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PETITIONER: MITHILESH GARG ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/11/1991

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ) KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:  1992 AIR  443            1991 SCR  Supl. (2) 428  1992 SCC  (1) 168        JT 1991 (4)   447  1991 SCALE  (2)1088  CITATOR INFO :  D          1992 SC1888  (13)

ACT: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988/1939:     Sections 71, 72,80,88/47,5 7---Grant of permits--Libera- lised procedure envisaged in the new Act--New permits  irre- spective  of number of persons already in the  route--Rights of existing operators--Whether affected--Different  criteria provided  for  inter-region,  intra-region  and  inter-State permits--Whether  violative of the Constitutional  guarantee under Article 14--Factors to be taken into consideration  by Regional Transport Authority before grant of permit. Constitution of India, 1950:     Articles  14 and 19(1)(g)--Provisions of Motor  Vehicles Act, 1988 Liberalised procedure for issue of  permits--Grant of  more  permits in the same route-Different  criteria  for inter-region,  intra-region and interState  permits--Whether violative of.

HEADNOTE:     These Writ Petitions filed before this Court  challenged the liberalisation for private sector operations in the Road Transport  field,  under the Motor Vehicles Act,  1988.  The petitioners were the existing operators on different routes.     On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that  the issue  of more permits on the same route adversely  affected their  rights  guaranteed under Articles 14 and  19  of  the Constitution of India. It was further contended that  though imposition  of  limit for grant of inter-State  permits  was permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act, it was not so in respect of intra-region permits and hence it is  discrimina- tory;  that  in public interest the  grant  of  intra-region permits should be limited. Dismissing the Writ Petitions, this Court, HELD: 1.1. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the 429 concentration of business in the hands of few persons there- by  giving rise to a kind of monopoly,  adversely  affecting the  public interest. The apprehensions of the  petitioners, that  too  many operators on a route are  likely  to  affect

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adversely the interest of weaker section of the  profession, is without any basis. The transport business is bound to  be ironed-out ultimately by the rational of demand and  supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires  huge investment.  The intending operators are likely to  be  con- scious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number  of vehicles would finally remain in operation  on  a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport  system  in a State is meant for the  benefit  and convenience  of  the  public. The policy  to  grant  permits liberally  under  the new Act is directed towards  the  said goal. [438 A-C].     1.2  The petitioners are in the full enjoyment of  their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article  19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. There is no threat of any kind whatsoever  from  any authority to the  enjoyment  of  their right  to  carry on the occupation of  transport  operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statu- tory  rights.  More operators mean healthy  competition  and efficient  transport system. Over-crowded buses,  passengers standing in the aisle, persons clinging to the bus-doors and even  sitting on the roof-top are some of the common  sights in this country. More often one finds a bus which has  noisy engine,  old upholstery, uncomfortable seats and  continuous emission of blacksmoke from the exhaust pipe. It is,  there- fore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators  on every  route to provide ample choice to the  commuter-public to  board  the  vehicle of their choice  and  patronise  the operator  who is providing the best service. Even  otherwise the  liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination  of corruption  and favouritism in the process of granting  per- mits. [437 EH; 438-A].     Hans  Raj  Kehar & Ors. v. The State of U.P.  and  Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 916, followed.     Jasbhai  Desai v. Roshan Kumar & Ors., [1976] 3 SCR  58; ,Saghir  Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and Ors., [1955]  1  SCR 707, relied on.     Rameshwar  Prasad  & Ors. v. State of  Uttar  Pradesh  & 0rs.[1983] 2 SCC 195, distinguished.   2.  It is only the State which can impose reasonable  res- tric- 430 tions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the  Constitution of  India. Section 47(3) and S7 of the old Act were some  of the  restrictions  which were imposed by the  State  on  the enjoyment  of the right under Article (19)(1)(g) so  far  as the  motor  transport business was concerned. The  said  re- strictions have been taken away and the said provisions have been  repealed from the Statute Book. The new  Act  provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who  intend to enter the motor transport business. The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitu- tion  of India. When the State has chosen not to impose  any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India in  respect  of motor transport business and  has  left  the citizens  to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g)  there can be no cause for complaint. [440 B-D].      3.   The three categories of permit-seekers in  respect of  interegion, intra-region and inter-State permits  cannot be  considered to be belonging to the same class.  Different criteria  have  been  provided under the  Act  for  granting permits in respect of each of the categories. It is not  the case  that  Section 80 brings about  discrimination  in  the matter  of grant of permits between applicants belonging  to the same class. [442-B]

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    Hans  Raj  Kehar & Ors. v. The State of U.P.  and  Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 916, relied on.      4.  Matters such as conditions of roads, social  status of  the  applicants  possibility of  small  operators  being eliminated  by  big operators, conditions of  hilly  routes, fuel  availability and pollution control are supposed to  be within  the comprehension of the transport authorities.  The legislative  policy  under the Act cannot be  challenged  on these  grounds. It is not disputed that the Regional  Trans- port  Authority  has the power under the Act  to  refuse  an application for grant of permit by giving reasons. It is for the  authority to take into consideration all  the  relevant factors  at the time of quasi-judicial consideration of  the applications for grant of permits. The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal  exercise  of. power in granting permits  under  the liberalised policy. [444 D-F]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1345 of 1989. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). 431 WITH     WRIT PETITION (Civil) 1110/89, 869/90, 740/90,  1100/90, 194/91,  195/91,  265/90, 327/91,  337/91,  334/91,  333/91, 330/91,  329/91,  322/91, 432/91,  420/91,  431/91,  573/91, 181/91,  316/91, 381/91, 390/91, 238/91, 686/91,  687/91   & 167/91)     R.K. Garg, R.K.Jain, Govind Mukhoty, Ved Prakash  Gupta, Suresh  Chand  Garg, Ms. Bharti Sharma, Rani  Chhabra,  B.S. Chauhan, Gaurav Jain, N.K. Goel, D.B. Vohra, Ms. Abha  Jain, Vijay  Hansaria,  A.K. Tiwari and C.K. Ratnaparkhi  for  the Petitioners.     Yogeshwar  Prasad,  Mrs. S.Dixit,  G.V.Rao,  A.V.Rangam, B.Parthasarthy and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KULDIP  SINGH, J. The liberalization for private  sector operations  in the Road Transport field - under  Section  80 and  other provisions of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -  has been challenged in these bunch-petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, filed by the existing-operators, primarily on the ground that they have been adversely affected in  the exercise  of  their rights under Articles 14 and 19  of  the Constitution of India.     It  is  necessary  to notice  the  statutory  provisions operating in the field of motor transport business prior  to and  after the coming into force of The Motor Vehicles  Act, 1988 (hereinafter called ’the Act’) The Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939  (hereinafter called ’the old Act was enacted  and  en- forced with the object of having closer control to establish a coordinated system of transport. The subject of  ’Mechani- cally  Propelled  Vehicles’ being in List-Ill of  the  VIIth Schedule  to the Constitution, various amendments were  made from  time  to  time by several  State  Legislatures  either adding to or modifying the provisions of the old Act.  Chap- ter IV of the old Act consisted of sections 42 to 68 provid- ing "control of transport vehicles". Sections 47 and 57,  to the relevant-extent, are re-produced as under:-               "47.Procedure of Regional Transport  Authority               in  considering application for stage  carnage               permit-  (1)  A Regional  Transport  Authority               shall,  in  considering an application  for  a

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             stage  carriage  permit, have  regard  to  the               following matters, namely:-               (a) the interest of the public generally;               (b) the advantages to the public of the  serv-               ice to be provided,               432               including  the  saving of time  likely  to  be               effected  thereby and any convenience  arising               from journeys not being broken;                    (c)  the  adequacy  of  other   passenger               transport  services  operating  or  likely  to               operate in the near future, whether by road or               other means, between the places to be served:                    (d) the benefit to any particular locali-               ty or localities likely to be afforded by  the               service;                    (e)  the  operation by the  applicant  of               other  transport services, including those  in               respect  of  which applications from  him  for               permits are pending;                    (f)  the condition of the roads  included               in the proposed route or area,               and  shall  also take into  consideration  any               representations  made by persons already  pro-               viding  passenger transport facilities by  any               means  along  or near the  proposed  route  or               area,  or  by  any  association   representing               persons  interested in the provision  of  road               transport facilities recognized in this behalf               by  the  State  Government, or  by  any  local               authority  or  police authority  within  Whose               jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or               area lies;  .................               (3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having               regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section               (1),  limit  the  number  of  stage  carriages               generally  or of any specified type for  which               stage  carriage permits may be granted in  the               region  or  in any specified area  or  on  any               specified route within the region.               57.  Procedure  in applying for  and  granting               permits.-  (1) An application for  a  contract               carriage permit or a private carrier’s  permit               may be made at any time.               (2) An application for a stage carriage permit               or a public carrier’s permit shall be made not               less  than six weeks before the date on  which               it  is  desired  that the  permit  shall  take               effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authori-               ty  appoints  dates for the  receipt  of  such               applications, on such dates.               (3)  On receipt of an application for a  stage               carnage  permit or a public carrier’s  permit,               the  Regional Transport Authority  shall  make               the  application available for  inspection  at               the office of the Authority and shall  publish               the application or the sub’               433               stance  thereof in the prescribed  manner  to-               gether with a notice of the date before  which               representation in connection therewith may  be               submitted  and the date, not being  less  than               thirty  days from such publication, on  which,               and the time and place at which, the  applica-               tion and any representations received will  be

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             considered:               Provided  that, if the grant of any permit  in               accordance with the application or with  modi-               fications would have the effect of  increasing               the  number of vehicles operating in  the  re-               gion,  or in any area or any route within  the               region,  under the class Of permits  to  which               the  application  relates,  beyond  the  limit               fixed in that behalf under sub-section (3)  of               Section  47 or sub-section (2) of Section  55,               as  the case may be,, the  Regional  Transport               Authority may summarily refuse the application               without  following the procedure laid down  in               this sub-section.               The old Act was repealed by the Act which came               into  force on July 1, 1989. The Statement  of               Objects  and  Reasons appended to the  Act  is               re-produced as under:-               "The  Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 (4  of  1939),               consolidates and amends law relating to  motor               vehicleS. This has been amended several  times               to keep it up to date. The need was,  however,               felt that this Act should now inter alia, take               into  account also changes in the road  trans-               port  technology,  pattern  of  passenger  and               freight  movements,  development of  the  road               network  in the country and  particularly  the               improved  techniques  in  the  motor  vehicles               management.               2.  Various Committees like National Transport               Policy Committee, National Police  Commission,               Road Safety Committee, Low Powered  Two-wheel-               ers Committee, as also the Law Commission have               gone into different aspects of road transport.               They have recommended updating, simplification               and  rationalisation  of  this  law.   Several               Members  of  Parliament have  also  urged  for               comprehensive  review  of the  Motor  Vehicles               Act, 1939, to make it relevant to the  modern-               day requirements.               3.  A Working Group was, therefore, constitut-               ed  in January, 1984 to review all the  provi-               sions  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and  to               submit  draft  proposals for  a  comprehensive               legislation to replace the existing Act.  This               Working Group took into account the suggestion               and  recommendations earlier made  by  various               bodies and institutions like Central Institute               of Road               434               Transport  Automotive Research Association  of               India,   and  other  transport   organisations               including  the manufacturers and  the  general               public.  Besides, obtaining comments of  State               Governments  on  the  recommendations  of  the               Working  Group,  these  were  discussed  in  a               specially convened meeting of Transport Minis-               ters of all States and Union Territories. Some               of  the more important modifications  so  sug-               gested related for taking care of-               (a)...........................               (b).............................                    (c)  the  greater flow of  passenger  and               freight  with  the least impediments  so  that               islands  of isolation are not created  leading

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             to regional or local imbalances;               (d).........................                    (e)   simplification  of  procedure   and               policy   liberalization  for  private   sector               operations in the road transport field; and               (f).....................               The proposed legislation has been prepared  in               the light of the above background. Some of the               more important provisions of the Bill  provide               for the following matters, namely:-               (a)                                         to               (f)  ....................................                    (g)  liberalized  schemes  for  grant  of               stage  carriage  permits  on  non-nationalized               routes,  all-india  tourist permits  and  also               national permits for goods carriages...               (h) to 1)  .........................     Chapter  V of the Act-substitute for Chapter IV  of  the old  Act consisting of Sections 66 to 96, provides for  ’co- ntrol of transport vehicles’. Sections 71, 72 and 80, to the relevant extent, are reproduced as under:               "71.Procedure of Regional Transport  Authority               in considering application for stage  carriage               permit.  - (1) A Regional Transport  Authority               shall, while considering an application for  a               stage  carriage  permit, have  regard  to  the               objects of this Act:                        Provided that such permit for a route               of  fifty kilometers or less shall be  granted               only  to  an individual or a  State  transport               undertaking.               435               (2)  A  Regional  Transport  Authority   shall               refuse  to grant a stage carnage permit if  it               appears from any time-table furnished that the               provisions  of this Act relating to the  speed               at which vehicles may be driven are likely  to               be contravened:                   Provided  that  before  such  refusal   an               opportunity shall be given to the applicant to               amend  the time-table so as to conform to  the               said provisions.               (3)(a)   The  State Government  shall,  if  so               directed  by  the  Central  Government  having               regard to the number of vehicles, road  condi-               tions and other relevant matters, by notifica-               tion  in the Official Gazette, direct a  State               Transport  Authority and a Regional  Transport               Authority  to limit the number of  stage  car-               riages generally or of any specified type,  as               may  be fixed and specified in  the  notifica-               tion, operating on city routes in towns with a               population    of    not   less    than    five               lakhs.....................               (4)  A Regional Transport Authority shall  not               grant more than five stage carriage permits to               any individual or more than ten stage carriage               permits  to  any company (not  being  a  State               transport undertaking).               (5)  In computing the number of permits to  be               granted  under  sub-section (4),  the  permits               held by an applicant in the name of any  other               persons and the permits held by any company of               which such applicant is a director shall  also               be taken into account.

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             72.  Grant  of stage carriage  permits  -  (1)               Subject  to  the provisions of Section  71,  a               Regional Transport Authority may, on an appli-               cation  made to it under Section 70,  grant  a               stage  carriage permit in accordance with  the               application  or with such modifications as  it               deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit:                   Provided  that  no such  permit  shall  be               granted  in respect of any route or  area  not               specified in the application.               80.  Procedure  in applying for  and  granting               permits, - (1) An application for a permit  of               any kind may be made at any time.               (2)  A Regional Transport Authority shall  not               ordinarily refuse to grant an application  for               permit of any kind made at any time under this               Act:                   Provided   that  the  Regional   Transport               Authority may summarily refuse the application               if the grant of any permit in               436                 accordance  with the application would  have               the  effect of increasing the number of  stage               carriages as fixed and specified in a  notifi-               cation  in the Official Gazette  under  clause               (a)  of  sub-section (3) of section 71  or  of               contract carriages as fixed  and specified  in               a  notification in the Official Gazette  under               clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 74:                 Provided  further  that  where  a   Regional               Transport Authority refuses an application for               the  grant of a permit of any kind under  this               Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing               its reasons for the refusal of the same and an               opportunity of being heard in the matter."       A comparative-reading of the provisions of the Act and the  old Act make it clear that the procedure for  grant  of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for asking  irre- spective  of the number of operators already in  the  field. Under Sections 57 read with Section 47(1) of the old Act  an application  for a stage carnage permit was to be  published and kept for inspection in the office of the Regional Trans- port  Authority  so that the existing operators  could  file representations/objections against the said application. The application,  along  with  objections, was  required  to  be decided in a quasi-judicial manner, Section 47(3) of the old Act  further permitted the imposition of limit on the  grant of permits in any region, area or on a particular route.  It is  thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV  "con- trol of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under:               1.  The applications for grant of permits were               published  and  were  made  available  in  the               office of the Regional Transport Authority  so               that the existing operators could file  repre-               sentations;               2.   The  applications for  grant  of  permits               along  with  the representations  were  to  be               decided in quasi judicial manner; and               3.   The Regional Transport Authority  was  to               decide  the applications for grant of  permits               keeping  in  view the criteria  laid  down  in               section  47(1)  and also keeping in  view  the               limit fixed under Section 47(3) of the Act. An               application  for  grant of permit  beyond  the

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             limited  number fixed under Section 47(3)  was               to be rejected summarily.      The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Section 47 and 57 of  the  old Act has been completely done away with  by  the Act. The right of existing- 437 operators  to  file objections and the provision  to  impose limit  on the number of permits have been taken away.  There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under  the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of  the Act  shows  that the purpose of bringing in the Act  was  to liberalize  the grant of permits. Section 71(1) of  the  Act provides  that while considering an application for a  stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall  have regard  to the objects of the Act. Section 80(2),  which  is the  harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that  a  Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant  an application  for permit of any kind made at any  time  under the  Act. There is no provision under the Act like  that  of Section  47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit  for  the grant  of  permits  can be fixed under the  Act.  There  is, however,  a  provision under Section 71(3) (a)  of  the  Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having popula- tion of more than five lakhs.     The petitioners are existing stage-carnage operators  on different routes. They hold permits granted by the  Regional Transport  Authorities concerned. Mithlesh Garg,  petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1345/89 has stated that he  holds a  stage  carnage  permit  and plies  his  vehicles  on  the Meerut-Parikshitgarh-Hasifabad-Laliana  and  allied   routes under the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport  Authority, Meerut.  According  to him prior to the enforcement  of  the Act, 23 permit-holders were operating on the said route  but thereafter  under Section 80 of the Act the Regional  Trans- port  Authority, Meerut has issued 272 more permits  in  re- spect  of the same route. Similar facts have been stated  in the other writ petitions. As mentioned above the petitioners are  permit  holders and are existing  operators.  They  are plying  their vehicles on the routes assigned to them  under the permits. They are in the full enjoyment of their  funda- mental  right guaranteed to them under Article  19(1)(g)  of the  Constitution of India. There is no threat of  any  kind whatsoever  from  any authority to the  enjoyment  of  their right  to  carry on the occupation of  transport  operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statu- tory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new  operators from coming in the field as competitors. We see no  justifi- cation  in  the  petitioners’  stand.  More  operators  mean healthy-competition  and efficient transport  system.  Over- crowded  buses,  passengers standing in the  aisle,  persons clinging  to the bus-doors and even sitting on the  roof-top are  some of the common sights in this country.  More  often one  finds  a  bus which has noisy  engine,  old  upholstry, uncomfortable  seats and continuous emission of  black-smoke from  the  exhaust pipe. It is,  therefore,  necessary  that there  should be plenty of operators on every route to  pro- vide ample choice to the commuter-public to board the  vehi- cle of their choice and patronize the operator who is 438 providing  the  best  service. Even  otherwise  the  liberal policy  is likely to help in the elimination  of  corruption and  favouritism  in the process of  granting  permits.  Re- stricted  licensing under the old Act led to the  concentra-

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tion of business in the hands of few persons thereby  giving rise  to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the  public interest.  The  apprehensions of the petitioners,  that  too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession, is without any basis.  The  transport business is bound  to  be  ironed-out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of  a vehicle  being as it is the business requires  huge  invest- ment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious  of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles  would finally remain in operation on a  particular route as are economically viable. In any case the  transport system  in a state is meant for the benefit and  convenience of  the public. The policy to grant permits Liberally  under the  Act is directed towards the said goal. The  petitioners who  are  already  in the business want to  keep  the  fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy  compe- tition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the  trade. This Court in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar & Ors., [1976] 3 S.C.R.  58 posed the following questions for its  determina- tion:-               "Whether  the proprietor of a  cinema  theater               holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph               films,  is entitled to invoke  the  certiorari               jurisdiction  ex  debito justitiae  to  get  a               ’No-Objection Certificate’, granted under Rule               6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short,               the  Rules)  by  the  District  Magistrate  in               favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and               quashed  on the ground that it suffers from  a               defect  of  jurisdiction,  is  the   principal               question  that falls to be determined in  this               appeal by special leave."                   Sarkaria,  J. speaking for the  Court  an-               swered the question in the following words:-               "In  the light of the above discussion, it  is               demonstrably clear that the appellant has  not               been  denied or deprived of a legal right.  He               has  not sustained injury to any legally  pro-               tected  interest. In fact the  impugned  order               does  not operate as a decision  against  him,               much less does it wrongfully affect his  title               to  something. He has not been subjected to  a               legal  wrong. He has suffered no legal  griev-               ance.  He has no legal peg for  a  justiciable               claim  to hang on......  While  a  Procrustean               approach  should  be avoided, as  a  rule  the               Court should not interfere at               439               the  instance of ’stranger’ unless  there  are               exceptional  circumstances involving  a  grave               miscarriage  of  justice  having  an   adverse               impact on public interests. Assuming that  the               appellant is a ’stranger’, and not a busybody,               then  also, there are no  exceptional  circum-               stances in the present case which would justi-               fy  the issue of a writ of certiorari  at  his               instance.  On the contrary, the result of  the               exercise of these discretionary powers, in his               favour,  will, on balance, be  against  public               policy. It will eliminate healthy  competition               in  this  business which is  so  essential  to               raise  commercial  morality; it will  tend  to               prepetuate the appellant’s monopoly of  cinema               business in the town; and above all, it  will,

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             in  effect, seriously injure  the  fundamental               rights  of respondents 1 & 2, which they  have               under  Article 19(1) (g) of the  Constitution,               to  carry  on  trade or  business  subject  to               ’reasonable restrictions’ imposed by law.  The               instant case fails well-nigh within the  ratio               of the this Court’s decision in Rice and Flour               Mills v. N.T. Gowda, wherein it was held  that               a  rice  mill-owner  has no  locus  standi  to               challenge under Article 226, the setting up of               a  new  rice-mill  by   another-even  if  such               setting up be in contravention of S. 8(3)  (c)               of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act,               1958 because no right vested in such an appli-               cant  is  infringed.  For  all  the  foregoing               reasons, we are of opinion that the  appellant               had  no  locus standi to invoke  this  special               jurisdiction under article 226 of the  Consti-               tution.  Accordingly, we answer  the  question               posed at the commencement of this judgment, in               the negative."     We, therefore, see on justification for the  petitioners to  complain  against the liberalised policy  for  grant  of permits under the Act.    Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India  guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession, or  to carry  on any occupation, trade or business subject to  rea- sonable  restrictions  imposed by the  State  under  Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and  Others, [1955]  1 S.C.R. 707 held that the fundamental  right  under Article 19(1)(g) entitles, any member of the public to carry on  the business of transporting passengers with the aid  of the  vehicles. Mukerjea, J. speaking for the Court  observed as under:               "Within  the limits imposed by  State  regula-               tions  any member of the public can ply  motor               vehicles  on a public road. To that extent  he               can also carry on the business of transporting               passen-               440               gers  with the aid of the vehicles. It  is  to               this carrying on of the trade or business that               the guarantee in article 19(1)(g) is attracted               and a citizen can legitimately complain if any               legislation takes away or curtails that  right               any more than is permissible under clause  (6)               of that article." It is thus a guaranteed fight of every citizen whether  rich or poor to take up and carry on, if he so wishes, the  motor transport  business. It is only the State which can   impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the  Constitution of India. Section 47(3) and 57 of the  old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by  the State  on the enjoyment of the fight under Article  19(1)(g) so  far as the motor transport business was  concerned.  The said restrictions have been taken away and the provisions of Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed  from the  Statute Book. The Act provides liberal policy  for  the grant  of  permits to those who intend to  enter  the  motor transport  business. The provisions of the Act are  in  con- formity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of  India. The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the Parlia- ment has undone. When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of india

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in  respect  of motor transport business and  has  left  the citizens  to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g)  there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners.     On  an earlier occasion this Court dealt  with  somewhat similar situation. The Uttar Pradesh Government amended  the old Act by the Motor Vehicle (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1972  and inserted Section 43A. The new Section 43-A apart from making certain changes in Section 47 of the old A Act also  omitted sub-section  (3) of Section 47 of the old Act)  Section  43A provided that in the case of non nationalised routes, if the State  Government  was of the opinion that it  was  for  the public interest to grant permits to all eligible  applicants it  might, by notification in the official gazette  issue  a direction accordingly. The necessary notification was issued with  the  result  that the transport  authorities  were  to proceed to grant permits as if sub-section (3) of section 47 was omitted and there was no limit for the grant of  permits on  any specified route within the region. Section 43-A  and the  consequent notification was challenged by the  existing operators  before the Allahabad High Court. The  High  Court dismissed  the writ petitions. On appeal this Court in  Hans Raj  Kehar  & Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Ors.,  [1975]  2 S.C,R. 916 dismissed the appeal. Khanna, J.speaking for  the Court held as under;-               "It hardly need much argument to show that the               larger number of buses operating on  different               routes would be for the conven-               441               ience and benefit of the travelling public and               as  such would be in the public interest.  Any               measure  which  results in  larger  number  of               buses operating on various routes would neces-               sarily eliminate or in any case minimise  long               hours  of waiting at the bus stands. It  would               also relieve congestion and provide for  quick               and  prompt transport service. Good  transport               service is one of the basic requirements of  a               progressive  society. Prompt and quick  trans-               port service being a great boon for those  who               travel, any measure which provides for such an               amenity is in the very nature of things in the               public interest.................  The  conten-               tion that the impugned notification is  viola-               tive  of  the rights of the  appellants  under               article 19(1)(f) or (g) of the Constitution(is               equally  devoid of force. There is nothing  in               the  notification  which prevents  the  appel-               lants from acquiring, holding and disposing of               their property or prevents them from  practis-               ing  any  profession or from carrying  on  any               occupation,  trade or business. The fact  that               some  others have also been enabled to  obtain               permits for running buses cannot constitute  a               violation of the appellants’ rights under  the               above two clauses of article 19 of the Consti-               tution. The above provisions are not  intended               to  grant  a  kind of monopoly to  a  few  bus               operators  to the exclusion of other  eligible               persons. No right is guaranteed to any private               party  by  article 19 of the  Constitution  of               carrying on trade and business without  compe-               tition from other eligible persons. Clause (g)               of article 19(1) gives a right to all citizens               subject  to  article  19(6)  to  practise  any               profession  or  to carry  on  any  occupation,

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             trade or business. It is an enabling provision               and  does not confer a right on those  already               practising  a  profession or carrying  on  any               occupation,  trade or business to exclude  and               debar fresh eligible entrants from  practising               that  profession  or  from  carrying  on  that               occupation, trade or business. The said provi-               sion  is not intended to make any  profession,               business or trade the exclusive preserve of  a               few  persons.  We, therefore,  find  no  valid               basis for holding that the impugned provisions               are violative of article 19".     The identical situation has been created by Sections 71, 72  and 80 of the Act by omitting the provisions of  Section 47(3) of the old Act. It has been made easier for any person to obtain a stage carriage permit under the Act. The  attack of the petitioner on Section 80 on the ground of Article  19 has squarely been answered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar’s case (supra).     It has been contended in the writ petitions that differ- ent  yard-sticks have been provided for interregion,  intra- region and inter-State permits 442 under  the Act. According to the petitioners the  imposition of  limit  for grant of inter-State permits  is  permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act whereas no such limit can  be imposed  in respect of intra-region permits. The  contention is that the provisions are discriminatory and are  violative of  article  14  of the Constitution of India.  We  are  not impressed  by the argument. The three categories of  permit- seekers  cannot  be considered to be belonging to  the  same class.  Different criteria have been provided under the  Act for  granting permits in respect of each of the  categories. It is nobody’s case that Section 80 brings about discrimina- tion  in the matter of grant of permits  between  applicants belonging  to the same class. The argument on the ground  of Article  14 is thus wholly untenable and is  rejected.  This question  also  came for consideration in Hans  Raj  Kehar’s case  (supra) and this Court rejected the contention in  the following words:-               "Argument  has  also been  advanced  that  the               deletion  of  Section  47(3)  would  have  the               effect of removing the limit on the number  of               permits for intra-region routes but that  fact               would  not prevent the imposition of  a  limit               for  the  number of permits  for  inter-region               routes. This argument has been advanced in the               context of the case of the appellants that the               impugned provisions discriminate in the matter               of issue of permits for intraregion routes and               those for inter-region routes and as such  are               violative  of article 14 of the  Constitution.               We  are not impressed by this argument for  we               find no valid basis for the inference that  if               there  is no limit on the number  _of  permits               for intra-region routes,limit on the number of               permits  for interregional routes would’  have               to  be  imposed. The object  of  the  impugned               notification  is  to liberalise the  issue  of               permits  and we fail to see as to how  such  a               liberal measure can have the effect of  intro-               ducing strictness or stringency in the  matter               of  grant of permits for inter-region  routes.               Assuming  that a different rule is  applicable               in  the  matter of  inter-region  routes,  the

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             differentiation   is  based  upon   reasonable               classification.  It is nobody’s case that  the               impugned provision brings about discrimination               in  the  matter of grant  of  permits  between               applicants  belonging to the same  class.  The               argument  about the impugned  provision  being               violative of article 14 is wholly trotenable."     The  learned  counsel  for the  writ  petitioners,  have relied  upon  a later decision of this  Court  in  Rameshwar Prasad  & Ors., v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,  [1983]  2 S.C.C.  195  and have contended that the  decision  of  this Court in Hans Raj Kehars case (supra) no longer holds the 443 field.  There is no force in the contention. This  Court  on two  occasions  interpreted the old Act as  amended  by  the State of Uttar Pradesh at the relevant times. The provisions of law which were interpreted in Hans Raj Kehar’s case  were entirely  different than those which were before this  Court in Rameshwar Prasad’s ease. The legal position with which we are faced in these writ petitions is almost similar to  that which was considered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar’s case. What  happened in the State of Uttar Pradesh was that  after the U.P. Amendment of 1972 to the old Act, which was subject matter  of  interpretation  before this Court  in  Hans  Raj Kehars ease, it was found that certain anomalies had arisean in  the working of the liberal policy of  granting  permits. With  a  view to remedy the situation the  U.P.  Legislature amended the old Act again by the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 permit- ting  imposition  of limit on the number of  permits  to  be issued. In spite of the restrictions on grant of permits  as provided  in  the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 the  State  Government issued  notifications  permitting grant of  permits  to  all eligible applicants without any upper limit. This Court held in Ratneshwar Prasad’s ease that the said notifications were inconsistent with the limitation as to the number of permits introduced  by the U.P. Amending Act 1976 and as  such  were bad in law. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) speaking  for the Court in Rameshwar Prasad’s ease observed as under:               "We may here state that any observations  made               in  Hans Raj Kehar case would be  inapplicable               so far as these cases presently before us  are               concerned.  In  that case the court  was  con-               cerned with sub-section (2) of Section 43-A of               the Act as it stood then which was a provision               enacted  by the legislature. That  sub-section               provided that without prejudice to the  gener-               ality  of the power contained in  Section  43-               A(1) of the Act where the State Government was               of  opinion that it was in public interest  to               grant  stage carriage permits (except  in  re-               spect  of  routes or areas for  which  schemes               have  been  published under Section  68-C)  or               contract  carriage permits or  public  carrier               permits  to  all eligible  applicants  it  may               issue appropriate directions as stated  there-               in. That sub-section contained a clear  legis-               lative  policy  which  considered  that  there               could  be no public prejudice if all  eligible               applicants   were  granted  permits.   Without               saying  anything more on the point, it may  be               slated  that  whatever  this  court  may  have               observed  while  considering  that   provision               would not apply now as there is a clear depar-               ture made by the legislature from that  policy               when  it  enacted the new sub-section  (2)  of

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             Section 43-A."     It is thus obvious that the reliance by the  petitioners on  the  ratio and observations of this Court  in  Rameshwar Prasad’s case is wholly mis- 444 placed.  The  Parliament has, under the Act,  made  a  clear departure  from the policy and has reverted to the  position which was before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar’s case.     Relying  on  Rameshwar  Prasad’s  case  the  petitioners contend  that it is in ’public interest’ to limit the  grant of permits on intra-region routes and while fixing the limit various factors indicated by this Court in the said case are to be taken into consideration. We do not agree. The concept of public interest, in relation to motor transport business, as  propounded by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad’s case  was only  in the context of the old Act as amended by  the  U.P. Act.  We  are  of the view that the  Act  having  brought-in complete  change  in  the policy of  granting  permits,  the observations  of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad’s  case  are not  relevant in the present context. The provisions of  law for consideration before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar’s case were almost similar to Section 80 of the Act. We are, there- fore, bound by the law laid down by the four-Judges Bench of this Court in Hans Raj Kehar’s case.     The  petitioners have further contended that the  condi- tions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, condi- tions  of  hilly  routes, fuel  availability  and  pollution control are some of the important factors which the Regional Transport  Authority  is bound to  take  into  consideration while  taking  a  decision on an application  for  grant  of permit.  These  are  the matters which are  supposed  to  be within  the comprehension of the transport authorities.  The legislative  policy  under the Act cannot be  challenged  on these  grounds. It is not disputed that the Regional  Trans- port  Authority  has the power under the Act  to  refuse  an application for grant of permit by giving reasons. It is for the  authority to take into consideration all  the  relevant factors  at the time of quasi-judicial consideration of  the applications for grant of permits. The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal  exercise  of power in granting  permits  under  the liberalised policy.     We,  therefore, see no force in any of  the  contentions raised  by the petitioners and as such we dismiss  the  writ petitions. The parties are left to bear their own costs. G.N.                                        Petitions   dis- missed. 445