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PETITIONER: MINERVA MILLS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THEIR WORKERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/1953

BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND MUKHERJEA, B.K. JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:  1953 AIR  505            1954 SCR  465  CITATOR INFO :  E&D        1958 SC1018  (16,19)

ACT:         Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7, 8,  10-Tribunal  constituted  for fixed period-Constitution of  new  tribunal  for  hearing  cases  not  fully  disposed  of  by   previous  tribunal-Legality-Powers of State Government.

HEADNOTE:  Under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  the appropriate  Government  has ample power  to  constitute  an industrial  tribunal  for  a fixed period  of  time  and  to constitute  a new tribunal on the expiry of that period,  to hear  and  dispose of all references made to  the  previous. tribunal which had not been disposed of by that tribunal.

JUDGMENT: APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to  143  and 156 and 157 of 1953.     Appeals by special leave granted by the Supreme Court by its  Order  dated the 23rd April, 1953,  from  the  decision dated  the  19th  December, 1952, of  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  of  India, Third Bench, Madras,  in  Appeals  Nos. Bom. 245/52, 246/52, 247/52 and 248/52. 466   C.K.  Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  for  India,  (I.    B. Dadachanji, with him) for the appellants in all the appeals.   S.Mohan  Kumaramangalam  for  the  respondents  in   Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to 143.    H.  J. Umrigar for the respondents in Civil Appeals  Nos. 156 and 157.   1953.  October 8. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by    MAHAJAN  J.-The  Government of Mysore by  a  notification dated  15th June, 1951, under powers conferred by section  7 of  the  Industrial  *Disputes  Act,  1947,  constituted  an Industrial Tribunal for a period of one year consisting of a chairman and two members for the adjudication of  industrial disputes  in accordance with the provisions of the Act.   It

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appointed  the  following persons as  chairman  and  members thereof:-    Chairman : Rajadharmaprasakta               T. Singaravelu Mudaliar.    Members : Janab Mohamed Sheriff.              Sri S. Rangaramiah.      Two disputes between the management and the workers  of the  Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore, and two  other  disputes between  the management and workers of the  Mysore  Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore, were referred to  the said Industrial Tribunal under section 10 (1) )c) of the Act for adjudication.  Several other disputes were also referred for adjudication to the same tribunal.  Till the 15th  June, 1952, when the period of one year expired, the tribunal  had only disposed of 5 out of the 22 disputes referred to it. In the four disputes with which we are concerned ,the  tribunal had  only framed issues and had not proceeded to record  any evidence.       On    27th    June,   1952,    the    Government    by another  notification constituted another tribunal       for adjudication  of  these disputes and  acting  under  section 10(1)  (c)  of the Act referred all  the  disputes      left undisposed of by the first tribunal to the newly constituted 467 tribunal.  This notification was not very happily worded and has been the subject matter of a good deal of comment in the courts below and also before us. It runs thus :-    "Whereas  under Notification No. L.S. 1075-L.W.  68-51-2, dated  15th  June,  1951  an  Industrial  Tribunal  for  the adjudication  of industrial disputes in accordance with  the provisions  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947,   was constituted for a period of one year,     And  whereas  the said period of one  year  has  expired creating  a vacancy in the office of both the  chairman  and the two members, namely,    Chairman: Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.    Members : Janab Mohamad Sheriff.              Sri S. Rangaramiah.        Now  therefore  in exercise of  the  power  conferred under sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, H.H. the Maharaja of Mysore is hereby pleased to  constitute an  Industrial  Tribunal  for  adjudication  of   industrial disputes  in  the  Mysore  State  in  accordance  with   the -provisions of the Act and further to appoint the  following persons as chairman and members thereof    Chairman    Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.    Members     Janab Mohamad Sheriff.                  Sri K. Shamaraja Iyengar.     Under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  H.  H.  the Maharaja is pleased to  direct  that  the tribunal now constituted under this notification shall  hear and  dispose  of  all the references made  to  the  previous tribunal  constituted under the notification of  15th  June, 1951,  and which have remained undisposed of on  15th  June, 1952."      When  the  second tribunal proceeded to hear  the  four disputes which are the subject matter of these appeals,  the employers   raised  a  number  of   preliminary   objections regarding  the  jurisdiction  of the tribunal  to  hear  and dispose  of the disputes, the principal  contentions  being, (1) that the time limit of one year fixed 468 for die life of the first tribunal was unauthorized  illegal and therefore the first tribunal continued to exist in spite of the expiry of that period; (2) that the Government  could

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not   withdraw   the   disputes  referred   to   the   first tribunal,from  it,  so  long as the  members  of  the  first tribunal  were available for discharging their  duties  and. that section 8 had no application to the facts of this  case ;  and  (3) that the trial of these disputes  by  the  newly constituted   tribunal,  even  if,it  had  jurisdiction   to entertain them, could not be started from the stage at which they  were  left by the first tribunal and should  begin  de novo.     The employees contested these propositions and contended that  it was competent for the Government to constitute  one or more Industrial Tribunals under section 7 and it was open to it to prescribe that these tribunals should function  for a limited period; that the notification dated the 27th June, 1952,  was valid both under sections 7 and 8 of the Act  and the  second  tribunal  was  properly  constituted  and   had jurisdiction over the disputes referred to it under  section 10  (1) (c) of the Act and that there was no need for  a  de novo trial in law.     The second tribunal rejected the preliminary  objections raised by the employers and came to the conclusion that  the Government  was competent to constitute the  first  tribunal for a limited period, that the second tribunal was  properly constituted  and  that the references made were  proper  and could  be proceeded with from the stage at which  the  first tribunal  had left them.  Against this order  the  employers preferred  appeals’ to the Labour Appellate  Tribunal,  Nos. 245 to 248 of 1952.  They also filed writ applications under article, 226 of the Constitution of India before the  Court, C.P.  Nos. 79 and 80 of 1952-53, for the issue of  writs  of prohibition prohibiting the second tribunal from  proceeding with  the  adjudication of the four  disputes,  the  subject matter  of the appeals.  The points that arose for  decision in  the  appeals as well as in the  writ  applications  were substantially  the  same.  In these circumstances  the  High Court postponed hearing the 469 writ  applications  till the appeals had been heard  by  the Labour Appellate Tribunal.     The  Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order  dated  19th December, 1952, dismissed all the ’appeals and  subsequently the  High  Court of Mysore by its order  dated  25th  March, 1953,  also dismissed the writ applications.   It,  however, granted  the employers a certificate of leave to  appeal  to this  court.  The employers filed applications  for  special leave  to appeal against the order of the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  passed  in the appeals before it, and  this  court granted  special  leave  to appeal by an  order  dated  23rd April,  1953.  The result is that we have four  appeals  now before  us  against  the  order  of  the  Labour   Appellate Tribunal,  C.A.  Nos.  140 to 143 of 1953  and  two  appeals before  us  from the order of the High  Court  refusing  the application of the employers under article 226 of  Constitu- tion, C.A. Nos. 156 and 157 of 1953.     As all these appeals raise a common question of law they can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment.    Mr.  Daphtary, who appeared for the employers,  contended that the four disputes between the ,employers and  employees that were referred to the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the  notification  of  15th June, 1951, were  still  in  law pending  before that tribunal and it was that  tribunal  and that tribunal alone that could adjudicate on them and  give its  award on them and that the second tribunal  constituted by the notification of 27th June, 1952, had no  jurisdiction to entertain the references or to give any awards concerning

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them.   It was contended that under the Industrial  Disputes Act  there  is no power in the Government for  appointing  a tribunal for a limited duration, and that its power is  only to  constitute a tribunal and to refer certain  disputes  to it.     It  is  said  that in the provisions of the  Act  it  is implicit  that  a  tribunal  once  appointed  can  cease  to function  only  after the references made to, it  have  been exhausted, i.e., after it has given its award.  It 6-83 S.C. India/59. 470 was  further urged that there is no power in the  Government once it has made a reference under section 10 of the Act  to withdraw it from the tribunal and to hand it over to another tribunal.   It was suggested that the members of  the  first tribunal should be directed to hear those references and  to give their award.  In our opinion, none of these contentions can  be sustained on the provisions of the Act Section 7  of the Act provides as follows :     "The  appropriate Government may constitute one or  more Industrial  Tribunals  for the  adjudication  of  industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Act.     (2)A   tribunal   shall  consist  of  such   number   of independent members as the appropriate Government may  think fit  to appoint, and where the tribunal consists of  two  or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the chairman thereof ..........".     Section  8  provides that if for any  reason  a  vacancy occurs in the office of the chairman or any other member  of a  court or tribunal, the appropriate Government  shall,  in the  case of a chairman, and may, in the case of  any  other member,  appoint another independent person,  in  accordance with the’ provisions of section 6 or section 7, as the  case may  be,  to fill the vacancy, and the  proceedings  may  be continued before the court or the tribunal so reconstituted. Section  7  does  not restrict or limit the  powers  of  the Government  in  any  manner  and does  not  provide  that  a tribunal  cannot be constituted for a limited period or  for deciding a limited number of disputes.  From the very nature and  purpose for which Industrial Tribunals are  constituted it  is  quite  clear  that such  tribunals  are  not  to  be constituted  permanently.  It is only when  some  industrial disputes  arise  that  such tribunals  are  constituted  and normally  such  tribunals function so long as  the  disputes referred  to  them  are  not disposed  of.   But  from  this circumstance  it cannot be inferred that it is not  open  to the  Government  to fix a time limit for the life  of  these tribunals in order 471 to  see that they function expeditiously and do not  prolong their  own  existence by acting in a dilatory  manner.   Mr. Daphtary,  however,  contended that though the  language  of section 7 was wide enough to include within its  phraseology a  power in the Government to constitute tribunals  for  any period of time it thought fit, this wide construction of its language  had  been limited by the other provisions  of  the Act.  He made reference to the provisions of section 4 which deals  with  conciliation  officers.   Sub-section  (2)   of section  4  provides  that a  conciliation  officer  may  be appointed  for a specified area or for specified  industries in a specified area or for one or more specified  industries and  either  permanently  or for a limited  period.   It  is obvious  that the nature of duties of conciliation  officers being  of  a different character, provision  has  been  made that  they  may  be either appointed permanently  or  for  a

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limited  period.  From these provisions it is  difficult  to infer the same or a different intention regarding Industrial Tribunals.   They  may  well  be  appointed  ad  hoc  for  a particular  dispute.   It  was  for  this  reason  that   no restriction was placed on the powers of Government regarding the constitution of tribunals, and Government was given very wide  discretion and it could appoint them for  any  limited time or for a particular case or cases as it thought fit and as  the situation in a particular area or a particular  case demanded.   Reference  was then made to  the  provisions  of sections 15 to 20 of the Act for the proposition that once a reference  is made to a tribunal, the adjudication  must  be ,concluded  by  that tribunal and that tribunal  alone  must give the award, and that the life of the tribunal cannot  be cut  short between the date of the reference of the  dispute for  adjudication  and the date of the  award.   Section  15 provides that where an industrial dispute has been  referred to   a  Tribunal  for  adjudication,  it  shall   hold   its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as practicable, on   the  conclusion  thereof,  submit  its  award  to   the appropriate  Government.   We  are unable to  see  that  any inference 472 can be raised from the provisions of the section  supporting the  contention  of  Mr.  Daphtary.   This  is  a  provision directing  the tribunal to function expeditiously  and  give its  award as soon as possible.  Section 20(3) is  in  these terms    "Proceedings  before a tribunal shall be deemed  to  have commenced  on  the  date of the  reference  of  dispute  for adjudication  and such -proceedings shall be deemed to  have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A."    This section lays down the date or the terminus a quo for the termination and commencement of the proceedings.  It  is difficult  to see that it in any way cuts the power  of  the Government  to  appoint a tribunal for a  limited  duration. Reference  was  also made to the provisions  of  section  33 which  relate  to  the  conditions  of  service  during  the pendency of the proceedings in adjudication.  It is provided therein  that there shall be no change in the conditions  of service  of  the  workmen  pending  adjudication.   In   our opinion,  the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the  High  Court were  right in holding that from these provisions  it  could not  be  held  that it was implicit in section  7  that  the Government  could  not  withdraw a  dispute  referred  to  a tribunal or make the appointment of a tribunal for a limited period  of  time.  In our opinion, under the  provisions  of section  7,  the appropriate Government has ample  power  of constituting  a  tribunal  for  a  limited  time,  intending thereby that its life would automatically come to an end  on the  expiry of that time.  The contention therefore  of  Mr. Daphtary that the notification appointing the first tribunal for  a period I of one year was illegal and that  the  first tribunal  continues to exist is without force.  His  further contention  that  the  Government  could  not  withdraw  the dispute  referred  to  the first tribunal  so  long  as  the members  of the first tribunal were available and could  not hand  it  over  to  the  ’second  tribunal  cannot  also  be sustained. 475