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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1727 of 2002

PETITIONER: Midnapore Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors.       

RESPONDENT: Chunilal Nanda & Ors.                                    

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/05/2006

BENCH: B. P. Singh & R. V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T With

SLP (C) Nos. 13045-46/2003

RAVEENDRAN, J.

This civil appeal by special leave is against the judgment dated  26.2.2001 in M.A.T. No.4075 of 1998 passed by the High Court of Calcutta.  

2.      The first respondent was working as Secretary of the Midnapore  Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd. [Appellant No.1 herein, for short the ’Bank’].  Appellants 2 and 3 are respectively the Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge  of the first appellant bank. The first respondent was kept under suspension  pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings, in pursuance of a resolution  of the Board of Directors of the Bank dated 16.4.1994.  The respondent filed  a writ petition [C.O. No. 8789(W) of 1995] challenging the suspension, inter  alia  on the ground that charge-sheet had not been issued. On 27.6.1995, the  said writ petition was disposed of recording the submission that the bank  was issuing a charge-sheet. The Bank was directed to deliver a copy of the  charge-sheet and pay the arrears of subsistence allowance within one week.  The first respondent was directed to file his written statement within 10  days. The Enquiry Officer was directed to conclude the enquiry within a  period of three months from the date of communication of the order subject  to first respondent rendering full cooperation for the conduct of the  disciplinary proceedings.  

3.      A charge-sheet dated 1.7.1995 was issued to the first respondent  containing nine charges. The first Respondent filed his written statement on  17.7.1995. The Enquiry Officer completed the enquiry and submitted his  report dated 14.9.1995 finding the first respondent guilty of all charges. A  copy of the said report was furnished to the first respondent  under cover of  bank’s letter dated 25.9.1995 giving him an opportunity to submit his  representation.  

4.      At that stage, the first respondent filed another writ petition [CO No.  20008 (W) of 1995]  before the High Court for quashing the enquiry  proceedings alleging bias against the Enquiry Officer (Asit Mahapatra). A  learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed the said writ  petition by order dated 9.4.1997 in the following manner :  

(i)     The enquiry proceedings and the consequential action taken by  the Bank were set aside.  

(ii)    The Chairman of the Bank was directed to appoint someone  who is not a member of the Bank’s Board of Directors as  Enquiry Officer by requesting the Registrar, Cooperative

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Societies to nominate a suitable officer preferably of the rank of  Asst. Registrar of  Cooperative Societies, to be the Enquiry  Officer. A time bound schedule was indicated for appointment  of the Enquiry Officer.   

(iii)   The Enquiry Officer to be so appointed was required to conduct  enquiry de novo by observing all the principles of natural  justice and the applicable rules and regulations and submit his  report within four months from the date of first sitting subject to  first respondent fully cooperating in the enquiry. The  Disciplinary Authority was directed to take suitable action on  the basis of such Report.  

(iv)    The Bank was directed to pay proper subsistence allowance to  the first respondent during the period of suspension.  

5.      On the Bank’s request, the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative  Societies, Midnapore-I appointed Sri H. K. Maiti, Cooperative   Development Officer, as Enquiry Officer on 9.5.1997. Subsequently, the  Assistant Registrar by communication dated 3.10.1997 revoked the  appointment of Sri H.K. Maiti as Enquiry Officer being of the view that the  tenor of the order of the High Court did not permit the appointment of Sri  H.K. Maiti who was only a Development Officer, as the Enquiry Officer.  Thereafter, the Bank wrote to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on  24.10.1997 to nominate an officer of the rank of an Assistant Registrar for  being appointed as Enquiry Officer. In view of the delay, the Bank also  approached the High Court for suitable extension of time. On 19.12.1997,  the court extended the time for appointment of Enquiry Officer by two  weeks. By order dated 5.1.1998, the Registrar nominated Sri S. K. Das,  Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Midnapore-I, for being  appointed as the Enquiry Officer. He was accordingly appointed as the  Enquiry Officer. He started a fresh enquiry.

6.      As the enquiry was not completed within four months from the date of  first sitting, the first respondent moved a contempt application [CPAN 2233  of 1997]. The Chairman of the Bank, the Enquiry Officer (S. K. Das), the  previous Enquiry Officer (Sri H. K. Maiti) and the Secretary-in-Charge of  the Bank were impleaded eo nomine as respondents 1 to 4 in the said  contempt petition. The learned Single Judge summoned the enquiry records  from the Enquiry Officer. On perusing the records, he was of the view that  the Enquiry Officer had not proceeded with due diligence. Therefore, the  learned Single Judge made an order dated 20.11.1998, the operative portion  of which is extracted below :  

"1.     Let a Rule be issued against the respondent no.2 Sri S. K. Das,  Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Midnapore I, (charging him ?)  with committing contempt of this Court (and ?) for directing him to show  cause as to why he should not be punished for committing contempt. The  Respondent no. 2 shall remain present personally on all the dates of  hearing in this Court. He shall file his affidavit in opposition within two  weeks from today.  

2.      Since the respondent no. 2 has by his conduct, disqualified himself  to be the Enquiry Officer, I direct that he shall cease to be the Enquiry  Officer. It shall be open to the respondents, however, in the light of the  aforesaid two orders of the Court, to appoint any other person as the  Enquiry Officer and to proceed with the matter once again in the light of  the aforesaid directions.  

3.      The petitioner shall immediately and forthwith be reinstated in the  service of the respondent Bank and shall deemed to be in their service all  through. He shall not be prevented in any manner from discharging his  duties and shall be paid all arrears of salary within four weeks from today.  

Let the contempt application appear two weeks hence. The suspension

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order shall be immediately deemed to have been revoked."  

7.      Feeling aggrieved, respondents 1 and 4 in the contempt petition  (Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank) filed M.A.T. No.4075 of  1998. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the said appeal as not  maintainable by the impugned judgment dated 26.2.2001, on the following  two grounds :  

(i)     The order of the learned Single Judge did not punish any  contemnor. Therefore, the appeal could not be entertained under  section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which provided for  appeals only against orders punishing a contemnor.  

(ii)    The appeal did not satisfy the requirements of clause 15 of the  Letters Patent, and, therefore, could not be entertained as a Letters  Patent Appeal.  

While so dismissing the appeal, the Division Bench directed the appellants  therein to forthwith implement the order of the learned Single Judge. The  said judgment is challenged in this civil appeal by special leave. This Court,  while granting leave on 25.2.2002, stayed the operation of the order dated  26.2.2001 in M.A.T. No.4075 of 1998, as also the further proceedings in the  contempt petition (CPA No.2233/1997) with a condition that the Enquiry  Officer appointed in pursuance of the order dated 9.4.1997 shall complete  the enquiry within six months.  

8.      In view of the observations of the Division Bench that the appeal by  the Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge eo nomine was not maintainable,  and  to avoid any technical objections, the Bank and its Board of Directors filed  M.A.T. No.1102 of 2001 on 4.4.2001 challenging the order dated  20.11.1998 along with an application for condonation of delay. A Division  Bench of the High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay  by merely stating that the delay of 728 days had not been properly  explained,  and consequently dismissed the appeal.  The said order  dismissing the application under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and  consequently, dismissing the appeal, is challenged in SLP(C) Nos.13045-46  of 2003.

9.      On the aforesaid facts and the contentions urged, the following  questions arise for consideration :

(i)     Where the High Court, in a contempt proceedings, renders a  decision on the merits of a dispute between the parties, either by an  interlocutory order or final judgment, whether it is appealable  under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ? If not,  what is the remedy of the person aggrieved ?  

(ii)    Where such a decision on merits, is rendered by an interlocutory  order of a learned Single Judge, whether an intra-court appeal is  available under clause 15 of the Letters Patent ?  

(iii)   In a contempt proceeding initiated by a delinquent employee  (against the Enquiry Officer as also  the Chairman and Secretary  in-charge of the employer-Bank), complaining of disobedience of  an order directing completion of the enquiry in a time bound  schedule, whether the court can direct (a) that the employer shall  reinstate the employee forthwith; (b) that the employee shall not be  prevented from discharging his duties in any manner; (c) that the  employee shall be paid all arrears of salary; (d) that the Enquiry  Officer shall cease to be the Enquiry Officer and the employer  shall appoint a fresh Enquiry Officer; and (e) that the suspension  shall be deemed to have been revoked ?  

Re : Point No. (i) :

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10.     Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [’CC Act’ for short]  provides for appeals. Relevant portion of sub-section (1) thereof is extracted  below :  (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court  in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a)     where the order or decision is that of a single Judge,  to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court: (b)       where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the  Supreme Court:

The scope of Section 19 has been considered by this Court in Baradakanta  Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra [AIR 1974 SC 2255], Purushotam  Dass Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon [AIR 1978 SC 1014], Union of India v.  Mario Cabral e Sa [AIR 1982 SC 691], D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal [1988 (3)  SCC 26], State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy [1996 (4) SCC 411]  and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar [1996 (6) SCC 291]. These cases dealt  with orders refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or initiating contempt  proceedings or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor or dropping the  proceedings for contempt. In all these cases, it was held that an appeal was  not maintainable under section 19 of CC Act as the said Section only  provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt.  

10.1)     In Baradakanta Mishra, a three Judge Bench of this Court held that  an order declining to initiate a proceeding for contempt amounts to refusal to  assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore, such a  decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to  punish for contempt. The question as to whether an appeal would be  maintainable under section 19 where the court initiates a proceeding for  contempt but after due consideration and hearing finds the alleged  contemnor not guilty of contempt, or having found him guilty declines to  punish him, was left open.  

10.2)   In Purushotam Dass Goel (supra), certain aspects of Section 19 were  left open. This relevant portion is extracted below :  The (contempt) proceeding is initiated under Section 17 by issuance of a  notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the  said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the  legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from  each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the  decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised  before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere  initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the  prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding,  does not decide any question\005\005\005... It is neither possible, nor advisable,  to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable  to this Court under Section 19. A final order, surely, will be appealable.  

If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High  Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred  under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding  is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under  Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained  pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our final  opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of  order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some  intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19."   

10.3)   While Baradakanda Mishra and Purushotam Das left open the  question whether an appeal under section 19 would be maintainable in  certain areas, in D. N. Taneja (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court,  categorically held that appeals under section 19 would lie only against the  orders punishing the contemnor for contempt and not any other order passed  in contempt proceedings. We extract below the relevant portions from the  said decision :

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"The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of Section 19  only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise  of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. \005\005\005When the High Court  does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court  does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The  jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is  imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court  has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article  215 of the Constitution.  It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is  guilty of contempt or not, the court hears the parties and considers the  materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and,  thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt.  When the High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not  exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the  High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing  punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the  High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction  or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.  The aggrieved party under section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who  has been punished for contempt of court."  [Emphasis supplied]                  10.4)   In Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), this Court reiterated the above  position thus :  "On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right  from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction  to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order  in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court,  then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section  19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal  shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal  has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by  the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings.  The words ’any order’ has to be read with the expression ’decision’ used in  said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction  to punish for contempt. ’Any order’ is not independent of the expression  ’decision’. They have been put in an alternative form saying ’order’ or  ’decision’. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for  contempt. If the expression ’any order’ is read independently of the  "decision" then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (I) of Section 19 even  against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the  High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result."

10.5)   J. S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar (supra) is nearest to this case, on  facts. A contempt petition was filed alleging that the seniority list drawn  pursuant to the order of the High Court was not in conformity with the said  order. The High Court found it to be so, but held that the disobedience  was  not willful and, therefore, did not punish for contempt. But the High Court  gave a direction to redraw the seniority list. The State Government   challenged the said direction in an intra court appeal. The Division Bench  held that the appeal was not maintainable under section 19 of the CC Act,  but was maintainable as an intra-court appeal as the direction issued by the  single Judge would be a "judgment" within the meaning of  that expression  in section 18 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Accordingly, the Division  Bench set aside the direction of the learned Single Judge  to re-do the list.  The said order was challenged before this Court. This Court confirmed the  decision of the Division Bench and held as follows :  "Therefore, an appeal would lie under section 19 when an order in  exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemnor has  been passed. In this case, the finding was that the respondents had not  wilfully disobeyed the order. So there is no order punishing the respondent  for violation of the orders of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal under  section 19 would not lie.

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The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt  proceedings to find out, whether it is in conformity with-the directions  issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed  by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there  arises a fresh cause of act on to seek redressal in an appropriate forum.  The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may  or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh  cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of  judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of  the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings,  a fresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw the  seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the  jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings.  It would not be permissible \005."

11.     The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals  against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus :  I.      An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against  an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its  jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing   punishment for contempt.  II.     Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for  contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor  an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order  acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under  Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may  be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.  III.    In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide  whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so,  what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.  In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or  decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between  the parties.  IV.     Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court  on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the  exercise of ’jurisdiction to punish for contempt’ and therefore,  not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception  is where such direction or decision is incidental to or  inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt,  in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also  encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.  V.      If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an  issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the  dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the  aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open  to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a  learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court  appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136  of the Constitution of India (in other cases).

The first point is answered accordingly.  Re : Point No. (ii) :

12.     We will next consider as to whether an intra-court appeal under  clause 15 of the Letters Patent was available against the interlocutory  order dated 20.11.1998 containing the directions on merits of the  dispute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal from a  ’judgment’ of a single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction, to a  Division Bench. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr.  [AIR 1981 SC 1786], the scope of clause 15 of the Letters Patent was  considered. This Court held : "The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil  Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted  by sub-section (2) of section 2 cannot be physically imported into  the definition of the word ’judgment’ as used in Cl. 15 of the

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Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the  term ’order’ or ’decree’ anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the  givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ’judgment’ should  receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word  ’judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time,  it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would  amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the  number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters  Patent. It seems to us that the word ’judgment’ has undoubtedly a  concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other  words, a judgment can be of three kinds \026 (1) A final Judgment  \005.. (2) A preliminary Judgment \005\005.. (3) Intermediary or  interlocutory judgment  - Most of the interlocutory orders which  contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to  (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be  judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore,  appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not  covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the  characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may  adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important  aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceedings. Before such an order  can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must  be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote   \005\005\005\005  in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a  judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide  matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties  and which work serious injustice to the party concerned."  "\005\005\005.any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the  trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some  inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other  cannot be treated as a judgment, otherwise the appellate court  (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of  orders passed by the trial Judge. \005\005\005\005\005\005.. the interlocutory  order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and  trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in  controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a  part of the proceedings."

14.     Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court  (corresponding to clause 15 of Letters Patent of Calcutta High Court)   was considered by this Court in Central Mine Planning and Design  Institute Ltd. v. Union of India [2001 (2) SCC 588]. In that case, the  award of an Industrial Tribunal directing reinstatement and payment  of partial backwages was challenged in a writ petition before the High  Court of Patna. The workman claimed interim relief under section 17- B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Single Judge  directed the employer to pay full wages to the workman during the  pendency of the writ petition. That was challenged in a Letters Patent  Appeal. The Division Bench held that the Letters Patent Appeal was  not maintainable as the order directing payment under section 17-B of  the I.D. Act was not a ’judgment’. Reversing  the said decision, this  Court held that an interlocutory order passed in a writ proceeding  directing payment under section 17B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  was a final determination affecting the vital and valuable rights and  obligations of parties and, therefore, would fall under the category of  ’intermediary or interlocutory judgment’ against which a Letters  Patent Appeal would lie. The following observations are relevant :  "It is now well settled that the definition of "judgment" in section  2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to Letters  Patent\005\005\005\005\005\005  \005\005\005.., it follows that to determine the  question whether an interlocutory order passed by one Judge of a  High Court falls within the meaning of ’judgment’ for purposes of  Letters Patent the test is : Whether the order is a final  determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of  the parties concerned. This has to be ascertained on the facts of

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each case."

15.     The above principle was reiterated in Mithailal Dalsangar  Singh vs. Annabai Devram Kini [2003 (10) SCC 691] and Subal Paul  vs. Malina Paul [2003 (10) SCC 361]. In the latter case, this Court  held :  "While determining the question as regards clause 15 of the Letters Patent,  the court is required to see as to whether the order sought to be appealed  against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or not. Once it is held  that irrespective of the nature of the order, meaning thereby whether  interlocutory or final, a judgment has been rendered, clause 15 of the  Letters Patent would be attracted. \005 Clause 15 of the Letters Patent  confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under  any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject  to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power  and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal  from a judgment would be effective."  

16.     Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency  of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories : (i)     Orders which finally decide a question or issue in  controversy in the main case.  (ii)   Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and  directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii)  Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question  which is not the subject matter of the main case. (iv)    Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of  the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v)  Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some  prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the  rights and obligations of the parties.

The term ’judgment’ occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will  take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section 2(9)  CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC, but also other  orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the  rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may  have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the  vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory  orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore,  ’judgments’ for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent.  On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not  ’judgments’ for purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters  Patent.         17.     The next question is whether the appeal was not maintainable  because, it was filed by the Chairman and the Secretary-in-Charge of  the Bank eo nomine, and not by the "Bank" itself. The order dated  20.11.1998 against which the appeal was filed, was passed by the  learned single Judge in the course of contempt proceedings. The  Chairman and the Secretary-in-Charge were parties to such  proceedings having been impleaded eo nomine as respondents 1 and 4  respectively. The ’Bank’ as such was not a party to the contempt  proceedings. The learned single Judge proceeded on the basis that the  Chairman and the Secretary-in-Charge represented the ’Bank’ by  referring to them as ’Respondent Bank’ and directing them to reinstate  the complainant (first respondent herein) and to pay all salary arrears  to him. If the Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge were considered as  representing the Bank for issuing such directions, certainly they could  file an appeal against such directions. The directions were issued to  them and they were the persons aggrieved.

18.     The Division Bench, therefore, committed a serious and  obvious error in holding that the appeal [MAT 4075/1998] was not  maintainable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Though the order

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of the learned Single Judge dated 20.11.1998, by which several  directions to the Bank with reference to first Respondent were issued,  is not a final ’judgment’, it is an ’interlocutory judgment’ which  finally decides several rights and obligations of the employee vis-‘-vis  the employer and therefore, appealable under clause 15 of the Letters  Patent.   Re : Point No. (iii) : 19.     As noticed above, by order dated 9.4.1997 in C.O.  No.200008(W)/1995, the first inquiry proceedings were set aside and  the Chairman of the Bank was directed to appoint an outsider,  preferably  an officer from the Co-operative Department, as the  Enquiry Officer,  with a further direction that such Enquiry Officer  should conduct the enquiry de novo, and submit the report within four  months (from the date of first sitting), and a direction to the first  respondent to fully co-operate in the enquiry. The time stipulated for  appointment of the Enquiry Officer was extended by two weeks on  19.12.1997. The new Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Registrar  of Co-operative Societies, on 5.1.1998. The inquiry was not  completed within four months and that led to the initiation of the  contempt proceedings by the employee (first respondent). The  Chairman of the Bank, the Enquiry Officer, the previous Enquiry  Officer (H. K. Maiti, whose appointment was revoked on 3.10.1997)  and the Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank were shown as  contemnors/respondents 1 to 4.  As H.K. Maiti was not a party to the  writ petition, and as he did not conduct the enquiry, there was no  question of his disobeying any order. After perusing the records, the  court  by order dated 20.11.1998 came to the conclusion that a prima  facie case was made out for issuing a show cause notice only against  Sri S.K. Das (Enquiry Officer). This meant that no case was made out  for issue of show cause notice to the Chairman and Secretary-in- Charge of the Bank.  In fact, it was not the case of the first respondent  that after the appointment of S.K. Das as Enquiry Officer, there was  any disobedience by the Bank.  

20.     In the circumstances, the court ought to have proceeded to  consider whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order dated  9.4.1997, on the part of S K Das and if so, punish him for contempt.  As S.K. Das was nowhere in the picture when the order dated  9.4.1997 was passed in the writ petition, and as he was appointed as  an independent Enquiry Officer only by an order dated 5.1.1988 and  as there was a complaint about the non-cooperation by the first  respondent, (delinquent employee), it is doubtful whether there was  any case for even issuing a show cause notice to him. Be that as it  may. We are not concerned with the issue of show cause notice to  S.K. Das in this appeal. What is relevant to be noticed is that the    learned Single Judge could not have made an order in the contempt  proceedings, that Sri S.K. Das had, by his conduct, disqualified  himself to be the Enquiry Officer and that he shall cease to be the  Enquiry Officer and that another Enquiry Officer shall be appointed.  

21.     There was also no justification for the further direction by the  learned Single Judge in the contempt proceedings, that too by an  interlocutory order, that the complainant should immediately and  forthwith be reinstated into the service of the Bank, and shall be  deemed to be in the service of the Bank all through, that the employee  shall not be prevented in any manner from discharging his duties and  that he shall be paid all arrears of salary within four weeks, and that  the suspension order shall be deemed to have been revoked. These  were totally outside the scope of the proceedings for contempt and  amounted to adjudication of rights and liabilities not in issue in the  contempt proceedings. At all events, on the facts and circumstances,   there was no disobedience, breach or neglect on the part of the Bank  and its President and Secretary, to provoke the court to issue such  directions, even assuming that such directions could be issued in the  course of the contempt proceedings. Hence, directions (2) and (3) and

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the direction relating to revocation of suspension are liable to be set  aside.  

Re : SLP (c) Nos. 13045-46/2003 22.     These SLPs. arise out of the order dated 3.9.2001 in MAT No.  1102/2001 filed by the Bank against the order dated 20.11.1998 in  CPAN No. 2237/1997. As we have held that the appeal filed by the  Chairman and Secretary on behalf of the Bank [MAT No. 4075/1998]  against the said order was maintainable, these SLPs. have become    infructuous.  Conclusion : 23.     During the pendency of this appeal, the Enquiry Officer has  completed the enquiry and submitted his report dated 18.7.2002. No  action has been taken thereon in view of the pendency of this civil  appeal and the interim order dated 25.2.2002 which permitted only the  completion of the enquiry. In view of this decision, there will now be  no impediment for the Bank to take further action based on such  Inquiry Report.   24.     In view of the above, we dispose of these matters as follows :  

(i)     CA No. 1727/2002 is allowed. The order dated 26.2.2001 of  the Calcutta High Court in MAT No. 4075/1998 is set aside.  Directions (2) and (3) as also the direction that "the  suspension shall be immediately deemed to have been  revoked" contained in the order dated 20.11.1998 of the  learned Single Judge passed in CPAN No.2233/1997  (arising from C.O. No. 20008(W) of 1995) are deleted.  (ii)    SLP (C) Nos. 13045-46/2003 are dismissed as infructuous.  (iii)   The appellant-Bank is at liberty to take further action in  pursuance of the Inquiry Report dated 18.7.2002, in  accordance with law.  (iv)    Parties to bear their respective costs.