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PETITIONER: MOHAMMADBHAI KHUDABUX CHHIPAAND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER(And connected petitions)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/03/1962

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1517            1962 SCR  Supl. (3) 875  CITATOR INFO :  R          1966 SC 385  (17)  RF         1981 SC1127  (11)  R          1982 SC 710  (19)  RF         1983 SC1246  (15)

ACT: Agricultural Produce Markets-Market committees-Levy of fees- Notification-Validity-A   class   and  B   class   traders-- Licences-Discrimination-Rules  declared   invalid-Subsequent amendments   to  enactment-Validity  of  rules-Doctrine   of eclipse--Saurashtra  Agricultural Produce  Markets  (Gujarat Amendment  and Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1961 (1  of 1961)-Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (Bom. 22 of  1939), as amended, ss.5A, 11, 29-B, rr. 53, 64, 65,  66, 67-Constitution of India, Arts.14, (31)(1), 265.

HEADNOTE: Consequent on the decision in Gulam Mohammad v. The State of Bombay,  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 659, by which rr. 53, 65, 66 876 and 67, framed under the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, were held to be ultra vires the provisions of ss. 6A and 11 of the Act, the State of Gujarat amended r.53 by a notification  dated June 23, 1961, and also  promulgated  an Ordinance on June 26, 1961, by which amendments were made in certain  sections of the Act and a new s. 29 B was  inserted in  the Act validating certain acts or things done prior  to the promulgation of the Ordinance.  The petitioners, some of whom  were  wholesale dealers and the rest  retail  dealers, filed  petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India for certain reliefs on the grounds (1) that the notification dated  June 23, 196 1, was discriminatory and thus  offended Art. 14 because under it a market committee could levy  fees on agricultural produce by different modes, (2) that s. 29-B was  insufficient  to validate the defects  noticed  in  the earlier  decision  of  the Supreme  Court  inasmuch  as  the relevant  provisions  of  the Act and  the  Rules  were  not retrospectively amended, (3) that under the bye-laws A class traders  were charged much higher fees than B class  traders

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and,  further,  B  class traders were  allowed  to  sell  to consumers  anywhere  in  the market  area  whereas  A  class traders   were  not  so  allowed,  and  this   amounted   to discrimination, (4) that the main provisions of the Act  had been  amended by the Ordinance and, therefore, the basis  on which  the Supreme Court upheld the Act no  longer  existed, (5)  that  rr. 65, 66 and 67 which had been declared  to  be ultra  vires had neither been reframed no validated  by  the Ordinance  and,  therefore, it was not open  to  the  market committee to issue licences under those rules, and (6)  that s. 29-B was bad in so far as it prevented refund of  licence fees collected before the Ordinance came into force in  view of Art.31 (1) of the Constitution. Held  that  : (1) the notification dated June 23,  1961,  by itself  could  not  be said to  be  discriminatory-  because imposition of the fees was made only by the bye-laws  framed by  the market committee under the power conferred on it  by s. 11 subject to the maxima prescribed in the  notification; if a bye law prescribed rates of fees in two modes in such a way as to result in discrimination then such a bye-law would have to be struck down. (2)the  fact  that under r.53 the market  committee  might levy  fees by one method on one agricultural produce and  by another method on another agricultural produce, would not be a  ground of discrimination, because each commodity must  be treated as a class by itself. (3)s. 29-B was sufficient to cure the defects pointed  out in the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court and to validate 877 the  actions taken and the things done before the  promulga- tion of the Ordinance dated June 26, 1961. (4)there was a basis for classification of traders into  A class  and B class, and the restrictions placed by the  Act, Rules  and  Bye-laws  were reasonable  restrictions  in  the interests of the general public. (5)the  purpose of the licence granted to B Class  traders was  to  permit  them to buy in the  market  yard  and  thus control their activity in connection with whole-sale  trade, and not to control retail dealers.  Consequently, the market committees were acting within their powers under Act. (6)though  s.5A  had been amended, the said  section  read with  the Rules did not involve any radical  departure  from the scheme of the Act as it was before the amendment.  (7)  rr.  65  and  67, which  were  valid  when  they  were originally  framed but became bad on the insertion of 5A  in the  Act in 1953, became valid again after the amendment  of the  section  by the ordinance, by the  application  of  the doctrine of eclipse. Dhikaji  Narain  Dhokras  v. The State  of  Madhya  Pradesh, (1955)  2 S. C. R. 589 and Deep Chand v. The State of  Uttar Pradesh (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R.8. applied. (8)s.  29-B  having validated the levy and  collection  of licence  fees, Art. 31 (1) was riot applicable to the  case, since  fees  were included within the taxing  power  of  the legislature    which   had   also   power    to    legislate retrospectively. M.P.  V.  Sundararamier  & Co. v. The  State  of  Anddhra Pradesh,(1958) S.C.R. 1422, relied on.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 226 to 229 and 233 of 1961. Petitions  under Art. 32 of the Constitution of’  India  for

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the enforcement of fundamental rights. A.S.  R.  Chari,  J.  B. Dadachanji,  O.  C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in Petns.  Nos. 226 to 229 of 61). I.N.  Shroff,  for the petitioners (in Petn, No.  233  of 61). A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, N. S. Bindra and 878 R.   H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1 (in all the petitions.) 1962.  March 15.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO,  J.-These  five  petitions under  Art.  32  of  the constitution,  which  are connected and will be  dealt  with together, raise questions as to the constitutionality of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, Bombay Act  No.XXII of 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended by the  Bombay  and  Saurashtra  Agricultural  Produce  Markets (Gujarat amendment and validating Provisions) Ordinance, No. 1  of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the  Ordinance),  and the  Rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder.  They  are  a sequal  to the judgment of this Court in Gulam  Mohammed  v. The State of Bombay (1), which was delivered on May 2, 1961. ’One of petitioners before us in these petitions was also  a party  in that petition, which was with respect to a  market established in Ahmedabad.  In that petition the challenge to the  constitutionality  of the main provisions  of  the  Act failed  but the provisions of certain Rules, namely rr.  53, 65, 66 and 67 were held to be ultra vires the provisions  of a. 11 and a. 5A of the Act.  In consequence, a direction was issued  prohibiting  the respondents in that  petition  from enforcing  the  provisions of the Act,  Rules  and  Bye-laws against  the petitioners in that petition till a market  was established in law for that area under s.5A and from levying any  fee under a. 11 till the maximum was  prescribed  under the  Rules.   Consequent  on that  decision,  the  State  of Gujarat  amended r. 53 by notification dated June 23,  1961. Further  the Ordinance was promulgated on June 26, 1961,  by which  certain amendments were made in certain  sections  of the act and a new s. 29-B was inserted in the Act validating certain acts or things done prior to the promulgation of the (1)  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 659, 879 ordinance.  The present petitions were filed thereafter. Four of the petitions (namely, Nos. 226 to 229)   are   with respect to Ahmedabad while the fifth    petition  (No.  233) is  with  respect  to  Nadiad. Two  of  the  petitioners  of Ahmedabad are wholesale dealers while the other two claim to be  retail dealers.  The contentions on behalf of the  Ahme- dabad  petitioners are that the notification amended r.  53, offends  Art. 14 of the Constitution and is  therefore  bad. It is further contended that though S. 5AA has been amended, the  amendment  is  prospective ;  therefore  the  infirmity noticed in the earlier judgment of this Court still  remains and  s. 29-B which has been inserted in the Act is  insuffi- cient  to validate what bad been done before  the  Ordinance came  into force.  It is further contended that the  bye-law under which the market committee issues licences to A  Class and   B   class  dealers  is  discriminatory   and   imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to  carry on  trade and business and is therefore bad.  Lastly  it  is contended  that  the  market committee  insists  on  issuing licences for retail trade and this it cannot do for  control of retail trade is, not within the provisions of the Act  as held by, this Court in the earlier judgment, and further  in consequence the market committee is using r. 64 in a  manner in  which it was not intended to be used and therefore  that

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rule though it was upheld in the earlier judgment should  be declared ultra vires. The  majority  of  the petitioners in the  Nadiad  case  are wholesale  dealers  but  a few of them claim  to  be  retail dealers.    These   petitioners   further   challenge    the constitutionality  of  the Act after its  amendment  by  the Ordinance, and their contention is that the Ordinance  makes radical  changes in the main provisions of the Act  and  the basis  on  which these main provisions were upheld  by  this Court 880 earlier, no longer applies, and therefore the Act as it  now stands  after the amendment is violative of the  fundamental right  to carry on trade and business guaranteed under  Art. 19(1)(g)  of the constitution as the restrictions placed  by it  on  the  said right are  unreasonable.   Further  it  is contended  that rr. 65, 66 and 67 were struck down  by  this Court in the earlier judgment as beyond the power  conferred on the State under s. 26 of the Act.  These rules  therefore cannot be held to be a part of the Rules in force now and in consequence  it was not open to the market committee to  Act as provided in these Rules.  Lastly it is urged on behalf of one of the petitioners that he. had paid licence fee to  the market committee and was entitled to a refund of that  after the  earlier  judgment  of this Court;  but  s.  29-B  newly inserted in the Act which in effect deprives this petitioner of  getting refund is invalid and illegal as it  is  against the  provisions of Art. 31(1).  Some other points have  also been raised by the Nadiad petitioners ; but as they are  not pressed, we shall not refer to them. The  petitions have been opposed on behalf of the State  and it  has  traversed all the points raised on  behalf  of  the petitioners.  It is not necessary to set out the grounds  on which  it  is urged on behalf of the  respondents  that  the contentions of the petitioners have no force.  These grounds will  appear  when we deal with the  contentions  raised  on behalf  of the petitioners one by one.  Nor do we  think  it necessary  to  set  out  the  previous  history  as  to  the establishment  of  the market in Ahmedabad as that  will  be found  in the earlier judgment ; nor is it necessary to  set out  the  previous history as to the  establishment  of  the market in Nadiad, for it is not in dispute that that history is  similar  to the, history in the case  of  the  Ahmedabad market.   We shall therefore proceed to indicate the  points which  alone have been pressed on behalf of the  petitioners and then consider them one by one. 881 Some  of  the points are not common; but as they  have  been raised in one petition or the other and these petitions have been dealt with together and. the decision on any point Will effect even other petitions in which it has not been raised, we shall proceed on the basis that all the points have  been raised  in  all the petitions particularly  as  the  learned counsel  appearing  in  the various  petitions  adopted  the arguments  of  one another during the hearing.   The  points therefore which call for decision are as below- (1)Is  the  notification dated June 23,  1961  fixing  the maximum   fee   to  be  charged.  hit  by  Art.14   of   the Constitution? (2)Does  the  insertion of s. 29-B in the Act  suffice  to validate acts or things done before the promulgation of  the Ordinance? (3)Are  the by-laws by which the market  committee  issues licences  to A class and B class dealers discriminatory  and thus  offend-Art. 14, and do they amount to an  unreasonable

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restriction  on the fundamental right to carry on trade  and business under Art. 19(1)(g)? (4)  Is the market committee acting beyond its powerunder the Act in requiring retail dealers to take out licences and is  r. 64 bad on account of the manner in which it is  being enforced by the market committee? (5)Are the main provisions of the Act after its  amendment by the Ordinance liable to be struck down as an unreasonable restriction  on the fundamental right to carry on trade  and business under Art. 19(1)(g)? (6)Was  it  necessary to reframe rr. 65,66  and  67  under power conferred on the State Government under s. 26; if  so, what is the effect of its not having been done? 882 (7)Is  a.  29-B  bad  in  view  of  Art.  31  (1)  of  the Constitution  insofar as it prevents refund  of  licence-fee collected before the Ordinance came into force? Re (1).               The notification is in these terms:-               "No.   APM/060/30797-F-In the exercise of  the               powers  conferred by section 26 of the  Bombay               Agricultural  Produce Market Act,  1939  (Bom.               XXII  of  1939),  the  Government  of  Gujarat               hereby amends the Bombay Agricultural  Produce               Market Rules 1941 as follows namely:-               "In  the said rules in rule 53,  for  sub.rule               (1)   except   in  explanation   thereto   the               following shall be substituted, namely:-               (1)’The   Market  Committee  shall  levy   and               collect  fees on agricultural  produce  bought               and  sold in the market area at such rates  as               may  be specified in the by laws,  subject  to               the following maximums, namely:-               (1)Rate  when  levied according to  cart  load               shall not exceed 40 naya paise per cart load.               (2)Rate  when  levied ad  valorem.  shall  not               exceed 40 naya paise per Rs. 100.               (3)Rate when levied according to weight  shall               not exceed.               (1) per quintal    15 naya paise               (2) per Bengali Maund 5 naya paise               (4)Rate when levied according to the number of               containers containing the agricultural produce               shall not exceed,               (a)   per bale of cotton 40 nay& paise               883               (b)per  gunny  bag or 5 naya paise  any  other               container,               (5)Rate  when levied in respect of  cattle,               sheep  and  goat shall and exceed  per  animal               Rs.2.’               By  order  and  in the  name  of  Governor  of               Gujarat." The  contention  on behalf of the petitioners  is  that  the notification  is  discriminatory in two ways: in  the  first place,  because it allows fees to be collected by  different modes,  i.e.,  by  cart load, by value,  by  weight  and  by containers.   It  is  urged that it is open  to  the  market committee  to levy fees on certain agricultural  produce  by (say) cart load and on certain other agricultural produce by (say)  weight;  and  this  is  very  likely  to  result   in discrimination.  in the second place, it is urged  that  the notification  gives power to the committee to levy  fees  on the  same  commodity by even two of  the  methods  mentioned therein.  For example, it is urged that the same  commodity,

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say,  potatoes may be charged under the notification by  the market  committee both by weight and by cart load  depending upon  whether  they are brought into the market  area  in  a cart, or for example, in a basket.  It is said that there is nothing in the rule which prevents the market committee from doing so, and this may result in discrimination. We  may  however point out that the notification  by  itself does not impose any, fee on any commodity.  What it does  is to carry out the terms of a. 11 which require the maxima  to be prescribed subject to which the market committee can levy fees  on Agricultural produce.  The imposition of the,  fees still  remains to be made by the market committee under  the power  conferred  on  it by s.  11  subject  to  the  maxima prescribed in the notification therefore the notification by itself cannot be, said to be discriminatory. 884 Lot  us,  however,  examine the two  contentions  raised  on behalf  of the petitioners on the basis that      though the notification   may  not  actually  impose      fees   on any commodity, it still allows discrimination to be practised by the  market committee, when it proceeds under s. II to  levy fees  within  the  maxima prescribed  by  the  notification. Taking  the  first contention, it may be that by  using  one method in the case of one, agricultural produce and  another method  in the case of another agricultural  produce,  there may be some difference in the incidence of the fees charged, if one were to judge that incidence on the basis of only one of  the modes prescribed in the notification.  But  that  in our opinion cannot be said to result in d discrimination for each produce must for this purpose be treated to be a  class by itself.  Therefore, so long as the market committee  uses one  method  of  levying fee with respect  to  one  kind  of agricultural   produce,  it  cannot  be  said  that  it   is discriminating if it use,% another method for levying fee on another kind of Agricultural produce.  It is well known even in systems of taxation that taxes Are levied with  different incidence  depending upon the nature of the  article  taxed, and  a fee levied under s. 11 is only the exercise  of  the’ power  of  taxation  using that word in  its  widest  sense. Therefore,  the  fact  that  under  this  rule,  the  market committee  may levy fees by one method on  one  agricultural produce  and  by  another  method  on  another  agricultural produce  will  not be a ground of discrimination,  for  each commodity must be treated as a class by itself, Turning now to the second contention, it is true that  there is  nothing  in  the rule expressly to  prevent  the  market committee from using two of the modes prescribed therein for the  purpose  of  levying  fees  on  the  same  agricultural produce.   It must be remembered however that the rule is  a general provision for levying fees within the                             885 maxima  prescribed  on the agricultural  produce  by  market committees in the market areas all over the State.   Various methods of levying fees have been included in the rule,  for we  assume  that the rule making authority knew  that  there were  various ways in which things are brought into  various market areas.  The. rule is meant to apply to all situations that  may arise in the State and there maybe different  ways in  which  things  may be brought to  the  market  areas  in different  parts of the State.  That is why the rule  has  a wide  sweep  and allows the market committee  to  levy  fees either  by  cart  load  or by value,  or  by  weight  or  by containers.   It  may be that if for the  same  agricultural produce fees are levied subject to the maxima two  different modes,  the  rates fixed may result in  discrimination.   It

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would  however not be impro-in r to assume that  in  framing the   bye-laws  in  which  pee  rates  for  any   particular agricultural  produce  shall be fixed the  market  committee shall   pay   due   wigard  to   the   prohibition   against discrimination  rentained  in Art. 14 of  the  Constitution. The  praccocal consequence of this is likely to be that  for one tigricultural produce the market committee will fix  ane rate  only  in one of the four modes.  If that  is  oone  no discrimination  can be said to arise.  It will dot  also  in our  opinion  be unreasonable to think that in  issuing  the notification the Government proceeded on the assumption that for  any particular agricultural produce one mode of  fixing fees whether according to cart load or according to value or according   to  weight  or  according  to  the   number   of containers-will  be adopted. .,Nor would it be difficult  if the rate is fixed in one of the modes, pay according to cart load,  to calculate the fees to be levied where the  produce is brought in any other manner, say in baskets, for then the proportional fee can be charged on each basket on the  basis of  so  many  basket-fuls  being equal  to  one  cart  load. Similarly where the bye-law fixes 886 the  fees  according to containers and a dealer  brings  the produce  in cart load, it will be possible to Calculate  the fee due on the basis of containers, by calculating how  many containers would be equal to one cart load.  Where the  fee. is fixed by weight or value there would be no difficulty  in any  case.  Therefore one may reasonably conclude  that  the market  committee  when  acting under  s.11  read  with  the notification will levy the fees on a single commodity in one only  of  the permitted modes.  If that  happens  in  actual practice there will be no question of any discrimination. But  assume  that a market committee chooses  to  adopt  two modes for levying fees on the same agricultural produce, say one according to cart load and another according to  weight. In  such  a  case  a question may  arise  whether  there  is discrimination in the incidence of fees.  That question  may have  to  be considered if and when it  arises  and  whether discrimination  actually arises in such a case  will  depend upon the rates fixed by the market committee for levying  of fees  on  the, same agricultural produce in  the  two  modes that,  it might choose.  If the rates are so fixed that  the incidence  is  substantially the same whether the  fees  are levied on the basis of cart load or on the basis of  weight, there  will be no discrimination.  On the other hand if  the rates   are   so  fixed  that  the   incidence   works   out substantially  differently  there  will be a  case  of  dis- crimination and in such a case: it is the bye-law that  will have  to  be  struck down as being  discriminatory  for  the actual imposition of fees will be made by the bye-law framed by the committee and not by the impugned notification.   The chances  however  of fixing two modes for the levy  of  fees even  on the same agricultural produce in such a way  as  to result  in discrimination are in our opinion so remote  that the  notification cannot be struck down on that  account  as discriminatory.  In such 887 a  case  it is not the notification which will  have  to  be struck down but the actual bye-law if it prescribes rates of fees   in  two  modes  in  such  a  way  as  to  result   in discrimination. Turning  now to the facts of the ’present case we find  that the bye-laws framed by the market committees have fixed only one  mode  of levying fees in these cases for  one  kind  of produce.   It is not the petitioners’ case that  the  market

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committees with which we are concerned in the present  cases have  used more than one mode for levying fees on  the  same agricultural  produce.   There  it; therefore  no  case  for discrimination made out on the basis of the actual  bye-laws which  have been framed by the market committees  under  the power   conferred   on  them  under  s.11  read   with   the notification.   In  these circumstances, the attack  on  the notification on the ground of, discrimination must fail. Re. (2). Sub-section  (1) of s.29-B provides that in the case  of  a, market  area  declared  before  the  commencement  of,   the Ordinance,  a  market for such market area shall  be  deemed always to have been established for the purposes of the  Act with  effect from the date on which a market yard  for  such market  area  was  declared for the  first  time  under  the Rules .or the Act and such market shall include and shall be deemed  always  to have included the said market  yard.   By this  provision  the  defect that was  pointed  out  in  the earlier  judgment  with respect to the  establishment  of  a market is intended to be validated. The sub-section  further provides that any action taken or anything done by a  market committee or any other authority after the establishment  of a market therein as aforesaid but before the commencement of the  Ordinance, which but for the provisions of this  clause would have been invalid, shall be and shall be deemed always to 888 have  been valid and shall not be called in question  merely on the ground that no market was established for such market area when such action was taken or thing done.   Sub-section (2)  then  provides that any fees levied  aid  collected  on agricultural produce bought and sold in a market area before the  commencement of the Ordinance by a market committee  at the rates specified in its bye-laws shall be deemed to  have been  validly  levied  and  collected  and  such  levy   and collection  shall  not be called in question merely  on  the ground  that  at  the time of such levy  and  collection  no maxima  were prescribed as required by a. 11. The  intention of this provision is to cure the defect which was noticed in the  earlier  judgment  inasmuch  as  no  maxima  had   been prescribed under s.11 by the State Government.   Rub-section (3) finally provides that all licences issued to operate  in a market area or any part thereof and fees charged therefore before  the  commencement  of  the  Ordinance  by  a  market committee under the Rules and bye-laws and any action  taken or thing done relating to licensing of persons, or obtaining of  a  licence, to operate in the market area  or  any  part thereof,  taken or done by a market committee or  any  other authority or person under the Rules and bye-laws before  the commencement  of the Ordinance shall be and shall be  deemed always to have been valid and the validity thereof shall not be  called in question merely on the ground that  when  such action  was  taken  or  thing  done,  the  power  right  or. obligation  therefore was not duly conferred or  imposed  by the Act on such market committee, authority or person.  This provision is intended to cure the defect arising from  rr.65 and  67  being  declared ultra vires by this  Court  in  its earlier judgment. The  contention on behalf of the petitioners is  that  these provisions are insufficient to validate                             889 the  defects which were noticed in the earlier  judgment  of this  Court inasmuch as the relevant provisions of  the  Act and the Rules have not been retrospectively amended.  We see no force in this argument, for the provisions as they  stand

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certainly  validate the defects pointed out in  the  earlier judgment  of  this  Court.  It is  true  that  the  relevant sections and the Rules have not been retrospectively amended by  the Ordinance, but this in our opinion was  unnecessary. Retrospective amendment may be necessary when it is  desired to  change  the law; but it seems that so far as  s.  11  is concerned,  the legislature did not intend that the  control of  the  State Government over levy of fees should  be  done away  with  for the future also.  Therefore,  all  that  was necessary  in that respect was to validate the past  actions and this is specifically provided for by sub-ss.(2) and  (3) of s.29-B. As for the establishment of market committees, an amendment  has been made in s.5.AA of the Act  deleting  the provision. by which a market could be established only if so required  by  the  State  Government.   This  amendment   is prospective.  It could have been made retrospective also and in  that  case  sub-s.  (1) of  s.29-B  may  not  have  been necessary.  The legislature, however, adopted the method  of amending s.5-AA  prospectively and making a separate  provi- sion  for validating the establishment of markets in  sub-s. (1)  of s.29-B. We see no reason why it should be held  that the  validation made by sub-s.(1) is not sufficient  because the legislature has adopted one method rather than the other for  carrying out its purpose.  We are therefore of  opinion that s.29-B is sufficient to cure the defects pointed out in the  earlier judgment of the Court and to  validate  actions taken  and  things  done  before  the  promulgation  of  the Ordinance which would otherwise have been invalid in view of the earlier judgment of this Court.  The contention on  this head must also be rejected. 890 Re. (3). Under the bye-laws as they now stand two classes of  traders are  mentioned, namely A class traders and B class  traders. A  class traders are those who hold licences to  buy  and/or sell agricultural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard, and the licence-fee which they have to  pay per  year  is Rs. 75.  B class traders are  those  who  have licences to buy agricultural produce in quantities not below 10  lbs.  in  the  market yard and  to  sell  in  retail  to consumers  anywhere  in  the market area.   They  have  been divided  into three classes, namely, (a)  shop-keepers,  (b) lari  holders, and (e) Toplawala (hawkers), with a  licence- fee  of Rs. 12, Rs. 6 and Rs. 3 respectively.  It  is  urged that  this amounts to discrimination between A class  and  B class  traders inasmuch as A class traders are charged  much higher  fees than the B class traders.  It is however  clear that  there  is a basis for classification between  the  two classes of traders.  A class traders are those who can  both buy and sell agricultural produce in the market yard while B class  traders can only buy in the, market yard  but  cannot sell  there.   It  is  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  State Government  that  B  class traders  are  those  persons  who generally  sell  in  retail  to consumers  after  buy  in  a wholesale  in  the  market  yard from  A  class  traders  or producers.   The  reason  why  B  class  traders  have  been permitted  to  buy  in  the market  yard  is  to  allow  for competition,  as otherwise there would have been a  monopoly of  the  few  A class traders who operate  in  a  particular market   yard.   This  classification  in  our  opinion   is reasonable.   A class traders are wholesale traders who  are permitted  both to buy and sell in the market yard  and  are thus  charged  a higher licence-fee.  B  class  traders  are ordinary  retailers  who in order to carry on  their  retail trade  are permitted to buy in the market yard but they  are

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,not permitted to sell there.  They are small trader, 891 and are therefore charged lower licence fees.  It appears to us  that in order to avoid the monopoly of A class  traders, who  are a few in number, with the result that prices  might be depressed by such traders, B class traders are  permitted only to buy in the market yard on payment of a small licence fee in order that the producer who brings his produce in the market  yard  may  have  a fair price.   We  see  no  reason therefore  to  hold  that there  is  any  discrimination  in creating  the  two classes of traders, for there is  a  fair basis of classification of traders into A class and B class. Nor  can  this restriction be deemed to be  an  unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade and business, for such  regulation is obviously envisaged by the Act in  order to  carry out its purposes and this Court, has already  held in  the  earlier judgment that the Act is a valid  piece  of legislation.   It is unnecessary to repeat the reason  given in  the  earlier  judgment,:  where it  was  held  that  the restrictions  placed by the Act, Rules and  Bye-laws  framed thereunder  are reasonable restrictions in the  interest  of general public. It is however urged that B class traders are allowed to sell to  consumers  anywhere in the market area whereas  A  class traders’,  are not so allowed.  It has already been held  in the  earlier  judgment that retail trade is  not  controlled under  the Act.  Therefore, the fact that the  bye-,law  has added the words ,to sell in retail to consumers anywhere  in the  market  area" in the case of B class traders is  of  no consequence,  for  B class traders, as they  are  retailers, would  be  entitled in any case,  without  being  controlled under the Act, to sell to consumers anywhere they like.   It if;  not the addition of these words which gives that  right to  B  class  traders,  for that  right  of  theirs  is  not controlled by the Act and they would be entitled to exercise it  without the addition of these words, which, we  consider as surpluses in the circumstances.  As for A class traders 892 they are admittedly wholesalers and there is no question  of their  selling in retail.  We are therefore of opinion  that the addition of the words mentioned above with respect to  B class traders is a mere sur-plusage and makes no  difference to the basis of classification.  There is no force therefore in the contention under this head and it must be rejected. Re. (4). It is next urged that the market committee is attempting  to control  retail dealers and requires them also to  take  out licences and this it is not authorised to do, as this  Court has  already held in the earlier judgment that retail  trade is not. within the ambit of the Act.  This argument is based on  the  use of the words "to sell in  retail  to  consumers anywhere  in  the market area" in connection  with  B  class traders.   It is said that in this way the market  committee is  controlling  retail trade also under the  Act  which  it cannot  do.  We are of opinion that this contention  has  no force.  B class traders are required to take out licences in order to buy agricultural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard.  The licence in our opinion is  not meant to permit them to carry on retail sale anywhere in the market area.  As we have said already these words are a mere surplusage and the real purpose of the licence granted to  B class  traders is to permit them to buy in the  market  yard and thus control their activity in connection with wholesale trade.   It  is urged, however, that no provision  has  been made  under  s.2(ix)( a) of the Act to define the  limit  of

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retail sale under any bye-law.  It is true that no  specific provision for that purpose has been made but when the  limit of  10  lbs. is fixed below which no  transaction  can  take place  in the market yard it is some indication of  what  is the  limit of retail sale.  In any case the  bye-laws  which provide for A and B class traders, indicate the limit  below which they cannot trade in the market yard and this clearly                             893 shows that the intention of the market committee was not  to control retail trade by the issue of licence to traders  for the  large proportion of retail trade may well be  below  10 lbs.  for each transaction.  We cannot therefore accept  the contention of the petitioners that the bye-laws by providing for  A  class and B class traders are really  providing  for control  of retail trade.  It is clear that B class  traders can only buy in the market yard but cannot sell there and as for  sale, they will be entitled to sell in retail  wherever they like, for the Act does not control retail trade. As  for r. 64, it merely provides for incidental  powers  in connection  with the regulation of market yards and  it  has already been held valid in the earlier judgment.  We see  no reason to hold that that rule is invalid on the ground  that the  market committee is using that rule to  control  retail trade.   We  have  already  pointed  out  that  the   market committee  cannot  be  said  to  control  retail  trade   by providing,  for  A  and B class licences’ and  there  is  no question  therefore  of  r. 64 being used in  a  manner  not intended thereunder. Lastly,  it  seems  that  there  is  some  dispute  by  some petitioners in Petitions Nos. 228 and 229 as to whether they hold  certain  shops in the market yard from  the  municipal committee  or  must be deemed to hold them from  the  market committee  and  what rights the market  committee  has  over those petitioners in that connection.  It appears that there have  been  suits in courts with, respect to  that  dispute. That  is a matter which in our opinion has to be decided  by the courts where the suits are said to be pending and cannot be the subject of adjudication in a petition under Art.  32. In  any  case r. 64 cannot be declared had  because  of  any dispute  between  the market committee, the  municipal  com- mittee and stall holders as to their respective rights 894 over  the stalls in the market yard.  There is therefore  no force in this contention either and it must be rejected. Re. (5). The  main  contention  under-this  head  is  that  the  main provisions of the Act have been so amended by the  Ordinance that the basis on which this Court upheld the provisions  as constitutional no longer exists and therefore the Act as  it now stands after its amendment by the Ordinance is an unrea- sonable  restriction on the right to carry on  trade.   This contention requires a consideration of the provisions of the Act  as they stand after the amendment by the Ordinance  and it  will have to be seen whether there has been any  radical departure  from the scheme of the Act as it was  before  the amendment.   If there has been no radical  departure  after, the  amendment  and  the control envisaged  by  the  Act  as amended  is still the same, as it was before  the  amendment the basis on which the earlier judgment of this Court upheld the main provisions ,the Act would still apply, and the  Act as amended would be constitutional.  Let us therefore see if there   has  been  any  radical  departure  from  the   main provisions  of the Act as they stood before  the  amendment. The Act still deals with the regulation of purchase and sale of  agricultural  produce and establishment of  markets  for

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ouch  produce.  Section 3 stands unamended and provides  for the  constitution of market areas and market committees  and gives  power to the Commissioner by notification to  declare his  intention of regulating the purchase and sale  of  such agricultural produce and in such area as may be specified in the notification.  Section 4(1) is also unamended and  gives power to the Commissioner after holding such inquiry as  may be necessary and considering the objections and  suggestions if any made after the notification under a. 3 to declare                             895 a  particular area as a market area for the purposes of  the Act.   There. has been some amendment in s. 4( 2) but it  is not of a radical character and does not make any  difference to  the  main provisions of the Act.  Section 4-A  has  also been amended by providing for declaration of a market proper and con. sequential changes necessary-due to such provision. This  amendment only brings in to the Act what was  formerly in  r. 51.  This amendment also therefore makes  no  radical change  in the Act.  Section 5-AA has also been amended  and the  provision  which  made  it  necessary  for  the   State Government  to  require a market committee  to  establish  a market  has  boon deleted.  Section 5-AA as  it  now  stands makes  it  the duty of the market committee to  enforce  the provisions of the Act etc. and when a market is  established thereunder  to provide for such facilities in the market  as the  State  Government  may  from time  to  time  direct  in connection  with  the  purchase  and  sale  of  agricultural produce  with which it is concerned.  The change in s.  5-AA therefore is also of an incidental character and does not in any  way affect the scheme of the Act as it was  before  the amendment.   Section  5A has also been amended  and  it  now reads as follows:-               "Where  a market is established under  section               4A, the market committee may issue licences in               accordance   with   the  rules   to   traders,               commission    agents,    brokers,    weighmen,               measurers,  surveyors, warehousemen and  other               persons  to operate in the market area or  any               part thereof" The  main  argument  of the petitioners  is  based  on  this amendment.  It is urged that under the unamended Act after a market  was  established the market committee had  to  issue licences for operation in the market so that the business of sale  and purchase of agricultural produce was  concentrated in the market which consisted of a principal market yard and 896 one  or more sab-market yards with the consequent  advantage to the agricultural producer that they had a place or places where  they  could find a large number of buyers  for  their produce  and could thus secure fair prices  under  regulated conditions.  Now, however, it ’is urged that under s. 5A  it is  open  to  the  market committee,  after  the  market  is established  under  s. 4A to give licences  to  traders  and other to operate in the market area or any part thereof with the  result  that  it  would not  be  necessary  to  have  a principal  market yard or sub-market yards.  There would  be some  force in this argument if we were to ignore the  rules framed  under the Act.  But the rules which were  framed  by the  State Government are still the same.  Rule 51  provides for the declaration of market yards and market proper by the State  Government.  Rule 60 provides that  all  agricultural produce  brought  into the market shall  pass  through,  the principal  market  yard or sub-market yards  and  shall  not subject to the provisions of sub-r.(2), be sold at, anyplace outside  such  yards.  The only exception to  this  is  sub-

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r.(2), which provides that proceed agricultural produce  may be  sold either in the principal market yard, or  sub-market yard,  or  in the market proper, or in the market.  area  in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws.  The  reason for  this distinction is clear, for where produce is  to  be processed, as for example, ginned cotton, it has to be taken to  a  ginning  factory  in which  came  it  would  be  most inconvenient  to  bring the produce to the market  yard  for sale and that may also add to the price by further transport charges.   Reading s. 5A therefore along with the Rules,  it is clear that the present provisions are materially the same as the agricultural produce (except that which is processed) shall have to pass through the principal market yard or sub- market  yards and be sold there.  The only  difference  that the amendment has made                             897 is  that whereas formerly under a. 5A ’ traders  could  only operate  in the market by virtue of the provisions  of,  the Act,  now they will operate in the market by virtue  of  the provisions  of  the  Act read with the  Rules.   The  rules, however,  are  still the same and therefore  in  effect  the provisions  of  the Act and the Rules  read  together  still provide  for the same kind of regulation which was  intended under  the unamended Act.  It is urged that it will be  open in  the future for the market committee to do away with  the necessity  of having market yards and sub-market  yards  and concentrating, wholesale trade only in market yards and sub- market yards in view of the provisions in the amended  s.5A, for the market committee would be entitled to issue licences in  accordance  with the Rules in case they are  changed  to traders etc. to trade in the market area or any part thereof It will be seen however that the power to change .the  Rules is  not  in  the market committee and until  the  Rules  are changed the position as it was under the unamended Act would remain  the  same.  We have no reason to  suppose  that  the State Government intends to change the Rules as they are now and  to permit the market committee to grant licences  under s. 5A for trade anywhere in the market indiscriminately.  It is  true  that  such a possibility can &rise  if  the  State Government changes the Rules as they exist at present.   But there  is  no  reason  to suppose  that  such  a  change  is intended.  So long therefore as the Rules stand as they are, there is no radical departure from the scheme of the Act  as it  was before its amendment and the reasons which  impelled this Court to uphold the Act and the Rules framed thereunder would still hold good.  If and when the Rules are so changed as to make a radical departure from the present position,  a question  may  well  arise whether  the  scheme  of  control envisaged under the 898 Act has failed in its purpose.  It may then be necessary  to decide  whether the Act and the rules      framed thereunder are unconstitutional; but so long as the rules stand as they are, we have to read s.5A along with the Rules, for licences are issued under that section in accordance with the  Rules, and reading s. 5A and the present Rules together it must  be held  that  there  has been no radical  departure  from  the scheme  of  the  act  as it was  before  the  amendment  and therefore  the reasons which impelled this court  to  uphold the  Act, Rules and bye-laws framed under it in the  earlier judgment still stand. Beside,  this main argument certain  subsidiary  contentions are also urged on behalf of the petitioners to challenge the constitutionality   of  the  act,  and  the   Rules   framed thereunder  on  the  ground  that  it  was  an  unreasonable

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restriction  on the fundamental right to carry on  trade  or business.   It is urged that a trader who has  business  all over the State may have to take 80 or more licences to trade in different market areas and that will mean a heavy  burden on  him  resulting  in increase  in  price  of  agricultural produce.  This in our opinion is a theoretical consideration and  in any case if a trader is so big as to carry on  trade in all the 80 or more market areas established in the  State we  see  no reason why he should not take  licence  in  each market  area.  He will be in a position to bear  the  burden and it need not necessarily affect the price of agricultural produce  seriously.  Then it is urged that the  Act  affects transactions  between traders outside the market  area.   We have  not been able to understand what exactly is  meant  by this. it is only when the sale takes place within the market area  that  the produce has to  pass through  the  principal market  yard  or  sub-market  yard, but  if  a  trader  gets something  from outside the market area and the  sale  takes place outside the market area and the thing is brought in to the  market  area  by the trader after  the  purchase,  such transaction will not                             899 be subject to any fees, for fees have only to be charged  on agricultural  produce  bought and sold in  the  market  area under r. 53 read with s. 11.  But where the sale takes place outside the market area and the commodity is merely  brought into the market area by the wholesale trader, there will  be no  question of any fee being charged on that,  transaction; of course, if there is a further sale in the market area  or in  the  market yards by the wholesale trader  to  some  one locally that may be liable to fee.  We do not we how in  the circumstances  it  can  be  said that  this  is  a  case  of unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade  and business. Next it is urged that the provisions in the Act also  affect transaction  between  traders and traders, and  also  affect produce  not grown within the market area if it is  sold  in the  market area.  That is undoubtedly so.  But  if  control has  to  be effective in the interest  of  the  agricultural producer  such incidental control of produce  grown  outside the market area and brought into the market yard for sale is necessary  as otherwise the provisions of the Act  would  be evaded  by alleging that the particular produce sold in  the market yard was not grown in the market area.  For the  same reasons transactions between traders and traders have to  be controlled,  if the control in the interest of  agricultural producers  and the general public has to be  effective.   We are  therefore  of opinion that the Act and the  Rule,%  and Bye-laws  thereunder cannot be struck down on  this  ground. The contention under this head therefore must fail. Re. (6). The  next contention is that rr. 65, 66 and 67  were  struck down by this Court in the earlier judgment and have  neither been  reframed nor validated by the  Ordinance.   Therefore, these  rules  do  not exist.  Consequence  of  this,  it  is alleged, is that it 900 is not open to the market committee to issue licences  which were provided by these rules.  Rules    65 provides that  no person shall do business as a trader or a general commission agent  in  agricultural produce in any  market  area  except under  a licence granted by the market committee under  this rule.  Rule 67 provides that no person shall do business  as a  trader,  commission agent,  broker,  weighmen,  measurer, surveyor, warehouseman or operate in any other manner in any

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market  area  except  under licence granted  by  the  market committees.   It  is urged that licences are  granted  under these rules read with s.5A, which now provides that whore  a market  is  established  the  market  committee  may   issue licences  in  accordance with rules to  traders,  commission agents,  brokers etc. to operate in the market area  or  any part  thereof.  Section 5A, it is urged, is a mere  enabling provision  and becomes effective when the rules  are  framed and that licences under the enabling provisions of s. 5A are to  issue in accordance with the rules; and if there are  no rules as to issue of licences the enabling provisions of  a. 5A  cannot be availed of by the market committee to  require the  taking  out  of licences.  It is rr. 65  and  67  which prohibit business in the market area without taking licences and provide for the manner in which applications for licence shall be made, the period for which the licence shall remain valid  and  other incidental matters.  It is urged  that  as these rules were struck down by this Court and have  neither been reframed nor validated under the Ordinance there is  no power in the market committee to require traders to take out licences merely because s. 5A enables it to issue  licences. The  argument  on behalf of the State is  that  even  though these  rr. 65 and 67 were struck down because they were  in- consistent with s. 5A as it stood before the amendment,  now that s. 5A has been amended these rules must be held to have revived and reliance in this connection is placed on certain decisions of                             901 this  Court  where it was held that an Act which  was  valid when  it was passed before the Constitution came into  force and  some provisions of which be. came invalid  for  certain purposes  in  view  of the provisions  in  the  Constitution relating  to fundamental rights and Art. 13 thereof,  became wholly effective again when the Constitution was amended and the inconsistency with the fundamental rights removed.  This principle  was  laid down by this Court  in  Bhikaji  Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradrsh (1), in these words:               "The true effect of Art. 13(1) is to render an               Act  inconsistent with the  fundamental  right               inoperative  to  the extent of  the  inconsis-               tency.  It is over-shadowed by the fundamental               right  and  remains dormant but is  not  dead.               With the amendment made in clause (6) of  Art.               19  by  the  First  Amendment  Act,  the  pro.               visions  of  the impugned Act were  no  longer               inconsistent therewith and the result was that               the  impugned Act began to operate once  again               from  the  date of such  amendment  with  this               difference that’, unlike amended clause (2) of               Art.19 which was expressly made retrospective,               no rights and obligations could be founded  on               the  provisions of the impugned Act  from  the               date  of the commencement of the  constitution               till the date of the amendment. This  matter  was further considered in Deep  Chand  v.  The State  of  Uttar Pradesh   (2) and it was  held  by majority that  ,,there was clear distinction between the two  clauses of  Art. 13.  Under cl. (1), pre-Constitution law  subsisted except   to  the  extent  of  its  inconsistency  with   the provisions  of  Part  III whereas under  cl.  (2)  any  post Constitution law contravening those provisions was a nullity from  its inception to the extent of such contravention  and (1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 589 589  (2) (1955) Supp. 2 S.C.R. B. 902 therefore  a law which was bad ab initio under Art. 13 (  2)

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either wholly or to the extent of the con   travention could not  be  revived by the application of     the  doctrine  of eclipse  and the doctrine could only apply in the case of  a law  that was valid when made but was rendered  invalid  for certain    purposes   by   a   supervening    constitutional inconsistency.  The argument on behalf of the State is  that if rr. 65 and 67 were valid when they were first framed  and became invalid on the introduction of s. 5A in the Act, they became  effective  again  when  s. 5A  was  amended  by  the Ordinance. It  has not been disputed in this case that the doctrine  of eclipse  applies  to cases of rules.  The only  dispute  was whether rr. 65 and 67 in the present form were in  existence before  1953  when a. 5A was inserted in the Act and  if  so whether they were valid in that form before 1953.  Time  was taken  by  the parties to trace the history of the  Act  and those  two  rules and the form in which the  Act  and  these rules stood before 1953.  Investigation in this matter shows that rules were framed for the first time in 1941 after  the Act  came on the statute book.  Rule 65 (1) was in the  same form  as it existed when it was struck down by  the  earlier judgment.   Rule 67 (1) was also substantially in  the  same form except that it did not originally include a trader or a commission agent or warehouseman as it did at the time  when it was struck down.  The addition or the words "the  traders and commission agents" in r. 67(1) is however not  material, for  these classes were already covered by r.65(1).  As  for the  werehousemen  which  were added sometime  later  to  r. 67(1),  that addition need not detain us because we are  not concerned in these petitions with warehousemen.  So it seems that r. 65 (1) and r. 67 (1) were practically the same  when they  were  first framed in 1941 as they existed  when  they were struck down.  The Act as originally passed in 1939  did not contain a section like s.5A. The scheme of the Act  then was that under a. 4 (2 903 the Government alone could grant licences for setting up any place  for  the  purchase and sale  of  agriculture  produce notified under the Act and thereafter under s. 5 it was  the duty  of the market committee established under the Act  for every  market area to enforce the provisions of the Act  and the  conditions  of the licence granted  by  the  Government setting  up  a  place as above and  to  establish  a  market therein, if so, required by the Government.  Section 26 gave power  to the Government to frame rules for the purposes  of carrying out the provisions of the Act.  Sub-section  (2)(e) and (f) were as below:-               "(2)  In particular and without  prejudice  to               the  generality  of the  foregoing  provisions               such rules may provide for or regulate:-               (e)the maximum fees which may be levied by the               market   committee  in  respect  of   licences               granted  to  traders and on  the  agricultural               produce bought and sold in the market area and               the recovery of such fees;               (f)the issue of licences to brokers, weigh-               men  measures and surveyors the form in  which               and  the  conditions  subject  to  which  such               licences  shall be issued or renewed  and  the               conditions subject to which the licences shall               carry  on  their business and the fees  to  be               charged therefore." It  will be seen that these provisions by which rules  could be  framed  for grant of licences did not confer  power  for issuing  licences only for the market established under  s.5

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is it originally stood.  These powers were general in  terms and  the Government could frame rules empowering the  market committee  to  issue  licences  for  carrying  on   business through.  out  the  market area.  Rules 65 (1)  and  67  (1) therefore  would  be within the power granted to  the  State Government under a. 26 when they were 904 originally framed in 1941 and would thus be valid then. Then we come to the amendment of the Act in  1948.  By  this amendment, clauses (e) and (f) of s.    26(2) were  combined in one and were numbered as   sub-s.  (2)(f), which runs  as follows:-               (2)In  particular and without prejudice  to               the generality of the foregoing provision such               rules may provide for or regulate:-               (f)the  issue of licences to traders,  com-               mission agents, warehousemen and other persons               operating  in-the market,  brokers,  weighmen,               measurers  and surveyors, the form  in  which,               and  the  conditions  subject  to  which  such               licences  shall be issued or renewed  and  the               fees to be charged therefore;". It  will be seen that though the words ’market area" do  not appear  in this provision, it is still of a  general  nature and  does not restrict the operation of the licence only  to the  market.   So rr. 65 an(] 67 would not  be  inconsistent with it. Then we come to the amendment of 1953 which introduced  s.54 (as it was before the amendment by the Ordinance) in the Act and that provided that ,’where a market is established under s.5,  the market committee may issue licences in  accordance with  the  rules  to traders,  commission  agents,  brokers, weighmen,  measurers,  surveyors,  warehousemen  and   other persons  to  operate  in  the  market."  This  section   was considered in the earlier judgment and it was held there  on the basis of this section that rr. 65 and 67 when they  gave power  to the committee to issue licences for  operation  in the  market area as distinguished from the market  were  bad after the enactment of S. 5A.                             905 It  is however clear from the above narration of facts  that r.65(1)  and r.67 (I,) were valid when they were  originally framed and remained valid till s. 5A was enacted in 1953 and became  bad on the insertion of s. 5A in the Act.  Now  that s.  5A has been amended by the Ordinance, rr. 65 and 67  are obviously  in  conformity  with  it,  r.  66  being   merely consequential.    Therefore   they  will   revive   by   the application of the doctrine of eclipse as they are no longer overshadowed  by s. 5A as it was before the Ordinance.   The contention under this head must therefore fail. Re. (7). The  argument  under this head is that subs.(3) of  s.  29-B which  validates  the collection of licence-fees  by  market committees  is  bad inasmuch as it makes it  impossible  for refund to be made of licence-fees collected at the time when the  market committee had no power to collect it.   We  have not  been able to understand this contention, for it is  not disputed  that  the  legislature  has  power  to   legislate retrospectively even with respect to taxation (see M. P.  V. Sundararamier  &  Co. v. The State, of Andhra  Pradesh  (1), where  Sales  Tax  Laws  Validation  Act,  1956,  was   held constitutionally, valid.  Fees ire also included within  the taxing  power  of the legislature in  the  broadest,  sense. Article (1) therefore has no application in the present case and  we  have to took to Art. 265 which says  that  "no  tax

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shall  be levied or collected except by authority  of  law". Sub-section (3) of s. 29-B is the law which  retrospectively authorises the levy of licence-fees collected in this  case. Retrospective  power of the legislature to make a law  being there  even in the case of taxation, we fail to see how  the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 29-B which validate the  levy and collection of licence-fees can be hold to be invalid (1)[1958] S.C.R. 1422. 906 under  Art. 31(1).  We may add that the same will  apply  to fees collected under s. II and validated by sub-s.     of s. 29-B.  There is’ therefore no force in this  contention.  It is hereby rejected. In the result, the petitions are dismissed with   costs. One set of hearing fee. Petitions dismissed,