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PETITIONER: MASOOD ALAM ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/01/1973

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  897            1973 SCR  (3) 268  1973 SCC  (1) 551  CITATOR INFO :  R          1973 SC2469  (4,5,6)  R          1974 SC 255  (13)  R          1974 SC 432  (7)  R          1974 SC2151  (18)  F          1975 SC  90  (8,13)  C          1982 SC1315  (31)  RF         1986 SC2177  (40)  R          1987 SC2332  (22)  RF         1990 SC1196  (8)

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, 1971  Section  3(1), Section 14(2)- "Fresh facts"-Whether fresh detention can  be ordered  without fresh facts after revocation of  expiry  of the  earlier order-Mala fides-Whether detention order  under Maintenance   of   Internal  Security  Act   malafides,   if objectionable   activities  attract  preventive   provisions (Chapter VIII) of the Cr. P.C. also-Whether second detention order  rendered  mala fide by the fact that  the  order  was served when the detenu was already in jail.

HEADNOTE: The  detenu  was  arrested on June 15,  1972  under  section 3(1)(a)(i) Arid (ii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,  1971.  The order was issued on the same date on  which he was arrested under sections 107/117/151 of the Cr.   P.C. The  order was to expire on the 26th June, 1972 as the  same was not approved under s. 3(3) by the Government.  On  25-6- 1972, a fresh order of detention was passed which was served on the detenu on 26-6-1972 while in jail.  The second  order did  not mention any fresh grounds of detentions.  Both  the detention  order were challenged on the groups (i)  that  no fresh  facts  were  disclosed for  the  fresh  detention  as required  by s. 14(2) of act and (iii)that the  orders  were mala fide.  Granting the writ of habeas corpus and directing the release of the petitioner. HELD : The second detention order was made without  alleging any  fresh facts after the expiry of the first  order.   The power  of  preventive detention is  an  extraordinary  power intended   to   be  exercised  in   extraordinary   emergent circumstances.   The legislative scheme of ss. 13 and 14  of

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the Act suggest that the detaining authority is expected  to know  and to take into account all the exising  grounds  and make  one  order of detention which must not go  beyond  the period fixed and fix the maximum period of detention upto 12 months  from  the date of detention.  It is  to  effectuate this restriction on the maximum period and to ensure that it is  not  rendered nugatory or ineffective  by  resorting  to camouflage of making a fresh order operative so-on aft&  the expiry of the period of detention, and also. to minimise the resort  to  detention  orders,  that  s.  14  restricts  the detention of a person on given set of facts to the  original order  and does not permit a fresh order to be made  on  the same grounds which were in existence when the original order was made. [276H-277D] Manubhusan Roy Prodhan v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 252 of 1972 dated 31-10-1972, relied on. Sampat  Prakash  v. State of J. & K.[1969] 3 S. C.  R.  574, distinguished. If the grounds are relevant and germane to the object of the Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, then  merely  because the  objectionable activities covered thereby  also  attract the  provisions  of  Chapter  VIII of  the  Cr.   P.C.,  the preventive  detention  cannot  for  that  reason  alone   be considered  to  be malafide provided the  authority  con  is satisfied of the necessity of the detention as  contemplated by the Act. [273C]      269 Sahib  Singh Duggal, v. Union of India, [1966] 1  S.C.R.313, Mohammed Salem Khan v. C. C. Bose, A.I.R. 1972 S.C.2256, Boriahan Gorey v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1972 S.C.2256, relied on. Merely  because  a person concerned has been served  with  a fresh detention order while in custody, that service  cannot invalidate the order of detention. Although  the   past conduct,   activities  and  antecedent  history  should   be proximate  in  point  of  time  and  should  have   rational connection withthe necessity for detention, what period of past activity should beconsidered   is   within   the discretion of the detaining authority. [275C-H] Ujagar  Singh V. State of Punjab, [1952] S.C.R. 757,  Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. Stare of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1120 and Rameshwar  Shaw  v. District Magistrate  Burdwan,  [1964]  4 S.C.R. 921, referred to. Hadibandhu Das v. The District Magistrate, Cuttack, [1969] 1 S.C.R.  227  and Kshetra Gogoi v. State of Assam,  [1970]  2 S.C.R. 517, held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 469 and 470  of 1972. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Bashir Ahmad, K. L. Hathi, Manzar Ul-Islam and P. C.  Kapur, for the petitioners. B.   D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1. D.   P.  Uniyal and O. P. Rana, for respondents Nos. 2 to  6 (in  W.P. No. 469) and for respondent Nos. 223 (in W.P.  No. 470). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUA,   J.  These  two  petitions  under  Art.  32   of   the Constitution  for  writs  in the  nature  of  habeas  corpus (Masood Alam v. Union of India & ors.  W.P. no. 469 of  1972 and  Abdul Bari Kairanvi v. Union of India W.P. No.  470  of

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1972), have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. Writ Petition No. 469 of 1972: In  writ petition no. 469 of 1972 we made a short  order  on December  20,  1972  directing the release  of  Masood  Alam unless  he  was required in some other case,  reserving  our reasons  for his release to be given later.  We now  proceed to  deal with the arguments advanced on his behalf and  give our reasons for our decision. Masood  Alam,  detenu-petitioner, was arrested on  June  15, 1972 pursuant to an order of detention dated June 14,  1972. No  copy  of that order is produced on the record.   It  is, however,  not disputed that the said order was made  by  the District  Magistrate under S. 3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of  the Maintenance of Internal 270 Security Act, 1971 (Act no. 26 of 1971) (hereinafter  called the  Act).  The grounds of detention signed by the  District Magistrate,  Aligarh were served on the, petitioner on  June 17,  1972, pursuant to s. 8 of the Act.  Those grounds  read :-               "(1)  That  you have  been  exciting  communal               feelings   amongst  Muslims  and  feeling   of               disaffection  towards the Government of  India               and of hatred to other communities.  You  have               also  been advocating use of force by  Muslims               in  India to secure withdrawal of  the  A.M.U.               (Amendment)  Bill,  1971-now  an  Act.   These               actions, which are a threat to security of the               State  and  the maintenance of  public  order,               find support from the following instances :-               (i)   that  you  are organiser at  Aligarh  of               Youth Majlis a paramilitary Organisation which               imparts  training to.  Muslims in the  use  of               lathi, swords and knives, etc.  You are member               of   Al  Jehad,  an   international   Islamic,               movement.  You are Naib Amir Ala Youth Majlis,               U.P.               (ii)You went to participate in Youth  Majlis               training  camp at Varanasi.  You were  trained               in the use of knife and demonstrated the  same               at  a  function of the Youth  Majlis  held  in               Mohalla Tantanpara, Aligarh.               (iii) You participated in a meeting  addressed               by  Shri Afaq Ahmed, Organiser, Youth  Majlis,               U.P.               (iv)On  12-7-1971  you stressed  upon  members               of .Youth Majlis to organise branches of Youth               Majlis in each Mohalla.  You went to Allahabad               to participate, in the Youth Majlis Camp orga-               nised  there from 23 to 26-6-71 and were  made               Naib Ala, U.P.               (V)   You  attended the meeting held  at  your               residence   on   29-10-71   wherein   training               programme of Youth Majlis in use of knife  and               aiming by air gun was discussed.               (vi)You  attended a private meeting of  Muslim               Majlis  on 11-1-1971 at the residence  of  Dr.               Hanif in Mohalla Rasalganj, Aligarh.  You dis-               closed  there that the Youth Majlis was  fully               prepared  to  meet any situation  on  communal               basis and pleaded for funds for Youth Majlis.               271               2.That   you   have   extra    territorial               loyalties  and  are, therefore,  a  threat  to

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             security of India which is evidenced from  the               following instances :-               (a)   You  visited Pakistan and returned  from               there  on  29-4-1971  and  participated  in  a               meeting   addressed   by  Shri   Afaq   Ahmad,               Organiser  Youth Majljs, U.P. In this  meeting               you  disclosed  that you  had  developed  many               contacts in Pakistan and that people there had               given you enough money for the help of Muslims               in Aligarh.               (b)   You  on 16-7-1971 along with Abdul  Bari               Qairanvi   and  Mohammad  Obed  were   noticed               criticising   Government  of  India’s   policy               towards Bangla Desh and accused Government  of               India and Indian Press of carrying on a false,               propaganda.               (c)   You  attended  a meeting  on  20-10-1971               held  at  your residence  wherein  Abdul  Bari               Qairanvi   asked  the  volunteers  to   remain               vigilant  and  prepared in  view  of  Indo-Pak               armies.   facing  each  other  to   meet   the               situation which might result therefrom. The  Government, it appears, did not accord its approval  of the  petitioner’s detention as required by s. 3 (3)  of  the Act.   According  to  para  22 of  the  Writ  Petition,  the contents of which are not controverted, as expressly  stated in  para  12 of the counter affidavit, on June 26,  1972  at about  12  noon  the  following  order  was  served  on  the petitioner :-               "Sub  : Release under Maintenance of  Internal               Security Act on 25-6-1972 at 23.50 hrs.  under               D.M. Aligarh Order dated 25-6-1972.               You are hereby informed that you are  released               on  25-6-1972 at 23.50 hrs. vide D.M.  Aligarh               Order  dated  25-6-1972  on  account  of  non-               receipt of approval from State, Government but               you were detained in Jail as under trial under               Rules  107/117, Cr.  P.C. You may inform  your               relations  or  lawyer if you want  to  arrange               your bail.                                    Sd/-                       Superintendent,                    Distt.  Jail, Aligarh." A fresh order of detention was also passed on June 25, 1972. This order was made by the Governor of U.P. under s. 3(1) of 272 the Act and was served on the petitioner on June 26, 1972 at about 3.30 p.m. It reads :               "Whereas  the  Governor of  Uttar  Pradesh  is               satisfied with respect to Sri Masood Alam  son               of  late Sri Baboo Ayoob resident  of  Mohalla               Bani Israilan, Aligarh City, that with a  view               to  preventing him from acting in  any  manner               prejudicial  to the security of the State  and               the   maintenance  of  public  order,  it   is               necessary so to order               NOW  THEREFORE,  in  exercise  of  the  powers               conferred  by sub-section (1) of section 3  of               the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971               (no.  26  of 1.971), the  Governor  is  hereby               pleased  to  direct that the said  Sri  Masood               Alam shall be detained under subclause (ii) of               clause  (a) of sub-section (1)  of  subsection               (3)  of  the said Act in  the  District  Jail,               Aligarh  in the custody of the  Superintendent

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             of the said Jail.                                    By order of the Governor,                                             Sd/.                                          R.K. KAUL                                     Special Secretary". On  behalf of the petitioner both the aforesaid,  orders  of detention  are  assailed before us.   The  first  contention pressed  by Mr. Bashir Ahmad, appearing for  the  petitioner relates to the earlier order of detention.  He has tried  to assail  that order with the object of showing mala fides  of the  detaining  authority in making ,the second  order.   In this  connection  it  is noteworthy that  according  to  the return of the State of Uttar Pradesh as averred in para27(r) of the counter-affidavit of Shri R. K. Kaul, Special  Secre- tary,  "the petitioner was arrested on 15th June 1972  under section  107/117/151, Cr.  P.C. and the, order of  detention was  also  served on him by the District Magistrate  on  the same  date.   Orders  for his release  were  issued  by  the District  Magistrate  under  the  Maintenance  of   Internal Security Act but he continued to be in  Jail under the above sections of the Cr.  P.C." The order of release mentioned in this  para has reference to the, order dated June  25,  1972 when the petitioner was supposed to have been released  from his  detention because of non-approval of his  detention  by the State Government.  Mr. Bashir Ahmad the counsel for  the detenu  has  contended that the grounds of  detention  dated June 17, 1972 served on the petitioner under s. 8 of the Act only  suggest a threat to the security of the State and  the maintenance  of  public, order and that this does  not  mean that the petitioner was likely to act in the near future  in a   manner  prejudicial  to  the  security  of   State   and maintenance of public order.  This conten- 273 tion  ignores para 3 of the grounds in which it  is  clearly stated  that the District Magistrate was satisfied that  the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to  the security of India, security of the State and maintenance  of public order and that with a view to preventing him from  so acting, it was necessary to detain him.  The submission that the  use of the word ’likely’ in this para only  brings  the petitioner’s  case within the purview of the  provisions  of Chapter   VIII  (Security  Proceedings)  of   the   Criminal Procedure Code thereby justifying only proceedings under  s. 107  of  the  Code and that an order of  detention  in  such circumstances  is an abuse and misuse of the  provisions  of the  Act  has  only to be stated to  be  rejected.   If  the grounds  are relevant and germane to the object of  the  Act then  merely  because the objectionable  activities  covered thereby also attract the provisions of Ch.  VIII, Cr.   P.C. the  preventive  detention cannot for that reason  alone  be considered to be mala fide provided the authority  concerned is   satisfied  of  the  necessity  of  the   detention   as contemplated by the Act : see Sahib Singh Duggal v. Union of India(1), Mohammad Salem Khan v. C. C. Bose(2) and  Borjahan Gorey  v. The Stale of West Bengal(3).  The jurisdiction  of preventive detention sometimes described as jurisdiction  of suspicion   depends  on  subjective  satisfaction   of   the detaining authority.  It is designed to prevent the mischief from  being committed by depriving its suspected  author  of the  necessary  facility  for  carrying  out  his  nefarious purpose.   This Jurisdiction is thus  essentially  different from that of judicial trials for the commission of  offences and  also from preventive security proceedings  in  criminal courts. both of which proceed on objective consideration  of the necessary facts for judicial determination by courts  of

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law  and  justice functioning according  to  the  prescribed procedure.   Merely because such jurisdiction of courts  can also  be  validly  invoked does not by  itself  exclude  the jurisdiction  of  preventive detention under the  Act.   The earlier  order. therefore, cannot be described to be  dither illegal   or  mala  fide  on  this  ground.   Although   the petitioner’s present detention is founded on the order dated June 25. 1972 the earlier order was challenged with the sole object  of showing that the present detention is  also  mala fide  because  the authorities are determined  to  keep  the petitioner in custody irrespective of the existence or  non- existence  of valid grounds.  We are not impressed  by  this submission and are unable to hold that the circumstances  in which  the  earlier order was made in any way  suggest  mala fides on the part of the detaining authority ’in making  the second order. Regarding  the second order also it has been suggested  that there is no imminent likelihood of the Petitioner acting  in a prejudicial manner and that his detention is thus an abuse or misuse (1)  [1966] 1 S.C.R. 313. (3)  A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2256. (2) A.LR. 1972 S.C. 1760. 274 of the power of detention conferred by the Act.  The  scheme of our Constitution with respect to the fundamental right of personal  liberty  and  the  protection  guaranteed  against arrest  and  detention of the individual is intended  to  be real  and  effective,  says  the  counsel,  and  adds   that preventive  detention  of a person for any reason  short  of imminent  likelihood of his acting in a  prejudicial  manner must  be  considered to be an invasion of this  right.   Our constitution  undoubtedly  guarantees various  freedoms  and personal  liberty to all persons in our ’Republic.  But  the constitutional guarantee of such freedoms and liberty is not meant  to  be  abused  and misused so  as  to  endanger  and threaten  the  very foundation of the pattern  of  our  free society  in  which the guaranteed  democratic  freedoms  and personal  liberty  are designed to grow and  flourish.   ’Me larger interests of our multireligious nation as a whole and the  cause  of preserving and securing to every  person  the guaranteed    freedoms   peremptorily   demand    reasonable restrictions  on the prejudicial activities  of  individuals which  undoubtedly jeopardise the rightful freedoms  of  the rest   of  the  society.   These  restrictions  within   the constitutional  limits have to be truly effective.   If  the detaining  authority  is  of opinion on  grounds  which  are germane  and  relevant,  that it is necessary  to  detain  a person from acting prejudicially as contemplated by s. 3  of the  Act  then  it  is  not  for  this  Court  to   consider objectively  how imminent is the likelihood ,of  the  detenu indulging  in  these activities.  This  submission  is  thus unacceptable.  The next point urged is that the petitioner had been served with the order of detention dated June 25, 1972 when he  was in  jail  and  that such service is  invalid  rendering  the petitioners  detention void.  This submission  is  generally unacceptable.  There is no legal bar in serving an order  of detention on a person who is in jail custody if he is likely to  be  released  soon  thereafter  and  there  is  relevant material on which the detaining authority is satisfied  that if  free,  the  person concerned is  likely  to  indulge  in activities  prejudicial  to  the security of  the  State  or maintenance of public order.  ’The decision in Makhan  Singh Tarsikka  v. State of Punjab(1) does not lay down the  broad

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proposition  canvassed.  In that case which dealt  with  the Defence of India Rules it was observed that r. 30(1) (b)  of these Rules postulates an order only where it is shown  that but  for  the  imposition  of  the  detention,  the   person concerned  would be able to carry out  prejudicial  activity ,of   the  character  specified  in  r.  30(1).   On   plain construction  of  that sub-rule it was held  that  an  order permitted  by  it could be served on a person who  would  be free  otherwise to carry out his prejudicial activities  and such  a  freedom could not be predicated  ,of  Makhan  Singh Tarsikka,  petitioner in that case.  It is  noteworthy  that the Court after referring with approval to its earlier (1)  A.I.R. 964 S.6.1120. 275 decision   in   Rameshwar  Shaw  v.   District   Magistrate, Burdwan(1) observed :               "Besides when a person is in jail custody  and               criminal proceedings are pending against  him,               the appropriate authority may in a given  case               take  the view that the  criminal  proceedings               may  end very soon and may   terminate in  his               acquittal.  In such a case it would be open to               the appropriate authority to make an order  of               detention  if the requisite conditions of  the               rule  or the section are specified and  served               on  the  person concerned if and after  he  is               acquitted in the said criminal proceedings".      No doubt, this decision does suggest that the order  of detention can be served on the person concerned if and after he is acquitted in the said criminal proceedings but in  our view  merely  because the person concerned has  been  served while  in custody when it is expected that he would soon  be released  that  service  cannot  invalidate  the  order   of detention.  The real hurdle in making an order of  detention against  a  person already in custody is based on  the  view that  is futile to keep a person in dual custody  under  two different orders but this objection cannot hold good if  the earlier  custody is without doubt likely to cease very  soon and  the detention order is made merely with the  object  of rendering it operative when the previous custody is about to cease.  It has also been pointed out that the grounds relate to  a  period  more  than  a year  prior  to  the  order  of detention.   This according to the submission  also  renders the  order  mala fide.  In our opinion, this  contention  is without  merit.   It  has to be borne, in mind  that  it  is always  the  past  conduct,  activities  or  the  antecedent history of a person which the detaining authority takes into account  in  making a detention order.  No  doubt  the  past conduct, activities or antecedent history should  ordinarily be  proximate, in point of time and should have  a  rational connection  with  the conclusion that the detention  of  the person  is necessary but it is for the  detaining  authority who  has  to arrive at a subjective satisfaction  in  consi- dering  the past activities and coming to his conclusion  if on  the the basis of those activities he is  satisfied  that the  activities of the person concerned are such that he  is likely  to indulge in prejudicial  activities  necessitating his  detention.   As observed in Ujjagar Singh v.  State  of Punjab(2)  it is largely from prior events or  past  conduct and  antecedent  history of a person showing  tendencies  or inclinations of a person concerned that an inference can  be drawn  whether he is likely even in the future to act  in  a manner prejudicial to the public order.  If the authority is satisfied  that  in view of the past conduct of  the  person there is need for deten-

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(1) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 921. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 757. 276 tion  then it could not be said that the order of  detention is not justified. The  next point raised on behalf of the petitioner  is  that the  earlier  order of detention was either revoked  or  had expired  with the result that unless the  present  detention pursuant to the order dated June 25, 1972 is passed on fresh facts arising after the expiry or revocation of the  earlier order  it  must be held to be invalid.  In support  of  this submission  reliance  has been placed on S. 14  of  the  Act which reads                14 (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of               section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897  a               detention  order may, at any time, be  revoked               or modified-               (a)   notwithstanding that the order has  been               made  by an officer mentioned  in  sub-section               (2)  of section 3 by the State, Government  to               which  that officer is subordinate or  by  the               Central Government.               (b)   notwithstanding that the order has  been               made  by  a State Government, by  the  Central               Government.               (2)   The revocation or expiry of a  detention               order  shall  not bar the making  of  a  fresh               detention  order under section 3  against  the               same person in any case where fresh facts have               arisen after the date of revocation or  expiry               on  which  the Central Government or  a  State               Government or an officer, as the case may  be,               is  satisfied  that such an  order  should  be               made". Support has also been sought from Hadibandgu Das v. The Dis- trict_Magistrate,  Cuttack(1)  which, was a case  under  the Preventive  Detention Act (IV of 1950).  The language of  S. 13(2)  of  that  Act  is identical with  that  of  S.  14(2) reproduced  above.   This decision was followed  in  Kshetra Gogoi v. State of Assam(2) also a case under Act 4 of  1950. In  our  opinion,  this submission does  possess  merit  and deserves to be accepted.  Section 14 speaks of revocation or expiry of a detention order.  The principle underlying  this section  has, its roots in the vital importance attached  to the fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by  our Constitution.  The Act fixes the maximum period of detention to  be  12 months from the date of the  detention  with  the proviso that the appropriate Government can revoke or modify the  detention order at any earlier time : S. 13.  It is  to effectuate  this  restriction on the maximum period  and  to ensure  that it is not rendered nugatory or  ineffective  by resorting to the camouflage of (1) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 227.      (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 517. 277 making a fresh order operative soon after the expiry of  the period of detention, as also to minimise resort to detention orders  that  s. 14 restricts the detention of a  person  on given  set  of  facts to the, original order  and  does  not permit  a fresh order to be made on the same  grounds  which were  in  existence when the original order was  made.   The power  of preventive detention being an extraordinary  power intended  to  be exercised only  in  extraordinary  emergent circumstances the legislative scheme of ss. 13 and 14 of the Act  suggests  that the detaining authority is  expected  to know  and to take into account all the existing grounds  and

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make  one  order of detention which must not go  beyond  the maximum  period fixed.  In the present case it is not  urged and indeed it is not possible to urge that after the  actual expiry  of  the  original order of  detention  made  by  the District Magistrate which could only last for 12 days in the absence  of its approval by the State Government, any  fresh facts  could  arise  for  sustaining  the  fresh  order   of detention.   The submission on behalf of the State that  the petitioner’s activities are so highly communal and prone  to encourage violent communal activities that it was considered absolutely  necessary  to  detain him  in  the  interest  of security of the State and maintenance of public order cannot prevail  in  face  of the  statutory  restrictions  and  the guaranteed  constitutional right which is available  to  all persons.   The rule of law reigns supreme in  this  Republic and  no person on the soil of free India can be deprived  of his  personal  liberty  without the authority  of  law.   As observed by this Court in Manu Bhushan Roy Prodhan v.  State of West Bengal (1) :               "...   The  Act  encroaches  on   the   highly               cherished   right  of  personal   liberty   by               conferring  on  the  executive   extraordinary               power  to  detain  persons  without  trial  by               coming to subjective decisions.  The detaining               authority  in exercising this power  must  act               strictly  within  the  limitations  this   Act               places  on its power so that the guarantee  of               personal liberty is not imperilled beyond what               the Constitution and the law strictly provide.               The limited right of redress conferred on  the               detenu under the law deserves to be  construed               with    permissible   liberality   with    the               provisions  of the Act and the  constitutional               guarantee." On  behalf  of  the respondent reference was  also  made  to Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2) dealing  with detention  under J. & K. Preventive Detention Act (J.  &  K. Act  13  of 1964).  Though in that Act there  is  a  similar provision [s. 14(2) of that Act] in the judgment there is no reference  to that section and it appears that  no  question similar to the one- raised" (1)  W.I. No. 252 of 1972 decided on October 31, 1972. (2)  [1969] 3 S.C.R. 574. 278 before  us was urged and adjudicated upon there.   We  have, therefore,  no option but to order the petitioner’s  release which we did ,on December 20, 1972.  As the detention  order is  being  quashed on this ground we do  not  consider  it necessary  to  express. any opinion on the point  that  the detention  order is vitiated because some of the grounds  on which  it  is based, though not of unessential  nature,  are vague. Writ Petition No. 470 of 1972 Abdul  Bari Kairanvi, petitioner in this writ  petition,  an associate  of  Masood Alam (Petitioner in W.P.  No.  469  of 1972)  both  in  the Youth Majlis  and  Muslim  Majlis,  was arrested  on June 3, 1972 when he had organised in the  City of  Aligarh  a procession in defiance of  the  order  issued under S. 144, Cr.  P.C. The general ,atmosphere of  communal tension prevailing in that city ultimately culminated in the unfortunate communal riots on June 5, 1972.  The arrest  was made  under  S.  188, I.P.C. and he  was  actually  produced before the Additional District Magistrate on the very day of his  arrest.   On  June 14, 1972 an order was  made  by  the District Magistrate for the petitioner’s detention under  s.

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3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act as amended by the  Defence of India Act 42 of 1971.  The grounds of his detention which were duly served on him under s. 8 of the Act read as  under :-               "1. That you are a member of the Executive  of               the  Muslim  Majlis.  You are also  an  active               member  of Youth Majlis.  The Youth Majlis  is               being trained in the use of lathis, swords and               knives as a fully militant Organisation.   You               contribute  and raise funds to  illegally  arm               the  Organisation.   You visited  Pakistan  in               November,  1971 for arranging the transfer  of               funds   collected  by  Shri  Masood  Alam   in               Pakistan  to Aligarh for use by  Youth  Majlis               for  training volunteers in the use  of  arms               and  knives  etc.  You collected Rs.  700  for               Youth  Majlis  from Varanasi,  Pratapgarh  and               other places.               2.That   you   have   extra    territorial               loyalties  and  are  therefore  a  threat   to               security  of India which is evident  from  the               following instances :-               (a)   That   you  on  1-4-1971   listened   to               Pakistan  Radio  and  propagated  Pak   policy               towards  Bangla Desh among the  Muslims.   You               also  propagated  that  India  engineered  the               trouble.               (b)   On 19-10-71 you participated in  private               meeting of commanders of Youth Majlis  wherein               you  delivered a short speech that  India  and               Pakistan  army were facing each other  on  the               border and               279               there was a great panic on the Indian side  of               the  border.  You also advised the  commanders               of  the  Youth Majlis to remain  vigilant  and               prepared for any situation that might  develop               as  a  result  of  clash  between  India   and               Pakistan  forces.   You criticised  India  for               allegedly meddling into the private affairs of               Pakistan.   You  pointed  out  to  them   that               Bengalees  had  been taught a lesson  and  the               Hindus  in  India would also share  a  similar               fate if Pakistan forces invaded.  You  accused               police  and  army  of  favouring  Hindus   and               stressed  upon the commanders of Youth  Majlis               to remain prepared.               (c)   That  you visited Pakistan in  November,               1971 and returned from there on 30-11-1971 and               propagated  that concentration of Pak army  in               Lahore  sector was quite heavy and  that  real               war would be fought in the sector.               (d)   That    you   on   10-12-1971    briefed               volunteers  of  Youth Majlis  that  local  Jan               Sangh workers were trying to tease the Muslims               by making unbecoming remarks against Pakistan.               3.That  you  have been  exciting  communal               feelings  among  the  Muslims  in  India   and               contributing  to the communal disturbances  in               the  Aligarh City which is, evident  from  the               following instances :-               (a)   That   you  on  15-10-71  attended   the               Executive Committee meeting of Youth Majlis at               Jama  Masjid  Upor  Kot,  Aligarh  where   you               demanded  that A.M.U. (Amendment) Bill  should

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             guarantee    minority   character    of    the               University.               (b)   That you on 10-3-1972 in your speech  in               a  gathering of about one thousand Muslims  at               Jama  Masjid in Upor Kot Aligarh City  alleged               that  the enemies of Islam had a tradition  to               make efforts to wipe out Islamic religion  and               culture  and  at the present time  also  these               enemies   of  Islam  were  trying  to   become               aggressive.   You  warned  that  in  case  the               Muslims culture was wiped out the Muslims will               also be exterminated.  You alleged that  there               was  systematic attempt to abolish Urdu.   You               exhorted the Muslims to be united and firm.               (c)   That  on  19-5-1972 after a  meeting  at               Jama Masjid Upor Kot, Aligarh you  distributed               a               280               pamphlet  captioned "Muslim University ki  mot               ka  Akhiri marhela.  Ek Jan aur ek  Awazbankar               usko  bachyiye"  issued in your name  and  the               names  of Dr. Ahsan Ahmad and others.  In  the               meeting  in your short speech you pointed  out               that action, if delayed, would fail to achieve               any result even by any amount of sacrifice  of               bloodshed.   You  also  remarked  "Hamari  kom               hamesha se talwar key saye me pali hai" and as               such  no  sacrifice  was too  grave  for  this               occasion.               (d)   That  on  25-5-72 along with  Dr.  Ahsan               Ahmad  attended a meeting of about 25  persons               at  the  residence of Abdul  Jalil  where  Dr.               Ahsan  Ahmad briefed the participants  on  the               agitation,  formation of action Committee  and               collection  of  funds in connection  with  the               agitation  against  A.M.U.  (Amendment)  Bill,               1972.               4.    In view of the above-mentioned grounds I               am  satisfied that you are likely to act in  a               manner  prejudicial to the security of  India,               security  of State and maintenance  of  public               order  and with a view to preventing you  from               acting in a manner prejudicial to the security               of India, security of State and maintenance of               public order it is necessary to detain you." His  detention was duly reported to the State Government  on June 18, 1972 and the State Government gave its approval  on June 25, 1972 which was duly reported to the, Government  of India on .June 29, 1972.  His case was sent to the  Advisory Board  on July 13, 1972 and the Board conveyed its  decision on  August  18/21,  1972.  His detention  was  confirmed  on August 30, 1972.  The petitioner had made his representation on  July  15/24, 1972 through the District  Magistrate  who forwarded  it  to  the Government on  July  29,  1972.   The Government  considered the representation on August 2,  1972 and the decision of the Government ,was duly conveyed to him on August 5, 1972. According to the petitioner’s counsel Mr. Bashir Ahmed,  the grounds on which the petitioner’s detention has been ordered are  irrelevant  and,  therefore,  the  detention  is  void. Emphasis  is laid ,on the submission that the  Youth  Majlis and  the Muslim Majlis are both organisations which  do  not advocate communal conflict ,or disharmony and the object  of both of them is social service ,of the society.  It is added that the Youth Majlis is a purely social Organisation  which

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is dedicated to the cause of the oppressed and the depressed and  its membership is open to all persons  irrespective  of their community or religious creed.  In support of this 281      contention  the counsel sought to refer to the  printed constitution  of  the  Organisation in Urdu  which  was  not permfitted,  not being on the record and not being  relevant to the limited scope of enquiry in the present  proceedings. In our opinion none of the grounds on which the petitioner’s detention  has  been ordered can be said to  be  irrelevant. The  facts  stated  in the grounds have to  be  accepted  as correct  and  it is not open to this Court to  enquiry  into their truth like a court of appeal.  Writ proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise.  And then it has to  be borne  in  mind  that  it was in  November,  1971  that  the petitioner is said to have gone to Pakistan (it is  asserted in  the grounds that he visited Pakistan in November,  1971, and  collected  funds  in that country for  the  purpose  of carrying  on the activities of the Youth Majlis  in  India), and he returned on November 30, 1971, just three days before the  actual war between India and Pakistan began.   Judicial notice  under s. 57 of the Indian Evidence Act can be  taken of the fact that the war between India and Pakistan actually began  on  December 3, 1971 lasting for about  a  fortnight. The  petitioner  has  admitted  his  visit  to  Pakistan  in November,  1971, the reason given by him being that  he  had gone  there to, see his ailing relations without  mentioning either  their  names  and  addresses  or  the  relationship. According   to  the  grounds,  the.  petitioner  has   extra territorial loyalties manifested by his anti Indian and pro- Pakistan  activities and also by inciting communal  feelings amongst  the  Muslims  during  the  period  of  tension  and conflict  between  India  and Pakistan on  the  question  of Bangla Desh.  The grounds further disclose, inter alia,  (i) that  the Youth Majlis engages in training Muslims in  India in  the use of lathis, swords and knives, and (ii) that  the petitioner  advised  the commanders of the Youth  Majlis  in October,  1971  to be vigilant and remain prepared  for  any situation  that might develop as a result of  clash  between India  and  Pakistan  forces, at the  same  time  suggesting invasion  of  India  by Pakistan  forces.   An  attempt  has undoubtedly  been made on behalf of the petitioner  to  show that  the  grounds  on which the  District  Magistrate  felt satisfied are nonexistent but as observed earlier it is  not open  to this Court to review and over-ride  the  subjective opinion  of the District Magistrate by going into the  truth or  otherwise  of  the facts accented  by  him.   The  facts contained in the grounds reproduced earlier seem to us to be clearly relevant for the purpose of forming an opinion  that they endanger both maintenance of public order and  security of  the State.  It is undeniable that hostility amongst  the citizens  founded  on differences in religious faiths  Is  a deadly  poison  for  healthy existence  and  progress  of  a secular,  egalitarian society like ours.  And when  violence is advocated and injected in such ’hostility, it is idle  to suggest that such activities cannot fall within the mischief designed  to  be  Prevented  by the  Act.   In  our  country patriotism is not communal or religious and the Constitution 282 guarantees  equal  freedom to all religious  faiths  without recognising the superior status of any particular  religion. There  is  absolutely  no discrimination  on  the  basis  of religion   and  indeed  in  this  Republic   every   citizen irrespective  of  his  religious faith  can  aspire  to  the highest   office,  if  otherwise  qualified.   Here   people

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professing   numerous   different   religious   faiths   and ideologies  live  in  perfect  harmony  with  equal   rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Articles 25 to 28 and  Art. 30  in Part III accord to the Right to Freedom  of  Religion and  the  Right of Minorities to  Establish  and  Administer Educational  Institutions, the status of fundamental  rights which can be enforced in the highest courts in this  country by  appropriate means.  Whenever, therefore, an  attempt  is made  to disturb the peaceful, tolerant and harmonious  life of  the  society by appealing to or inciting  and  inflaming religious  passions  and prejudices and  by  fanning  morbid fanaticism  it  must necessarily tend to  disturb  the  even tempo  of  the  life  of the  society  as  a  whole  thereby prejudicially  threatening the maintenance of public  order. When such a climate in communal disharmony is engendered for stimulating anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan feelings during the period of extreme tension between the two countries then  it must  also  tend to seriously prejudice the  maintenance  of security of the State.  Our attention has been drawn to  the pamphlet Annexure A to the writ petition for the purpose  of fortifying  the argument that the agitation with respect  to the  Muslim University at Aligarh in which  ,the  petitioner had undeniably taken part was a non-violent movement.  We do not  think- it is possible on the basis of this document  to decline to accept the opinion of the District Magistrate who had   sufficient  material  about  the  activities  of   the petitioner  and  of the organisations to  which  he  himself professes to belong.  This pamphlet which merely announced a meeting to be held on May 22, 1972 is, therefore, of  little consequence. The  contention that the petitioner is a  Muslim  theologist highly qualified in Muslim theology, assuming it to be true, is also unhelpful to the petitioner as the impugned order is made  on  the basis of his activities which  are  considered clearly prejudicial to ,the maintenance of public order  and security  of State.  His learning as a theologist is  wholly immaterial.  It neither places him above the law nor does it displace  or  detract  from  the  opinion  of  the  District Magistrate with respect to his activities and their  effect. On  the  contrary  it has to be borne in mind  that  when  a person  professing  to  be  learned  in  religious  theology encourages  defiance  of law in the name  of  religion  then ignorant  and credulous people are more likely to be  misled and  swayed  by  religious passions  and  sentiments.   Such activities   naturally   have   greater   potentiality   for prejudicially threatening the maintenance of public order. 283 According  to the writ petition the petitioner is an  active member  of the Muslim Majlis and also a member of the  Youth Majlis.  He was arrested while defying the order promulgated under s. 144, Cr. P.C. This had been preceded by the various Prejudicial  activities in the month of May, 1972 as  stated in the grounds of detention and was followed two days  later by  communal  clashes.   This agitation was  carried  an  in connection  with  a  bill relating  to  the  Aligarh  Muslim University  ignoring that the legal position in  respect  of this  University  had been authoritatively settled  by  this Court  as  far back as October, 1967 in S.  Azeez  Basha  v. Union  of  India(’;).  These activities  clearly  bring  the petitioner’s  case within s. 3 of the Act, being  calculated to incite communal violence. It  has  then  been contended that some of  the  grounds  of detention   conveyed  to  the  petitioner  are  vague   and, therefore,  the  order of detention is liable to  be  struck down as invalid.  Reference has in this connection been made

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to  the  last  two lines of ground no.  1  relating  to  the collection of Rs. 700/ for Youth Majlis and to grounds  nos. 2 and 3. The argument is wholly misconceived.  If ,the  last two  lines  are  read, as they should  be,  along  with  the remaining  contents of ground no. 1 it cannot be  said  that the  petitioner  was unable to tender his  explanation  with respect to the allegation contained therein.  Quite clearly, the  exact  point  of time and the people  from  whom  small amounts  were  collected could not possibly be  stated  with precision.   Grounds  nos.  2 and 3, as  is  clear,  contain precise details in the various clauses enumerated  therein.. According  to  ground  no.  2  the  petitioner  has   extra- territorial  loyalties  and, therefore, he is  a  threat  to security  of India and this conclusion is arrived at on  the basis  of the instances stated in cls. (a) to (d) which  are precise and definite.  Similarly, ground no. 3 says that the petitioner  has  been exciting communal feelings  among  the Muslims  in India and contributing to communal  disturbances in  Aligarh city and this conclusion is based  on  instances stated  in cls. (a) to (d) which are precise  and  definite. lie  instances.  under both these grounds are  relevant  and germane. to the object which is sought to be achieved by  s. 3  of the Act for the purpose of detaining persons  who  are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order.  The (1)[1068] 1 S.C.R. 833. 3-L796Sup.C.I/73 284 decisions, relied  upon on behalf of the petitioner reported in  Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and  Kashmir(1) and Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal (2) are.  on  the  facts and circumstance of this,  case  of  no assistance to him. This writ petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. S.B.W.               Petition dismissed. (1) [1956] S.C.R. 948.          (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635. 285