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PETITIONER: MEETHIYAN SIDHIQU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUHAMMED KUNJU PAREETH KUTTY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/01/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1003            1996 SCC  (7) 436  JT 1996 (1)   578        1996 SCALE  (1)498

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      Heard counsel  on both  sides. The  facts  are  not  in dispute.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment and decree  of the  Kerala High Court passed on September 9, 1986 in  Second Appeal  No.296/82. Admittedly, the appellant is a  purchaser of  the property from the 1st respondent who was a  minor at  that time and the property was sold through his mother  as guardian. The question raised in this caseis, whether the  sale is  valid and  whether the  appellant  has perfected his  title. Admittedly,  the sale  was effected in 1949. The  trial Court  and the  appellate Court  upheld the right of the respondent but the High Court reversed the same and held that since the sale by the mother as a guardian was void in  law, the  appellant  could  not  get  valid  title. Parties are co-owners of the properties. One co-owner cannot claim prescriptive  right against  another co-owner  and  in view of  the fact  that the  plea was  not  raised  that  he asserted adverse title, disclaiming the right under the sale deed and  that the  respondent had acquisced to it, the plea of adverse  possession was  not sustainable in law. The High Court decreed  the suit  of the respondent. Thus this appeal by special leave.      Shri  Anam,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has contended that  since the  father Mohammad  Kunju died,  the mother is  the natural  guardian and the sale made by her as guardian of  the respondent, therefore, is not void. We find no force in the contention.      Mulla’s "Principle  of the  Mohammadan Law"  [Ninteenth Edition] by  Justice M. Hidaytullah, former Chief Justice of this  Court   and  Arshad  Hidayatullah,  deals  with  legal property guardians  of a muslim minor in Section 359. In the order, only father, executor appointed by the father’s will, father’s father  and the  executor appointed  by the will of

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the father’s  father, are  legal guardians  of property.  No other relation  is  entitled  to  be  the  guardian  of  the property of  a minor  as of  right;  not  even  the  mother, brother or uncle but the father or the paternal grand-father of the minor may appoint the mother, brother or uncle or any other person  as his  executor or  executrix of  his will in which case  they become  legal guardian  and  have  all  the powers of  the legal guardian as defined in Sections 362 and 366 of  the above Principles. The Court may also appoint any one of  them as  guardian of  the property  of the  minor in which case  they will  have all  the powers  of  a  guardian appointed by the court, as stated in Sections 363 to 367.      In Section  360, it  is stated  that in  default of the legal guardians  mentioned  in  Section  359,  the  duty  of appointing the  guardian for the protection and preservation of the  minor’s property  falls on the Judge as representing the State.  The  Court  may  appoint  any  other  person  as guardian of  the property  of the  minor. In  so doing,  the Court  should   be  guided   by  all   the  powers   in  the circumstances to  be for the welfare of the minor. The court may appoint  mother as guardian of the property of the minor son in  preference to  his paternal uncle. The fact that the mother  is  a  Pardanashin  lady  is  no  objection  to  her appointment. In  Section 362,  the  legal  guardian  of  the property of  a minor  has no  power to  sell  the  immovable property of  the minor  except in the cases [1] where he can obtain double  its value;  [2] where  the minor has no other property and  the sale is necessary for his maintenance; [3] where there are debts of the deceased, and no other means of paying them; [4] where there are legacies to be paid, and no other means  of paying  them; [5]  where the expenses exceed the income  of the  property;  [6]  where  the  property  is falling into  decay; [7] when the property has been usurped, and the  guardian has reason to fear that there is no chance of fair restitution.      In Imambandi  v.  Mutsaddi  [(1918)  45  I.A.  73]  the Judicial Committee  envisaged the  grounds on  which and the circumstances in  which the  property of  a minor  could  be alienated by legal guardian.      Tyabji in  his "Principles  of Mohammadan Law" also has stated in  Section 261 that neither mother, nor brother, nor the uncle  can without  the authority of the Court deal with the property  of a  minor. Asaf A.A. Fyzee in Section 34 has reiterated the  same principles.  In Venkama  Naidu v.  S.V. Chistry [AIR  1951 Mad. 399], the Madras High Court had held that after  the father’s  death, the mother, as the guardian of  the  minor,  has  no  power  to  execute  a  sale  deed. Therefore, the  sale deed executed by the mother was held to be void and inoperative under mohamaddan law.      In Mumammadan law by Syed Ameer Ali [Vol .2] also it is stated at  page 500  that unless  mother is appointed by the father as  the guardian of his minor children’s estate or is so appointed  by the  Judge, she has no power to intermeddle with their  immovable property.  All her  dealings with  the property are ipso facto void. In case the minor has no means of support  except the property, she must apply to the court for sanction in order to deal with the property.      Father is the natural guardian and in his absence other legal guardians  would be entitled to act. In their absence, property guardian  appointed by the competent court would be competent  to  alienate  property  of  the  minor  with  the permission of the court. When a sale is to be made on behalf of the  minor the  necessary ingredients  are that  the sale must be  for  the  benefit  of  the  estate  of  minor  and, therefore, the  competent person  entitled to  alienate  the

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minor’s property  would be,  subject to the above condition, either  the   natural  guardian  or  the  property  guardian appointed by the Court. In this case after the demise of the father no  property  guardian  was  appointed.  The  mother, therefore,  is  not  guardian  for  the  alienation  of  the property  of  the  minor.  The  sale  made  by  the  mother, therefore, is void.      The  question   then  is:  Whether  the  appellant  has perfected his title by adverse possession. The High Court in the judgment has held that:      "It is  also true  that the  trial couet      and the  appellate court found that even      after  the  date  of  Ext.B1  or  A1  on      10.10.1949 the plaintiff or defendants 1      and  2   were  not  in  possession.  The      exclusive   possession    of   the   3rd      defendant from  10.10.1949 or  the  non-      participation  of   the  income  by  the      plaintiff by  itself may  not amount  to      adverse possession as between co-owners.      So also  the  mere  fact  that  the  3rd      defendant   who    was   in    exclusive      possession executed  documents  and  put      the transferees  in  possession  of  the      property also  will not  prove ouster or      adverse  possession.   As  a  matter  of      course plaintiff  can not  be fixed with      knowledge  of   those  documents  simply      because  of   the  fact  that  they  are      registered  documents.  Registration  of      the documents  by itself can not operate      as notice  to the  plaintiff that  third      defendant  was   holding  the   property      adverse to  him and  dealing with  it as      full   owner.   Knowledge   ouster   and      exclusive possession  with the requisite      animus  are  facts  to  be  alleged  and      proved by  defendants 3  and 4  in  O.S.      208/78 who  pleaded adverse  possession.      There is  no such  plea and  there is no      such proof  also. No  such plea or proof      is evident  from  the  judgment  of  the      courts below.           In  order   to  constitute  adverse      possession the  other co-owners  out  of      possession must  be proved  to have  had      notice of the assertion of hostile title      and exclusive  possession  ousting  them      with  the   requisite  animus   for  the      statutory period. It must be pleaded and      proved. There  is no  such plea or proof      and no such plea or proof could be found      out from  the judgments  of  the  courts      below  also.   As  earlier   stated  the      peculiar position  of the 3rd defendant,      the  relationship,  the  dependency  and      illiteracy of defendants 1 and 2 and the      minority  of   the  plaintiff   are  all      factors  which   indicate   absence   of      knowledge on  the part  of the plaintiff      regarding   the    animus,    if    any,      entertained by  the 3rd  defendant.  The      courts below found adverse possession on      insufficient  pleadings   and   in   the      absence  of   legal  evidence   to  that

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    effect.  That  generates  a  substantial      question of law by which the finding has      to be  reversed and  I  do  so.  If  so,      defendants 3  and 4 in O.S. 208/78 could      have only  the position of co-owners and      the plaintiff  is entitled  to partition      and recovery of his share."      It is,  therefore, clear  from  the  above  facts  that unless there is a specific plea and proof that the appellant had disclaimed  his right  and asserted  hostile  title  and possession to  the knowledge  of the  respondent within  the statutory period  and the latter acquiesced to it, he cannot succeed to  have it  established that he perfected his right by prescripetion.  The High  Court has  taken the  fact that there is  neither a plea nor proof in this behalf. We cannot find  any   infirmity   in   this   finding.   Under   these ciurcumstances, the finding that the appellant has perfected his title  by prescription  is clearly illegal. In this case we are  concerned only  with the  validity of  the  sale  in respect of  the share of the respondent-plaintiff and not of the share of the mother.      The appeal  is accordingly  dismissed and  the judgment and decree of the High Court is upheld. No costs.