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PETITIONER: MEERUT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SATBIR SINGH AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/09/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH C.A.  Nos.   2217/88,  2758/88,1829/88,   2219/88,,  2221/88 2218/88, 2220/88, 2222/88, 1830/88, C.A Nos. 12810-12825/96@ SLP(C) Nos.   5832/88,  5833/88, 5834/88,  5835/88, 5836/88, 5837/88,  5838/88,   5839/88,  5840/88,   6094/88,  6095/88, 13207/88, 13577/88,  13296/88, 13463/88, 7331/88,  W.P.  [C] Nos.153/96, C.As.12826-28/96@   SLP(C)Nos. 3822/76, 3823/76, 3824/76                          O R D E R      Substitution allowed.      Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.      Notification  under   Section  4   [1]  of   the   Land Acquisition Act,  1894 [for  short, the "Act"] was published on June  11, 1985.   The Government also exercised the power under Section  17 [4]  of the  Act and  dispensed  with  the enquiry under  Section 5-A  and had  the  declaration  under Section 6  published on  June 13,  1985.  The publication of substance of  the notification  in the local newspapers came to  be  made  on  July  25,  1985.    In  August  1985,  the respondents filed  a batch  of writ  petitions in  the  High Court impugning  the  validity  of  the  notification  under Section 4  [1] and of the declaration under Section 6 on six grounds.  Five of the grounds raised by the respondents were negatived  by   the  High   Court  as  not  sustainable  but declaration under  Section 6  was quashed on the ground that after the  Amendment Act  68 of  1984 had  come in  to force w.e.f, September  24, 1984,  the simultaneous publication of the declaration   under  Section 6 along with publication of notification under  Section 4  [1] was invalid in law.  They relied upon  the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam and Ors. etc. [(1989) 1 SCR 92] . The respondents  filed cross  appeals against  the  findings that were  negatived by the High Court in respect of all the other five points.  Thus these appeals by special leave.      Pending appeals,  the  Governor  exercising  the  power under Article  213 of  the Constitution issued the Ordinance No.32 of  1990 and  the State  Legislature enacted  the Land Acquisition [U.P. Amendment and Validation Act, 1991 [UP Act 5 of   1991]  which came  in to force from December 28,1990, introducing provision  to Section 17 [4] of the Act and also

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by Section  3 thereof  validated all  the notifications  and declarations issued  under the  Act prior to the date of the judgment of  this Court  in Radhey Shyam Nigam case [supra]. The Ordinance  came to be challenged by way of writ petition No.153/96.   Thus all  the matters  tagged are  disposed  of together.    With  a  view  to  satisfactorily  resolve  the controversy, it  is, at  the first  instance,  necessary  to dispose of the writ petition.      It is seen that this Court in Radhey Shyam Nigam’s case had considered  the provisions  of U.P.  Urban Planning  and Development Act  and the  Act.   In exercise  of power under Section 17  [4] of the Act, the appropriate State Government was empowered  to issue  and get  published the notification under Section  4 [1]  and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act  simultaneously.   That was  upheld by this Court in Smt. Somawanti  and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [(1963) 2 SCR  775].  After the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was brought on statute, sub-section (4) of Section 17 envisages that the authority empowered  to have the declaration under Section 6 published after  the publication  of the  notification under Section   4 [1].   In other words, the simultaneous exercise of power  to get  the notification  under Section  6 was not valid in law.  This Court had held thus;      "It is  true  that  the  expression      "after the  date of the publication      of the  notification" introduced in      Section 17  [4] can be explained...      changes in  Sections 4 and 6 of the      Act".      It is to be seen that the State Legislature thereafter, has enacted proviso to sub-section [4] as under:      "Provided that where in the case of      any   land,    notification   under      Section 4,  sub-section    [1]  has      been  published   in  the  official      Gazette on  or after  September 24,      1984 but  before January  11, 1989,      and the  appropriate Government has      under  this   sub-section  directed      that the  provisions of Section 5-A      shall not  apply,   a   declaration      under Section  6 in  respect of the      land    may    be    made    either      simultaneously with  or at any time      after,  the   publication  in   the      Official     Gazette     of     the      notification under  Section 4, sub-      section [1]".      This proviso  was inserted  by Section  2 of  the State Amendment Act  5 of  1991,  sub-section  [3]  validated  the acquisitions pending  as on the date of the judgment of this Court which reads as under:      "  3.     Validation   of   certain      acquisitions.    -  Notwithstanding      any judgment,  decree or  order  of      any  Court,   Tribunal   or   other      authority ,  no acquisition of land      made, or  purporting Act before the      commencement of  this  Act  and  no      action   taken    or   thing   done      [including any order or declaration      made, agreement  entered in  to  or      notification     published]      in      connection with  such  acquisition,      which is  in  conformity  with  the

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    provisions of  the Principal Act as      amended by  this Act  as amended by      this Act  shall  be  deemed  to  be      invalid  or   ever  to   have  been      invalid merely  on the  ground that      declaration under  Section 6 of the      Principal Act  was published in the      Official Gazette  on the  same date      on which notification under Section      4,     sub-section     [1]  of  the      Principal Act, was published in the      Official Gazette  or on  any  other      date   prior   to   the   date   of      publication of such notification as      defined in  Section 4,  sub-section      [1] of the Principal Act".      The controversy  is no  longer res integra.  This Court in Ghaziabad  Development Authority  v.  Jai  Kalyan  Samiti Sheopuri  Ghaziabad  and  Anr.    [(1996)  2  SCC  365]  has considered   the effect  of the  proviso introduced  by  the State Legislature  by way  of amendment  to Section  17 [4]. The validity  has been upheld by the Two-judge Bench of this Court.      Shri   Pradeep   Misra,   learned   counsel   for   the respondents, contended  that if  the law is declared by this Court that  simultaneous publication under Section 4 [1] and declaration under  Section 6  of the  Act  is  invalid,  the Legislature has  no  power  to  over-rule  and  nullify  the judgment of  this Court by way of amendment.  It has only to remove the defect, as pointed out by this Court, by suitably amending the  statute.   In this  case,  a  reading  of  the proviso would  indicate that  the State Legislature, without removing  the   defect,  as   pointed  out  by  this  Court, reiterated the defect and sought to validate all the invalid notification or  declarations as  declared by  this Court in Radhey Shyam  Nigam’s case [supra] as valid.  Therefore, the U.P. Amendment Act 5 of 1991 is invalid in law.      It is well-settled by catena pf decisions of this Court that when  this Court  in  exercise  of  power  of  judicial review, has  declared a  particulate statute  to be invalid, the Legislature  has no  power to  over-rule  the  judgment; however, it  has the  power to suitably amend the law by use of appropriate phraseology removing the defects poins out by the court  and by amending the law inconsistent with the law declared by  the court  so that the defects were pointed out were never  on statute for effective enforcement of the law. This Court  has considered  in extenso  the case  law  in  a recent judgment in Indian Aluminium Co. and Ors. v. State Of Kerala and  Ors. [(JT 1996 (2) SC 85]  had held that such an exercise of  power to amend a statute is not an Incursion on the judicial  power the court but is a statutory exercise of the constituent  power to  suitably amend  the  law  and  to validate the actions which have been declared to be invalid. It laid down the following principles:      "[1] The adjudication of the rights      of the  parties  is  the  essential      judicial function.  Legislature has      to lay down the norms of conduct or      rules which will govern the parties      and the  transactions  and  require      the court to give effect to them:      [2] The    Constitution  delineated      delicate balance in the exercise of      the   sovereign    power   by   the      Legislature,     Executive      and

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    Judiciary:      [3] In a democracy governed by rule      of law,  the Legislature  exercises      the power  under Articles  245  and      246 and  other  companion  Articles      read  with   the  entries   in  the      respective  Lists  in  the  Seventh      Schedule  to  make  the  law  which      includes power to amend the law:      [4] Courts  in  their  concern  and      endeavour  to   preserve   judicial      power equality  must be  guarded to      maintain   the   delicate   balance      devised by the constitution between      the three  sovereign functionaries.      In order that rule of law permeates      to  fulfil  an  egalitarian  social      order,  the   respective  sovereign      functionaries  need   free-play  in      their joints  so that  the march of      social progress  and  order  remain      unimpeded.     The  smooth  balance      built with  delicacy must always be      maintained:      [5] In  its  anxiety  to  safeguard      judicial power,  it is  unnecessary      to be  over jealous  and conjure up      incusion   in   to   the   judicial      preserve invalidating the valid law      competently made:      [6] The  Court, therefore,  need to      carefully scan  the law to find out      : (a)  whether the vice pointed out      by   the   Court   and   invalidity      suffered by  previous law  is cured      complying  with   the   legal   and      constitutional  requirements:   (b)      whether   the    Legislature    has      competence to validate the law: (c)      whether    such    validation    is      consistent    with    the    rights      guaranteed  in   Part  III  of  the      constitution:      [7] The  Court does  not  have  the      power to validate an invalid law or      to legalise  or to  remove the norm      of  invalidation   or   provide   a      remedy.   These  are  not  judicial      functions   but    the    exclusive      province   of    the   Legislature.      Therefore,   they   are   not   the      encroachment on judicial power.      [8] In exercising legislative power      the     Legislature     by     mere      declaration, without anything more,      cannot directly overrule, revise or      override a  judicial decision.   It      can   render    judicial   decision      ineffective by  enacting valid  law      on the topic within its legislative      field  fundamentally   altering  or      changing       its        character      retrospectively.   The  changed  or      altered conditions  are  such  that      the  previous  decision  would  not

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    have been rendered by the Court, if      those conditions had existed at the      time  of   declaring  the   law  as      invalid.   It is  also empowered to      give   effect    to   retrospective      legislation with  a deeming date or      with effect from a particular date.      The  Legislature   can  change  the      character of  the tax  or duty form      impermissible  to  permissible  tax      but the  tax or  levy should answer      such character  and the Legislature      is competent to recover the invalid      tax  validating   such  a   tax  or      removing  the   invalid  base   for      recovery from the subject or render      the   recovery   from   the   State      ineffectual.   It is  competent for      the legislature  to enact  the  law      with   retrospective   effect   and      authorise its  agencies to levy and      collect the tax on that basis, make      the imposition  of  levy  collected      and recovery of the tax made valid,      notwithstanding the  declaration by      the Court  or the  direction  given      for recovery thereof.      [9] The consistent thread that runs      through all  the decisions  of this      Court  is   that  the   legislature      cannot   directly    overrule   the      decision or make a direction as not      binding on it but has power to make      the   decision    ineffective    by      removing  the  base  on  which  the      decision was  rendered,  consistent      with the  law of  the  Constitution      and  the   legislature  must   have      competence to do the same".      The same view as reiterated in State Of Orissa v. Gopal Chandrarath [(1995)  6 SCC  243], Bhubaneswar Singh and Anr. v. Union  of India  and Ors.  [(1994) 6  SCC 77] and Comorin Match Industries  P. Ltd,  v. State  of Tamil Nadu [(1996) 4 SCC 281].   It  is equally  settled law  that validating Act cannot simply  seek to  take away the effect of the judgment of the  Court.   In such  an even,  it will  be  legislative repeal of  judicial decision  as had been held by this Court in Madan  Mohan Pathak  v. Union of India [(1978) 2 SCC 50], State of U.P. and Anr. v. Keshwav Prasad Singh [(1995) 5 SCC 587] and  State of  Haryana  v.    The  Karnal  Co-operative Farmers’ Society Ltd. [JT 1993 (2) SC 235].      The question  in this  case is; whether the Legislature has merely  reiterated the  defect pointed out by this Court and  thereby  caused  legislative  repeal  of  the  judicial decision or  it has  cured the  defect pointed  out by  this Court so  as to  be in  conformity with  the law?   In  this behalf, it must be remembered on the facts in this case that acquisition is  a concurrent  subject vide  Entry 42  in the List III  of the  Seventh Schedule  to the  constitution  on which both  the Parliament  as well as the State Legislature have competence  to enact  the law suitable to the situation prevailing in  the appropriate  State.   Article 254  of the Constitution deals with such an area.  Clause [2] of Article 254 envisages that "Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with  respect to  one of the matters enumerated in the

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Concurrent List  contains any  provision  repugnant  to  the provisions of  an earlier  law made  by  parliament,  or  an existing law  with respect  to that matter, then, the law so made by  the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for  the consideration  of the  President  and  has received his  assent, prevail  in that  State".   The  scope thereof was  elaborately considered  by this  Court in Gouri Shankar Gauri  and Ors.  v. State of U.P. and Ors. [(1994) 1 SCC 92 at 117-118] and it was held thus:      "...[1] Where  the provisions  of a      Central Act  and a State Act in the      Concurrent    List     are    fully      inconsistent  and   are  absolutely      irreconcilable,  the   Central  Act      will prevail and the State Act will      become  void   in   view   if   the      repugnancy: [2]  where, however,  a      law passed  by the  States comes in      to collision  with a  law passed by      Parliament  on   an  Entry  in  the      Concurrent  List,   the  State  Act      shall prevail  to the extent of the      Central  Act   would  become   void      provided the  State  Act  has  been      passed in  accordance  with  clause      (2)   Article   254:   (3)   where,      however, a  law made  by the  State      Legislature on a subject covered by      the Concurrent List is inconsistent      with or repugnant to a previous law      made by parliament, then such a law      can be  protected by  obtaining the      assent  of   the  President   under      Article    254     [2]    of    the      Constitution.     The   result   of      obtaining   the   assent   of   the      President would  be that  so far as      the State Act is concerned, it will      prevail in  the State  and overrule      the provisions  of the  Central Act      in  their  applicability  to  State      only.  Such a state of affairs will      exist only  until Parliament may at      any time  make a  law adding to, or      amending, varying  or repealing the      law made  by the  State Legislature      under the  proviso to  Article 254.      In that  case it was held that part      of   the    provisions   were   not      repugnant in  their application  to      the public  men in  Tamil Nadu  but      are void  to the  extent of  public      servants.  T. Baraj v. Henry Ah Hoe      [(1983) 1  SCC 177] is a case where      Section   16   [1]   (a)   of   the      prevention  of   Food  Adulteration      Act, 1954   in  the Concurrent List      prescribes  a   punishment  of  six      years and  fine.   The West  Bengal      State  Legislature  amended  it  by      West Bengal Amendment Act, 1973 and      prescribed    a    punishment    of      imprisonment  for   life  for   the      selfsame offence  under Section  16      [1] of the Act.  Prevention of Food

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    Adulteration  Act  was  amended  by      Parliament in 1976.  The proviso to      Article 254  [2] the  State law  is      void.   Since the Central Amendment      Act, 1976  occupies the  same filed      imposing  lesser   punishment,  the      previous   State    law    imposing      punishment  of   imprisonment   for      life, though received the assent of      the  President,   was  held  to  be      void".      It is  not in dispute that the State Amendment Act 5 of 1991 was  enacted and  reserved  for  consideration  of  the President and  received  the  assent  of  the  President  on 26.2.1991 and  the Act  was  published  in  the  Gazette  on 27.2.1991. it  is to  be seen  that as  regards simultaneous publication of  the  notification  and  the  declaration  in respect of  acquisition  of  the  land  for  public  purpose exercising the  power of eminent domain in certain situation where possession was need urgently, depending upon the local needs and  the  urgency,  Government  requires  such  power. Consequently, the  State Legislature  thought it appropriate that despite  the enactment  of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 amending Section  17(4), the State needed further amendment. Resultantly, the  U.P. Amendment  Act 5  of 1991  came to be made and  it was given retrospective effect from the date of the Amendment  Act 68  of 1984  has come  in to force, i.e., September 24, 1984.      It is  true that  the proviso  was not  happily worded. But a reading of it would clearly give us an indication that the proviso  to sub-section   (4) introduced by Section 2 of the Amendment  Act 5  of  1991  would  deal  with  both  the situation, namely,  the notification  published on  or after September 24,  1984 but before January 11, 1989 but also the declaration  to   be  simultaneously   published  subsequent thereto.   The literal interpretation sought to be put up by Shri Pradeep  Misra would  defeat  the  legislative  object. Therefore, ironing  out the  creases we are of the view that the proviso  applies  not  only  to  the  notifications  and declarations simultaneously  published  after  the  date  of coming in  to force of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 but also to the  future declarations as well.  Thus, it could be seen that   the   proviso   would   operate   prospectively   and retrospectively from April 24, 1984 applying to the previous notifications and  declarations but also to the notification and declaration to be published subsequently.      It is  true that  normally the  Legislature has to give effect to  he judgment of the court only to cure the defects pointed out  in the  previous judgment so that the operation of the law would be consistent with the law declared by this Court.   But in view of the peculiarity, namely, the special needs of the State, Article 254(2) itself gives such a power to  the   State,  Legislature  to  amend  the  law  to  make applicable in  relation to that State though Central Law may be inconsistent  with the law operating in other States.  In other words,  when the  topic is  occupied in the Concurrent List, uniformity of the operation of the law is not the rule but simultaneous  existence of  the inconsistency would also operate in the same field.  But when the State Amendment was reserved and  received the  assent of  the President  to the extent of  inconsistency is saved in relation to that State. Therefore, the  amendment by proviso to Section 17(4) is not invalid.   Any other construction would dry out the power of the State  Legislature to  enact the  law on  the subject of acquisition.

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    It is  seen that  Section 3  of the  Amendment Act 5 of 1991  seeks   to  validate  the  illegal  declarations  made simultaneously  with   the  publication  of  the  Section  4 notification and in some cases even prior to the publication of Section 4 notification: it also seeks to validate certain acquisitions envisaged  thereunder.   This validation is not illegal.   Shri Misra  contended that since the appeals were pending before  this Court,  the Legislature  would  not  be competent to  amend the law so as to take away the effect of the  decisions  of  this  Court.    In  support  thereof  he contended that  leave was  granted by  this Court and it was directed to  post these  cases along  with the  main matter, i.e. Radhey  Shyam Nigam’s case.  Since the matters were not disposed of,  the amendment  was brought about to defuse the effect of  the judgment.   Therefore,  the amendment  is not valid in law.  We find no force in the contention.      Government of Andhra Pradesh v. H.W.T. [1975 (supp) SCR 384] was  a case  where pending  appeals in  this Court  the Legislature has  amended the Gram Panchayat Act and suitably defined ’house’  which was found to be defective as declared by a  judgment of  A.P. High  Court under appeal.  Amendment was made to the Gram Panchayat Act.  When the Validation Act was challenged,  a bench  of three  judges of this Court had upheld the  validity of  the Amendment Act and held that the State  Legislature  has  not  overruled  or  set  aside  the judgment of  the High  Court.  It has amended the definition of ’house’  by substitution of a new Section 217 for the old section and  it has  provided that  the new definition shall have retrospective effect notwithstanding anything contained in any  judgment, decree  or order  of any  court  or  other authority.   In other words, it has removed the basis of the decisions rendered  by the  High Court  so that the decision would not have been given in the altered circumstances.  The same ratio applies to the facts in this case.      It is  then  contended  by  Shri  Krishnamani,  learned Senior counsel appearing for some of the appellants in cross appeals that in the Amendment Act two inconsistent dates for coming in  to force  of the  Act and  giving effect  to  the provisions of  the Act  have been  introduced.  That is also impermissible.   We find  no force in the contention.  It is seen that  the Amendment Act 5 of 1991 was given effect from the date  when the  amendment Ordinance was published in the Gazette but  the effect  of the  amendment was to remove the defects pointed  out and  to validate  the notifications and declarations   which    otherwise    would    be    invalid. Consequently, the  retrospective effect  was given  from the date of  the issuance  of  the  Ordinance  to  the  Act  and operation retrospectively  from the date of judgment.  Under those circumstances,  we do  not find  any inconsistency  in operation of  the Act  or invalidity in giving two dates for the respective operation provision of the Act.      Then it is contended by Smt. S. Janani, learned counsel for the  appellants in cross appeals that the High Court was not justified  in rejecting  5 of  the contentions raised by the appellants.   The  exercise of  the power  is arbitrary. She has  highlighted her point by placing before us a map in which some  of the  portions were  omitted from  acquisition while the lands in question came to be acquired.  Therefore, it is  arbitrary exercise  of the power. We find no force in the contention.  When we  have  enquired  from  the  counsel appearing for  the M.D.A.,  it is pointed out that the lands left out  were agricultural  lands which  could be  acquired under the Land Reforms Act and that, therefore, they had not been resorted  to the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.   It is  also pointed  out that some of the lands where

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abadi is  situated, such  lands were  not  acquired.    Shri Rajeev Dhawan,  learned senior  counsel for  the MDA further contended that certain lands were left out where greenery is in existence  and that  was not sought to be disturbed so as to maintain  ecology. Mrs.  Janani has  pointed out that the Kanugo had  intimated  that  the  respondents  are  free  to construct house without obtaining permission. The High Court has pointed  out that  such construction  was invalid in law and therefore  the notification  under Section 17(4) was not to be  sustained on  that ground. The view of the High Court is not  correct in  law. We find no force in the contention. It is  seen that  where large  extent of  land was acquired, mere existence of some houses even if they were constructed, may be  according to rules or may not be according to rules, the exercise  of  the  power  under  Section  17(4)  by  the Government dispensing  with  the  enquiry  does  not  become invalid, when  there was  urgency to  take possession of the acquired  land.  It  is  now  settled  legal  position  that acquisition for  planned development  of housing  scheme  is also urgent  purpose as  laid down by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt.  Governor of  Delhi and  Ors. [(1975)  4 SCC 285] and Smt. Pista  Devi v. H.D.A. [(1986) 4 SCC  251] and in recent judgment of  this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan [(1996)7 SCC  450].   In the  light  of  the  settled  legal position the  acquisition  for  housing  development  in  an urgent purpose and exercise of the power under Section 17(4) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A is not invalid.      Mrs.  Janani   has  further  contended  that  since  no developments have  been undertaken  and no  plans have  been prepared, the acquisition is bad in law. We find no force in the contention.  Under the U.P. Urban Development Act is not mandatory that the entire scheme should be prepared prior to the notification  under  section()  was  published.  Similar situation was  considered by this Court in L.Krishnan’s case (supra) and it was held that the acquisition on that account is not  bad in law. Accordingly we hold that the exercise of the power  under section()  and declaration  under section() and declaration  under section   are  not  vitiated  by  any manifest error  of law  warranting to  quash the declaration under section  as was done by the High Court.      The appeals  of the  Meerut Development  Authority  are accordingly  allowed.   The  appeals   of   the   claimants- respondents stand  dismissed. The  writ petition also stands dismissed. But in the circumstances, without costs.      Shri Markandeya,  learned counsel  has pointed out that in some  of the cases despite the status quo order passed by this Court,  some of  the respondents/appellants in contempt case have carried out the constructions and that, therefore, he has  taken out  contempt proceedings for violation of the orders of  the court.  We need not take any further steps in this case. Suffered to state that any constructions will not bind the authority nor are they entitled to compensation for these illegal  construction. The same would be taken note by the Land  Acquisition Officer  at the  time of  passing  the award and  would be  deal with  appropriately. The  contempt petitions are  accordingly dismissed.  The Land  Acquisition Officer should  pass the  award within  six months  from the date of the receipt of this order.