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PETITIONER: MOHAMMAD HASNUDDIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/11/1978

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) SINGH, JASWANT PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  404            1979 SCR  (2) 265  1979 SCC  (2) 572  CITATOR INFO :  F          1982 SC  61  (3)  R          1986 SC1164  (5)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894,  Ss. 14  and  18-Power  of Collector to  make a  reference under s. 18 circumscribed by fulfilment  of   conditions  laid   down  therein-Duty   and jurisdiction of  court to  go behind  the reference  made on time barred application and decline to answer it.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant’s   land  was   acquired  by  the  State Government under s. 5 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, A notification  under s.  3(1) was  published  on  the  28th February, l958  and on  the 13th  of January,  1962 the Land Acquisition officer,  Aurangabad, made  an  award  directing payment of  compensation inclusive  of 15%  solatium to  the appellant at the rate of 37 n.p. per sq. yard as against his claim for payment of compensation at the rate of RS.10/- per sq. yard. the award was communicated to the appellant on the 20th of January, 1962 and on the 5th February, 1962 he filed an  application  for  review  before  the  Land  Acquisition officer who  made a recommendation  through the Collector to the Secretary  to the  State Government  that the  award  be reconsidered. But, the Collector by his order dated the 23rd of March,  1962 declined to forward the same. On the 14th of May, 1962 the appellant applied for reference under s. 14(1) of the  Hyderabad Land  Acquisition Act  which  is  in  pari materia with  s. 18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894, praying that  the period  spent in  the proceedings  for the review be  excluded while computing the period of limitation prescribed under  s. 14 of the Limitation Act. The Assistant Collector, Aurangabad, who was the Land Acquisition officer, made a  reference  to  the  District  Court  of  Aurangabad, .without opining  Whether the application was time barred or not. The  Government  raised  a  preliminary  objection  the application   being   time   barred.   the   reference   was incompetent. The  objection  prevailed,  both  the  District Court and the High Court.      The appellant  contended  that  while  dealing  with  a reference under  s. 14(1)  of the  Hyderabad Act,  the court

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cannot go  into the  question that  the application was time barred under  s. 18(2)  of the and Acquisition Act, 1894 and tbereby refuse to entertain the reference.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD:  (1)  The  power  of  the  Collector  to  make  a reference under  s. 18  is circumscribed  by the  conditions laid down therein. These conditions are matters of substance and  their  observance  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the Collector’s power  of reference.  The  fulfilment  of  these conditions, particularly  the one  regarding limitation  are the conditions,  subject to which the power of the Collector to make  the reference  exists. Therefore, the making of are application for  reference within  the  time  prescribed  by proviso to  s. 18(2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. [269G-H, Z71B, 278FGl      Abdul  Sattar   ‘Sahib  v.   Special   Dy.   Collector, Vizagapatam Harbour  Acquisition,  ILR  47  Mad.  357  (FB); BalKrishna Daji Gupta  v. The Collector,Bom 18-817SCI 79 266 bay Suburban,  ILR 47  Bom.  699;  Jagarnath  Lall  v.  Land Acquisition Dy.  Collector Patna,  ILR Pat. 321; S. G. Sapre v. Collector  Saugar, ILR  1938 Nag. 149; Amar Nath Bhardwaj v. The Governor General in Council, ILR 1941 Lah. 100; Kashi Parshad v.  Notified Area of Mahoba, ILR 54 All 282, Bhagwan Dass Shall  v. First  Land Acquisition  Collector, [1937] 41 CWN 130I,  and Gopi  Nath Shah  v.  first  Land  Acquisition Collector, [1937] 41 CWN 212; approved.      Secy. Of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, ILR 51 All. 96; State of U.P.  v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 All. 556; Panna Lal v. The Collector   of    Etah,   ILR    [l959]    1    All.    628; Venkateshwarasawami v. Sub-Collector, Bezwada, AIR 1943 Mad. 327 and  Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu, ILR [19S8] 1 Punj. 844; over-ruled.      Krishna Das Roy v. Land Acquisition Collector Pabna, 16 CWN 327; Upendra Nath Roy v. Province of Bengal, 45 CWN 792; Leath Elias  Joseph Solomon  v. H.  C. Stork,  38  CWN  844; disapproved.      Pramatha Nath  v. Secretary of State, ILR 57 Cal. 1148; Ezra v. Secretary of State for India ILR 32 Cal. 60S and ILR 30 Cal.  36;  Harish  Chandra  v.  Deputy  Land  Acquisition officer, [1962]  1 SCR 676; and The Administrator General of Bengal v.  The  Land  Acquisition  Collector,  24  Parganas, [1907-8] 12 CWN 241; referred to.      2. Where the tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that  creates it  and that  statute also defines the condition under which the tribunal can function, it is bound to see  that such  statutory conditions  have been  complied with. The  court functioning under the Act, being a tribunal of special  juris-diction, it  us its  duty to  see that the reference made  to it  by the Collector under s. 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein. [279B-C, D]      Even if  a reference  is wrongly  made by the Collector the court will still have to determine its validity, because the very  jurisdiction of  the court  to  hear  a  reference depends on  a proper reference being made under s. l8 and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the court. to  hear the reference. The court has jurisdiction to decide whether  the reference  was made  beyond  the  period prescribed by  the proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 18 of he Act, and if  it finds  that it  was so  made, deoline  to  answer reference. [279EG]      The Queen  v. Commissioner  for Special Purposes of the Income Tax,  LR [1888]  21 QBD  313; Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga

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Prasad, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 733 and Nusserwanfee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan, LR [1855] 6 M.I.A. 134; applied.      Re. Land  Acquisition Act,  ILR 30  Bom.  275;  Sukhbir Singh v.  Secretary of  State,  ILR  49  All.  212;  Mahadeo Krishna v.  Mamlatdar of  Alibag, ILR  1944 Bom.  90; G.  J. Desai v.  Abdul Mazid  Kadri,  AIR  l951  Bom.  156;  A.  R. Banerjee v.  Secy. of  State,  AIR  1937  Cal.  680,  K.  N. Narayanappa Naidu  v. Revenue  Divisional officer  Sivakasi, AIR 195S  Mad. 20;  State of  Rajasthan v.  L. D. Silva, ILR [19S6] 6  Raj. 6S3;  Sheikh Mohommad  v.  Director  of  Agri culture; M.P.,  1966 MPLJ  433; Ramdeval  Singh v.  State of Bihar AIR  1969 Pat.  131; Anthony D’ Silva v. Kerala State, AIR l971  Ker. 51;  Swatantra L. & F. Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Haryana, ILR  [1974] 2  Punj. 7S;  Swami Sukhanand  v. Samaj Sudhar Samiti,  AIR 1962  J &  K 59; and Abdul Sattar v. Mt. Hamida Bibi Pak. L.R. l95O Lah. 568 (FB); approved. 267      State of  Punjab v.  Cst. Qaisar  Jahan  Begam  &  Anr. [1964] SCR  971, and A State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim, [CA No. 2434/1966 decided on . 3-9-1969] referred to.      Secretary of  State v.  Bhagwan Prasad, ILR 52 All. 96; State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 All. 556; Pannalal v. True  Collector   of  Etah,   ILR   11959]   1   All.   628; Venkateswaraswami v.  Sub-Collector, Bezwada,  AIR 1943 Mad. 327; and Hari Krishna Khosla v. State of Pepsu, ILR [1958] 1 Punj. 8S4; over-ruled.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  No.  1926 of1969.      (From the  Judgment and  Decree dated  S 2  68  of  the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 4S1 of 1964).      Shaukat Hussain and Mohd. Mian for the appellant.      R. H. Dhebar and M. N. Shroff for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment  of the  Bombay High  Court, and  it involves  an important question namely, whether a court in dealing with a reference under  s.14, Sub-s.  (1)  of  the  Hyderabad  Land Acquisition Act,  1309 Fasli, corresponding to s. 18, sub-s. (1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894, can  go behind the reference made  by the Collector if the application on which the  reference  has  been  made  is  beyond  the  period  of limitation prescribed therein.      The material  facts giving  rise to  this appeal are as follows: The  case arises  from that  part of  the erstwhile princely State  of Hyderabad,  known  as  Marathwada,  which merged  in   the  State  of  Bombay  under  the  States  Re- organisation Act,  l956. The land belonging to the appellant admeasuring 2057  sq. yards  in the  city of Aurangabad, has been acquired  by the  State Government  under  s.5  of  the Hyderabad Land  Acquisition Act  for the  construction of  a building  for   the  medical   college  at  Aurangabad.  The Government published  a Notification  under s.  3 (1) on the 28th of  February, 1958.  On the  13th of  January, 1962 the Land Acquisition officer, Aurangabad made an award directing payment of Rs. 1,318.11 P. inclusive of 15 per cent solatium as compensation  to the  appellant at the rate of 37 np. per sq. yard,  as against  his claim for payment of compensation at the  rate of  Rs. 10/-  per sq.  yard. The said award was communicated to  the appellant on the 20th of January, 1962. The appellant instead of making an application for reference under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act, filed an application for

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review before  .he Land  Acquisition officer  on the  5th of February, 1962  requesting him ’to revise the award’ stating further that  in case  it was  not revised he would seek his remedy in a court of law’. The Land Acquisition 268 officer obviously  felt that the amount fixed by him was too low and  accordingly on  the 17th  of February,  1962 made a recommendation, through  the Collector,  to the Secretary to the State  Government that  the award  be reconsidered. But, the Collector  by his  order dated  the 23rd  of March, 1962 declined to forward the same and informed the appellant that he must seek his remedy in! a court of law.      Eventually, on the 14th of May, 1962 the appellant made an application  for reference under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act and  prayed that the period spent in the proceedings for the review before the Land Acquisition Officer subsequent to the date  of the  award be  excluded while  considering  the question of  limitation under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. A reference was  made under  section 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act to  the   District  Court   of  Aurangabad.   The  Assistant Collector, Aurangabad, who was the Land Acquisition officer, while making  a reference  made no expression of his opinion whether the  application was  time-barred or  not, evidently taking the  view that  the point  should  be  left  for  the decision  of  the  court.  He,  however,  while  making  the reference gave  a complete  narration of  facts and left the question open.  A preliminary  objection was  raised by  the Government  that   the  reference   was   incompetent,   the application being  time-barred. This objection prevailed and the contention  of the  appellant based  on1 s.  14  of  the Limitation Act was negatived both by the Civil Judge, Senior Division Aurangabad  by his  order dated  the 28th  of June, 1962, and by the High Court of Bombay by its order dated the 5th of  February, 1968  holding that  the time taken between the 5th  of February, 1962 and the 23rd of March, 1962 could not be  excluded while  computing the  period of  limitation prescribed under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act inasmuch as s. 14  of   the  Limitation  Act  was  not  applicable  to  the proceedings, and  further,  that  even  if  it  applied  the appellant was  not entitled  to the  benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act,  stating that  good faith,  which is  also a necessary ingredient under s. 14, was not established.      The learned  Civil Judge  raised an  issue whether  the application for  reference was barred by limitation under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act, and he answered that issue in the affirmative,  and  we  have  no  doubt,  whatever  that  his decision on  that point,  as well  as that of the High Court affirming it,  was right. The application was clearly out of time.      Section  14,   Sub-s.  (1)   of  the   Hyderabad   Land Acquisition Act, 1309 Fasli provides that:           "Every person  interested, who  is displeased with      the Taluqdar’s  award may,  within two  months from the      date of  receiving notice  of the  award, apply  to the      Taluqdar in writing to refer 269      the case  to the  court for  determination, whether his      objection be  to the measurement of the land, or to the      amount of  the compensation,  or to the persons to whom      it  is   payable  or   to  the   apportionment  of  the      compensation among the persons interested."      Section 15,  sub-s. (1)  enjoins that  the Taluqdar  in making the  reference shall forward to the Court a statement in writing,  containing certain particulars. Sub-section (2) there of  provides that  to  the  said  statement  shall  be

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attached a  schedule giving  the particulars  of the notices served upon,  and of  the  statements  in  writing  made  or delivered by the parties interested respectively.      It is  conceded for  our present  purposes that  s. 14, sub-s. (1)  of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act is in pari materia with the provisions of s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  Hence hereinafter reference will be made only to the provisions  contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ’the Act’.      Learned counsel for the appellant rested his submission on the .ground that the court while dealing with a reference under s.  14, sub-s.  (1) of  the Act,  cannot go behind the reference and  decline to  answer it.  The  point  regarding applicability of s. 14 of the Limitation Act was rightly not pressed before us. Nor was any contention raised by him that the application  for review made by the appellant before the Land Acquisition  officer on  the  9th  of  February,  1962, asking him  to revise  the award should, in law, be regarded as an application under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Act.      The short  question that falls for determination in the appeal is  whether the court can go into a question that the application for  reference was  not made  to  the  Collector within the  time prescribed in s. 18, sub-s. (2) of the Land Acquisition Act;  and if  so, can it refuse to entertain the reference if  it finds it to be barred by time. There was at one time  a great  divergence of  judicial  opinion  on  the question. But  almost all  the High  Courts have  now veered round to  the view  that the  court has the power to go into the question  of limitation.  It not  only has the power but also  the  duty  to  examine  whether  the  application  for reference was  in accordance  with law  i.e., whether it was made within  time prescribed under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 18 of the Act or not. The view taken by them is that a Collector’s jurisdiction  is circumscribed by the conditions laid down in s. 18, sub-s. (1), that if he makes a reference even though the application for reference was not in accord 270 ance with  the provisions  of s.  18, the  court acquires no jurisdiction to hear the reference and that it can refuse to hear it if it was made on a time-barred application.      The matter  came up twice before this Court in State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaiser Jehan Begum & Anr.(1) and the State of U.P. v.  Abdul Karim(2)  in which  the conflict  of judicial opinion in  the High  Courts was noticed but not resolved as the Court  in both  the case,s  rested  its  decision  on  a narrower ground  namely that the application for a reference was not  barred by  time. In  Mst. Qaiser Jehan Begum’s case (supra) it was observed:           "In the  view which  We have taken on the question      of limitation,  it is  unnecessary for us to decide the      other question  as to  whether the  civil court,  on  a      reference under  s. 18  of the  Act, can  go  into  the      question of  limitation. We  have al-ready  stated that      there  is  a  conflict  of  judicial  opinion  on  that      question. There  is no  one side  a line  of  decisions      following the  decision of the Bombay High Court in re.      Land Acquisition  Act, which  have held  that the civil      court is  not debarred  from satisfying itself that the      reference which  it is  called upon  to hear is a valid      reference. There  is, on  the other  side,  a  line  of      decisions which  say that the jurisdiction of the civil      court is  confined to  considering and pronouncing upon      any one  of the  four different  objections to an award      under the Act which may have been raised in the written      application for  the reference.  The  decision  of  the

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    Allahabad High  Court in  Secretary of State v. Bhagwan      Prasad is  typical of  this line of decisions. There is      thus a  marked conflict  of  judicial  opinion  on  the      question ’This  conflict, we think, must be resolved in      a more  appropriate case  on a future occasion". In the      case before  us the  question doe6 not really arise and      is merely  academic and  we prefer  not to  decide  the      question in the present case. That question now directly arises.      It is  contended on  behalf of  the  appellant  that  a reference to  the Court  having been  made by the Collector, the court  had no  jurisdiction to  question the validity of that reference and was bound to decide the matter on merits. In support  of this contention certain authorities have been cited to  us, in  which it has been laid down that it is for the  Collector,  and  the  Collec-tor  alone,  to  determine whether to  make a reference under s. 18, sub-s. (1), and if he decides to make a reference, it is not      (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 971.      (2) Civi] Appeal No. 2434 of 1966 decided on 23-9-1969. 271 open  to  the  court  to  go  behind  the  decision  of  the Collector, and  hold  the  reference  to  be  out  of  time. Illustrative of  this line of decisions is that of Allahabad High Court  in Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad(1). That view has  been reiterated by the Full Bench of the same High Court in  the State  of U.P.  v. Abdul  Karim(2) and  in its earlier decision  in Panna  Lal v. The Collector of Etah(3), and the  decisions in  Venkateswaraswami  v.  Sub-Collector, Bezwada(4), Hari Kishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu(5).      Chandravarkar J.  in re  Land Acquisition  Act(6)  held that it  is clear  from section  18 that the formalities are matters of  substance and  their observance  is a  condition precedent to be Collector’s power of reference. He held that the court  is bound  to go  into the  question  whether  the reference under s. 18 was within time. He also held that the court was  not only  entitled, but  bound, to satisfy itself that the  conditions laid  down in  s. 18 have been complied with. In stating the principle, Chandravarkar J. Observed:           "These are  the conditions  prescribed by  the Act      for the  right of  the party  to  a  reference  by  the      Collector  to   come  into   existence.  They  are  the      conditions to  which the power of the Collector to make      the reference  is subject. They are also the conditions      which must  be fulfilled  before  the  court  can  have      jurisdiction to entertain the reference." The principle  laid down  by him in that case was acted upon in Sukhbir  Singh v. Secretary of State(7). In that case the Collector had  made  a  reference,  although  there  was  no application before him as required by s. 18 and the Division Bench held  that being so, there was no valid reference. But in a latter case which came before another Division Bench in Secretary of  State v.  Bhagwan Prasad  (supra), it was held that it  was not  open to the court under s. 18 to go behind the reference,  that it  was for  the  Collector  to  decide whether  the   conditions  justifying  reference  have  been complied with  and if  he thought  that they  had been,  the court was  bound to  answer the  reference. This  view found favour with  a Single  Judge of  the Madras  High  Court  in Venkateswaraswami v.  Sub-Collector Bezwada  (supra)  and  a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State  of Pepsu  (supra). All  these decisions clearly do not lay down good law. (1) ILR 52 All. 96. (2) AIR. 1963 All. 556.

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(3) ILR [1959] 1 All. 628. (4) AIR 1943 Mad. 327. (5) ILR [1958] 1 Punj. 854. (6) I.L.R. 30 Bom. 275, 285, 286 (7) ILR 49 All. 212. 272      In State  of U.P. v. Abdul Karim (supra) the Full Bench of the  Allahabad High  Court, on  its view of the scheme of the Act, declined to follow the decision of Chandavarkar, J. in re  Land Acquisition  Act (supra)  and the  long line  of decisions taking  the same  view. It  preferred to  rest its decision on  the earlier view of its Full Bench in Panna Lal v. The  Collector of  Etah (supra)  and that in Secretary of State v.  Bhagwan prasad  (supra). In  the  light  of  these decisions, it held that the Collector’s jurisdiction to make a reference is not circumscribed by the conditions laid down in s.  18, sub-s.  (1) and (2), that if he makes a reference even  though  the  application  for  reference  was  not  in accordance with  the provisions of s. 18, the court acquires jurisdiction to  hear the  reference,  and  that  it  cannot refuse to  hear it  even if  it was  made or.  a time-barred application. Upon  its view,  it held  that the court has no power to  determine or  consider a question of limitation as its jurisdiction  is strictly  limited by  the terms  of the section as  laid down  by the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath v.  Secretary   of  State(1).   It  further  held  that  the legislature having contemplated the Collector to be an agent of the  Government, as  that is the position assigned to him by the  Privy council  in Ezra  v. Secretary  of  State  for India(2), his  status is  certainly not  changed by the mere fact that  he is required to make a reference under s. 18 if the application  is within prescribed time and complies with certain conditions.  That being  so, even  if the  Collector wrongly decides  that  an  application  is  within  time  or satisfies other conditions, the Government as its principal, may have  a remedy  against him  but was bound by his act so long as  it remains. The act being of the agent is their own and they  are bound by it. The Government cannot, therefore, be permitted  to contend  at the  hearing of  the  reference before the  court that it was illegally made. In view of all this, the Full Bench was of the view that this class of case does  not   fall  within   the  class  of  cases  where  the jurisdiction of  an  inferior  authority  depends  upon  the existence of  a certain state of facts, as indicated by Lord Eshar, M.  R. in  The Queen  v.  Commissioners  for  Special Purposes of the Income-tax(1).      On principle,  apart from authority, it is difficult to accept the  line of  reasoning of  the Allahabad High Court, namely, whatever  might be  the defects and imperfections in the reference  made, once  it is before the court, the court is debarred  from enquiring  into its validity or otherwise. The decision  in Abdul  Karim’s case  (supra) proceeds  on a com- (1) ILR 57 Cal. 1148. (2) ILR 32 Cal. 605. (3) L.R. (1888) 21 QBD 313. 273 plete misunderstanding  of the decision of the Privy Council in Pramatha   Nath  v. Secretary of State (supra), where the Judicial Committee interpreting s. 21 observed:           "Their  Lordships   have   no   doubt   that   the      jurisdiction of  the Courts under this Act is a special      one and  is strictly  limited by  the  terms  of  these      sections. It  only arises when a specific objection has      been taken to the Collector’s award, and it is confined

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    to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it      is ascertained that the only objection taken, is to the      amount of  compensation, that  alone  is  the  "matter"      referred, and  the Court  has no  power to determine or      consider anything beyond it." All that the Privy Council intended to lay down was that the jurisdiction of  the court in dealing with a reference under s. 18 is restricted by the terms of the section, as enjoined by s.  21. That  decision cannot be interpreted to mean that the court  while, hearing  a reference  under s.  18  cannot enquire into  competency or  otherwise of the reference made by the  Collector, i.e., whether the conditions precedent to the exercise  of power  by the Collector, and, therefore, of the  court,   and  in  particular  the  condition  regarding limitation, are fulfilled or not.      In Ezra  v. Secretary  of State  for India  (supra) the Privy Council,  while dealing  with  the  functions  of  the Collector in  making an award under s. 11 laid down that the functions  of   the   Collector   are   not   judicial   but administrative and  all that  he does is to make an offer to the claimants  with regard to the, valuation of the property to be  acquired. In  that  context,  it  did  not  think  it necessary to  repeat the  reasoning of  the  judgment  under appeal where  the sections and the questions as a whole were very satisfactorily stated, and observed:           "The proceedings of the Collector resulting in the      ’award’ are  administrative and not judicial. The award      in which  the enquiry  results  is  merely  a  decision      (binding only  on the collector) as to what sum I shall      be tendered to the owner of the lands and if a judicial      ascertainment is decided by the owner, he can obtain it      by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector      to the Court." These observations,  however, related  to proceedings  under Part II of the Act and not under Part III.      Ameer Ali  and Stephen  JJ., in delivering the judgment under appeal, explained the functions of the Collector under s. 11  in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India(1) where they said: (1) ILR 30 Cal. 36. 274           "throughout the  proceedings the Collector acts as      the  agents   of  Government   for  the   purposes   of      acquisition....He is in a sense of the term, a judicial      officer, nor  is the  proceeding before  him a judicial      proceeding.... he  is not  a Court....  The  Government      .... at  whose instance  the land  is being taken up is      not entitled to demand a reference.. The reason of this      is plain.  The Collector  acts  as  the  agent  of  the      Government.... and  they   are accordingly bound by the      award of their agent.       ...... the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry      and the  valuation of  the land only as an agent of the      Government  and   not  as   a  judicial   officer;  and      ....consequently, although the Government .... is bound      by his  proceedings, the  persons  interested  are  not      concluded by  his finding  regarding the  value of  the      land or the compensation to be awarded."      On the  basis of  the Privy  Council decision in Ezra’s case (supra),  this Court  in Harish  Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition officer(1)  held that the Collector in making an award acts as an agent of the Government, and that the legal character of  the award  made by the Collector was that of a tender or offer by him on behalf of the Government.      The  Allahabad  High  Court  has  read  more  into  the

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decision of the Privy Council in Ezra’s case (supra) than is there. Merely  because the  Collector while  making an award under s.  11 or in serving a notice of the owner of the land under s. 12, acts as an agent of the Government, it does not necessarily imply that while making a reference to the court under s.  18, he  acts in  the capacity  of an  agent of the Government. While  it is  true that  the Collector in making the award under s. 11 acts as an agent of the Government, he in making  a reference  to the  court under  s. 18 acts as a statutory authority.  Section 18,  sub-s.  (1)  of  the  Act entrusts to  the Collector  the statutory  duty of  making a reference on  the fulfilment  of the  conditions  laid  down therein. The  Collector, therefore,  acting under  s. 18, is nothing but  a statutory authority exercising his own powers under the section.      In the  context, we  may advert to the controversy that had arisen  as a  result of  the Privy Council’s decision in Ezra’s  case  (supra)  holding.  that  the  Legislature  had assigned to the Collector the position of an: (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676. 275 agent of  the Government  while making an award under s. 11. The problem that arose was that the claimants were left with no remedy  where the Collector improperly declines to make a reference   although    the   application    fulfilled   the requirements of  s. 18.  In  The  Administrator  General  of Bengal v. The Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas(1) the Calcutta High Court while dealing with the question tried to draw a  distinction between  the functions  of the Collector under Part  Il of  the Act  land that  under Part  III,  and observed:           "It is  admitted that up to and including the time      of making  his award  the Collector  was in  no sense a      judicial officer  and that  the proceedings  before him      were not  judicial  proceedings(Ezra  v.  Secretary  of      State) and  however irregular  his proceedings were, we      cannot interfere with his award made under s. 11 of the      Act.           But when  an application  is made to the Collector      requiring him  to refer  the matter to the Civil Court,      the Collector  may have  to determine  and, it seems to      us, determine  judicially whether the person making the      application was  represented or  not when the award was      made, or  whether a  notice had  been served  upon  the      applicant  under   sec.  12(2)   and  what   period  of      limitation applies and whether the application is under      the circumstances  made within  time.  The  Collector’s      functions  under  Part  III  of  the  Act  are  clearly      distinguishable from  those under  Part II. Part III of      the. Act  relates  to  proceedings  in  Court.  In  our      opinion the  Collector in rejecting the application was      a Court  and acting judicially and his order is subject      to revision  by this  Court. To hold otherwise would be      to give  finality to  an award  under sec.  11 even  in      cases in  which  the  Collector  acts  irregularly  and      contrary  to  law  and  then  refuses  on  insufficient      grounds to  make a reference under Part III of the Act.      The party aggrieved may be left without remedy which is      implied by a judicial trial before the Judge." These observations were no doubt made in a different context but they bear some relevance to the point at issue.      The question at issue was whether the Collector’s order refusing to make a reference could be interfered with by the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or s. 107 of  the Government of India Act, 1919. The Calcutta High

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Court’s view that the Collector’s power was a judicial power and that  the Collector  was a Court subordinate to the High Court was obviously wrong but it persisted in taking (1) (1907-8) 12 CWN 241 276 that view  to obviate  injustice: Krishna  Das Roy  v.  Land Acquisition  Collector,   Pabna;(1)  Upendra   Nath  Roy  v. Province of  Bengal,(2) Leeth  Elias Joseph Solomon v. H. C. Stork(3). The  Calcutta High  Court tried  to  exercise  its supervisory jurisdiction  to  provide  the  subject  with  a remedy. The power of the Collector to make an order under s. 18 was not judicial in nature, nor was the Collector a court subordinate  to  the  High  Court.  The  other  High  Court, therefore, expressly dissented from the view of the Calcutta High Court:  Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatnam Harbour  Acquisition, (4) Balkrishna Daji Gupta v. The Collector, Bombay Suburban,(5) Jagarnath Lall v. Land Acquisition Deputy  Collector,  Patna,(6)  S.  G.  Sapra  v. Collector, Saugar;(7)  Amar Nath  Bhardwaj v.  The  Governor General in  Council,(8) Kashi  Pershad v.  Notified Area  of Mahoba.(9). Even  the Calcutta  High Court later changed its view:  Bhagwan   Das  Shah   v.   First   Land   Acquisition Collector,(10) Gopi  Nath Shah  v.  First  Land  Acquisition Collector.(11)  It  was  held  that  the  functions  of  the Collector under  s. 18  were statutory  or quasi-judicial in nature.      The construction  placed by the Allahabad High Court on s. 18  of the  Act is  not borne  out either  by  the  plain language of  the section  itself or  by accepted principles. The following  observations appear  in  Abdul  Karim’s  case (supra):           "There is  no support for the proposition that the      necessary sine qua non of a reference is an application      for Reference made in accordance with the provisions of      section 18."           "There is no provision. which bars the Collector’s      power to  make a  reference, if  he is inclined to make      one on a time barred application.           "If the  Collector decides to make a reference the      Land Acquisition Court cannot go behind the reference."           "A   Collector   and   a   Collector   alone   has      jurisdiction to make a reference and a reference by him      is not  a nullity merely because it is based on a time-      barred application." (1) 16 CWN 327. (2) 45 C.W.N. 792. (3) 38 C.W.N. 844. (4) I.L.R. 47 Mad. 357 (F.B.) (5) ILR 47 Bom. 699. (6) I.L.R. Pat. 321. (7) ILR (1938) Nag. 149. (8) ILR (1941) Lah. 100 (9) ILR 54 All. 282. (10) (1937) 41 C.W.N. 1301. (11) (1937) 41 C.W.N. 212 277           "The facts  regarding limitation of an application      for reference  are not  required to  be stated  by  the      Collector in  his reference, and indeed he is not bound      to send  the application  along with the reference. All      that the Court has to do on receipt of the reference or      can do  is to  hear it after giving notice of the date.      The word  ’thereupon’ in Section 19 must be interpreted      to mean "as soon as the collector makes a reference and      states for the information of the Court various matters

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    set out in Section 19."           "A District  Judge gets  jurisdiction not from the      Collector but from the receipt of a reference from him.      It  is  the  receipt  of  the  reference  that  confers      jurisdiction upon  him  and  not  any  finding  of  the      Collector."           "The Court  has to  perform a  ministerial act  of      causing a  notice to he given to the objector. There is      no provision  entitling  it  to  examine  the  question      whether  the  Collector’s  order  was  correct  on  the      question of the application having been made within the      prescribed time."           The jurisdiction  of the  Court under the Act is a      special one  and  strictly  limited  by  the  terms  of      section 18  to 21.  It  only  arises  when  a  specific      objection has  been taken to the Collector’s award, and      it is  confined to a consideration of that objection. A      Court undoubtedly  has certain  jurisdiction  over  the      reference,  but  it  does  not  include  any  appellate      jurisdiction over  the  Collector  in  respect  of  the      reference made by him without statutory sanction." It is difficult to subscribe to these propositions which are not warranted by law.      In  his   celebrated   judgment   in   The   Queen   v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (supra) Lord Esher,  M.R., while  dealing with  statutory Tribunals, divided them into two categories, namely:           (i) "When  an inferior  court or  tribunal or body      which has  to exercise  the power of deciding facts, is      first   established   by   Act   of   Parliament,   the      Legislatures has  to consider  what powers it will give      that tribunals or body. It may in effect say that, if a      certain state  of facts  exists and  is shown  to  such      tribunal or  body before  it  proceeds  to  do  certain      things, it  shall have  jurisdiction to do such things,      but  not   otherwise.  There   it  is   not  for   them      conclusively to decide 278      whether  that  state  of  facts  exists,  and  if  they      exercise the  jurisdiction without  its existence, what      they do  may be  questioned, and  it will  be held that      they have acted without jurisdiction.           (ii) The  legislature may  intrust the tribunal or      body  with   a   jurisdiction,   which   includes   the      jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state      of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding      that it  does exist, to proceed further or do something      more. When  the legislature  are  establishing  such  a      tribunal or  body with  limited jurisdiction, they also      have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them,      whether there  shall be any appeal from their decision,      for other wise there will be none."      The law  as enunciated  by Lord Eshar has been accepted by this  Court as  laying down the true principle in Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad (1)      The word  "require" in  s. 18  of the  Act implies.  It carries with  it the idea that the written application makes it incumbent  on the  Collector to  make  a  reference.  The Collector is required to make a reference under s. 18 on the fulfilment of  certain conditions.  The first  condition  is that there  shall be  a  written  application  by  a  person interested who  has  not  accepted  the  award.  The  second condition is  as to the nature of the objection is which may be taken,  and the  third condition is as to the time within which the  application shall  be  made.  The  power  of  the

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Collector  to   make  a   reference  under  s.  18  is  thus circumscribed by  the conditions  laid down therein, and one condition is  the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso.      The conditions  laid down  in s.  18  are  ’matters  of substance and  their observance  is a condition precedent to the Collector’s  power of reference’, as rightly observed by Chandavarkar J.  in re  Land Acquisition Act (supra). We are inclined to  the view that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly  the   one  regarding   limitation,   are   the conditions subject  to which  the power  of the Collector to make the  reference exists. It must accordingly be held that the making  of an  application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to s. 18. Sub-s. (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector.      From these  considerations, it  follows that  the court functioning under  the  Act  being  a  tribunal  of  special jurisdiction, it  is its duty to see that the reference made to it  by the  Collector  under  s.  18  complies  with  the conditions laid  down  therein  so  as  to  give  the  court jurisdiction (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 733. 279 to hear the reference. In view of these principles, we would be extremely  reluctant to  accept the statement of law laid down by  the Allahabad  High Court  in  Abdul  Karim’s  case (supra).      Every tribunal  of limited  jurisdiction  is  not  only entitled but  bound to determine whether the matter in which it is  asked to  exercise its  jurisdiction comes within the limits  of   its  special   jurisdiction  and   whether  the jurisdiction of  such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain  facts or  circumstances. Its  obvious duty is to see that  these facts  and circumstances  exist to invest it with  jurisdiction,   and  where   a  tribunal  derives  its jurisdiction from  the statute  that  creates  it  and  that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function,  it  goes  without  saying  that  before  that tribunal assumes  jurisdiction  in  a  matter,  it  must  be satisfied that  the conditions  requisite for  its acquiring seisin of  that matter  have in  fact arisen. As observed by the  Privy   Council  in   Nusserwanjee  Pestonjee  v.  Meer Mynoodeen Khan,(1) wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an  Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain  specified terms  contained in that Act it is a universal principle  that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise.      If an application is made which is not within time, the Collector will  not have  the power  to make a reference. In order to  determine the limits of his own power, it is clear that  the   Collector  will   have  to  decide  whether  the application presented  by the  claimant is  or is not within time, and  satisfies the conditions laid down in s. 18. Even if a  reference is  wrongly made  by the Collector the court will still  have to  determine the validity of the reference because the  very  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  hear  a reference depends  on a proper reference being made under s. 18, and  if  the  reference  is  not  proper,  there  is  no jurisdiction in  the court to hear the reference. It follows that it  is the  duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid  down in  s. 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference It is ‘ only a  valid reference  which  gives  jurisdiction  to  the

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court, and,  therefore, the  court has  to  ask  itself  the question  whether  it  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the reference.      In deciding  the question  of jurisdiction in a case of reference under  s. 18  by the  Collector to  the court, the court is  certainly not  acting as  a court of appeal; it is only discharging  the elementary  duty of  satisfying itself that a  reference which  it is  called upon  to decide  is a valid and (1) LR (1855) 6 M.I.A. 134. 280 proper reference  according to  the provisions  of  the  Act under which it is made. That is a basic and preliminary duty which  no  tribunal  can  possibly  avoid.  The  court  has, therefore, jurisdiction  to decide whether the reference was made beyond  the period prescribed by the, proviso to sub-s. (2) of  s. 18  of the  Act, and  if it  finds that it was so made, decline to answer reference      Beaumont C. J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench in  Mahadeo Krishna  v. Mamlatdar of Alibag,(1) agreed with the view of Chandavarkar J. and observed:           "It seems to me that the Court is bound to satisfy      itself  that   the  reference  made  by  the  Collector      complies with  the specified  conditions, so as to give      the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It is not      a question  of the  Court sitting in appeal or revision      on the  decision of  the Collector; it is a question of      the Court  satisfying itself  that the  reference  made      under the  Act is  one which it is required to hear. If      the reference  does not  comply with  the terms  of the      Act, then  the Court cannot entertain it. I have myself      some difficulty  in seeing  on what principle the Court      is to  be  debarred  from  satisfying  itself  mat  the      reference, which  it is called upon to hear, is a valid      reference. I  am in  entire  agreement  with  the  view      expressed by Chandavarkar J. that it is the duty of the      Court to  see that  the statutory  conditions have been      complied with."      The same  view has  been reiterated  by almost  all the High Courts  except the Allahabad High Court :G. J. Desai v. Abdul  Mazid   Kadri(2)  A.  R.  Banerjee  v.  Secretary  of State,(3) K.  N. Narayanappa  Naidu  v.  Revenue  Divisional Officer, Sivakasi;(4)  State of  Rajasthan v. L. D’Silva,(5) Sheikh  Mohommad   v.  Director   of   Agriculture,   Madhya Pradesh;(6) Ramdeval  Singh v.  State of  Bihar,(7)  Anthony D’Silva v.  Kerala State;(8)  Swatantra L. & F. Pct. Ltd. v. State of  Haryana,(9) and  Swami Sukhanand  v. Samaj  Sudhar Samiti.(10) This is also the (1) TLR (1944) Bom. 90. (2) AIR’ 1951 Bom 156. (3) A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 680. (4) A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 20. (5) I.L.R. (1956) 6 Raj. 653. (6) 1966 MPLJ 433. (7) A.I.R. 1969 Pat. 131. (8) A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 51. (9) I.L.R. (1974) 2 Punj. 75. (10) A.I.R. 1962 J. & K. 59 281 view expressed  by a  Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Sattar v. Mt. Hamida Bibi.(1)      The view  to a  contrary effect  taken by the Allahabad High court  in Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad (supra), Panna Lal v. The Collector of Etah (supra) and State of U.P. v. Abdul  Karim (supra)  and by a Single Judge of the Madras

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High Court  in Venkateswaraswami  v. Sub- Collector, Bezwada (supra) and  by a  Single Judge  of the Punjab High Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu (supra) clearly do not lay down  good law and these decisions are" therefore, over- ruled.      It is impossible not to feel sorry for the appellant in this case,  who was guilty of almost incredible folly by not filing an  application for reference under s. 14, sub-s. (1) of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1309 Fasli within the time prescribed therein, and is thus precluded from claiming what may  be legitimately due to him by way of compensation. But, the  decision must  depend upon the construction of the section and  the law must take its course. We trust that, as assured by  its counsel, the State Government of Maharashtra will be  generous enough  to consider whether it should make an ex gratia payment to the appellant of a sufficient amount by way  of compensation  which will be Commensurate with the market value  of  the  land  acquired  as  on  the  28th  of February, 1958.  It certainly  was a  piece of  land of some value as it was situate in the city of Aurangabad.      The result, therefore, is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed.  There shall  be no  order as to costs of this appeal and of the courts below. M. R.                                      Appeal dismissed.      (1) Pak L.R. 1950 Lah. 560 (F.B) 19-817SCI/78 282