http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: MINOR P. RAJENDRAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/1968

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ) BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ) BACHAWAT, R.S. SHELAT, J.M. MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1012            1968 SCR  (2) 786  CITATOR INFO :  F          1968 SC1379  (6)  D          1970 SC  35  (10,11)  R          1971 SC1439  (5,7,8)  D          1971 SC1762  (20,21,22,47,48)  R          1971 SC2303  (3,9,11,30,31)  R          1971 SC2560  (12)  R          1972 SC1375  (36,47,90,93,94)  R          1975 SC 563  (37)  C          1980 SC 820  (26)  R          1984 SC1420  (11,15,16,19)  F          1985 SC1495  (119)  RF         1986 SC1362  (3,4,6)  R          1987 SC 400  (21)  RF         1990 SC 334  (33)

ACT: Constitution   of  India,  Arts.  14,  15-State   Government promulgating  rules for selection of candidates  to  medical course-One  rule providing for district-wise  allocation  of seats  on basis of population-If discriminatory when  object is  to attract best talent-Socially and educationally  back- ward  classes specified by reference to castes-Whether  Art. 15(1)  infringed-Interview by selection committee-extent  to which criterion for allotting marks can be indicated.

HEADNOTE: The petitioners challenged an order of the State  Government by which rules were promulgated for selection of  candidates for admission to a medical course.  These rules provided for reservations of seats for various categories of  candidates, i.e.  for  he  Scheduled Tribes and  Scheduled  Castes,  for ’socially  and  educationally  backward  classes’,  and  for women;  the remaining seats were placed in the general  pool available to all.  One rule provided for the appointment  of a  selection  committee of not more than  three  persons  to interview the candidates and another, Rule 8, provided  that the,  seats  reserved  in  the  general  pool  and  for  the ’socially  and  educationally  backward  classes’  would  be allocated  among the various districts of the State  on  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

basis of the ratio of the population of each District to the total  population  of the State.  It was  contended,,  inter alia,  on behalf of the petitioners that r. 8, in  providing for  district-wise distribution of the seats, violated  Art. 14  of  the Constitution because such  allocation  of  seats might  result  in  candidates  of  inferior  caliber   being selected  in one District and those of superior calibre  not being  selected  in  another  District.   Furthermore,   the provision  in the application form for the candidates as  to "nativity  claimed" was a camouflage for  discrimination  on the ground of place of birth and therefore violative of Art. 15(1).   It  was  also  claimed  that  the  reservation  for ’socially and educationally backward classes’ infringed Art. 15(1)  because  it was made by reference to a list  of  such classes specified in another context and that this list  was nothing but a list of certain castes; and that there was  no objective test laid down in the Rules for interview and  the question that were put were unrelated to s. 10(d) which lays down  certain  criteria for the purpose.  On behalf  of  the respondent  State  it was contended that there  were  better educational ’facilities in Madras city as compared  to/other districts  and therefore if district-wise selection was  not made  candidates  from Madras city would  secure  many  more seats  than was justified on the basis of the proportion  of the  population  of  Madras  city;  furthermore,  candidates coming  from  various Distric’s would settle down  in  those Districts  and  thus  medical help  would  be  available  in sufficient measure in all the Districts. HELD  :  Rule 8 providing for district-wise  allocation  was discriminatory and violative of Art. 14.  The State had made out no case for such district-wise allocation and there  was no  nexus shown between such distribution and the object  to be achieved, namely, admission of the best talent among  the candidates. [794 E, F] The  district-wise distribution on the basis  of  population was not justified even assuming that candidates from  Madras city Would get a larger number 787      of seats in proportion to the population of the  State. ’Mat  would happen because a candidate from Madras city  was better.   Even  if the respondent’s contentions were  to  be accepted that would only justify allocation of seats between the city of Madras on one side and the rest of the State  on the  other  and not a district-wise  allocation  throughout. [793 G, H] There  were  no  facts and figures  given  to  suggest  that candidates from     a particular district would by and large settle  down in that district.  Furthermore, the  provisions as   to  "nativity  claimed"  by  candidates   showed   that candidates  would have a number of districts to choose  from depending  upon where they thought that their  chances  were best   and   therefore  the  argument   that   district-wise allocation was justifiable on this ground had no merit. [794 D] If the reservation in question had been based only on  caste and  had not taken into account the social  and  educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15(1).  But a caste is also      a  class  of citizens and if the caste as  a  whole  is socially and educationally backward, reservation can be made in  favour  of  such  a caste on the ground  that  it  is  a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15(4). [790 F-G] M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439 at pp. 45960, ’referred to.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

There  was  no substance in the argument that there  was  no test provided for marking. Rule 10(d) indicates what matters have  to  be taken into consideration  for  allotting  marks provided  under that rule. It would be difficult to  provide any further guidance in the matter and the rest must be left to  the  selection  committee. It cannot be  held  that  the committee did not follow the criterion indicated in r. 10(d) in allotting the marks provided in that rule. [794 H-795 B]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION  : Writ Petitions Nos. 194,  196  and 202 of 1967. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.       AND Civil Appeal No. 1456 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 16, 1967 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 308 of 1967. H. R. Gokhale, Shyamala Pappu, M. K. Ramamurthi and    Vineet Kumar, for the petitioner (in W.P. No. 194 of 1967). M.  K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for  the petitioners (in W-Ps. Nos. 196 and 202 of 1967). Abdul Karim and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1456 of 1967). C.  K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, G. Ramanujam and       A. V.        Rangam, for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 194 and 196 of         1967)  respondents Nos. 2 to 6 (in  C.A.  No. 202  of  1967)  and respondent No. 1 (in C.A.  No.  1456  of 1967). 788 C.   K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Mudaliar, Advocate General for the State of Madras, A. V. Rangam and G. Ramanu- jam, for respondent No. 1 (in W.P. No. 202 of 1967). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo,  C.J.  The  three petitions and  the  civil  appeal challenge  the  same order of the State of Madras  by  which rules  were  promulgated  for selection  of  candidates  for admission to the First Year integrated M.B.B.S. Course.   We shall  briefly  refer  to the provisions  of  the  Rules  to understand  the attack made thereon.  It appears that  there was a large rush of candidates for admission to the  medical colleges in the State of Madras while the seats therein were limited.   In  consequence, the State of Madras  which  runs these  colleges framed rules for admission to them.   It  is not necessary to refer to all the Rules and we shall confine ourselves  to  those  Rules  which have  a  bearing  on  the challenge  made  in  these  cases.   Rule  2  provides   for reservation  of  10 seats for certain  categories.   We  are however not concerned with it as it is not challenged.  Rule 3  provides for appointment of a Selection Committee of  not more than three persons.  The Committee has to interview all candidates  who are qualified and eligible for admission  to the  course and the interview is for verifying the data  and allotting  marks  for extra curricular activities.   Rule  4 provides  for reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes  and Scheduled  Castes, with which also we are not  concerned  in the present cases.  Rule 5, which is one of the rules  under challenge, provides for reservation for socially and  educa- tionally  backward  classes,  and lays  down  that  for  the purpose  of this rule "socially and  educationally  backward classes"  will mean those classes which have been  specified in  Group  III of the revised Appendix 17-A  to  the  Madras

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

Educational  Rules,  issued with G.O.  (Ms)  839  Education, dated  6th  April, 1951, as subsequently  amended.   Rule  6 provides for reservation for women, which is also not  under challenge,  and the remaining seats, under r. 7, go  to  the general pool available to all. Rule 8, which is another rule under challenge, provides that the  seats  reserved  in  the general  pool  and  the  seats reserved for the socially and educationally backward classes will  be allocated among the various districts on the  basis of  the  ratio of the population of each  districts  to  the total   population  of  the  State.   This   district   wise allocation  will not apply to seats reserved  for  Scheduled Tribes  and  Scheduled  Castes provided  under  r.  5.  Then follows  r.  9  as  to  the  procedure  for  selection   and qualifications  of  candidates.  Rule 10(d) provides  for  a maximum  of 75 marks for extra curricular  activities  which have  been  specified under five heads.  Further  the  Rules also prescribe the form of 789 application,  and  as  the selection is  on  a  districtwise basis,   the  form  has a column to  the  effect:  "NATIVITY CLAIMED".   It further appears from the form  that  nativity depends  on the S.S.L.C. Register, i.e., the  district  from which  the candidate passed the S.S.L.C. Examination, or  on the  nativity  certificate  of  parents.   Further  for  the purpose of nativity, the place where the candidate’s parents were  born  or  the place  where  they  possessed  immovable property has to be considered.  The candidate may choose the district from which he passed the S.S.L.C. Examination,  but he  may, in the alternative, choose some other  district  on the  ground of nativity, and this choice leaves it  open  to him  to  choose the district of permanent residence  of  the father or the mother.  Further the form of certificate shows that where the parents are dead even the guardian’s nativity can  be  the  basis of the district which  a  candidate  may claim. On  the basis of these rules, a number of Selection  Commit- tees  were appointed, each consisting of three members.   It is  not in dispute that the three members of  the  Selection Committee did not sit together to interview candidates; each member  was  allotted  25  marks out  of  the  total  of  75 prescribed for the interview and interviewed each  candidate separately.  This method of selection has also been attacked as against the Rules. Four  main contentions have been raised before us  in  these cases.   It  has been urged that r. 5,  which  provides  for reservation for socially and- educationally backward classes is  bad, as it violates Art. 15 of the Constitution  on  the ground that it is based entirely on consideration of  caste. The second attack is on the districtwise allocation under r. 8 on the ground that it violates Articles 14 and 15.  It  is urged that in effect the selection is made to a large extent on  the basis of the place of birth and this  violates  Art. 15.  It is also urged that districtwise allocation of  seats for medical colleges is discriminatory, for such  allocation has no nexus with the object of selection, namely, to secure the best talent for admission to medical colleges.  Thirdly, it  is  urged that the procedure evolved  by  the  Selection Committee for interview, which we have already referred  to, was in violation of the Rules.  It is also urged that  there was  no objective test laid down in the Rules for  interview and the questions that were put were unrelated to r.  10(d), which  lays down certain criteria for the purpose.   Lastly, it is urged that the selection was mala fide inasmuch as the two    official   members   contrived   to   secure    caste

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

representation in the matter of admission. The petitions have been opposed on behalf of State of Madras as  also the civil appeal.  It has been urged that there  is no  substance  in  any of the contentions  raised  in  these cases.  It is 790 unnecessary  to  refer to the stand taken by  the  State  of Madras  in  detail  at  this stage for  it  will  appear  at appropriate  places  when  we consider  the  various  points raised in these cases. Before we consider the points raised in these cases, we  may refer  to  a preliminary objection raised on behalf  of  the respondents.  It is urged that the selected candidates whose number  is in the neighbourhood of 1,100 have not been  made parties  in  these cases and therefore the cases  should  be rejected  on  that ground alone.  Learned  counsel  for  the petitioners  appellant however, accepted that so far as  the present  selections are concerned, they would not press  for quashing  them,  for in any case it would be  too  late  for these  petitioners/appellaiit  to get admission  in  medical colleges  this  year.  They therefore pray that  the  points raised may be decided for the future and the selection  made this  year may not be disturbed.  On that basis it is  urged on behalf of the petitioners and the appellant that it would not  be necessary to make the candidates selected  for  this year  parties.   In  view of this statement at  the  bar  we propose to decide the points raised in these cases but shall not disturb the selections made this year. The  first  challenge  is  to r. 5 on  the  ground  that  it violates  Art. 15 of the Constitution.  Article  15  forbids discrimination  against any citizen on the grounds  only  of religion,  race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of  them. At the same time Art. 15 (4) inter alia permits the State to make  any  special  provision for  the  advancement  of  any socially  and  educationally backward classes  of  citizens. The   contention   is  that  the  list  of   socially,   and educationally backward classes for whom reservation is  made under r. 5 nothing but a list of certain castes.  Therefore, reservation in favour of certain castes based only on  caste considerations   violates   Art.  15(1),   which   prohibits discrimination  on  the ground of caste only.   Now  if  the reservation in question bad been based only on caste and had not   taken   into  account  the  social   and   educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15(1), But it must not be forgotten that a caste  is also  a  class of citizens and if the caste is  a  whole  is socially and educationally backward reservation can be  made in  favour  of  such  a caste on the around  that  it  is  a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15(4).  Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore(1) to the effect that it was not  irrelevant to consider the caste of a class of citizens in  determining their  social and educational backwardness.  It was  further observed that though the caste of a class of citizens may (1)  [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439 at p. 459-460. 791 be  relevant its importance should not be exaggerated;  and, if classification of backward classes of citizens was  based solely  on  the caste of the citizen, it might  be  open  to objection.  It is true that in the present cases the list of socially   and  educationally  backward  classes  has   been specified by caste.  But that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that persons  belonging to  these  castes  are  also not a  class  of  socially  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

educationally  backward citizens.  In its reply, the,  State of  Madras  has  given the history as to how  this  list  of backward  classes was made, starting from the year 1906  and how.  the  list  has  been  kept  upto  date  and  necessary amendments  made therein.  It has also been stated that  the main criterion for inclusion in the list was the social  and educational  backwardness of the caste based on  occupations pursued  by these castes.  Because the members of the  caste as  a  whole  were found to be  socially  and  educationally backward, they were put in the list.  The matter was finally examined  after  the Constitution came into  force  in  ’the light of the provisions contained in Art. 15(4).  As it  was found  that  members  of  these  castes  as  a  whole   were educationally and socially backward, the list which had been coming  on from as far back as 1906 was finally adopted  for purposes of Art. 15 (4).  In short the case of the State  of Madras  is that the castes included in the list are  only  a compendious  indication  of  the class of  people  in  those castes and these classes of people had been put in the  list for the purpose of Art. 15(4) because they had been found to be socially and educationally backward. This is the position as explained in the Affidavit filed  on behalf  of the State of Madras.  On the other hand the  only thing  stated in the petitions is that as the list is  based on  caste  alone  it is violative of Art.  15(1).   In  view however  of  the explanation given by the State  of  Madras, which has not been controverted by any rejoinder, it must be accepted  that  though the list shows  certain  castes,  the members of those castes are really classes of  educationally and  socially  backward citizens. . No attempt was  made  on behalf  of the petitioners/appellant to show that any  caste mentioned  in this list was not educationally  and  socially backward.   No  such averment was made in the  affidavit  in support of their cases, nor was any attempt made to traverse the  case  put forward on behalf of the State of  Madras  by filing  a rejoinder affidavit to show that even one  of  the castes  included  in  the list  was  not  educationally  and socially backward.  In this state of the pleadings, we  must come  to  the conclusion that though the  list  is  prepared caste-wise,  the  castes  included therein are  as  a  whole educationally  and socially backward and therefore the  list is not violative of Art. 15.  The challenge to r. 5 must 792 The next attack is on r. 8, which provides for  districtwise distribution  of  seats  according  to  population  of   the district.   This  is attacked first on the  ground  that  it violates Art. 15 ( 1) which lays down that there shall be no discrimination  on  the basis of place of birth  and  it  is urged that the provision for "nativity claimed" in the  form is really a camouflage, for discriminating on the ground  of place of birth.  We have already referred to the  provisions relating  to nativity certificate.  We must say  that  these provisions are as complicated and confusing as possible  and there  may be some force in the contention raised that  this has been done to get over the prohibition in Art. 15(1) with respect  to discrimination on the basis of place  of  birth. What exactly "nativity" means is not clear from the  rule-,; it  may  be the place from where. the candidate  passed  his S.S.L.C.  Examination; it may be the place where his  lather was  born or his mother was born it may be the  place  where his  father has property or his mother has property;  or  it may  be the place of permanent residence of the  parents  or guardian, for the words "permanent residence" appear in  the form of nativity certificate.  But the dictionary meaning of the word " nativity" is birth and when the Rules provide for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

nativity  certificate they really mean the place  of  birth. However,  it  appears  ’that  the  place  of  birth  of  the candidate  is nowhere mentioned in the Rules.   Even  though there  may  be some substance in the charge  that  all  this complicated and confusing method has been provided in  order to  get over the prohibition in Art. 15(1) by a  camouflage, we cannot say that there is a clear violation of Art.  15(1) for  the  district which the candidate may  claim  does  not depend  upon  the place of his birth.  We  cannot  therefore strike down r. 8 on the ground that it discriminates on  the basis of place of birth of the candidate concerned. In   the  alternative,  it  is  urged   that   district-wise distribution violates Art. 14 of the Constitution because it denies  equality before the law or equal protection  of  the laws,  inasmuch  as such allocation of seats may  result  in candidates  of  inferior  calibre  being  selected  in   one district  while  candidates of superior  calibre  cannot  be selected  in  another district.  It has not been  denied  on behalf of the State that such a thing cannot happen,  though there are no statistics available in this behalf because the mark-sheets were all destroyed after the interviews. The question whether districtwise allocation is violative of Art. 14 will depend on what is the object to be achieved  in the  matter of admission to medical  colleges.   Considering the  fact that there is a larger number of  candidates  than seats  available, selection has got to be made.  The  object of selection can only 793 be  to  secure the best possible material for  admission  to colleges   subject  to  the  provision  for   socially   and educationally  backward classes.  Further whether  selection is  from the socially and educationally backward classes  or from  the general pool, the object of selection must  be  to secure  the best possible talent from the two  sources.   If that  is the object, -it must necessarily follow  that  that object would be defeated if seats are allocated district  by district.   It  cannot be and has not been denied  that  the object  of Selection is to secure the best  possible  talent from  the two sources so that the country may have the  best possible  doctors.  If that is the object, the  argument  on behalf  of  the petitioners/appellant is  that  that  object cannot possibly be served by allocating seats  districtwise. It is true that Art. 14 does not forbid classification,  but the  classification has to be justified on the basis of  the nexus  between  the  classification and  the  object  to  be achieved, even assuming that territorial classification  may be  a reasonable classification.  The fact however that  the classification  by  itself is reasonable is  not  enough  to support it unless there is nexus between the  classification and the object to be achieved.  Therefore, as the object  to be  achieved  in  a  case of the  kind  with  which  we  are concerned is to get the best talent for admission to profes- sional colleges, the allocation of seats districtwise has no reasonable  relation  with the object to  be  achieved.   If anything,  such allocation will result in many cases in  the object   being   destroyed,   and  if  that   is   so,   the classification,   even  if  reasonable,  would   result   in discrimination, inasmuch as better qualified candidates from one district may be rejected while less qualified candidates from other districts may be admitted from either of the  two Sources. Let us now look to the justification which has been put for- ward  on  behalf of the State of Madras in support  of  this districtwise  allocation.  It is said that there are  better educational  facilities in Madras city as compared to  other

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

districts  of  the  State  and  Therefore  if   districtwise selection  is  not made, candidates from Madras  city  would have  an  advantage and would secure many  more  seats  than justified  on the basis of proportion of the  population  of Madras  city  compared to the population of the State  as  a whole.   This  in  our  opinion  is  no  justification   for districtwise  allocation,which  results  in  discrimination, even  assuming that candidates from Madras city will  get  a larger  number of seats in proportion to the  population  of the  State.   That  would happen because  a  candidate  from Madras  city  is- better.  If the object is to  attract  the best  talent, from the two sources, districtwise  allocation in  the  circumstances would destroy that  object.   Further even  if we were to accept this contention that  would  only justify  allocation of seats between the city of  Madras  on one side and’ 794 the  rest of the State on the other and not  a  districtwise allocation  throughout.   But apart from this,-  we  are  of opinion that the object being what we have indicated,  there is no reason why there should be discrimination which  would go against the Candidates from Madras city.  We may add that candidates  who  pass  from  Madras city  need  not  all  be residents  of  the  city for it  is  common  knowledge  that schools  and colleges in the capital city  attract  students from  all  over  the State  because  of  better  educational facilities. Another justification that has been attempted is that candi- dates  coming  from various districts would settle  down  in those districts and thus medical help would be available  in sufficient  measure in all the districts.  Now this was  not stated  in the affidavit on behalf of the State  of  Madras. Besides  there  are  no facts and figures  to  suggest  that candidates  from  a particular district would by  and  large settle  down in that district.  Further the various  options in  the  matter  of nativity certificate to  which  we  have referred,  show  that  candidates  will  have  a  number  of districts  to  choose from depending upon where  they  think that their chances are best and therefore the argument  that districtwise allocation is justifiable on this ground is  in our  opinion of no merit.  We are satisfied  therefore  that the  State of Madras has made out no case  for  districtwise allocation  of  seats  in medical  colleges.   We  are  also satisfied that such allocation results in discrimination and there is no nexus between this territorial distribution  and the  object  to be achieved, namely, admission of  the  best talent  from  the  two sources already  indicated.   We  are therefore   of   opinion  that  allocation   of   seats   on districtwise basis is violative of Art. 14.  We may add that we  do  not mean to say that territorial  classification  is always  bad under all circumstances.  But there is no  doubt that districtwise classification which is being justified on a territorial basis in these cases is violative of Art.  14, for  no  justification  worth the name  in  support  of  the classification has been made out.  We therefore hold that r. 8  providing  for  districtwise allocation  is  bad,  as  it violates Art. 14 and we hereby strike it down. In  view of our decision as to r. 8 and in view of the  fact that  there is no question of disturbing the selection  made this  year, we do not think it necessary to  decide  finally whether the procedure for selection followed in the  present cases  to  which we have already referred is  in  accordance with  the  Rules or not.  All that we need say  is  that  it certainly  looks  odd  that the  members  of  the  selection committee should sit separately.  But we do not propose  ’to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

decide the point finally in the present cases. We  do not find any substance in the argument that there  is no  test  provided for marking.  Rule 10(d)  indicates  what matters 795 have  to  be taken into consideration  for  allotting  marks provided  under  that  rule.  We do not  think  that  it  is possible  to provide any further guidance in the matter  and the rest must be left to the Selection Committee.  It may be added that we are not prepared to accept that the  Committee did  not  follow  the criterion indicated  in  r.  10(d)  in allotting the marks provided in that rule. This leaves the question of mala fide.  Only two points  are urged  in this connection.  The first is that  the  official members  of the Selection Committees contrived to get  caste representation  in the matter of selection at the behest  of the  Government.  There is in our opinion no proof  of  this and  we are not prepared to accept that this was done.   The second  point in support of mala fides is  that  mark-sheets were  destroyed after the selection was over.  It does  look odd  that mark-sheets were so destroyed and we  should  have thought  that mark-sheets would be kept for some  period  at any rate after the selection was over.  But from this it  is not  possible  to infer that the selection itself  was  mala -fide.   Moreover the attack on the selection on the  ground of  mala  fides will affect the current selection  only  and therefore  in  view  of the stand taken at the  bar  by  the petitioners this ground does not now avail them.  The ground that the selection was mala fide must therefore fail. We  now come to the civil appeal.  Learned counsel  for  the appellant  wished  to raise an argument based  on  Art.  21, which  deals with protection of life and  personal  liberty. Apart  from the question whether admission  to  professional colleges results in deprivation of life and liberty, we  did not  allow learned counsel to develop this point because  no such case was made out before the Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal.  We told learned counsel  that he could argue only those points which had been urged before the  Division  Bench.   The  only  point  urged  before  the Division  Bench  was  on the basis of  a  provision  in  the University Act as to eligibility and qualification of candi- dates  for admission to medical colleges.  There is  however no  substance in the contention raised in this  behalf,  for the  Rules as to eligibility and qualification as framed  by the  University have been followed.  So far as admission  is concerned, it has to be made by those who are in control  of the  Colleges,-in  this  case the  Government,  because  the medical  colleges are Government colleges affiliated to  the University.   In  these circumstances,  the  Government  was entitled  to frame rules for admission to  medical  colleges controlled  by it subject to the rules of the university  as to  eligibility and qualifications.  This was what was  done in  these  cases  and  therefore  the  selection  cannot  be challenged on the ground that it was not in accordance  with the University Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 796 We therefore partly allow the petitions and strike down rule 8  of  the Rules for admission to  medical  colleges,  which deals  with  districtwise allocation.  The  appeal  is  also allowed to the same extent.  We have already indicated  that so  far as the selection for the current year is  concerned, it  will  stand; how-ever, r. 8 will not  be  enforced  when selection is made hereafter. -The petitioners/Appellant will get their costs, one set of hearing fee. R.K.P.S.                     Petitions and Appeal allowed in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

part.