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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5422-5423 of 1998

PETITIONER: Meher Rusi Dalal

RESPONDENT: U.O.I. & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2004

BENCH: S. N. VARIAVA & H. K. SEMA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S. N. VARIAVA, J.

       These Appeals are against a Judgment of the Bombay High Court  dated 6th July, 1998.         Briefly stated the facts are as follows: One Jerbano Cursetji and Dr. K. J. Cursetji were granted a lease in  perpetuity by the Municipal Authority of Bombay in the year 1932.  On  11th January, 1938 the property was taken over by the Defence  Department for war purposes.  The Defence Department paid a sum of  Rs. 1,903/- per annum and such payments have been made till 1994.  In 1980 a notice to quit out was given to the Defence Department.   Thereafter in 1982 a Writ Petition No. 919/1982 was filed for directions  that the property  be acquired or the possession be handed back.  In  that Writ Petition a statement was made, on the basis of the written  instructions received from the Union of India, that the land would be  acquired.  On this statement the Writ Petition was withdrawn.         The land was still not acquired. Therefore on 8th June, 1994  Jerbano Cursetji filed Writ Petition No. 1733/1994 for directions that in  compliance with the statement made earlier the land be acquired or  the possession be handed back.  After this Writ Petition was filed, on  3rd November, 1994, Jerbano Cursetji died.  It must be mentioned that  her husband Dr. K. J. Cursetji had died earlier to the filing of the Writ  Petition.          The Government now invoked urgency clause under Section 17  of the Land Acquisition Act and a Notification under Section 4 was  published on 31st December, 1994.   Section 6 Notification was  published on 23rd February, 1995 and an Award came to be passed on  30th May, 1995.   In that Award the compensation was fixed at Rs.  9,20,51,175/-.     The Appellants, who were the Legal Representatives   of Mrs. Jerbano Cursetji and Dr. K. J. Cursetji, applied that the amount  of compensation be paid to them.  Since there was no response they  filed Notice of Motion bearing No. 156/1996 in pending Writ Petition  No. 1733/94 that the amount be paid to them.  On 24th June, 1996 the  High Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer to deposit the  amount in Court.         On 24th July, 1996 the Union of India filed Writ Petition No.  1603/1996 challenging the Award as excessive.  Union of India took  out the Notice of Motion No. 279/96 for extension of time to deposit  the amount. On 30th August, 1996 the Writ Petition taken out by the  Union of India was rejected. However Union of India was granted time  till 1st October, 1996 to deposit the amount.         The Union of India now files a S.L.P., in this Court, against the  Order dated 24th June 1996.  On 2nd September, 1996 the S.L.P. was  dismissed with the following observation: "\005\005\005\005.The Award of the Collector is an offer made  on behalf of the State and, therefore, under law, the State  cannot question the correctness of the award determined

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by the Land Acquisition Officer.  The State is bound by the  same.  Under these circumstances, they cannot impeach  the award of the Collector as being excessive of the  prevailing market value as on the date of the notification.   There is no law applicable to the Petitioners that they are  entitled to seek any reference under Section 18 as regards  the rate of compensation determined under Section 23(1)  of the Act.  Only in the State of U.P. by a local  amendment, such a right to the State to seek reference  under Section 18(3) was conferred upon the  Commissioner.  No such similar law is existing under Act 1  of 1874."

       "\005\005\005.,, it would be open to them to agitate the  remedy in that behalf in an appeal filed against that order  in the Writ Petition or in any appropriate proceedings  arising thereunder, we do not find any illegality in the  impugned order.

       The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed."

       The Union of India again applied to the High Court for extension  of time.  The High Court by its Order dated 1st October, 1996 refused  to extend the time.   Union of India now files an S.L.P. against Order dated 30th  August 1996.  This S.L.P. also came to be rejected by this Court, but  time to make deposit was extended till 25th October, 1996. On 25th  October 1996 Union of India orally applied to this Court for permission  to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings.  This was not granted by  this Court.    The Union of India then filed an application before the Special  Land Acquisition Officer seeking permission to withdraw from  acquisition and to set aside the award.  This was not granted.  On 4th  April, 1997, the Union of India took out Notice of Motion No. 101/97 in  Writ Petition 1733/94 seeking permission of the High Court to  withdraw from acquisition.  The High Court by its Order dated 25th  July, 1997 held as follows: "\005\005\005\005.In our judgment, Respondents No. 1 and 2  cannot be permitted to resile from their statements earlier  made that the property in question will be acquired.  As far  as withdrawal from acquisition is concerned, the Award in  question has already been passed and possession is  already with Respondents No. 1 and 2.  After passing of  the award, nothing further was required to be done in  order to obtain possession.  Land has thus vested in the  government.   Respondents No. 1 and 2, in the  circumstances, are not entitled to withdraw from  acquisition in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act."

"Hence, Respondents No. 1 and 2 are not, at this  belated stage, entitled to withdraw from acquisition.  In  the circumstances we find that present notice of motion is  devoid of merit and the same is dismissed with costs."

The Union of India again filed a S.L.P. before this Court against the  rejection of the Notice of Motion.  This Court inquired whether Union of  India is willing to hand back possession.  This Court was informed that  Union of India was not willing to hand back possession.  This Court  therefore declined to interfere and directed the Union of India to file an  undertaking affirming that the payment would be made.  On 1st  September, 1997 the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, New  Delhi filed an affidavit of undertaking in the following terms: "\005\005\005..I, on behalf of the Government of India undertake  to deposit with the Special Land Acquisition Officer,

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Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority,  Bombay a sum of Rs. 9,20,51,175/- (Rupees nine crore,  twenty lacs, fifty one thousand one hundred and seventy  five only) as awarded by the said Land Acquisition Officer  on 30.5.1995 in respect of acquisition of plot No. 53-A,  Worli, Bombay in proceedings No. LAQ/SR-I/94 on or  before 21-9-97.  The said amount will be paid over to the  Claimants after steps are taken by the SLAO for vesting  the property absolutely in Government of India.

       I respectfully submit that the above said deposit will  be without prejudice to the rights of either party to  initiate/take any proceedings arising out of in respect of or  relating to the said land or acquisition thereof in  accordance with law.  It is, however, submitted that in  view of the above undertaking contempt of court  proceedings No. 5/97 in Bombay High Court on account of  failure to deposit the above said amount is liable to be  dropped.                  I say that the statement made above are true to my  knowledge."

This Court kept this undertaking on file and disposed of the S.L.P. in  the following term:         "\005. We are not inclined to interfere with the  impugned order.  The undertaking filed on behalf of the  Petitioners is kept on record.  On the prayer of learned  ASG appearing for the Union of India, time to deposit  money in High Court is extended by 21st September, 1997.   It is submitted by Mr. Nariman, Learned senior counsel  appearing for the Respondents that in view of the  assurance given that the money will be deposited by 21st  September, 1997 the respondents will not press the  Contempt Petition.  The S.L.P. stands disposed of."          The Contempt Petition mentioned in this Order is a contempt  petition which had been filed by the Appellants before the High Court  on 12th December, 1996.         Now the Union of India files an application before the Land  Acquisition Officer for apportionment of their share under Section 30 of  the Land Acquisition Act.  The Land Acquisition Officer rejects this  application by his Order dated 26th September, 1997, wherein it is  mentioned that no claim had been made by the Defence Department  or the Union of India in the land acquisition proceedings, even though  their representatives were present at the time of hearing.  It is also  held that they had given an undertaking to this Court that they would  make the payment and in that undertaking there was no mention of  claim for apportionment.    The Union of India then filed Writ Petition No. 1929/97  challenging the aforesaid order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer.   The Petitioner filed Contempt Petition in this Court on 21st January,  1998 as the Union of India had not permitted payment to be made to  the Petitioner.   A notice was issued by this Court in the Contempt  Petition on 20th February, 1998.            On 6th July, 1998 the Bombay High Court allowed the Writ  Petition filed by the Respondents and directed the Special Land  Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 30 of the Land  Acquisition Act.  The High Court has held (a) that it was not disputed  that the Respondents were tenants paying yearly rent, (b) that under  Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act a duty is cast upon the Special  Land Acquisition Officer to inquire and consider the interest of the  Respondents and to apportion the compensation irrespective of  whether they had appeared or not.  It is held that as the Land  Acquisition Officer had not enquired into and considered

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apportionment of compensation amongst all persons interested in the  land, in spite of the fact, that he had information that the Respondents  were tenants they were entitled to claim reference (c) that the  Respondents are not entitled to claim a reference under Section 18 of  the Land Acquisition Act and thus the only remedy was to claim a  reference under Section 30 or file a Civil Suit.  (d) that the application  for apportionment is not barred by res-judicata or on principles  analogous to res-judicata.  It is this Judgment which has been  impugned in these Appeals.         In these Appeals, by an interim order dated 30th October, 1998  the Appellants have been permitted to withdraw 50% of the amount  deposited subject to the outcome of the Appeal.  The Contempt  Petition taken out by the Petitioners was also directed to be heard  along with these Appeals.  Hence the Contempt Petition is also on  board today.         In our view, the High Court has clearly erred in setting aside the  order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference. It is  settled law that in land acquisition proceedings the Government cannot  and does not acquire its own interest.   The interest which is acquired  in land acquisition proceedings are interest of 3rd parties.  This Court  has as far back as in 1955, in the case of  The Collector of Bombay vs.  Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors. reported in (1955) 1 SCR 1311,  negatived a contention that when land is acquired valuation is made of  all interest thereon including the interest of the Government.  This  Court held as follows: "We are unable to accept his contention. When the  Government acquires lands under the provisions of the  Land Acquisition Act, it must be for a public purpose, and  with a view to put them to that purpose, the Government  acquires the sum total of all private interests subsisting in  them. If the Government has itself an interest in the land,  it has only to acquire the other interests outstanding  therein, so that it might be in a position to pass it on  absolutely for public user. In In the Matter of the Land  Acquisition Act: The Government of Bombay v. Esupali  Salebhai ([1909] I.L.R. 34 Bom. 618, 636) Batchelor, J.  observed :  "In other words Government, as it seems to me, are not  debarred from acquiring and paying for the only  outstanding interests merely because the Act, which  primarily contemplates all interests as held outside  Government, directs that the entire compensation based  upon the market value of the whole land, must be  distributed among the claimants".  There, the Government claimed ownership of the land on  which there stood buildings belonging to the claimants,  and it was held that the Government was bound to acquire  and pay only for the superstructure, as it was already the  owner of the site. Similarly in Deputy Collector, Calicut  Division v. Aiyavu Pillay ([1911] 9 I.C. 341), Wallis, J. (as  he then was) observed :  "It is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not  contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest  which already belongs to Government in land which is  being acquired under the Act, but only for the acquisition  of such interests in the land as do not already belong to  the Government".  With these observations, we are in entire agreement.  When Government possesses an interest in land which is  the subject of acquisition under the Act, that interest is  itself outside such acquisition, because there can be no  question of Government acquiring what is its own. An  investigation into the nature and value of that interest will  no doubt be necessary for determining the compensation  payable for the interest outstanding in the claimants, but

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that would not make it the subject of acquisition. The  language of section VIII of Act No. VI of 1857 also  supports this construction. Under that section, the lands  vest in the Government "free from all other estates, rights,  titles and interests", which must clearly mean other than  those possessed by the Government. It is on this  understanding of the section that the award, Exhibit P, is  framed. The scheme of it is that the interests of the  occupants are ascertained and valued, and the  Government is directed to pay the compensation fixed for  them. There is no valuation of the right of the Government  to levy assessment on the lands, and there is no award of  compensation therefor.  

       Faced with this situation Mr. Goswami relied upon the Judgment  of this Court in the case of Inder Parshad vs. Union of India reported in  (1994) 5 SCC 239.  In this case the Government had given a lease of  the land.  That land was then acquired. This Court recognized the  principle that the Government is not enjoined to acquire its own  interest in the land.  This Court held that however where the Collector  determined the compensation without taking into consideration that  the private party is only entitled to leasehold interest, then the  compensation would have to be apportioned between the Government  and the private party.  There can be no dispute with this preposition.   In the present case it is to be seen that the land belonged to the  Municipality of Bombay. In the Award the Collector has apportioned  the compensation between the Municipality and the Appellants herein.  Therefore, this authority can be of no assistance to the Respondents  who are not claiming the land as owners.  They are now claiming on  the basis that they are protected tenants under the Bombay Rent Act  and that as such tenants they are entitled to share in the  compensation.  As is being pointed out later no such claim was made  before the Collector and it cannot be made at this stage.  Mr. Goswami also relied upon the case of Ratan Kumar Tandon  vs. State of U.P. reported in (1997) 2 SCC 161.   In this case, by  virtue of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act excess land  stood vested in the State. In the Reference under Section 18 the State  pointed out that no compensation could be paid in respect of the  excess land as it already stood vested in the State.  This Court held  that the claimants would only be entitled to compensation for the land  which remained with them after the application of the Urban Land  (Ceiling and Regulation) Act.  This authority is of no assistance to the  Respondents. If anything this authority is against the Respondents  inasmuch as it also recognizes that the Government does not acquire  its own land and that when compensation is being fixed it is only in  respect of the interest of the third party claimants.            Of course if the Respondents had a right as tenants they would  be entitled to share in the compensation. However such a claim, if any,  was in respect of a pre-existing right and should have been made  before the Land Acquisition Officer in the land acquisition proceedings.   From the Award it is clear that the Respondents were represented  before the Land Acquisition Officer. They had been given notice. No  claim of tenancy had been made before the Land Acquisition Officer.  The High Court in its earlier Judgment dated 30th August 1996 has  itself observed as follows: "\005..admittedly by the petitioners have not contended  before the land acquisition officer that they were yearly  tenants protected under the Bombay Rent Act."

The Special Land Acquisition Officer has also in his decision dated 26th  September 1997 pointed out that Respondents were represented in  the acquisition proceedings but had made no such claim. The High  Court has also failed to notice that even the Respondents do not assert  that they had made any such claim in the acquisition proceedings.  

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The High Court is thus in error in observing that the Land Acquisition  Officer was aware of such a claim.   We are unable to subscribe to the  view of the High Court that it was the duty of the Land Acquisition  Officer to enquire into and ascertain their interest in the land whether  or not they were present. The Special Land acquisition Officer may  have been aware that they were in possession. But merely because a  party is in possession does not lead to an inference that the party is in  possession under a right. It must be remembered that the possession  had been taken during the war for defence purposes and that the  notice to quit had been given in 1980.  Therefore, if any claim to  tenancy was to be made it had to be specifically raised and then only it  could have been determined.  If a party is present and makes no claim  the Special Land Acquisition Officer is under no duty to make an  enquiry. Once a party is represented and makes no claim it would be a  reasonable inference that it is claiming no rights. It is clear that the  claim of tenancy, now put forth, is an afterthought. Having failed in all  their efforts to frustrate payment, through the gamut of litigations set  out hereinabove, now this attempt.            Even otherwise, we find that the High Court has clearly erred in  not noticing that it has already been held by this Court that the  Respondents are not entitled to a reference under Section 18 of the  Land Acquisition Act.  What is the scope of Sections 18 and 30 has  been set out by this Court in the case of G. H. Grant vs. State reported  in (1965) 3 SCR 756.  It has been held as follows:         "There are two provisions ss. 18(1) and 30 which  invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a  dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the  persons to whom it is payable. By sub-s. (1) of s. 18 the  Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to  apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on  the application within the time prescribed by sub-s. (2) of  that section of a person interested who has not accepted  the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to  the Court after compensation is settled under s. 11, any  dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any  part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any  part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the  award which relates to apportionment of compensation,  who is present either personally or through a  representative, or on whom a notice is served under sub-s.  (2) of s. 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply  to the Collector within the time prescribed under s. 18(2)  to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not  appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector  may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a  dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom  it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference under  s. 30, for determination of his right to compensation which  may have existed before the award, or which may have  developed upon him since the award. Whereas under s. 18  an application made to the Collector must be made within  the period prescribed by sub-s. (2) cl. (b), there is no such  period prescribed under s. 30. Again under s. 18 the  collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed  by a person interested. The Collector is under s. 30 not  enjoined to make a reference : he may relegate the person  raising a dispute as to apportionment, or as to the person  to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in  a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared  by his award."         xxx                     xxx                     xxx

"\005\005..The Collector is not authorised to decide finally the  conflicting rights of the persons interested in the amount  of compensation : he is primarily concerned with the

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acquisition of the land. In determining the amount of  compensation which may be offered, he has, it is true, to  apportion the amount of compensation between the  persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of  whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or  not they have appeared before him. But the scheme of  apportionment by the Collector does not finally determine  the rights of the persons interested in the amount of  compensation : the award is only conclusive between the  Collector and the persons interested and not among the  persons interested. The Collector has no power to finally  adjudicate upon the title to compensation, that dispute has  to be decided either in a reference under s. 18 or under s.  30 or in a separate suit. Payment of compensation  therefore under s. 31 to the person declared by the award  to be entitled thereto discharges the State of its liability to  pay compensation (subject to any modification by the  Court), leaving it open to the claimant to compensation to  agitate his right in a reference under s. 30 or by a  separate suit."

       This Court has again in the case of Sharda Devi vs. State of  Bihar reported in (2003) 3 SCC 128 very succinctly dealt with the  provisions of Sections 18 and 30 and on an analysis of the provisions  and the various authorities held as follows:         "26. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy  of reference under Section 18 is intended to be available  only to a ’person interested’. A person present either  personally or through representative or on whom a notice  is served under Section 12(2) is obliged, subject to his  specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector  within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to make a  reference to the Court. The basis of title on which the  reference would be sought for under Section 18 would  obviously be a pre-existing title by reference to the date of  the award. So is Section 29, which speaks of ’persons  interested’. Finality to the award spoken of by Section  12(1) of the Act is between the Collector on one hand and  the ’persons interested’ on the other hand and attaches to  the issues relating to (i) the true area, i.e. measurement of  the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e. the quantum of  compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the compensation  among the ’persons interested’. The ’persons interested’  would be bound by the award without regard to the fact  whether they have respectively appeared before the  Collector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by  Section 29 is as between the ’persons interested’ inter se  and is confined to the issue as to the correctness of the  apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation  only to ’persons interested’. It would, therefore, be  available for being invoked by the ’persons interested’ if  they were neither present nor represented in proceedings  before the Collector, nor were served with notice under  Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of  a title coming into existence post award. The definition of  ’person interested’ speaks of ’an interest in compensation  to be made’. An interest coming into existence post award  gives rise to a claim in compensation which has already  been determined. Such a person can also have recourse to  Section 30. In any case, the dispute for which Section 30  can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) as to the  apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part  thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount of  compensation (already determined) or any part thereof is  payable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre-existing

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right would not be a ’person interested’, as already pointed  out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre- existing, the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to  invoke either Section 18 or Section 30 seeking  determination of its alleged pre-existing right. A right  accrued or devolved post award may be determined in a  reference under Section 30 depending on Collector’s  discretion to show indulgence, without any bar as to  limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left open by  the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independent  legal proceedings. This view is just, sound and logical as a  title post award could not have been canvassed upto the  date of the award and should also not be left without  remedy by denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this  angle, Section 18 and 30 would not overlap and would  have fields to operate independent of each other."  

       xxx                     xxx                     xxx          "36. To sum up the State is not a ’person interested’  as defined in Section 3(2) of the Act. It is not a party to  the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which  the expression ’parties to the litigation’ carries. The  Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a  representative of the State Government. Land or an  interest in land pre-owned by State cannot be subject- matter of acquisition by State the question of deciding the  ownership of State or holding of any interest by the State  Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot  arise in proceedings before the Collector (as defined in  Section 3(c) of the Act). If it was a government land there  was no question of initiating the proceedings for  acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the  land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to pre-existing  right or interest of the State Government in the property  sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being  adjudicated upon or referred to the Civil Court for  determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the  Act. The reference made by the Collector to the Court was  wholly without jurisdiction and the Civil Court ought to  have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have  rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of  the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication  thereon by the Civil Court suffer from lack of inherent  jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared  so."

It is thus clear that persons who have notice of acquisition  proceedings would have to apply for a Reference under Section 18.  To  be noted that under Section 18 Reference could be in respect of the  measurement of the land and/or the amount of compensation and/or  in respect of persons to whom it is payable and/or for apportionment  of compensation amongst persons interested.     Section 30 merely  deals with apportionment of compensation when the amount of  compensation has been settled.   Thus, as set out in the above  mentioned cases, Section 18 is to be invoked when a person claiming  a pre-existing right has notice of the acquisition proceedings, whereas  Section 30 comes into play only if a person had no notice of the  acquisition proceedings or the rights came into existence after the  acquisition proceedings.   It is clear that the person who had notice of  the acquisition proceedings and who, by virtue of Section 50, is  debarred from filing a Reference under Section 18 cannot be allowed  to apply for a Reference under Section 30.  In this case, this Court has  already held that the Respondents were not entitled to apply for a  Reference under Section 18.   This meant that they were not entitled

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to seek a Reference not just in respect of the compensation but also  for apportionment of the compensation.   Once it has been held that  they had no right to move under Section 18 there was no question of  their being permitted to move under Section 30.  To permit a party,  who cannot apply under Section 18, to apply under Section 30 would  be to render Section 50 nugatory.            The High Court has also erred in holding that the claim for  apportionment was not barred by principle of res-judicata or principles  analogous thereto.  As has been set out hereinabove the Respondents  had filed Writ Petition No. 1603/96 challenging the Award as  excessive.   One of the grounds for claiming the Award as excessive  was as follows: "Petitioners submit that thus while assessing or  determine the compensation the Special Land Acquisition  Officer - Respondent No. 4 ought to have considered the  share of the tenants/lessees/documents including the  Ministry of Defence on the basis of hiring and as to that  extent the compensation ought to have been reduced."

Thus in that Writ Petition they had already claimed that their share as  tenants/lessees should have been taken into consideration.  That Writ  Petition came to be dismissed.  The S.L.P. filed against that Writ  Petition was withdrawn by them.  To claim apportionment on the  ground that they had share as tenant or lessee is in fact nothing else  but an attempt to reduce the compensation.  The prayer asked for now  is identical to the prayer made earlier.         Even otherwise, it is settled law that in every proceeding the  whole of the claim which a party is entitled to make should be made  and where a party omits to sue in respect of any portion of the claim  he cannot afterwards sue for the portion so omitted.   Explanation 4 to  Section 11 C. P. C. also provides that any matter which might or ought  to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former  proceeding will be deemed to have been a matter directly and  subsequently in issue in that proceeding.    Therefore, clearly the claim  now made was barred on principle of res-judicata or principles  analogous thereto.   There is one other reason why the High Court should not have  allowed the Writ Petition.   Under Section 18 if a party wants to claim a  Reference it is to be done within a particular period.  The Proviso to  Section 18 reads as follows: "\005\005\005\005\005 Provided that every such application shall be  made -

(a)     if the person making it was present or  represented before the Collector at the time  when he made his award, within six weeks  from the date of the Collector’s award; (b)     in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt  of the notice from the Collector under section  12, sub-section (2); or within six months from  the date of the Collector’s  

Undoubtedly under Section 30 no such time limit has been prescribed.   However, it is clear that any such application must be made within a  reasonable time.  What is the reasonable time will depend upon the  facts and circumstances of each case.  In a case like present, the  reasonable time would be the time as allowed under Section 18.  This  Court has in the case of Gujarat vs. Raghav reported in (1970) 1 SCR   335 considered the provisions of Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay  Land Revenue Code, 1879.   It was noticed that Section 211 did not  prescribe a time limit within which the Commissioner could revise an  order under Section 65.  It was however held as follows: "\005\005\005It is true that there is no period of limitation  prescribed under s. 211, but it seems to us plain that this  power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length

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of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of  the case and the nature of the order which is being  revised.

       It seems to us that s. 65 itself indicates the length of  the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must  act under s. 211.  Under s. 65 of the Code if the Collector  does not inform the applicant of his decision on the  application within a period of three months the permission  applied for shall be deemed to have been granted.  This  section shows that a period of three months is considered  ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond  that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that  permission shall be deemed to have been granted.   Reading ss. 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the  Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a  few months of the order of the Collector\005\005\005\005"

Even in Sharda Devi’s case (supra) this Court has held that even  though no limitation is provided for making a reference under Section  30 the power had to be exercised within a reasonable period.  This  Court has held that what is the reasonable period would depend upon  the facts of each given case.  It appears to us that in cases where the  parties have notice of the acquisition proceedings, even presuming,  they can apply for a reference under Section 30, the reasonable time  would be the period prescribed under Section 18.  We immediately  clarify that where parties do not have notice of the acquisition  proceedings and/or their rights come into existence subsequent to the  acquisition proceedings the starting point of limitation may be  postponed but the reasonable time would be the time set out in  Section 18 from the date of the knowledge or from the date they  acquire rights, whichever is later.         For all the above reasons, it will have to be held that the  impugned Judgment cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.  The  Writ Petition filed by the Respondents stands dismissed.  We affirm the  order of the Land Acquisition Officer dated 26th September, 1997 and  hold that the Respondents cannot claim a Reference under Section 30  nor claim apportionment.         In our view, the Respondents have by adopting multifarious  proceedings delayed the payment of amount for a number of years.   We therefore direct that the Appellants shall be entitled to withdraw  the balance amount deposited in the Court without any further delay.         The Appeals stand disposed of.  There will be no order as to  costs.