careful  perusal of  this  provision  manifestly          reveals  that the statute has armed the Court  with          all  the  powers  to do full  justice  between  the          parties  as full justice cannot be done until  both          the  parties  are properly heard the  condition  of          giving  an opportunity to the accused to rebut  any          fresh  evidence  sought to be adduced  against  him          either at the trial or the appellate stage  appears

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        to  us to be implicit under Section 540 of the  Cr.          P.C."      See  also Kewalji’s case (cited above).  This  was  the view  taken by various High Court such as in Channu  Lal  v. R., AIR 1949 All. 692; Rengaswami Naicker v. Muruga Naicker, AIR 1954 Mad. 169; Shugan Chand v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 531 and The Queen v. Assanoolah, 13 SWR (Crl.) 15.      The  views  expressed  in the above  judgments  of  the various  High  Courts  have been approved by this  Court  in Rameshwar  Dayal’s case.  We are in full agreement with  the above  view  of  Fazal Ali, J and  hold  that  whenever  any additional  evidence  is  examined  or  fresh  evidence   is admitted against the accused, it is absolutely necessary  in the interest of justice that the accused should be  afforded a  fair  and reasonable opportunity to rebut  that  evidence brought on record against him.      With  this  legal  background let us now  turn  to  the challenge posed by the appellant in these appeals. The Trial Court  and the First Revision Court rejected the request  of the  prosecution  on three grounds, namely, first  that  the prosecution has attempted to fabricate evidence at a belated stage  to  fill up the lacuna in the  prosecution  case  and secondly  that  the request of the  prosecution  for  taking additional evidence was after the closure of the defence and thirdly  a  substantial  prejudice would be  caused  to  the appellant  if  the prosecution is allowed  to  adduce  fresh evidence.  As pointed out by the High Court in its  impugned order,  gold, silver ornaments of the value  of  Rs.8,48,482 and  currency notes of Rs.79,000 have been seized  from  the premises,  searched  on the strength of the  search  warrant issued by Shri K.K. Das.  What the appellant now contends is that the order of the High Court permitting the  prosecution to  recall  one  of the witnesses already  examined  and  to summon two other new witnesses to prove                                                        726 the  foreign makings on the legadis is in violation  of  the principle  underlying  Section  540.  We  waded  through the entire  records  inclusive  of the  copies  of  depositions, search warrant and the application filed by the  prosecution under Section 540 which are available in the file, forwarded by  the  High Court though those documents are  not  annexed with  the  SLP.   The prosecution  filed  the  petition  for examination  of  the three witnesses  stating  that  foreign ingots (lagadis) have been sized from the possession of  the appellant and that warrant for search of the premises of the appellant/accused was issued in this regard by the Assistant Collector  of Customs, namely Shri K.K. Das and hence  fresh evidence  is  necessary  for a just decision  of  the  case. After  perusing  the depositions of  the  witnesses  already examined  that  are  found on the file, we  think  that  the appellant/accused cannot be said to be prejudiced in any way by examination of these three witnesses.  PW-2 who was  then working  as Superintendent of Customs in the office  of  the Assistant Collector of Customs at Adipur during the relevant period  has  stated  that Shri K.K. Das  who  was  the  then Assistant  Collector  of Customs issued  the  warrant  dated 7.9.1971  authorising  Shri Mirchandani,  Superintendent  of Customs,   Adipur to search for the prohibited and  dutiable goods  and  documents  in  the  premises  mentioned  in  the warrant.  It is elicited from the same witness in the  cross examination  that the gold ornaments were seized  since  the sizing  authority  doubted that they are smuggled  gold  and procured  by  contriving the Gold Control Act.  It  is  seen from  the evidence of PW-3 that he and others  inclusive  of Superintendent   Mirchandani  went  to  the  house  of   the

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appellant  and they seized the gold ornaments  Dhalia,  that is,  primary gold under Panchnama and search list  Exts.  24 and  25.  Therefore, the appellant’s grievance that  he  has been taken by surprise on the request of the prosecution for taking  fresh  evidence;  that the  evidence  sought  to  be obtained is only for filling up the lacuna and the judgment, impugned  is prejudicial to him cannot be countenanced.   Of the  three witnesses, permitted to be summoned and  examined on  the side of the Union of India, the Mint Master is  only an  assayer.   In  our considered  opinion,  the  facts  and circumstances  of the case require the examination of  these three  witnesses for a just decision of the case as held  by the High Court.      In  the light of the proposition of law which  we  have derived in the preceding portion of the judgment there is no illegality  in summoning the witnesses after the closure  of the  defence  arguments.  It is seen from the order  of  the Trial  Court that the argument  of the prosecution  has  not yet  begun.  Since we feel that any further  observation  of ours  in  justification  of this  order  may  prejudice  the defence of the appellant                                                        727 before  the Trial Court, we are not inclined to discuss  the evidence any further.      A  decision of this Court in Mir Mohd.  Omar and  Other v. State of West Bengal, [1989] 4 SCC 436 was relied upon to show that after the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the new Code (corresponding to Section 342 of the old Code)  the prosecution should not move the Trial  Judge  for recalling  a witness already examined, but  the  observation made in that decision has no application to the present case because  in  that case the said observation was made  in   a different context by this court while examining the plea  of the  prosecution  in  making  corrections  of  the  evidence already  recorded  under Section 272 of the  Code  and  that decision does not deal with the ambit of Section 540 of  the Code.      The other contention raised on behalf of the  appellant is   that  the  order  of  the  Magistrate   rejecting   the application  of the prosecution under Section 540 is  not  a revisable  order  under  Section  397(1)  as  it  being   an interlocutory  order  and even if it is not so,  the  second revision  by  the  same party-i.e.  Union of  India  is  not entertainable  in  view of the statutory bar  under  Section 397(3)  of  the new Code as the Union of India  has  already availed the revision under Section 397(2) before the Session Judge.   We may straightaway reject this plea on the  simple ground that the prosecution in the present case was launched under the old Code and as such the only provision of the old Code have to be applied as per Section 484 of the new  Code. The fervent plea of the appellant is though the  prosecution was  instituted under the old Code he should not  be  denied the  benefit and advantage of Section 397(2) and (3) of  the new  Code.   We  are afraid that we  could  accede  to  this inexorable request of the appellant for two reasons, namely, that the appellant has not challenged the maintainability of the second revision, filed and heard after the  commencement of the new Code before the High Court, claiming advantage of Section 397(3) of the new Code and secondly he  participated in  the revision proceedings throughout under the old  Code. Having  failed  in the revision he has no  justification  to raise  this  point before this Court,  especially  when  the proceedings under the old Code are saved by Section 484   of the new Code.      As  far as the question whether an order under  Section

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540  of  the old Code is an inerlocutory order  or  a  final order, need not be gone into as that question does not arise in  these  proceedings.  We would like to point  out  before parting with this judgment that though the High Court by its impugned judgment directed the Union of India to                                                        728 examine the three witnesses, in fact it has allowed all  the four   revision  applications  inclusive  of  the   revision application  Nos. 124 and 125 of 1978 filed by the State  of Gujarat  seeking  the same prayer as that of  the  Union  of India.   The  appellant  as  we  have  pointed  out  in  the prefatory  portion  of this judgment that that part  of  the judgment of the High Court allowing the two revisions  filed by  the State Government remains unchallenged.   Further  we would  like  to  point  out  that  the  High  Court  in  its concluding  paragraph of its judgment instead of  using  the words "I ...... direct" ought to have used the word "I ..... permit".      For  all  the  reasons stated above we  hold  that  the judgment  of  the  High  Court  does  not  suffer  from  any illegality or perversity calling for an interference at  the hands of this Court and as such the appeals are liable to be dismissed  as devoid of any merit.  However, we  direct  the Trial   Court   to  afford  a  fair   opportunity   to   the appellant/accused  to cross-examine the witnesses sought  to be examined by the Union of India and also to lead  rebuttal evidence if the appellant so desires.  Accordingly these two appeals are dismissed. Y.L.                                      Appeals dismissed.                                                        729