07 April 2008
Supreme Court
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MINISTRY OF TEXTILE Vs MURARI LAL GUPTA

Bench: DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,P. SATHASIVAM
Case number: C.A. No.-002509-002509 / 2008
Diary number: 17979 / 2005
Advocates: D. S. MAHRA Vs ANITHA SHENOY


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2509 of 2008

PETITIONER: Ministry of Textile

RESPONDENT: Murari Lal Gupta & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/2008

BENCH: DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT REPORTABLE

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.  2509 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21769 of 2005)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench  of the Delhi High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the  appellant.  Challenge in the appeal was to the judgment and  order dated 21.9.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ  Petition (Civil) No. 4662 of 2002.

3.      Background facts as projected by the respondent in the Writ  Petition filed by him before the High Court are essentially as  follows:  

Respondent was appointed as Chowkidar in Carpet Weaving  Training Center, Bharatpur, Rajasthan on 24.8.1982. On  26.3.1985 respondent filed a representation for regularization.   The same was rejected by order dated 20.5.1985 as he was over  aged.  According to the appellant, respondent stopped attending  his duties in the office from 6.12.1987 and served a notice  seeking reinstatement on 30.5.1988. On 3.6.1988 respondent  filed L.A. No.201 of 1988 and 202 of 1988 for payment of  difference in salary in the period from 24.8.1982 to 5.12.1987  and for overtime wages for the same period. On 5.7.1988  respondent filed a statement of claim before Conciliation Officer  (Central), New Delhi.  The efforts for conciliation proceedings  failed and on 30.6.1989 failure report was submitted to Ministry  for Labour.  

Respondent filed a writ petition in 1993. By order dated  23.8.1995 respondent’s writ petition was disposed of with a  direction to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal  notwithstanding the pendency of the matter filed by the  respondent regarding minimum wages and overtime.  The  reference was rejected earlier by order dated 6.8.1990.  The  rejection was made on the ground that the matter was pending in  Court. However, pursuant to the order of the High Court,  reference was made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 (in short the ’Act’).  By award dated 9.2.2001 the

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Tribunal directed reinstatement with back wages.  It is to be  noted that the matter was decided ex-parte.  In the year 2002,  the scheme in which respondent claimed to have been appointed  was abandoned by the Government of India.  On 1.8.2002 the  respondent filed writ petition No.4662 of 2002 for  implementation of order of the Tribunal. On 17.10.2003 the  appellant filed writ petition No.7707 of 2003 challenging the  award.  By order dated 21.9.2004, the writ petition filed by the  appellant was dismissed while the writ petition filed by the  respondent was allowed. The LPA was filed in respect of the order  in writ petition No.7707 of 2003.  LPA 26 of 2005 which was filed  against the order in Writ Petition No.4662 of 2002.  LPA No.26 of  2005 was dismissed as withdrawn and the other LPA was  dismissed by the impugned order dated 24.3.2005.   

The primary stand of the appellant is that the unit has  already been closed and, therefore, the direction for  reinstatement could not have been given. In addition if the  termination was in November, 1987 as claimed by the  respondent, the writ petition filed was highly belated and no  direction could have been given to refer the matter to the  Industrial Tribunal.

Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand  submitted that the writ petition filed by the respondents has  been allowed and therefore, the High Court was justified in  dismissing the LPA.

4.      Undisputedly the writ petition was filed after about five  years.  The High Court directed reconsideration of the matter and  did not in fact direct reference to be made. Except in certain  unexceptional cases courts should not direct reference to be  made. It is within the domain of the Government to decide as to  in which case reference is to be made and in which case  reference is not to be done.  The reference was apparently made  on the ground that the High Court had directed a reference to be  made.  That was not factually correct.  Be that as it may, writ  petition filed by the respondents was allowed by the High Court.  But the fact that the project has already been closed cannot be  lost sight of.   Also relevant is the belated filing of the writ  petition.  

5.      In State of M.P. & Ors. v. Arjunlal Rajak [2006(2) SCC 711]  it was held as follows:

"11. Keeping in view the fact that the  services of the respondent were terminated on  the ground that the production unit in which  he was working itself had been closed, we are  of the opinion that interest of justice would be  subserved if a monetary compensation of Rs  10,000/- is granted to him. It, however, goes  without saying that he would be entitled to the  wages for the period he had actually worked  pursuant to or in furtherance of the order of  the Labour Court and as also of the High  Court upon his reinstatement. The award of  the Labour Court as also the judgment of the  High Court are set aside."

6.      In Municipal Council, Sujanpur v. Surinder Kumar [2006(5)  SCC 173] it was held as follows:

"22. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set  aside the directions of the Labour Court and

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direct that in place of the respondent being  reinstated with back wages, the appellant  would pay monetary compensation to him,  quantified at Rs.50,000. We make no order as  to costs."

7.      In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the  respondent be paid an amount of Rs.50,000/- in full and final  settlement of his claim. The direction for reinstatement and/or  back wages stands set aside.

8.      The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order  as to costs.