27 October 1969
Supreme Court
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MEHARBANSINGH AND OTHERS Vs NARESHSINGH AND OTHERS

Case number: Appeal (civil) 1438 of 1967


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PETITIONER: MEHARBANSINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARESHSINGH AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/10/1969

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1971 AIR   77            1969 SCR  (3)  18  1969 SCC  (3) 542  CITATOR INFO :  D          1976 SC1121  (57)  R          1980 SC 696  (1)

ACT: Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act XIII of 1951-S. 4  (1) (f)--Proprietary  rights  vesting in  State-Khud-kasht  land allowed to he retained in possession-Land whether khud-kasht have  to be first gone into--Notice to the State,  necessity of.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  filed a suit for redemption of  a  mortgage. The lower courts decreed the suit.  The High Court held that in  view  of the provisions of the  Madha  Bharat  Zamindari Abolition  Act XIII of 1951 the appellants were entitled  to redeem the mortgage but disentitled to get possession of the mortgaged  land since under the Act the  proprietary  rights including  the right to possession vested in the State.   In appeal  to this Court it was urged that High Court  did  not afford  the appellants an opportunity to show that the  land in question was Khud-kasht and, therefore in according  with section  4  they  were  entitled  to  remain  in  possession thereof. HELD  : The precise question requiring decision by the  High Court in the present case was lost sight of and not properly adverted to.  Under the Act the proprietor,  notwithstanding any  other  consequences  of the vesting in  the  State,  is entitled to continue to retain possession of his  Khud-kasht land  which  is  so recorded in the  annual  village  papers before  the date of vesting.’ In the present case  both  the contesting parties claim for themselves actual possession of the  land in dispute as Khud-kasht and also assert that  the relevant  entries  in the annual village papers  before  the date  of  vesting showed them in such possession.   On  this basis  they  both  claim right  to  retain  possession  even against the State.  These rival controversial claims pressed by  both  the  parties was the  central  question  involving proper  appraisal  of the material on the  record  and  this basic  dispute  had to be first adverted to  and  judicially determined  and  thereafter the Court had  to  consider  the applicability of the relevant provisions of Act XIII of 1951

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to the facts found.  As the question of vesting of title  in the State was also of vital importance it was fit and proper for  the Courts below to have issued notice to the State  as well  thereby enabling it to be impleaded as a party, if  it so desired. [25D-26B] Haji  Sk.  Subban v. Madho Rao, [1962] Supp. 1  S.C.R.  123, distinguished. [The  case  was  remitted  to the High  Court  for  a  fresh decision].

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1438 of.1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated September 27, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench in Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1960. S.   T. Desai and P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants. 19 B.   C.  Misra,  Bhajan Ramrakhyani  and  Urmila  Kapoor,for respondents Nos. 1 to 4, 8 and 10 to 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. This is the plaintiffs’ appeal by special leave from a   common judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge  of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior dated September 27, 1962  partially allowing the defendants’ second  appeal  and dismissing that of the plaintiffs. It is not necessary to state the detailed facts of the case. Facts   necessary for the purpose of this appeal  alone  may briefly  be  stated.  In May, 1939 Ramle  Singh  and  Jomdar Singh  created  a  mortgage of the suit land  in  favour  of Munshi  Singh for a sum of Rs. 2,242/14/-.  It is said  that in  May, 1943 notice given by the mortgagors for  redemption of the mortgage was refused by the mortgagee.  In June, 1943 the  suit giving rise to the present appeal  was  instituted for redemption of the mortgage.  Some other persons who were found  to  be  in possession of the  land,  claiming  to  be tenants, were also impleaded as defendants.  On May 25, 1951 Madhya  Bharat  Zamindari  Abolition Act XIII  of  1951  was enforced.   It  appears  that an application  to  amend  the plaint  as a result of the new enactment was  disallowed  by the  trial  Court, but on revision the Madhya  Pradesh  High Court by its order dated October 10, 1955 reversed the order of the trial Court and permitted the plaintiffs to amend the plaint.   The  pleadings after the amendment  gave  rise  to nearly  17  issues on the merits.  On October 10,  1958  the suit was decreed in respect of the relief for redemption but claim   in   regard  to  mesne   profits   was   disallowed. Preliminary  decree for redemption was accordingly  granted. In the course of its judgment the trial Court observed under issue No. 10 as follows :               "I  have in preceding paras shown that as  per               allegations in the written statements and  the               patwari papers, it appears that the suit lands               have  been  in  possession  of  Hanumantsingh,               Shambhoosingh,   khemsingh,   Mansingh    and’               Namdassingh.   It  will  be  discussed   later               whether  they and descendants  of  Munshisingh               are joint owners or not.  Before abolition  of               zamindari,  the records show half of the  suit               lands   as   the  Khundkasht  of   the   above               defendants and half as the tenancy holding  of               Namdas  (Kastkari).  These entries however  do               not  confer any title on the  parties.   Their               right to remain in possession is limited  i.e.

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             till such time as the property is redeemed  by               the  mortgagers  i.e. the  plaintiffs.   These               entries  or  the rights shown  therein  cannot               prejudice the right of the plaintiffs."               20               The Court while deciding issues Nos. 16 and 17               observed thus             A               "I  have discussed these issues earlier  in  a               different  context.   I may briefly  add  that               Abolition of Zamindari Act does not affect the               right of the plaintiffs to recover  possession               of  lands which were placed in  possession  of               the  mortgagees (1956, M.B.L.J.  Rameshwar  vs               Bhogiram).    Defendants   Hanumantsingh   and               others did not acquire possession of the  suit               lands by virtue of the sale in favour of their               father Daulat Singh because they had purchased               only  an equity of redemption as, will  appear               from  the judgment in Civil Suit  No.  21/2001               filed  on  record.  Entries as  Pacca  Krishak               cannot  affect the rights under  the  mortgage               bond.  I find accordingly." Three  appeals were presented in the District Court  against the.  decree founded on this judgment, one of them being  by the  plaintiffs  challenging refusal by the trial  Court  to grant  mesne  profits. -In- October,  1960  the  plaintiffs’ appeal was partly allowed and mesne profits decreed from the date of deposit of the mortgage amount in Court.  The  other two  appeals  were dismissed.  That Court  disposed  of  all appeals by a common judgment and came to the conclusion that the lands had been mortgaged with possession by Samle  Singh and Jomdar Singh with Munshi Singh and that they were  under self-cultivation of the plaintiffs before the mortgage,  the mortgagees  having  come into possession by  reason  of  the mortgage.   The  matter was taken by the defendants  to  the High  Court  on second appeal, the  plaintiffs  having  also preferred  an appeal in that.  Court against the  decree  of the  first  appellate Court declining to  give  full  relief claimed in regard to mesne profits.  In the High Court  also three  appeals  were presented.  The  High  Court  partially allowed the defendants’ appeal in view of the provisions  of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act XIII of 1951.  The plaintiffs  were  held entitled to redeem  the  mortgage  by paying the mortgage money but disentitled to get  possession of the mortgaged land.  The proprietary rights including the right to get possession having vested in the State under the aforesaid Act, the plaintiffs, according to the High  Court, could  only  claim compensation from the Government  on  the basis  of  their  proprietary  rights  after  redeeming  the mortgage  by  making  payment of  the  mortgage  money.   In support  of this view the High Court relied on this  Court’s decision  in Haji Sk.  Subhan v. Madho  Rag(1),  considering that  decision to be decisive of the point in  issue.   That decision,  however, appears to us to be  directly  concerned with  the  Madhya Pradesh Abolition  of  Proprietary  Rights (Estates, Muhals, alienated land) Act, 1950 (Madhya  Pradesh Act 1 of 1951). Before  us  the  short  question raised  on  behalf  of  the appellants  is that reliance on the Madhya Bharat  Zamindari Abolition Act XIII of (1)  [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 123. 2 1      1951 for the first time in the High Court was  improper and  that in any event without affording an  opportunity  to the  appellants to show that the said Act did not  apply  to

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the case in hand, their suit could not have been  dismissed. The submission is not wholly correct.  There was in fact  an amendment  of  the plaint pursuant to the enactment  of  the Madhya  Bharat  Abolition of Zamindari  Act  and  additional issues  were framed on the amended pleadings.,  The  parties and  the courts were thus not ignorant of the  existence  of the said Act on the statute book. Turning  to  the  Act in question, it  was  brought  on  the statute  book in 1951, as the preamble shows, in  order  "to provide  for  the  public purposes  of  the  improvement  of agriculture  and  financial condition of  agriculturists  by abolition  and acquisition, of the rights of proprietors  in villages,  muhala,  chaks  or blocks  settled  on  zamindari system which is only a. system of,, keeping an  intermediary between   the  State  and  the  tenants  injurious  to   the betterment  of agriculture as well as the agriculturists  in Madhya Bharat and for other matters connected therewith," "Proprietor"  as  defined in s. 2(a) means, "as  respects  a village, muhal or land settled on zamindari system, a person owning whether in trust or for his own benefit such village, muhal or land and includes               (1)   a Malguzar as defined in sub-clause (12)               of  section  2 of Qanoon Mal,  Gwalior  State,               Samvat 1983; and               (2)   as respects a chak or block a chakdar or               blockdar  whose  lease granted to him  by  the               Government  under  any Act, Rule  or  Circular               relating  to chaks and blocks, includes  also,               amongst its other conditions, a condition that               he   shall  acquire  the           proprietary               rights  in respect of that chak or block  when               the conditions of the lease are fulfilled;               (3)   the heir and successors in interest of a               proprietor; Section  2(c) defines "Khud-kasht" to mean "land  cultivated by  the  Zamindar  himself or  through  employees  or  hired laborers  and  includes sir land." Sections 3  and  4  which occur  in Chapter II dealing "vesting of proprietary  rights in the State" provides as under :               "3.  Vesting  of  proprietary  rights  in  the               State.               (1)   Save  as otherwise provided in this  Act               and subject to the provisions of section 8, on               and   from  a  date  to  be  specified  by   a               notification by the Government in this  behalf               (hereinafter referred               22               to  as  the date of  vesting  all  proprietary               rights in a village, muhal land, chak or block               in  Madhya Bharat vesting in a  proprietor  of               such  village, Muhal, land, chak or  block  as               the  case  may  be,  or  in  a  person  having               interest in such proprietary right through the               proprietor shall pass from such proprietor  or               such  other person, to and vest in  the  State               free of all encumbrances.               (2)   After issue of a notification under sub-               section  (1)no right shall be acquired  in  or               over  the land to which the said  notification               relates except by succession or under a decree               or  order  of  a Court or  under  a  grant  or               contract in writing made or entered into by or               on  behalf  of the Government;  and  no  fresh               clearings  for  cultivation or for  any  other               purpose  shall be made in such land except  in

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             accordance  with such rules as may be made  by               the Government in this behalf.               (3)   The   Government  may  by   notification               published   in  the  Gazette  vary  the   date               specified  under sub-section (1) at  any  time               before such date.               4.    Consequences of the vesting of an estate               in the State.               (1)   Save  as otherwise provided in this  Act               when  the  notification  under  section  3  in               respect of any area has been published in  the               gazette,   then,   notwithstanding    anything               contained  in any contract, grant or  document               or  in  any other law for the  time  being  in               force,  the  consequences as  hereinafter  set               forth  shall  from the beginning of  the  date               specified  in such  notification  (hereinafter               referred  to  as the date of  vesting)  ensue,               namely :-               (a)   all  rights, title and interest  of  the               proprietor   in  such  area,  including   land               (cultivable,  barren or Bir),  forest,  trees,               fisheries,  wells (other than  private  wells)               tanks,  ponds,  water channels  ferries,  path               ways, village-sites, hats and bazars and mela-               grounds and in all sub-soil including  rights,               if  any, in mines and minerals, whether  being               worked or not shall cease and be vested in the               State free from all encumbrances;               23               (b)   all grants and confirmation of title  of               or to land in the property so vesting or of or               to  any right or privilege in respect of  such               property  or land revenue in  respect  thereof               shall,  whether liable to resumption  or               not, determine;               (c)   all  rents and cesses in respect of  any               holding  in  the property so vesting  for  any               period  after the date of vesting  which,  but               for  such vesting would have been  payable  to               the proprietor, shall vest in the State and be               payable to the Government and any payment made               in contravention of this clause shall not be a               valid  discharge of the person liable  to  pay               the same; Explanation-=The  word  "Holding" shall for the  purpose  of this clause be deemed to include also land given, on  behalf of  the  proprietor, to any person on rent for  any  purpose other than cultivation-,               (d)   all arrears of revenue, cesses or  other               dues in respect of any property so vesting and               due by the proprietor for any period prior  to               the  date  of  vesting shall  continue  to  be               recoverable  from  such  proprietor  and  may’               without   prejudice  to  any  other  mode   of               recovery, be realised by deducting the  amount               from  the compensation money payable  to  such               proprietor under Chapter V;               (e)   The,  interest  of  the  proprietor   so               acquired shall not be liable to attachment  or               sale  in  execution of any  decree,  or  other               process  of any court, civil or  revenue,  and               any attachment existing at the date of vesting               or any order for attachment passed before such               date  shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of

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             section  73 of the Transfer- of Property  Act,               1882, cease to be in force.               (f)   every mortgage with possession  existing               on the property so vesting_or part thereof  on               the  date  immediately preceding the  date  of               vesting  shall,  to the extent of  the  amount               secured  on such property or part  thereof  be               deemed without prejudice to the rights of  the               State   under   section  3,   to   have   been               substituted by a simple mortgage.               24               (2)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               subsection  (1) the proprietor shall  continue               to.  remain. in possession of  his  khud-kasht               land, so recorded in the annual village papers               before the date of vesting.               (3)   Nothing  contained in sub-section ( 1  )               shall  operate as bar to the recovery  by  the               outgoing  proprietor of any sum which  becomes               due  to  him  before the date  of  vesting  in               virtue of his proprietary rights." A  plain  reading  of these sections  would  show  that  all rights,  title and interests of the proprietors in the  area notified were to cease and were instead to vest in the State free  from  all encumbrances with effect from  the  date  of notification  and  after  such vesting in  the  State  every mortgage with possession existing on the property so  vested or  part thereof on the date immediately preceding the  date of  vesting,  to the extent of the amount  secured  on  such property or part thereof, is to be deemed, without prejudice to  the  right  of the State under section 3  to  have  been substituted by a simple mortgage.  The proprietor,  however, notwithstanding  other  consequences  of the  vesting  in  a State,  is entitled to continue to remain in  possession  of his  khud-kasht  land  which is so recorded  in  the  annual village  papers  before  the date of vesting.   Now  it  was clearly  open  to the plaintiffs to show that  the  land  in question  was khud-kasht and, therefore, in accordance  with s. 4 they were entitled to remain in possession thereof. On behalf of the appellants’ also our attention was  invited to  the  decision  of this Court in the  case  of  Haji  Sk. Subhan(1)  and specific reliance was placed on  observations at  page  139  of the report which suggests  that  a  person continuing  in  possession on the basis of  entries  in  the village papers, which had to be presumed to be correct,  was not  affected  by the Act.  Reference was also made  to  the observation at page 142 of the report where right to possess was  upheld  in  favour  of the party  who  had  obtained  A declaration of being an owner in possession. On  behalf  of the respondents reliance was placed  on  Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad (2 ,  but that decision does not deal with the Madhya Bharat Act which concerns.   That               is            with  the  U.P. Zamin-dari  Abolition  and Land Reforms Act 1 of  1951,  the scheme  of which is not shown to be similar to that  of  the Madhya  Bharat Act so far as it concerns us in  the  present case.  That decision is, therefore, of little assistance  in construing the Madhya Bharat Act.  Another decision on which the  respondents’  learned Advocate has placed  reliance  is Raja  Sailendra  Narayan  Bhaj Deo v.  Kumar  Jagat  Kishore Prasad Narayan Singh(s) which again (1)  [1962] Supp.  I S.C.R. 123. (2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 441. (3)  [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 119.                              25

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deals  with  the Bihar Lands Reforms Act and  not  with  the Madhya  Bharat Act.  The scheme of the Bihar Act being  also dissimilar from that of the Madhya Bharat Act, this decision too cannot be of much help. The last decision relied on by Shri Mishra is Suraj Ahir  v. Prithinath  Singh and others(1) which is concerned with  the Bihar Lands Reforms Act XXX of 1950 as amended by Act XVI of 1959.  This decision is equally unhelpful. In  our opinion the High Court was in error in allowing  the appeal before it and in dismissing the plaintiff-appellants’ suit  for  possession  on  the  authority  of  this  Court’s decision  in  the  case  of Haji  Sk.   Subhan(2).   In  the reported case the word "document" as occurring in s. 4(1) of the  M.P.  Abolition of Proprietary Rights (M.P.  Act  1  of 1951) was construed to include a decree of the Court and  it was held that the principle that the executing Court  cannot question the decree and has to execute it, had no  operation on  the  facts of that case, because the objection  was  not based  on the invalidity of the decree but on the effect  of the  aforesaid  Act  on  the rights  of  the  decree  holder proprietor,  to retain possession.  The facts of  that  case were, therefore, different and so was the problem  requiring solution.   The precise question requiring decision  by  the Court in the present case was lost sight of and not properly adverted  to.   We  are  required in  the  present  case  to consider  the effect of s. 4(1) (f) of the M.P. Act XIll  of 1951 on the rights of the plaintiff-appellants to redeem the mortgage and secure possession of the mortgaged land. It  may be pointed out that both the contesting  parties-the appellants   and   the  respondents-before  us   claim   for themselves actual possession of the land in dispute as Khud- kashi  and  also  assert that the relevant  entries  in  the annual village papers before the date of vesting showed them in such possession.  On this basis they both claim right  to retain  possession  even  against the  State.   These  rival controversial  claims  pressed by both the parties  was  the central  question involving proper appraisal of material  on the  record and this basic dispute had to be first  adverted to and judicially determined and thereafter the Court had to consider the applicability of the relevant provisions of the M.P.  Act XIII of 1951 to the facts found.  As the  question of  vesting  of  title  in  the  State  was  also  of  vital importance  it was, in our opinion, fit and proper  for  the Courts  below to have issued notice, to the State  as  well, thereby  enabling  it to be impleaded as a party  if  it  so desired.   The approach of the High Court is  erroneous  and its   decision  highly  unsatisfactory.    The   controlling questionseems to have been missed.  We, therefore, allow the appeal and remit the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision of the- (1) A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 454. Sup.Cl.170-3 (2) [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.P. 12?. 26 appeal  after notice to the State and after hearing  it,  in case  it desires to be heard.  It would also be open to  the High Court, if it considers just and proper, to implead  the State  and  if  necessary to permit it  to  adduce  evidence before  the  High Court or to remit the case  to  the  trial Court  for that purpose.  In the circumstances of the  case, parties would bear their own costs in this Court. Y.P.                                 Appeal allowed. 27

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