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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2106 of 2007

PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT OF COIMBATORE DISTRICT CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK

RESPONDENT: SECRETARY, COIMBATORE DISTRICT CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/2007

BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & TARUN CHATTERJEE

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T CIVIL APPEAL No.        2106        OF 2007 Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5187 OF 2005

C.K. THAKKER, J.

       Leave granted.         A Public Utility Undertaking (Co-operative Bank)  challenges in this appeal an order passed by a Single  Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated  September 18, 2000 in Writ Petition No. 11948 of 1993  and modified by the Division Bench of the said Court on  November 3, 2004 in Writ Appeal No. 45 of 2001. FACTUAL MATRIX         To appreciate in its proper perspective an important  question raised in the appeal, it is necessary to set out  relevant facts.         The appellant is Coimbatore District Central Co- operative Bank having its head office at Coimbatore.  It is  having 17 branches in the Revenue District of  Coimbatore.  It is the case of the appellant-Bank that the  Coimbatore District Central Bank Employees Association  (’Union’ for short) gave a ’strike notice’ on March 31,  1972 which was received by the Management on April 5,  1972 proposing to go on strike from April 14, 1972.  The  reason for such notice and going on strike was  suspension of certain employees and withholding of their  salary by the Management.  Since the strike-call was  illegal and the notice was not in consonance with the  provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the action of going  on strike was unlawful. The Union was accordingly  informed not to go on strike. The Labour Officer,  Coimbatore in the meanwhile commenced Conciliation  Proceedings in connection with certain issues raised by  the Union.  Despite proper advice by Labour Officer, the  employees commenced strike from April 17, 1972.  The  strike was totally illegal and unlawful.  On April 19,  1972, notice was issued to the Union stating therein that  the workmen should join duties by April 22, 1972 by  tendering unconditional apology. The employees accepted  it. A settlement had been arrived at between the  Management and the Union and 134 employees gave up  ’strike call’ and resumed work.  53 employees, however,  refused to join duty and continued their illegal strike and  acts of misconduct.  The illegal acts of employees affected  the work of the Bank very badly.  It was alleged that not  only the workmen did not join duty and continued illegal

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and unlawful strike, but also prevented other employees  from resuming duty and threatened them with dire  consequences if they returned for duty.  Disciplinary  proceedings were, therefore, initiated against 53  workmen, they were placed under suspension and  inquiry was instituted.  The employees were intimated of  the charges levelled against them, which they denied.  In  spite of notices, the workmen did not participate in  disciplinary proceedings and remained absent. The  Management was, therefore, constrained to proceed with  the disciplinary inquiry ex parte against them.  By an  order dated January 6, 1973, the workmen were held  guilty of the charges and an order of punishment was  passed.  By the said order, two punishments were  awarded on the workmen; (i) stoppage of increment for 1- 4 years with cumulative effect; and (ii) non-payment of  salary during the period of suspension.  According to the  Bank, the case was an appropriate one to impose  extreme penalty of dismissal from service, but by taking  liberal view, the extreme punishment was not imposed on  the employees and they were retained in employment by  the Bank.  The workmen joined duty on January 17,  1973.  They should have accepted the order gracefully  and appreciated the attitude adopted by the  Management.  The workmen, however, did not do so.   They preferred to file appeal which was dismissed by the  Executive Committee. DECISION OF LABOUR COURT The workmen, being aggrieved by the decision,  raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred  to Labour Court, Coimbatore by the Government under  Section 10 of the Act.  The Labour Court after extending  opportunity of hearing to both the sides and considering  the evidence on record framed the following two issues; 1.      Whether the punishment of stoppage of 1 to 4  increments with cumulative effect on the 1 to  53 workers is justified? 2.      Whether the 53 workmen are entitled to be  paid wages for the period of suspension?         After considering the evidence in its entirety and  relevant case law on the point, the Court held that all the  four charges levelled against the workmen were proved.   It also held the inquiry to be legal, valid and in  consonance with the principles of natural justice.  The  evidence established that threat was administered by the  employees. The Labour Court concluded; "Unlike criminal cases it is not necessary  that the evidence should be beyond doubt.   Nevertheless, the witnesses have given clear  evidence to prove charges.  Therefore, we have  to accept them and hold that charges 1 to 4  have been proved against all the 53  employees."

On the basis of the above finding, the Labour Court  held that it could not be said that the action of the  Management could be described as illegal, unlawful or  improper.  Accordingly, the demands of the workmen  were rejected and reference was dismissed. APPROACH OF HIGH COURT         Being aggrieved by the award passed by the Labour  Court, the Union approached the High Court by filing a  Writ Petition.  The learned Single Judge did not disagree  with the findings recorded by the Labour Court and held

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that the workmen were not entitled to wages for the  period they had not worked. As to the second  punishment, however, the learned Single Judge held that  stoppage of 1 to 4 annual increments with cumulative  effect was ’harsh’.  The penalty of stoppage of annual  increments with cumulative effect had far-reaching  consequences.  It would adversely affect the workmen  throughout their service and in retrial benefits to be  received by them. It would further affect their families.   Imposition of such punishment, according to the learned  Single Judge, was ’not valid in law’ and liable to be set  aside.  The petition was, accordingly, partly allowed  confirming the withdrawal of wages for the period of  suspension, but by setting aside the order of punishment  of stoppage of increments.  The Management was  directed to pay the arrears in respect of stoppage of  increments to the workmen with ’interest at the rate of  12% per annum’ within sixty days from the date of receipt  of the copy of the order.         The Management was aggrieved by the above order  passed by the learned Single Judge and preferred intra- court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.   The Division Bench rightly noted that it is settled law  that the question of choice and quantum of punishment  is within the discretion of the Management. "But, the  sentence has to suit the offence and the offender".  If it is  unduly harsh or vindictive, disproportionate or shocks  the conscience of the Court, it can be interfered with by  the Court.  Then referring to a leading decision of this  Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 4  SCC 611, the Division Bench held that the order passed  by the learned Single Judge required modification.  The  Division Bench opined that proper punishment would be  stoppage of increment/increments without cumulative  effect on all 53 employees would serve the ends of justice.   The Division Bench also held that the order passed by  the learned Single Judge directing the Management to  pay interest was not proper and was accordingly set  aside.  It is this order which is challenged by the  Management in the present appeal.

RIVAL SUBMISSIONS         We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.         The learned counsel for the appellant-Bank  contended that both, the learned Single Judge as well as  the Division Bench of the High Court, were in error in  interfering with the order of punishment passed by the  Management particularly when the said action had been  confirmed by a well-considered and well-reasoned award  made by the Labour Court, Coimbatore.  It was urged  that once an inquiry has been held to be in consonance  with rules of natural justice, charges had been proved  and an order of punishment had been passed, it could  not have been set aside by a ’Writ-Court’ in judicial  review.  The Labour Court recorded a finding of fact  which had not been disturbed by the High Court that  principles of natural justice were not violated.  The  inquiry was conducted in consonance with law and all  the charges levelled against the employees were  established.  If it is so, the High Court was clearly wrong  in interfering with the award of the Tribunal.  According  to the counsel, the High Court was neither exercising  appellate power over the action taken by the Management  nor on quantum of punishment awarded.  The Court was  also not having appellate jurisdiction over the Labour

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Court.  The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article  226/227 of the Constitution was limited to the exercise of  power of judicial review.  In exercise of that power, the  High Court could not substitute its own judgment for the  judgment/order/action of either the Management or the  Labour Court.  The order of the High Court, therefore,  deserves to be quashed and set aside.  It was also urged  that even if it is assumed that the High Court has  jurisdiction to enter into such arena, then also, in the  facts and circumstances of the case and considering the  allegations levelled and proved against the workmen, it  cannot be said that an order of stoppage of  increment/increments with cumulative effect could not  have been made.  On the contrary, the matter was very  serious which called for much more severe penalty, but  by taking liberal view, the Management had imposed only  a ’minor’ penalty.  Such reasonable order could not have  been set aside by the High Court.  The counsel submitted  that ’Banking service’ is an ’essential service’.  It has  public utility element therein and it was the duty of the  employees connected with such service to discharge their  duties sincerely, faithfully and whole-heartedly. In the  instant case, not only the workmen refused to join duty,  but they prevented other employees who had amicably  settled the matter with the Management in discharging  their duties by administering threat and by successfully  obstructing the Management in the discharge of its  obligations as Public Utility Undertaking.  Serious view,  therefore, was called for.  There was total and complete  misconception on the part of the High Court in holding  that the punishment was ’harsh’.  It was, therefore,  submitted on behalf of the Management that the order  passed by the learned Single Judge and modified by the  Division Bench deserves to be set aside by confirming the  action taken by the Management and approved by the  Labour Court, Coimbatore.         The learned counsel for the respondent-Union, on  the other hand, supported the order passed by the  Division Bench of the High Court.  According to him, the  learned Single Judge was fully justified in partly allowing  the petition observing that the punishment imposed on  the workmen was ’clearly harsh’ and in setting aside that  part of the punishment by which increment/increments   was/were stopped.  Since the punishment imposed by  the Management was grossly disproportionate, the  learned Single Judge was also right in directing the Bank  Management to pay salary with 12% interest.  It is no  doubt true, stated the learned counsel, that the Division  Bench partly set aside the direction of the learned Single  Judge by modifying the punishment permitting stoppage  of increment/increments of the workmen without  cumulative effect and by setting aside payment of salary  with 12% interest, but as the said part of the order  passed by the Division Bench has not been appealed  against by the Union, it would remain.  But no case has  been made out by the Bank Management to interfere with  the order of the Division Bench and the appeal deserves  to be dismissed. FINDINGS RECORDED         We have given our most anxious and thoughtful  consideration to the rival contentions of the parties. From  the facts referred to above and the proceedings in the  inquiry and final order of punishment, certain facts are  no longer in dispute.  A call for strike was given by the  Union which was illegal, unlawful and not in consonance

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with law.  Conciliation proceedings had been undertaken  and there was amicable settlement of dispute between  the Management on the one hand and the Union on the  other hand.  Pursuant to such settlement, 134 workmen  resumed duty.  53 workmen, however, in spite of the  strike being illegal, refused to join duty.  Their action  was, therefore, ex facie illegal.  The workmen were, in the  circumstances, placed under suspension and disciplinary  proceedings were initiated.  In spite of several  opportunities, they did not co-operate with the inquiry  and the Inquiry Officer was compelled to proceed ex parte  against them.  Four allegations were levelled against the  workmen;          (i)     The employees did not come for work from  April 17, 1972;         (ii)    They took part in illegal strike from that date,  i.e. April 17, 1972;         (iii)   They prevented other employees who returned  for work from joining duty by administering threat to  them; and          (iv)    They prevented the employees who came to  receive wages on April 17, 1972.         At the enquiry, all the charges levelled against the  employees were established.  In the light of the said  finding, the Management imposed punishment of (i)  stoppage of increment of 1 to 4 years with cumulative  effect; and (ii) non-payment of salary during period of  suspension.  In our considered opinion, the action could  not be said to be arbitrary, illegal, unreasonable or  otherwise objectionable.  When the Union challenged the  action and reference was made by the ’appropriate  Government’ to the Labour Court, Coimbatore, the  Labour Court considered all questions in their proper  perspective.  After affording opportunity of hearing to  both the parties, the Labour Court negatived the  contention of the Union that the proceedings were not in  consonance with principles of natural justice and the  inquiry was, therefore, vitiated.  It held that the inquiry  was in accordance with law. It also recorded a finding  that the allegations levelled against the workmen were  proved and in view of the charges levelled and proved  against the workmen, the punishment imposed on them  could not be said to be excessive, harsh or  disproportionate.  It accordingly disposed of the reference  against the workmen.  In our considered opinion, the  award passed by the Labour Court was perfectly just,  legal and proper and required ’no interference’.  The High  Court, in exercise of power of judicial review under Article  226/227 of the Constitution, therefore, should not have  interfered with the well-considered award passed by the  Labour Court.         The learned counsel for the Union, however,  submitted that under the ’doctrine of proportionality’, it  was not only the power, but the duty of the ’Writ Court’  to consider whether the penalty imposed on workmen  was in proportion to the misconduct committed by the  workmen.  Our attention, in this connection, was invited  by both the sides to several decisions of English Courts  as also of this Court. DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY         So far as the doctrine of proportionality is  concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said doctrine  has not only arrived at in our legal system but has come  to stay.  With the rapid growth of Administrative Law and  the need and necessity to control possible abuse of

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discretionary powers by various administrative  authorities, certain principles have been evolved by  Courts.  If an action taken by any authority is contrary to  law, improper, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise  unreasonable, a Court of Law can interfere with such  action by exercising power of judicial review.  One of such  modes of exercising power, known to law is the ’doctrine  of proportionality’.         ’Proportionality’ is a principle where the Court is  concerned with the process, method or manner in which  the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a  conclusion or arrived at a decision. The very essence of  decision-making consists in the attribution of relative  importance to the factors and considerations in the case.   The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true  nature of exercise \026 the elaboration of a rule of  permissible priorities.         de Smith states that ’proportionality’ involves  ’balancing test’ and ’necessity test’. Whereas the former  (’balancing test’) permits scrutiny of excessive onerous  penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a  manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter  (’necessity test’) requires infringement of human rights to  the least restrictive alternative. [’Judicial Review of  Administrative Action’; (1995); pp. 601-605; para 13.085;  see also Wade & Forsyth; ’Administrative Law’; (2005);  p.366].          In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th edn.); Reissue,  Vol.1(1); pp.144-45; para 78, it is stated;  "The court will quash exercise of  discretionary powers in which there is no  reasonable relationship between the objective  which is sought to be achieved and the means  used to that end, or where punishments  imposed by administrative bodies or inferior  courts are wholly out of proportion to the  relevant misconduct.  The principle of  proportionality is well established in European  law, and will be applied by English courts  where European law is enforceable in the  domestic courts.  The principle of  proportionality is still at a stage of  development in English law; lack of  proportionality is not usually treated as a  separate ground for review in English law, but  is regarded as one indication of manifest  unreasonableness."

       The doctrine has its genesis in the field of  Administrative Law.  The Government and its  departments, in administering the affairs of the country,  are expected to honour their statements of policy or  intention and treat the citizens with full personal  consideration without abuse of discretion.  There can be  no ’pick and choose’, selective applicability of  Government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or  unreasonableness.  It is not permissible to use a ’sledge- hammer to crack a nut’. As has been said many a time;  "Where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded".         In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service  Union (CCSU) v. Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER  935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1985) AC 374 (HL), Lord  Diplock proclaimed;  "Judicial review has I think developed to  a stage today when, without reiterating any

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analysis of the steps by which the development  has come about, one can conveniently classify  under three heads the grounds on which  administrative action is subject to control by  judicial review.  The first ground I would call  ’illegality’, the second ’irrationality’ and the  third ’procedural impropriety’.  This is not to  say that further development on a case by case  basis may not in course of time add further  grounds.  I have in mind particularly the  possible adoption in the future of the principle of  proportionality’\005"           (emphasis supplied)

                CCSU has been reiterated by English Courts in  several subsequent cases.  We do not think it necessary  to refer to all those cases. So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine  is well-settled.  Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held  that if punishment imposed on an employee by an  employer is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or  unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial  scrutiny, and it is always open to a Court to interfere  with such penalty in appropriate cases.          In Hind Construction Co. v. Workmen, (1965) 2 SCR  85 : AIR 1965 SC 917, some workers remained absent  from duty treating a particular day as holiday.  They were  dismissed from service.  The Industrial Tribunal set aside  the action.  This Court held that the absence could have  been treated as leave without pay.  The workmen might  have been warned and fined.  (But) "It is impossible to  think that any reasonable employer would have imposed  the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire  permanent staff in this manner."  The Court concluded  that the punishment imposed on the workmen was not  only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one  which, in our judgment, no reasonable employer would  have imposed.  (emphasis supplied)         In Indian Chamber of Commerce v. Workmen, (1972)  1 SCC 40 : AIR 1972 SC 763, the allegation against the  employee of the Federation was that he issued legal  notices to the Federation and to the International  Chamber of Commerce which brought discredit to the  Federation \026 the employer.  Domestic inquiry was held  against the employee and his services were terminated.   The punishment was held to be disproportionate to the  misconduct alleged and established.  This Court observed  that "the Federation had made mountain out of a mole  hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its  prestige and reputation."         In Ranjit Thakur referred to eariler, an army officer  did not obey the lawful command of his superior officer  by not eating food offered to him.  Court Martial  proceedings were initiated and a sentence of rigorous  imprisonment of one year was imposed.  He was also  dismissed from service, with added disqualification that  he would be unfit for future employment.  Applying the doctrine of proportionality and  following CCSU, Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then  was) observed:         "The question of the choice and quantum  of punishment is within the jurisdiction and  discretion of the court-martial.  But the  sentence has to suit the offence and the  offender.  It should not be vindictive or unduly

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harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to  the offence as to shock the conscience and  amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias.   The doctrine of proportionality as part of the  concept of judicial review, would ensure that  even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within  the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the  decision of the court even as to sentence is an  outrageous defence of logic, then the sentence  would not be immune from correction.   Irrationality and perversity are recognized  grounds of judicial review."                                                             (Emphasis supplied) DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY : WHETHER  APPLICABLE         From the above decisions, it is clear that our legal  system also has accepted the doctrine of proportionality.   The question, however, is whether in the facts and  circumstances of the present case, the High Court was  justified in invoking and applying the doctrine of  proportionality.  In our judgment, the answer must be in  the negative.  Normally, when disciplinary proceedings  have been initiated and finding of fact has been recorded  in such inquiry, it cannot be interfered with unless such  finding is based on ’no evidence’ or is perverse, or is such  that no reasonable man in the circumstances of the case  would have reached such finding.  In the present case,  four charges had been levelled against the workmen.  An  inquiry was instituted and findings recorded that all the  four charges were proved.  The Labour Court considered  the grievances of the workmen, negatived all the  contentions raised by them, held the inquiry to be in  consonance with principles of natural justice and  findings supported by evidence.  Keeping in view the  charges proved, the Labour Court, in our opinion, rightly  held that the punishment imposed on workmen could not  be said to be harsh so as to interfere with it. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was not  right in exercising power of judicial review under Article  226/227 of the Constitution and virtually substituting its  own judgment for the judgment of the Management  and/or of the Labour Court.  To us, the learned counsel  for the appellant-Bank is also right in submitting that  apart from charges 1 and 2, charges 3 and 4 were  ’extremely serious’ in nature and could not have been  underestimated or underrated by the High Court.         In this connection, it is profitable to refer to a  decision of this Court in Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram  Prabesh Singh & Ors., (1964) 1 SCR 709 : AIR 1964 SC  486.  In that case, the respondents were employees of the  appellant. A strike was going on in the concern of the  appellant. The respondents obstructed loyal and willing  trammers from working in the Colliery and insisted those  workmen to join them in the obstruction.  A charge-sheet  was served on the respondents and disciplinary inquiry  was instituted.  They were found guilty and were  dismissed from service. Since another reference was  pending, approval of the Industrial Tribunal was sought  which was granted. In a reference, however, the  Industrial Tribunal held that penalty of dismissal was  uncalled for and amounted to victimization. The  Management approached this Court. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the  Tribunal and upholding the order of dismissal, this Court  stated;

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       Now there is no doubt that though in  case of proved misconduct, normally the  imposition of a penalty may be within the  discretion of the management there may be  cases where the punishment of dismissal for  the misconduct proved may be so  unconscionable or so grossly out of proportion  to the nature of the offence that the tribunal  may be able to draw an inference of  victimisation merely from the punishment  inflicted. But we are of opinion that the  present is not such a case and no inference of  victimisation can be made merely from the fact  that punishment of dismissal was imposed in  this case and not either fine or suspension. It  is not in dispute that a strike was going on  during those days when the misconduct was  committed. It was the case of the appellant  that the strike was unjustified and illegal and  it appears that the Regional Labour  Commissioner, Central, Dhanbad, agreed with  this view of the appellant. It was during such a  strike that the misconduct in question took  place and the misconduct was that these  thirteen workmen physically obstructed other  workmen who were willing to work from doing  their work by sitting down between the  tramlines. This was in our opinion serious  misconduct on the part of the thirteen workmen  and if it is found \026 as it has been found \026  proved, punishment of dismissal would be  perfectly justified.              (emphasis supplied)

       In M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra  Sharma, (2005) 3 SCC 401, this Court held that  dismissal for breach of discipline at workplace by  employee could not be said to be disproportionate to the  charge levelled and established and no interference was  called for on the ground that such punishment was  shockingly disproportionate to the charge pleaded and  proved.         As observed by this Court in M.P. Gangadharan &  Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 162, the  constitutional requirement for judging the question of  reasonableness and fairness on the part of the statutory  authority must be considered having regard to the factual  matrix in each case. It cannot be put in a straight-jacket  formula. It must be considered keeping in view the  doctrine of flexibility. Before an action is struck down,  the Court must be satisfied that a case has been made  out for exercise of power of judicial review. The Court  observed that we are not unmindful of the development of  the law that from the doctrine of ’Wednesbury  unreasonableness’, the Court is leaning towards the  doctrine of ’proportionality’. But in a case of this nature,  the doctrine of proportionality must also be applied  having regard to the purport and object for which the Act  was enacted.          It was then contended on behalf of 53 workmen that  if the objectionable act on the part of the workmen was  going on strike, all workmen ought to have been treated  equally and even-handedly. The Management was not   right in reinstating 134 employees immediately by  depriving similar benefit to 53 employees.  It was,  therefore, submitted that in the facts and circumstances

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of the case, the High Court was right in considering that  aspect. Keeping in view the fact that they (134 workmen)  had joined work and resumed duty, they were paid wages  also. Since other employees (53 workmen) had not joined  duty, the action of the Management of non-payment of  salary may not be interfered with. But if they would be  visited with other penal consequences of stoppage of  increment/increments, the action would be arbitrary and  unreasonable.  We are unable to uphold the contention. In our  considered opinion, 53 employees cannot be said to be  similarly situated to 134 employees who had entered into  amicable settlement with the Management and resumed  duty in 1972.  It is settled law that equals must be  treated equally and unequal treatment to equals would  be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  But, it is  equally well-established that unequals cannot be treated  equally. Equal treatment to unequals would also be  violative of ’equal protection clause’ enshrined by Article  14 of the Constitution. So far as 134 employees are  concerned, they accepted the terms and conditions of the  settlement and resumed work.  53 workmen, on the other  hand, did not accept the settlement, continued with the  strike which was declared illegal and unlawful and in  departmental inquiry, they were found guilty. Moreover,  they resorted to unlawful actions by administering threat  to loyal workers.  53 workmen, therefore, in our  judgment, cannot be said to form one and the same class  in which 134 employees were placed. 53 employees,  therefore, cannot claim similar benefit which had been  granted to 134 employees.         In Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC  177, a similar mistake was committed by the Central  Administrative Tribunal which was corrected by this  Court. In that case, P, an employee was chargesheeted  alongwith other two employees for preparing false pay  bills and bogus identity card. All of them were found  guilty. A minor punishment was imposed on two  employees, but P was dismissed from service since he  was the ’mastermind’ of the plan. P approached the  Central Administrative Tribunal.  The Tribunal modified  the punishment on the ground that two other persons  were let off with minor punishment but the same benefit  was not given to P. His application was, therefore,  allowed and the penalty was reduced in the line of two  other employees. The Union of India approached this  Court. It was urged that the case of P was not similar to  other employees inasmuch as he was the principal  delinquent who was responsible for preparing the whole  plan was a party to the fraud and the Tribunal was in  error in extending the benefit which had been given to  other two employees.  Upholding the contention, this  Court set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and  restored the order of dismissal passed by the Authority  against him. The principle laid down in Parma Nanda has been  reiterated recently in Obettee (P) Ltd. V. Mohd. Shafiq  Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 47. In Obettee, M instigated the  workers of the factory to go on strike. He did not allow  the vehicles carrying the articles to go out of the factory  and also administered threat to co-workers. Proceedings  were initiated against three employees. Two of them  tendered unconditional apology and assurance in writing  that they would perform their duties diligently and would  not indulge in strike. The proceedings were, therefore,

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dropped against them. M, however, continued to contest  the charges levelled against him. He was held guilty and  was dismissed from service. The Tribunal upheld the  action. The High Court, however, held that the distinction  made by the Tribunal between M and other two workmen  was ’artificial’ and accordingly granted relief to M similar  to one granted to other two employees. Setting aside the order of the High Court, upholding  the action taken against him and restoring the order of  the Tribunal, this Court observed that the cases of other  two employees stood on a different footing and the High  Court failed to appreciate the distinctive feature that  whereas the two employees tendered unconditional  apology, M continued to justify his action. The order of  the High Court was, therefore, clearly unsustainable. It, therefore, cannot be said that the cases of 53  employees were similar to 134 employees and 53  employees were also entitled to claim similar benefit as  extended by the Management to 134 employees.         The net result of the above discussion would be that  the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge and  modified by the Division Bench of the High Court must  be set aside. Certain developments, however, were  brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the  Union.  It was stated that though in the departmental  proceedings the workmen were held guilty, their services  were not terminated.  They were not paid wages for  intervening period for which they had not worked, but  were allowed to join duty and in fact they resumed work  in the year 1973. This was done before more than three  decades. The Labour Court did not grant any relief to  them. Though the learned Single Judge allowed their  petition and granted some relief, the order was modified  by the Division Bench. 53 employees are now performing  their functions and discharging their duties faithfully,  diligently and to the satisfaction of the appellant-Bank.   No proceedings have been initiated against them  thereafter.  ’Industrial peace’ has been restored.  If at this  stage, some order will be passed by this Court after so  long a period, it may adversely affect the functioning of  the Bank.  It was further submitted that the grievance of  the Bank has been vindicated and correct legal position  has been declared by this Court. The Court in the  peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore,  may not interfere with a limited relief granted by the  Division Bench of the High Court. In our considered view, the submission is well  founded and deserves acceptance.  Hence, even though  we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was not  right in granting benefits and the order passed by the  Division Bench also is not proper, it would not be  appropriate to interfere with the final order passed by the  Division Bench. Hence, while declaring the law on the  point, we temper justice with mercy. In the exercise of  plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, we  think that it would not be proper to deprive 53 workmen  who have received limited benefits under the order  passed by the Division Bench of the High Court.         For the foregoing reasons, we hold that neither the  learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High  Court was justified in interfering with the action taken by  the Management and the award passed by the Labour  Court, Coimbatore which was strictly in consonance with  law. In peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and  in exercise of power under Article 142 of the

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Constitution, we do not disturb the final order passed by  the Division Bench of the High Court on November 3,  2004 in Writ Appeal No. 45 of 2001.   The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the above  terms.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there  shall be no order as to costs.