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PETITIONER: MAULAVI ABDUR RUB FIROZE AHMED & CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAY KRISHNA ARORA

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/10/1975

BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1976 AIR  479            1976 SCR  (2) 205  1976 SCC  (1) 295

ACT:      West Bengal  Premises Tenancy  Act 1956-Section  20 and Schedule  there-to-Scope  regarding  jurisdiction  vis-a-vis Section 5(2)  of the  city Civil,  Court Act 1953-Landlord’s need  of   the  business   premises  for  personal  use  and occupation for residential purpose is not barred by law.

HEADNOTE:      The  plaintiff-respondent   obtained  a  decree  in  an eviction suit  filed u/s  20 of  the  West  Bengal  Premises Tenancy Act,  1956 on the original side of the Calcutta High Court on the grounds of "personal use and occupation", which was confirmed  by a bench of the High Court. On an appeal by certificate of  fitness, the  defendant-appellant raised the following contentions:      (i) That  the Civil  Court at Calcutta and not the High Court had  jurisdiction to try the suit as per section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956.      (ii) That  there could  be no reasonable requirement of the landlord  of the suit premises for residential purposes, as they were being used by the tenant appellant for business purpose. The  requirement of the landlord must exist for the same purpose  to which  the premises  were being used by the tenants.      (iii) That  in any  event the  High Court ought to have decreed the  suit for  eviction from  a part of the premises only under section 13(4) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act 1956.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD :  (i) Section  20 is  couched in a language which does not determine merely the place of suing but affects the jurisdiction of  one court  or the  other. Triability of the suit by  the High  Court excludes the triability by the city civil court. [207-D]      (ii) If  a suit  were to  be instituted  in a  court to which both  Section 8  of the  Suit Valuation  Act 1887  and section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fee Act 1870 would apply, the nature of the suit both for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fee  will be  the amount  of rent  payable during  the preceding 12  months. But  on the original civil side of the

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Calcutta High  Court the  procedure  followed  and  the  law applicable is different. Within the local limits of ordinary Original Civil  Jurisdiction of  the Calcutta High Court the legislature thought  to provide  that, if  the value  of the suit exceeded  Rs. 10,000/- it was only entertainable by the High Court at Calcutta. But apart from the value of the suit if the  value of  the suit premises of which the recovery of possession is  claimed exceeds  Rs. 10,000/-  only the  High Court can  entertain such  a  suit.  The  intention  of  the legislature is that if the value of the premises exceeds Rs. 10,000/- then  irrespective of  the value  of the  suit, the suit can  be entertained  only by  the High Court and not by the City Civil Court. [207F, G-H, 208-A]      (iii) There  is no conflict between Section 5(2) of the city civil  court and Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act  of 1956  read with its Schedule. The High Court alone has  the jurisdiction to try the suit and not the city civil court,  in the  view, either  the value  of the  suits exceeds Rs.  10,000/-or because  of the special provision in the Act when the market value of the premises (not the value of the lease held interest) exceeds Rs. 10,000/- [208 F-G]      (iv) The  law does  not require  the landlord must need the premises  for his own occupation only for the purpose to which they were being put by the tenant. It may well be that a tenant cannot put the demised premises to any 206 other use.  But there  is no  bar in  law in  the way of the landlord requiring the business premises for his residential occupation and  vice versa provided the premises are capable of being put to different uses. [309-E]      B. Banerjee  v. Smt.  Anita Pan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1146, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1937 or 1974.      From the  Judgment and  Decree dated  the  6th  August, 1974, of  the Calcutta  High Court  in Appeal  from Original Decree No. 21 of 1972.      Purshottam Chattarjee and Rathin Das for the Appellant.      Govinda  Mukhoty   and  G.   S.  Chatterjee   for   the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      UNTWALIA, J.  The defendant appellant in this appeal by certificate of the Calcutta High Court is a firm carrying on business in  the town  of Calcutta. The plaintiff respondent filed a  suit for  eviction of  the appellant from the first and second  floors of  the building  No. 86,  Purshottam Rai Street, Calcutta  on the  ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and that he had no  other house  in or  around Calcutta  where he  could reside. The  suit was instituted on the original side of the Calcutta High  Court. It  was contested  by the appellant on several grounds.  The learned  Trial Judge decreed the suit. The appellant’s  appeal was dismissed by a Bench of the High Court.  It   has  come  to  this  Court  after  obtaining  a certificate of fitness from the High Court.      Mr. Purshottam  Chatterjee,  learned  counsel  for  the appellant urged  the following  points in  support  of  this appeal:           (1)  That the  High Court  had no  jurisdiction to                try the  suit, Only  the City  Civil Court at                Calcutta had jurisdiction to try it.

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         (2)  That there could be no reasonable requirement                of the  landlord of  the  suit  premises  for                residential purpose,  as they were being used                by the tenant appellant for business purpose.                The requirement  of the  landlord must  exist                for the  same purpose  to which  the premises                were being used by the tenant.           (3)  In any  event the  High Court  ought to  have                decreed the  suit for eviction from a part of                the premises  only in accordance with section                13(4) of  the West  Bengal  Premises  Tenancy                Act, 1956-hereinafter called the Act.      The point  of jurisdiction of the High Court to try the suit was  very strenuously  urged and  does need our careful consideration. The  suit in  question was  instituted in the Calcutta High  Court on  the 3rd of October, 1969. After the institution of  the suit  the Act  stood amended by the West Bengal Premises  Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, West Bengal Act 34 of 1969-hereinafter called the Amendment Act. Section 20 of the Act had already been amended by an Amending Act of 1957 (West Bengal Act 27 of 1957). It reads as follows:           "Notwithstanding anything  contained in  any other      law, a  suit or  proceeding by  a  landlord  against  a      tenant in which re- 207      covery of  possession of any premises to which this Act      applies is  claimed shall lie to the Courts, as set out      in the  Schedule, and no other Court shall be competent      to entertain or try such suit or proceeding."      The relevant portion of the Schedule runs as follows:           (1)  Where  the  premises  are  situate  on  land,      wholly within  the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction      of the Calcutta High Court-      (i)  Where the  value of  the  suit  or  the  value  of           premises  of   which  recovery  of  possession  is           claimed does not exceed ten thousand rupees-to the           City Civil  Court as  defined in  the  City  Civil           Court Act, 1953 (W.B. Act 21 of 1953);      (ii) Where the  value of  the suit exceeds ten thousand           rupees-to the High Court at Calcutta."      Section 20  is couched  in a  language which  does  not determine  merely   the  place  of  suing  but  affects  the jurisdiction of  the one  court or  the other.  If under the schedule, the  suit is  triable by  the High Court, the City Civil Court  has no  jurisdiction to  try it.  While, on the other hand,  if the  latter had  jurisdiction to try it, the former will  have no jurisdiction to do so. The inclusion of the word  ’proceeding’ in  section 20 by the Amending Act of 1957, will  not make  any  difference  for  the  purpose  of determination of  the point  at  issue  in  this  case.  The schedule, however,  does not  seem to be happily worded. Yet it is  not difficult  to spell  out  the  intention  of  the legislature.      Under section  8 of  the  Suits  Valuation  Act,  1887, except in few exceptions mentioned therein, the value of the suit for  the purposes  of Court fee and jurisdiction is the same. Under  section 7 (xi) (cc) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 the amount  of Court  Fee payable in a suit for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant is on the amount of rent for the  suit premises  payable for the year next before the date of  presenting the  plaint. If  the  suit  were  to  be instituted in  a court to which the two acts would apply the value of  the suit both for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fee  will be  the amount  of rent  payable during  the preceding 12  months. But  on the Original Civil Side of the

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Calcutta High  Court the  procedure  followed  and  the  law applicable is different.      In the  instant case the rental was about Rs. 110/- per month. On  that basis  the value  of the  suit ought to have been Rs.  1320/- only.  That being so the suit, according to the contention  of the  appellant, was entertainable only by the City  Civil Court and not by the High Court The argument so presented  does not,  however, stand scrutiny. Within the local limits  of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High  Court the legislature thought to provide that if the  value of  the suit exceeded Rs. 10,000/- it was only entertainable by  the High  Court at  Calcutta. If the value was below  Rs. 10,000/-  the City Civil Court only will have the jurisdiction.  But apart  from the  value of the suit if the value  of the  suit premises  of which  the recovery  of possession is 208 claimed exceeds  Rs. 10,000/- then the City Civil Court will have no  jurisdiction to try a suit. Only the High Court can entertain such  a suit.  The intention  of  the  legislature seems to  be that  if the  value of the premises exceeds Rs. 10,000/- then  irrespective of  the value  of the  suit, the suit can  be entertained  only by  the High Court and not by the City Civil Court.      But that  apart, we  may also  rest our  judgment on  a simple basis.  Assuming the  plaintiff could have valued his suit at  Rs. 1320/-  but he  chose to value it in accordance with the  value of  the suit  premises, there was nothing in law to  compel him  to put  the lower  valuation and not the higher. The  value of  the suit  premises mentioned  in  the plaint cannot  be  said  to  be  contrary  to  law  and  the plaintiff is not obliged to put the 12 months’ rental value. In the  instant case  the plaintiff  asserted in  his plaint that the  value of  the suit premises exceeded Rs. 10,000/-. The defendant  asserted in  its written  statement that  the suit was "under valued"; it ought to have been valued at the amount of  one year’s  rent. Perhaps  the use  of  the  word "under-valued" is  a mistake for the word "over-valued". The statement in  the plaint  being squarely  in accordance with the law  and not  contrary to  it, the  High Court  was  the proper forum  for the institution and trial of the suit. The plaint could not be instituted in the City Civil Court.      Mr. Chatterjee  also placed  reliance upon section 5(2) of the  City Civil  Court Act, 1953 as stood at the relevant time. It says:           "Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and      (4), and  of section 9, the City Civil Court shall have      jurisdiction  and   the  High   Court  shall  not  have      jurisdiction to  try suits  and proceedings  of a civil      nature, not exceeding rupees ten thousand in value."      Counsel submitted  that according to the said provision of law  the City Civil Court alone will have jurisdiction to try a  suit of  a civil  nature the  value of which does not exceed Rs.  10,000/-. There  is no  conflict between section 5(2) of  the City Civil Court and section 20 of the Act read with its  schedule. In  the view  which  we  have  expressed above, either  the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000/- or because of  the special provision in the Act when the market value of  the premises  (not the  value of  the  lease  hold interest) exceeds  Rs. 10,000/-  the High  Court  alone  has jurisdiction to  try such  a suit  and not  the  City  Civil Court.      Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act as it stood before it was amended by  the Amendment  Act stated the ground of eviction in clause (f) as follows:

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         "Where the premises are reasonably required by the      landlord either for purposes of building or re-building      or  for   making  thereto   substantial  additions   or      alterations or  for his  own occupation  if he  is  the      owner or  for the  occupation of  any person  for whose      benefit the premises are held;" 209 By the  Amendment Act  with retrospective effect, instead of clause (f)  there were  brought about  two clauses, viz. (f) and (ff). They run as follows:           "(f) subject  to the provision of sub-section (3A)      and section  18A, where  the  premises  are  reasonably      required by  the landlord  for purposes  of building or      re-building or for making thereto substantial additions      or alterations,  and such  building or  re-building, or      additions or alterations, cannot be carried out without      the premises being vacated;"           "(ff) subject  to the  provisions  of  sub-section      (3A), where the premises are reasonably required by the      landlord for  his own  occupation if he is the owner or      for the  occupation of any person for whose benefit the      premises are  held and  the landlord  or such person is      not  in   possession   of   any   reasonably   suitable      accommodation." The constitutional  validity of  the retrospective operation of the  Amendment Act was upheld in the majority decision of this Court  in B.  Banerjee v.  Smt. Anita  Pan(1). The High Court has  recorded a  finding in  this case  which squarely covers the  requirement of  clause (ff)  introduced  by  the Amendment Act.  The learned  Trial Judge  has  found,  which finding was  upheld by  the High  Court, that the respondent not only  required the  suit premises for his own occupation but was  not in  possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. The  law does  not require  that the landlord must need  the premises  for his own occupation only for the purpose to  which they  were being put by the tenant. It may well be that a tenant cannot put the demised premises to any other use.  But there  is no  bar in  law in  the way of the landlord requiring the business premises for his residential occupation and vice versa, provided the premises are capable of being  put to  different uses, as they seem to be in this case.      Even apropos  the last  point urged  on behalf  of  the appellant we  find no  error in  the decision  of  the  High Court. In  view of  the provision  of law  contained in sub- section (4)  of section  13 of  the Act,  the High Court has come to  the conclusion  that it  was not  a case  where the eviction of  the tenant  could be ordered only from the part of the  premises. Having  appreciated the facts as they were placed before  us by  learned counsel  for the appellant and Mr. G  Mukhoty, learned counsel for the respondent, we agree with the conclusion of the High Court in this regard also.      For the  reasons stated  above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. S.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 210