REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   941    OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6759 of 2008)

Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and others …. Appellants

Versus

State of Gujarat …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

S, B. SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

1. Whether with the change of an investigating authority, police custody  

of the accused on remand can be sought for,  although cognizance of the  

offence had already been taken, is the question involved herein.   

2. It arises out of a judgment and order dated 5th September, 2009 passed  

by  the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad  in  Criminal  Revision  

Application No.482 of  2008 setting aside an order  dated 23rd May,  2008

passed  by  the  learned  Second Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Himatnagar  in  

Sessions Case No.70 of 2002.   

3. Shorn of all unnecessary details the fact of the matter is as under :-

Appellants had been prosecuted for commission of an offence under  

Sections  302/307/395/396/397/201/435/324/143/147/148/149/153-A/341/  

337/427 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 135 of  

the Bombay Police Act.   

4. The  occurrence  in  which  the  appellant  is  involved  is  said  to  have  

taken place on 20th August, 2002 at Vadvasa Patia Village near Prantij.  A  

first  information report  was lodged on the same date.   During course of  

investigation all the six appellants were arrested.   

5. Indisputably, they were remanded to police custody in terms of sub-

section  (2)  of  Section  167  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’).   Upon completion of investigation, a  

charge sheet  was  submitted.   The matter  was  committed  to  the  Sessions  

Court.  Cognizance of the offence was taken by the Sessions Judge.  They  

were granted bail by the High Court by an order dated 30th August, 2003.  

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6. The matter,  however, came up before this Court.   A Bench of this  

Court by an order dated 26th March, 2008 passed by in Writ Petition (Crl.)  

No. 109 of 2003 appointed a Special Investigation Team.  Pursuant to or in  

furtherance of the said direction the State of Gujarat issued a Notification on  

1st April, 2008 constituting a Special Investigation Team to investigate into  

cases arising out of Godhra incident and communal riots erupted thereafter  

in the year 2002.   

In terms of the said Notification the SIT could work out the modalities  

and  the  norms  required  to  be  followed  for  the  purpose  of  

inquiry/investigation including further investigation.    

7. An  application  was  filed  on  or  about  22nd May,  2008  by  one  

Himanshu Shukla, Assistant Superintendent of Police, seeking remand of the  

accused for a period of 14 days.  The reasons assigned therefor were that that  

offences under some provisions were added and investigation with respect to  

the  said  offences  from the  accused  could  not  be  carried  out  therefor  in  

respect of certain points mentioned therein.  

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8. By reason of  a judgment  and order  dated 23rd May,  2008 the said  

application  was  rejected  by  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  relevant  portion  

whereof which reads as under:-

“….However at present, this Court cannot entrust  the  physical  custody  of  accused  to  the  Special  Investigation  Team  for  custodial  interrogation  because  in  the  presence  offence,  the  Hon’ble  Gujarat High Court had granted regular bail vide  Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4115/2002  dated 30/08/2002 and in that  bail  order  imposed  certain  conditions.   Hence  without  getting  cancelled  the  said  regular  bail  granted  by  the  Hon’ble High Court, this court cannot grant Police  remand as the present accused are on bail, hence  first of all Special Investigation Team is required  to resort the Hon’ble High Court for cancellation  of  said  bail  order  for  Police  custody  for  the  purpose of further investigation as directed by the  Hon’ble Highest Court of our Land.

14. Therefore,  applicant-member  of  Special  Investigation  Team  directed  to  approach  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  to  set  aside/cancel  the  said  regular  bail  order  passed  by  the  Hon’ble  High  Court.

15. It is pertinent to note that Police remand can  be granted only by the committal court.  Therefore,  after getting cancellation of bail order, applicant- member  of  Special  Investigation  Team  is  also  directed to first of all approach the learned Judicial  Magistrate First Class Prantij-committal  court for  Police  custody  in  the  present  case  because  this  court  is  a Sessions Court not competent  to grant  remand  order  unless  and  until  that  prayer  is  rejected by Magistrate.”  

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9. Respondent  preferred a  revision application  thereagainst  before  the  

High Court.  By reason of the impugned judgment the High Court reversed  

the  decision  of  the  Sessions  Judge  and  directed  that  the  appellants  be  

remanded to custody.  

10. Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants  

would  contend that  having regard  to  the  provisions  contained in  Section  

167(2) as well Section 309(2) of the Code the impugned judgment cannot be  

sustained.   

11. Ms.  K.  Enatoli  Sema,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent-State, on the other hand, urged that keeping in view the special  

facts and circumstances of this case, the order of the High Court should not  

be interfered with.

12. The short question which arises for consideration is whether in the  

facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was correct in directing  

custodial remand of the appellants.

13. The High Court in support of its order opined :

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a) Having regard to the constitution of the Special Investigating  

Team, further investigation is required to be made and Section  

167(2) of the Code gives ample power for further investigation.  

b) Further  investigation is  required to be made in the facts  and  

circumstances of the case as earlier investigation was carried  

out in a most perfunctory manner.

c) Since  new  sections  are  added,  further  enquiry/investigation  

would  be  required  to  be  conducted  in  the  matter  and  the  

investigating agency cannot be denied such a right and to have  

the custody of the appellants.  For the said purpose, the fact that  

the appellants had been granted bail would be of no relevance.  

d) Section 167 (2) and not the proviso appended to Section 309 (2)  

of the Code would be applicable in a case of this nature.

e) As  the  Special  Investigating  Team  has  the  power  to  

reinvestigate, it is not necessary to seek for cancellation of bail.

f) The committal  order  having been passed,  the Sessions Judge  

should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 397 of the  

Code.

14. By an order dated 22nd September, 2008 this Court directed as under :-

“ Application for exempting from filing O.T.  is allowed.   

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Issue notice.

Till  further  orders,  further  investigation by  Special  Investigation  Team  may  proceed.  However, the petitioner may be summoned by the  Special  Investigation  Team  appointed  by  this  Court on the days fixed by it  without taking the  petitioners  into  custody  and  their  interrogation  shall be done only during day time.  One or more  members  of the Special  Investigation Team only  would interrogate the petitioners and nobody else.”  

15. It is stated at the Bar that pursuant to the said order appellants had  

appeared  before  the  concerned  Sessions  Judge  as  also  the  Special  

Investigating  Team.   They  had  visited  Police  Station,  Prantij  on  13th  

September,  2008  and  submitted  a  written  representation  expressing  their  

willingness  to  cooperate  with  the  further  investigation  by  the  Special  

Investigating Team but they were not examined.    Their presence, however,  

was  required  on  14th September,  2008  wherefor  a  letter  dated  12th  

September,  2008  was  sent  by  fax  on  13th September,  2008.   Appellants  

appeared before the Sessions Judge and the on 14th September, 2008 and the  

matter  was  adjourned  to  22nd September,  2008.   They  visited  the  police  

station also on 14th and 15th September, 2008.

 16. This Court while passing the order in exercise of its jurisdiction under  

Article 32 of Constitution of India did not direct re-investigation.  This court  

exercised  its  jurisdiction  which  was  within  the  realm  of  the  Code.  

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Indisputably the investigating agency in terms of sub-section (8) of Section  

173 of the Code can pray before the Court and may be granted permission to  

investigate into the matter further.  There are, however, certain situations,  

where such a formal request may not be insisted upon.   

17. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’ and ‘re-

investigation’ stand on different footing.  It may be that in a given situation a  

superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely under Articles  

226 and 32 of  the  Constitution  of  India  could direct  a  ‘State’  to  get  an  

offence  investigated  and/or  further  investigated  by  a  different  agency.  

Direction of a re-investigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior  

could would ordinarily issue such a direction.  

Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar, [(2008) 5 SCC 413],  

opined as under :-

“7.  At this juncture it would be necessary to take  note  of  Section  173  of  the  Code.  From a  plain  reading of the above section it is evident that even  after completion of investigation under sub-section  (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police has right  to further investigate under sub-section (8), but not  fresh investigation or reinvestigation…”

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18. A distinction, therefore, exists between a re-investigation and further  

investigation.   

19. If the investigating authority, in terms of the provisions of the Code,  

could not ask for re-investigation, we would have to proceed on the basis  

that  this  Court  in  its  order  dated  26th March,  2008 only  directed  further  

investigation.  

20. We may notice that this aspect of the matter has also been considered  

by this Court in  Nirmal Singh Kahlon  v.  State of Punjab, [ (2009) 1 SCC  

441 ], wherein it has been opined :-

“63. The  High  Court  in  this  case  was  not  monitoring any investigation.  It only desired that  the  investigation  should  be  carried  out  by  an  independent agency.  Its anxiety, as is evident from  the  order  dated  3-4-2002,  was  to  see  that  the  officers of the State do not get away.  If that be so,  the submission of Mr. Rao that the monitoring of  an  investigation  comes  to  an  end  and  after  the  charge-sheet is filed, as has been held by this Court  in  Vineet Narain   and  M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor  Scam) v.  Union of India, loses all significance.”  

21. The  investigating  agency  and/or  a  court  exercise  their  jurisdiction  

conferred on them only in terms of the provisions of the Code.  The courts  

subordinate to the High Court even do not have any inherent power under  

Section  482 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  or  otherwise.   The  pre-

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cognizance jurisdiction to remand vested in the subordinate courts, therefore,  

must  be  exercised  within  the  four-corners  of  the  Code.   The  power  to  

remand, indisputably, is vested in a Magistrate in terms of sub-section (2) of  

Section 167 of the Code which reads as under :-

“167.  Procedure  when  investigation  cannot  be  completed in twenty-four hours.

(1) …. ….

(2) The Magistrate to whom all accused person is  forwarded under this section may, whether he has  or  not  jurisdiction  to  try  the  case,  from time  to  time, authorise the detention of the accused in such  custody as such Magistrate thinks fit,  a term not  exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has  no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial,  and  considers  further  detention  unnecessary,  he  may  order  the  accused  to  be  forwarded  to  a  Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that-

(a) The Magistrate may authorize the detention of  the accused person, otherwise than in the custody  of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if  he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing  so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention  of  the  accused  person  in  custody  under  this  paragraph for a total period exceeding-

(i) Ninety days, where the investigation relates to  an  offence  punishable  with  death,  imprisonment  for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than  ten years;

(ii)  Sixty days,  where the investigation relates to  any other offence,

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And,  on  the  expiry  of  the  said  period  of  ninety  days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused  person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to  and does furnish bail, and every person released on  bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be to  released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII  for the purposes of that Chapter;

(b) No Magistrate shall authorize detention in any  custody  under  this  section  unless  the  accused  is  produced before him;

(c) No Magistrate of the second class, not specially  empowered in this behalf by the high Court, shall  authorize detention in the custody of the police.

Explanation I.  For the avoidance of  doubts,  it  is  hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of  the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused  shall be detained in Custody so long as he does not  furnish bail.

Explanation II.  If any question arises whether an  accused  person  was  produced  before  the  Magistrate  as  required  under  paragraph  (b),  the  production of the accused person may be proved  by  his  signature  on  the  order  authorizing  detention.”

22. The power of remand in terms of the aforementioned provision is to  

be exercised when investigation is not complete.  Once charge-sheet is filed  

and cognizance of the offence is taken, the court cannot exercise its power  

under sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code.  Its power of remand can  

then be exercised in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 309 which reads as  

under :-

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“309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.

(1) …. ….   (2)  If  the  court  after  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence,  or  commencement  of  trial,  finds  it  necessary  or  advisable  to  postpone  the  commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial,  it  may,  from  time  to  time,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded,  postpone or  adjourn the  same on such  terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers  reasonable,  and  may  by  a  warrant  remand  the  accused if in custody:

Provided  that  no  Magistrate  shall  remand  an  accused person to custody under this section for a  term exceeding fifteen days at a time:

Provided  further  that  when  witnesses  are  in  attendance no adjournment or postponement shall  be  granted,  without  examining  them,  except  for,  special reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted  for  the  purpose  only  of  enabling  the  accused  person  to  show  cause  against  the  sentence  proposed to be imposed on him.

Explanation-1.  If  sufficient  evidence  has  been  obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may  have committed an offence, and it appears likely  that  further  evidence  may  be  obtained  by  a  remand, this is  a reasonable cause for a remand.

Explanation 2. The terms on which an adjournment  or  postponement  may  be  granted  include,  in  appropriate  cases,  the  payment  of  costs  by  the  prosecution or the accused.”

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23. Appellants  had been granted bail.   They are  not  in  custody of  the  

court.  They could not be taken in custody ordinarily unless their bail was  

not cancelled.  The High Court, in our opinion, was not correct in holding  

that as further investigation was required, sub-section (2) of Section 167 of  

the Code gives ample power for grant of police remand.  

24. The distinction between the power of remand in terms of sub-section  

(2)  of  Section  167  and  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  309  of  the  Code  is  

apparent.   

25. We may notice a few precedents in this behalf :-

In Raghubir Singh and others  v.  State of Bihar, [(1986) 4 SCC 481],  

this Court held :-

 “22. The result of our discussion and the case-law  is this: An order for release on bail made under the  proviso to Section 167(2) is not defeated by lapse  of time, the filing of the charge-sheet or by remand  to  custody  under  Section  309(2).  The  order  for  release on bail  may however  be cancelled under  Section  437(5)  or  Section  439(2).  Generally  the  grounds  for  cancellation  of  bail,  broadly,  are,  interference  or  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  due  course of administration of justice, or evasion or  attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of  the liberty granted to him. The due administration  of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or  suborning  witnesses,  by  interfering  with  

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investigation, by creating or causing disappearance  of  evidence  etc.  The  course  of  justice  may  be  evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the  country or going underground or otherwise placing  himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may  abuse the liberty  granted to him by indulging in  similar or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been  granted under the proviso to Section 167(2) for the  default  of  the  prosecution  in  not  completing  the  investigation in 60 days, after the defect is cured  by  the  filing  of  a  charge-sheet,  the  prosecution  may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground  that  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to  believe that  the accused has committed a non-bailable offence  and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit  him to  custody.  In  the  last  mentioned  case,  one  would expect very strong grounds indeed.”

Yet again in  CBI v.  Anupam J. Kulkarni, [ (1992) 3 SCC 141], K.  

Jayachandra Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench held as under :-

 “We may,  however,  like  to make it  explicit  that  such re-arrest or second arrest and seeking police  custody  after  the  expiry  of  the  period  of  first  fifteen  days  should  be  with  regard  to  the  investigation  of  a  different  case  other  than  the  specific  one  in  respect  of  which  the  accused  is  already  in  custody.  A  literal  construction  of  Section 167(2) to the effect that a fresh remand for  police  custody  of  a  person  already  in  judicial  custody  during  investigation  of  a  specific  case  cannot under any circumstances be issued, would  seriously  hamper  the  very  investigation  of  the  other  case  the  importance  of  which  needs  no  special emphasis. The procedural law is meant to  further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the  same. It is an accepted rule that an interpretation  which  furthers  the  ends  of  justice  should  be  preferred. It is true that the police custody is not  the  be-all  and end-all  of  the  whole  investigation  but  yet  it  is  one  of  its  primary  requisites  

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particularly  in  the  investigation  of  serious  and  heinous  crimes.  The  legislature  also  noticed  this  and permitted limited police custody. The period  of  first  fifteen  days  should  naturally  apply  in  respect of the investigation of that specific case for  which  the  accused  is  held  in  custody.  But  such  custody  cannot  further  held  to  be  a  bar  for  invoking  a  fresh  remand  to  such  custody  like  police custody in respect of an altogether different  case involving the same accused.

[Emphasis  supplied]

We may also notice that in State  v.  Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, [AIR  

1997 SC 2494 ], a Three Judge Bench held as under :-

“The  manner  in  which  a  person  arrested  during  investigation  has  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  Investigating Agency, and by the Magistrate on his  production before him, is provided in Section 167  of  the  Code.  The  said  section  contemplates  that  when the investigation cannot be completed within  24 hours fixed by Section 57 and there are grounds  to  believe  that  the  charge  levelled  against  the  person arrested is well founded it is obligatory on  the part of the Investigation Officer to produce the  accused  before  the  nearest  Magistrate.  On  such  production  the  Magistrate  may  authorise  the  detention  of  the  accused  initially  for  a  term not  exceeding 15 days either in police custody, or in  judicial custody. On expiry of the said period of 15  days the Magistrate may also authorise his further  detention otherwise than in police custody if he is  satisfied  that  adequate  grounds  exist  for  such  detention.”

This Court in Dinesh Dalmia  v. CBI, [ (2007) 8 SCC 770 ], opined:-

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“38. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation  of  statute  that  it  is  to  be  read  in  its  entirety.  Construction  of  a  statute  should  be  made  in  a  manner  so as to give effect  to all  the provisions  thereof. Remand of an accused is contemplated by  Parliament at two stages; pre-cognizance and post- cognizance.  Even  in  the  same  case,  depending  upon  the  nature  of  charge-sheet  filed  by  the  investigating officer in terms of Section 173 of the  Code,  a  cognizance may be taken as against  the  person against  whom an offence  is  said  to  have  been made out and against whom no such offence  has  been  made  out  even  when  investigation  is  pending. So long a charge-sheet is not filed within  the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of  the  Code,  investigation  remains  pending.  It,  however,  does  not  preclude  an  investigating  officer, as noticed hereinbefore, to carry on further  investigation  despite  filing  of  a  police  report,  in  terms  of  sub-section  (8)  of  Section  173  of  the  Code.”

In  Rama Chaudhary v.  State of Bihar, [2009 (5) SCC 366], it was  

held:

“9. The above said provision also makes it  clear  that further investigation is permissible, however,  reinvestigation  is  prohibited.  The  law  does  not  mandate  taking  of  prior  permission  from  the  Magistrate for further investigation. Carrying out a  further  investigation  even  after  filing  of  the  charge-sheet  is  a  statutory  right  of  the  police.  Reinvestigation  without  prior  permission  is  prohibited. On the other hand, further investigation  is permissible.

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10.  From a plain reading of  Sub-section (2)  and  Sub-section (8) of Section 173,  it  is  evident  that  even after submission of police report under Sub- section  (2)  on  completion  of  investigation,  the  police has a right to "further" investigation under  Sub-section  (8)  of  Section  173  but  not  "fresh  investigation" or "reinvestigation". The meaning of  "Further"  is  additional;  more;  or  supplemental.  "Further"  investigation,  therefore,  is  the  continuation of the earlier investigation and not a  fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started  ab  initio  wiping  out  the  earlier  investigation  altogether. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 clearly  envisages  that  on  completion  of  further  investigation,  the  investigating  agency  has  to  forward to the Magistrate a "further" report and not  fresh  report  regarding  the  "further"  evidence  obtained during such investigation.

26. Furthermore in this case the Special Investigating Team has already  

submitted its report to this Court.  Nothing has been pointed out before us as  

to why even the bail granted to the appellants should be cancelled so as to  

enable us to consider that question independently.   

27. No sufficient  or  cogent  material  has been placed on record by the  

State or the Special Investigating Team in this behalf.  

28. For  the  reasons  aforementioned  the  impugned judgment  cannot  be  

sustained which is set aside accordingly.  The appeal is allowed.

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29. We, however, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, in  

exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,  

make the interim direction absolute subject to any other or further orders that  

may be passed by the Sessions Judge till an additional charge sheet, if any, is  

filed by the Special Investigating Agency before the learned Sessions Judge.  

……..………..……………..J. [ S.B. Sinha ]

……………………………..J. [(Dr.) Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi May 06, 2009

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