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PETITIONER: MILAN BANIKP.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/03/1974

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1214            1974 SCR  (3) 789  1974 SCC  (4) 504  CITATOR INFO :  F          1975 SC 623  (3)

ACT: Maintenance   of  International  Security   Act--S.3--Public Order--Meaning of--Whether detention order can be passed for the  same  set of activities in respect of which  cases  had already been registered under Indian Penal Code.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner was detained under S. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal  Security  Act,  1971 on the grounds  that  on  two occasions he along with other associates, committed  robbery on  point  of dagger in a town in West Bengal  and  snatched away  money  and other valuables.  Such  activities  of  the petitioner  terrorised the local people and created a  panic in  the area and the petitioner was detained because in  the opinion  of  the  District Magistrate, he was  acting  in  I manner prejucial to the maintenance of public order. In  a  petition  under  Art. 32  of  the  Constitution,  the detention  was  challenged on the following grounds  :-  (i) That  the  alleged activities for which the  petitioner  had been  detained were not germane to public order;  (ii)  that the  names of all the associates of the petitioner were  not mentioned  in the grounds of detion and as such the  grounds should  be  held  to be vague; (iii)  that  two  cases  were registered  against  the,  petitioner  in  respect  of   the activities  mentioned  in  the  grounds  of  detention   and therefore for the same activities. the petitioner could  not be detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security  Act, and  (iv) that the period of the petitioner’s detention  has not been specified by the State Government and therefore  it is an infirmity in the detention order. Dismissing the petition, HELD  :  (i) The test for determining whether  a  particular activity  affects law and order or whether it impinges  upon public order is : Does it interfere with the current of life of  the community so as to amount to disturbance  of  public order  or  does it affect merely an individual  leaving  the tranquillity  of  the society undisturbed in which  case  it would be an activity affecting law and order. [791 E-F] Kannu    Biswas  V.  State of West  Bengal  [1973]  1  S.C.R 546 referred to.

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Keeping this test in view it was held that the activities of the petitioner had the effect of disturbing Public order. In Re : Sushanta Goswami & Ors. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 138 referred to and distinguished. (ii)  As regards vagueness of the grounds, a perusal of  the grounds of detention shows that the date, time and place  of the  incidents were specified.  Particulars were also  given regarding  the nature of the activities of  the  petitioner. The facts stated in the grounds of detention were sufficient to  apprise the petitioner of the precise activities of  the petitioner  on account of which the order for detention  had been  made and it cannot be said that the petitioner was  in any  way handicapped in making an  effective  representation against  the  detention order.  What has to be seen  by  the court  is  that  the grounds of detention  supplied  to  the petitioner  should  not be so vague as to prevent  him  from making   an  effective  representation.   The   grounds   of detention  in  the  present  case do  not  suffer  from  the infirmity of vagueness. [792 AC] Sk.  Hasan Ali v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2590 referred to. (iii)  There  is no legal bar for a District  Magistrate  to make  an  order  for  detention  in  respect  of  the   same activities  of the detenu for which cases had  earlier  been registered  in a Criminal Court, but in which cases  he  was discharged.   The detaining authority might well  feel  that though  there  was  not  sufficient  evidence  for  securing conviction, the activities of the person ordered 790 to be detained were of such a nature as to justify the order of detention, [792F-G] Mohd.   Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose and another  W.P.  No. 435/71 decided on April 25, 1972 referred to. (iv)  Further, non-specification of an definite period in  a detention  order  made  under the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, is not a material omission as would render the order to be invalid.  U93 G] Suna  Ullah v. State of J.& K. AIR 1972 SC 2431  and  Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab [1952] S.C.R. 756 refer-red to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 2023 of 1973. Under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for issue  of  a Writ in the nature of habeas corpus. G. Narayana Rao, for the petitioner. Dilip Sinha and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA,  J. Milan Banik petitioner was ordered  by  District Magistrate  Burdwan  to be detained under section 3  of  the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of  1971) with  a  view  to  prevent him from  acting  in  any  manner prejudicial   to  the  maintenance  of  public  order.    In pursuance  of  the  detention  order,  the  petitioner   was arrested  on  July 23, 1973.  The petitioner has  now  filed this   petition  through  jail  under  article  32  of   the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus. After  making the detention order on June 1, 1973  the  D.M. sent  report to the State Government about his  having  made the detention order along with the grounds of detention  and other necessary particulars.  The State Government  approved the  detention order oil June 12, 1973.  The  petitioner  at the time of his arrest on July 23, 1973 was served with  the order  of  detention  as well as the  grounds  of  detention

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together  with vernacular translation thereof.  The case  of the  petitioner  was  placed before the  Advisory  Board  on August 7, 1973.  The same day the State Government  received a   representation   from   the   petitioner.    The    said representation  after being considered was rejected  by  the State Government on August 8, 1973.  The representation  was then  forwarded to the Advisory Board.  The  Advisory  Board expressed  the opinion on September 25, 1973 that there  was sufficient  cause for the detention of the  petitioner.   On October 1, 1973 the State Government confirmed the detention order. It  has  been argued by Mr. Narayana Rao, who  has  appeared amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner, that the  alleged activities  for which the petitioner had been detained  were not  germane  to public order.  In this connection  we  find that  according to the grounds of detention, the  petitioner was  being detained because in the opinion of  the  District Magistrate  he  was acting in a manner  prejudicial  to  the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the  particulars given below :               "1.  On 8-5-73 at about 04.00 hrs.  you  along               with  your associates stopped the rickshaw  of               Sri Gopal Sharma on 791               point  of  dagger  while he  was  coming  from               Burdwan  Railway Station towards  Curzon  Gate               and snatched each Rs. 20/-and other  valuables               and escaped.  Your commission of this  highway               robbery created panic amongst local people and               thereby disturbed the normal avocation of life               in the area.               2. On 15-5-73 at about 04.30 hours your  along               with  your associates Swapan Singh and  others               attacked  Shri Aditya Mondal, a Bus  conductor               on B. C. Road, Burdwan and on the point of  an               open  Bhojali robbed him of each Rs. 30/-  one               wrist watch and other valuables and forced him               to keep silent.  Your such act terrorised  the               local  people and created a sense of panic  in               their  minds and as a result flow of  life  in               the area was highly disturbed.               Your such acts created a panic in the area and               the  local people were afraid to come  out  of               door  as usual and their normal  avocation  of               life was disturbed." It  would appear from the above that the petitioner and  his associates committed robbery on point of dagger on a  public road in Burdwan on two occasions in the month of May,  1973. The activities of the petitioner and his associates were  of such  a nature as terrorised the local people and created  a sense  of  panic.  On account of the  above  activities  the local  people  were afraid to come out of their  houses  and follow  the  normal  avocations  of  life.   The  activities attributed to the petitioner, in our opinion, have a  direct nexus with the maintenance of public order because they  bad the  effect  of  disturbing the even tempo of  life  of  the people in the locality.  The test for determining whether  a particular  activity  affects law and order  or  whether  it impinges  upon public order is : Does it interfere with  the current  of  life  of  the community  so  as  to  amount  to disturbance  of  public order or does it  affect  merely  an individual   leaving   the  tranquillity  of   the   society undisturbed in which case it would be an activity  affecting law and order [see Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal(1) ]. Keeping  this  test  in  view we  have  no  doubt  that  the

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activities  of the petitioner had the effect  of  disturbing public order. Reference  has been made by Mr. Narayana Rao to the case  of In  Re  :  Sushanta Goswami &  Ors.(2)  wherein  this  Court directed  the  release  of a detenu  named  Ram  Kamal  Dhar inspite  of the fact that he along with his  associates  was alleged to have snatched a wrist watch from a person at  the point of dagger.  There is, however, nothing to show that in that  case the activity of the detenu created panic  amongst the local people and thereby disturbed the normal  avocation of  life  in  the area.  As such,  the  petitioner,  in  our opinion, cannot derive much help from that authority. Another contention advanced by Mr. Narayana Rao is that  the names  of  all  the associates of the  petitioner  were  not mentioned  in  the  grounds of detention  and  as  such  the grounds  should be held to be vague.  There is no  force  in this contention.  Perusal of the grounds (1) [1973] 1 SCR 546.         (2) [1969] 3 SCR 138. 792 of  detention  shows that the date, time and  place  of  the incidents  were  specified.   Particulars  were  also  given regarding  the nature of the activities of  the  petitioner. The facts stated in the grounds of detention were sufficient to  apprise  the  petitioner of the  precise  activities  on account of which the order for detention had been made  and, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any  way handicapped in making an  effective  representation against  the  detention order.  What has to be seen  by  the court  is  that  the grounds of detention  supplied  to  the petitioner  should  not be so vague as to prevent  him  from making   an  effective  representation.   The   grounds   of detention  in  the  present  case do  not  suffer  from  the infirmity of vagueness.  The fact that the names of all  the associates  of the petitioner were not given in the  grounds of  detention  would not make the grounds to be  vague  [see also  Sk.   Hasan Ali v. State of West Bengal(l)  wherein  a similar content on was repelled). It  has  further been argued by Mr. Narayana  Rao  that  two cases  were registered against the petitioner in respect  of the  activities mentioned in the grounds of detention.   For the same activities the petitioner, according to the learned counsel,  could  not be detained under  the  Maintenance  of Internal Security Act.  This contention is equally devoid of force.   It would appear from the affidavit of  Shri  Shyama Charan Chatterjee District Magistrate that in both the cases final  reports  were submitted and the  petitioner  was  got discharged as the witnesses were unwilling to give  evidence against  him in open court for fear of their lives.  In  the circumstances  there  was  no legal bar in the  way  of  the District Magistrate in making an order for the detention  of the  petitioner.  A similar argument was advanced on  behalf of  the  detenu in the case of Sasti @ Satish  Chowdhary  v. Chowdhary v. State of West Bengal(2) and it was repelled  in the following words :               It  is always open to the detaining  authority               to pass an order for the detention of a person               if the grounds of detention are germane to the               object for which a detention order can legally               be made.  The fact that the particular act  of               the  detenu which provides the reason for  the               making  of the detention order constitutes  an               offence under the Indian Penal Code would  not               prevent  the detaining authority from  passing               the order for detention instead of  proceeding               against him in a court of law.  The  detaining

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             authority  might well feel that  though  there               was  not sufficient evidence admissible  under               the   Indian  Evidence  Act  for  securing   a               conviction,  the  activities  of  the   person               ordered  to be detained were of such a  nature               as  to justify the order of detention.   There               would  be  no  legal  bar  to  the  making  of               detention  order  in such a case.   It  would,               however, be imperative that the incident which               gives rise to the apprehension in the mind  of               the  detaining  authority  and  induces   that               authority  to  pass the  order  for  detention                             Should  be  germane to the object for  which  a               detention  order  can be made under  the  Act.               Even in cases where a person has been actually               prosecuted in a court of law in res- (1) AIR [1972] SC 2590.     (2) [1973] 1 SCR 467. 793               pect of an incident and has been discharged by               the  trying magistrate, a valid order  of  his               detention   can  be  passed  against  him   in               connection  with that very incident.   It  was               recently observed by this Court in the case of               Mohd.   Salini Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose &  Anr.               (Writ  petition  No. 435 of  1971  decided  on               April 25, 1972) that from the mere fact that a               detenu  was  discharged  in  a  criminal  case               relating  to an incident by a  magistrate,  it               could not be said that the detention order  on               the  basis of that incident  was  incompetent,               nor  could it be inferred that it was  without               basis   or  mala  fide.   Reliance   in   this               connection  was placed upon the case of  Sahib               Singh Duggal v. Union of India(1)," Reference has also been made to the fact that the period  of the  petitioner’s  detention has not been specified  by  the State  Government  This  fact,  in  our  opinion,  does  not introduce  an infirmity in the detention order.   A  similar question arose before this Court in Suna Ulla v. State of J. &  K.  (2) while dealing with a detention  order  under  the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964.  It was held by  this  Court  that  it is difficult  to  infer  from  the language  of section 12 of the Jammu and Kashmir  Preventive Detention Act that the State Government while confirming the detention order should also specify the period of detention. All that the section requires is that, if the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of the person, the Government may  confirm the detention order.  There is nothing in the section  which enjoins  upon  the  Government  to  specify  the  period  of detention  also white confirming the detention  order.   The concluding words of sub-section (1) of section 12, according to  which the Government may continue the detention  of  the person  concerned for such period as it thinks fit,  pertain to  and  embody the consequence of the confirmation  of  the detention  order.  It is, however, manifest that the  period for which a person can be detained after the confirmation of the,  detention order is subject to the limit of two  years. which is the maximum period of detention for which a  person can  be  detained vide section 13 of the Act’  Although  the above  dictum  was  laid down while  dealing  with  Jammu  & Kashmir  Preventive Detention Act, it holds equally good  in the case of detention made under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of which the relevant provisions except for the

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maximum  period  of detention are in pari materia.   It  may also  be mentioned in the above context that in the case  of Ujagar  Singh  v. The State of Punjab(3) this  Court,  while dealing with a ease under the Preventive Detention Act, held that non-specification of any definite period in a detention order  made under section 3 of that Act was not  a  material omission as would render the order to be invalid. The  order for the detention of the petitioner has not  been shown  to  be not in accordance with  law.   We  accordingly dismiss the petition. Petition dismissed. (1) [1966] 1 SCR 313.            (2) AIR [1972] SC 2431. (3) [1952] SCR 756. 794