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PETITIONER: MEENGLAS TEA ESTATE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ITS WORKMEN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/02/1963

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1719            1964 SCR  (2) 165  CITATOR INFO :  D          1967 SC 122  (20)  RF         1968 SC 236  (9)

ACT: Industrial   Dispute--Requirements   of   valid    inquiry-- Principles of natural justice--Practice of Supreme Court not to enter into evidence to find facts for itself--Case of  no evidence.

HEADNOTE: In January, 1956, there was an incident in which a group  of workmen assaulted the Manager and two Assistant Managers  of tile appellant company.  All the three officers Were  Wound- ed.  Some  workmen were suspended,  and  charge-sheets  were served  on  them, charging them with  participation  in  the riot.   After  an inquiry the workmen were  dismissed.   The inquiry  was  held by the Manager and one of  the  Assistant Managers,During the inquiry, no witness was examined and  no statement made by any witness was tendered in evidence. (1)  [1957] S. C. R. 779, 166 The dispute was first referred to the Labour Court and  then to  the Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal.  The Tribunal  set aside  the inquiry held by the appellant company  and  asked the company to prove the allegations against each workman de novo  before it.  The company examined five witnesses.   The Tribunal  held that orders for dismissal of 15 workmen  were justified  but  it  ordered  the  remaining  workmen  to  be reinstated.   The  company  came to this  Court  by  special leave. Held,  that  the view of the Tribunal was correct  that  the inquiry  made by the company was not in accordance with  the principles  of  natural justice.  The inquiry  consisted  of putting  questions to each workman in turn.  No witness  was examined  in  support of the charge before the  workman  was questioned.  It is an elementary principle that a person who is  required  to  answer a charge must  not  only  know  the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported.   He  must be given a clear chance  to  hear  the evidence  in support of the charge and to put such  relevant questions  by  way of cross-examination as he  desires.   He

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must  also  be  given a chance to  rebut  the  evidence  led against him. As  regards two workmen, this Court held that  the  Tribunal was justified in not accepting the findings which  proceeded almost  on no evidence.  As regards one workman, this  Court held that as the Tribunal had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the two Assistant Managers, this Court would be  slow to  reach a conclusion different from that of the  Tribunal. Moreover,  in  such cases, it is not the  practice  of  this Court  to enter into evidence with a view to  finding  facts for itself.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the Award dated April 3,  1961 of the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-303 of 1960. B.Sen,  S.C. Mazumdar, D. N. Mukherjee for B. N. Ghosh,  for the appellant. Janardhan Sharma, for the respondents. 1963.  February 22.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH  J.---By  this appeal filed  with  the  special leave of this Court, by the Meenglas Tea  167 Estate against its Workmen the Company seeks to challenge an award  dated  April  3 , 1961,  pronounced  by  the  Seventh Industrial  Tribunal, West Bengal.  The order  of  reference was  made  by the Government of West Bengal as far  back  as October 29, 1957, in respect of the dismissal of 44 workmen. The issue which was referred was as follows:- "Whether  the  dismissal  of the workmen  mentioned  in  the attached  list  is  justified  ?  What  relief  by  way   of reinstatement and/or compensation are they entitled to?" From  November 5, 1957, to August 17, 1960,  this  reference remained pending before the First Labour Court.  It was then transferred  to  the  Seventh Industrial  Tribunal  and  the letter  made  the impugned award on April 3, 1961.   By  the time the award was made two of the workmen (Nos. 12 and  37) had  died and four had been reemployed (Nos. 31, 33, 34  and 35).   One  of the workmen (No. 22) was not found  to  be  a workman  at all.  The Tribunal held that the orders of  dis- missal   of   fourteen   workmen   were   justified   though retrospective effect could not be given to the orders.   The Company was ordered to re-instate the remaining workmen  and to  pay  them  compensation  in some  cases  (but  not  all) amounting to three months’ wages.  In the present appeal the Company  seeks to challenge the award regarding 13 of  those workmen who have, been ordered to ’be reinstated.  of  these workmen the cases of three fall to be considered  separately and  those of the remaining ten can be considered  together. We shall now give the facts from which the reference arose. The appellant Meenglas Tea Estate in Jalpaiguri District  of West  Bengal is owned by Dun-can Brothers Ltd.  The  workers belong  to  the  Zilla Chabagan  Workers’  Union,  Malbazar, District 168 jalpaiguri.  On January 18, 1956, there was an ugly incident in  which  a  group of workmen assaulted  the  Manager,  Mr. Marshall and his two Assistant Managers Mr. Nichols and  Mr. Dhawan.   This happened one morning in a section of the  tea gardens  where about two hundred workmen had surrounded  Mr. Nichols and were making a violent demonstration.  First  Mr.

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Dhawan and soon after Mr. Marshall arrived on the scene  and the  workmen  surrounded  them also.  In  the  assault  that followed  these  three officers  were  wounded   Mr.Marshall seriously.  A criminal cage was started against some of  the rioters but we are not concerned with it.  The Company  also started proceedings against some workmen.  It first issued a notice of suspension which was to take effect from  February 6, 1956, and then served charge-sheets on a large number  of workmen charging them with participation in . the riot.  The Work men replied denying their complicity.  The Company then held  enquiries  and ordered the dismissal of  a  number  of workmen  with effect from January 18, 1956.  A sample  order of dismissal is exhibited as annexure F in the case.  In the enquiry before the Tribunal the Union admitted the  incident though it said that it was caused by provocation on the part of  the Management.  The Union, however, denied that any  of the  workmen  who were charged was concerned in  the  affray pointing  out that none of these workmen was  prosecuted  by the  police.  The enquiry was held by Mr., Marshall and  Mr. Nichols and the record of the proceedings is marked Exhibits 17 and 18 series.  That record was produced before us by the appellant  for our perusal.  It was admitted before us  that there  was no further record of evidence for the Company  as none was recorded.  Exhibit 17 and 18 series are the answers of  the  workmen  to the charges against  .  them  and  such replies  as  they gave to questions put -to them  in  cross- examination,  169 The  Tribunal held that the enquiry was vitiated because  it was  not held in accordance with the principles  of  natural justice.    It  is  contended  that  this   conclusion   was erroneous.  But we have no doubt about its correctness.  The enquiry  consisted of putting questions to each  workman  in turn.   No  witness was examined in support  of  the  charge before  the  workman was, questioned.  It is  an  elementary principle  that a person who is required to answer a  charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony  by which the accusation is supported.  He must be given a  fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and  to put  such relevant questions by way of cross-examination  as he  desires.   Then he must be given a chance to  rebut  the evidence led against him.  This is the barest requirement of an  enquiry of this character and this requirements must  be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be  accepted.  A departure from this requirement  in  effect throws  the  burden  upon the person charged  to  repel  the charge  without  first making it out against  him.   In  the present  case neither was any witness examined nor  was  any statement  made  by any witness tendered in  evidence.   The enquiry,  such  as it was, was made by Mr. Marshall  or  Mr. Nichols who were not only in the positionof  judges  but also of prosecutors and witnesses.  There Was DO opportunity to the persons charged   to  cross-examine them  and  indeed they  drew  upon  their own knowledge of  the  incident  and instead cross-examined the persons charged.  This was such a travesty  of  the principles of natural  ,justice  that  the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the findings and  asking the Company to prove the allegation against each workman  de novo before it. In the enquiry which the Tribunal held the Company  examined five  witnesses including Mr. Marshall, Mr. Nichols and  Mr. Dhawan,  who  were the eye-witnesses.  In view of  the  fact that the 170 enquiry  was  being made into an incident which  took  place

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four  and  a half years ago the Tribunal  in  assessing  the evidence held that it would not accept that any workman  was incriminated  unless at least two witnesses deposed  against him.   Some of the workmen got the benefit of this  approach and  it is now contended that the Tribunal was in  error  in insisting  upon corroboration before accepting the  evidence of  a single witness.  Reference in this connection is  made to s. 134 of the Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) which  lays down  that  no particular number of witnesses shall  in  any case  be  required for the proof of any fact.  It is  not  a question  of an error in applying the Evidence Act.   It  is rather a question of proceeding with caution in a case where admittedly  many  persons  were involved  and  the  incident itself took place a very long time ago.  The Tribunal  acted with caution and did not act upon uncorroborated  testimony. It  is  possible,  that the evidence  against  some  of  the persons to whom the benefit has gone, might be cogent enough for  acceptance, but the question is not one of believing  a single  witness in respect of any particular workman but  of treating all workmen alike and following a method which  was likely to eliminate reasonably chances of faulty observation or incorrect recollection.  On the whole, it cannot be  said that  the  Tribunal  adopted  an  approach  which  made   it impossible for the company to prove its case.  It followed a standard which in the circumstances was prudent.  We do  not think  that for this reason an interference is  called  for. Since no other point was argued the appeal of the Company in respect of the ten workmen, who were alleged to be concerned in the occurrence of January 18, 1956, must be dismissed. This  brings  us to the consideration of the  three  special cases.   They  concern Dasarath Barick (No. 25),  Lea  Bichu (No.  26)  and Nester Munda (No. 27).  Dasarath  Barick  was said to have threatened the  171 loyal workers and to have prevented them from work on  March 15,  1956.  Lea Bichu was said to have forced the  chowkidar to hand over the keys of the gate to him on the same day and to  have  locked  the  gate with a  view  to  hampering  the movement of workmen.  The Tribunal held that the enquiry  in both  the cases was not a proper enquiry and the  conclusion was not acceptable.  Here, again no witness was examined  in the enquiry to prove the two occurrences and even before the Tribunal  there  was  no evidence against  them  except  the uncorroborated  testimony of Mr. Mar-shall.  No  worker  was examined to prove that he was threatened by Dasarath  Barick or to show that it was Lea Bichu who had taken the keys from the  chowkidar  and  locked -the gate.   In  view  of  these circumstances  the Tribunal was justified in  not  accepting the  findings  which proceeded almost on  no  evidence.   We agree with the Tribunal that no case was made out before the Tribunal for the dismissal of Dasarath Barick and Lea Bichu. The last case is of Nester Munda who is the Secretary of the Union.,’  It  was alleged against him that on,  January  16, 1956, he had abused Mr. Nichols and had demonstrated at- the head of a hostile group of workmen.  Here, again, no  proper enquiry  was held and the conclusion reached at the  enquiry by the Company was not acceptable.  The Tribunal, therefore, enquired  into  the case for itself.  Mr.  Nichols  and  Mr. Dhawan gave evidence which the Tribunal was not prepared  to accept.   It pointed out that their testimony conflicted  on vital  points.   Since the Tribunal had the  opportunity  of hearing  and seeing Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan we should  be slow  to  reach  a conclusion different  from  that  of  the Tribunal.   In  addition,  in  such cases,  it  is  not  the practice of this Court to enter into evidence with a view to

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finding  facts  for  itself.  Following  this  well  settled practice we see no reason 172 to interfere with the conclusion of the Tribunal. The  result is that the appeal fails and is  dismissed  with costs. Appeal dismissed