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PETITIONER: MARY ANGEL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       13/05/1999

BENCH: K.T.Thomas, M.B.Shah

JUDGMENT:

       SHAH,J.

     Leave granted.

     The  question  involved in this appeal is whether  the High Court has jurisdiction to impose exemplary cost of Rs. 10,000/-  to  be  paid  by each  of  the  appellants  while rejecting  a  frivolous or vexatious petition under  Section 482  of  the Criminal Procedure Code for setting  aside  the charge  framed  against the appellants?  FIR was  lodged  by Josephine  Jaya  on  29th September, 1989 stating  that  her in-laws  demanded from her father Rs.  60,000/- in cash,  65 soverigns of gold jewellary for the bride and nine soverigns or   similar  jewellary  for  the   groom;   that   out   of Rs.60,000/-,   Rs.50,000/-  were  paid;    that  after   the marriage,  she  was treated cruelly and there were  unlawful demands  for a colour television and Rs.  50,000/- in  cash. It  is  also  alleged  that at the  instigation  of  in-laws accused   nos.   2  to  6,   accused  No.1   (her   husband) administered  certain  medicine  with a view  to  abort  her pregnancy.    After  preliminary   investigation,  on   18th October,  1989,  a charge sheet was filed against A1  to  A6 under  Sections 498(A), 406, 420, 315 I.P.C.  and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  The case was committed to the  Sessions Court, Nagercoil and was numbered as  Sessions Case  No.   10  of  1989.  Accused Nos.  3  to  6  filed  an application under Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code for  their  discharge.   That  application  was  allowed  by holding  that  they had not demanded dowry and there  is  no material to show that medicine for abortion was administered at their instigation.  Against that order, complainant filed Criminal  R.C.   No.  442 of 1990 before the High  Court  of Madras.   By  Order  dated 9th July, 1993,  the  High  Court allowed  the Revision case filed by the complainant and  set aside  the  order  of discharge.  In pursuance of  the  said Order,  on  13th June, 1996, learned Sessions  Judge  framed charges  against accused Nos.  A3 to A6 also.  Against  that Order  dated  13th June, 1996, accused Nos.3 to 6, that  is, the  present appellants preferred Criminal Revision case No. 601  of 1996 before the High Court on the ground that  there was no prima facie case for framing of charges against them. The  Court  while  dismissing  the same  observed  that  the proceedings  have  been  dragged  on for 8  years  and  that petition  was  filed without disclosing even to the  learned

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counsel  that  revision against the order of non-framing  of charges  was  allowed earlier by the High Court  by  holding that there was sufficient material for framing charges.  The Court  also observed that despite the directions of the High Court  to  the  Sessions  Court  to  finish  the  trial   as expeditiously  as possible, appellants have not allowed  the Sessions  Court  to comply with the said directions  of  the High  Court.   Considering the aforesaid conduct,  the  High Court  imposed costs of Rs.  10,000/- each on the appellants to  be paid to the informant (complainant), wife of  accused no.   1  and directed the Sessions Court to dispose  of  the case within two months from the date of the communication of the  Order.   That  Order is challenged before  us  in  this appeal.   The  learned Counsel for the appellants  submitted that  in  criminal cases High Court has no  jurisdiction  to impose costs except as provided under Sections 148(3), 342 & 359  of the Cr.  P.C.  empowering the Court to impose  costs and  submitted  that inherent powers of the Court cannot  be exercised contrary to the said provisions.  As against this, learned  Counsel  for  the respondent submitted  that  while exercising  its  jurisdiction  under   Section  482  of  the Criminal   Procedure  Code  the   High  Court  has  inherent jurisdiction  to  impose costs to prevent the abuse  of  the process  of law or otherwise to secure the ends of  justice. It  is  submitted that for one or other reason, the  accused prevented  the Sessions Court from proceeding with the  case and  by  suppressing the previous Order passed by  the  High Court,  approached the Court for quashing and setting  aside the   charges  framed  against   them.   It  is,  therefore, submitted  that  the  High Court has rightly  exercised  its inherent  powers  and  has imposed costs to be paid  to  the cruelly  treated wife (informant).  Admittedly, in  Criminal R.C.   No.  442 of 1990 and Criminal R.P.  No.  440 of 1990, the  High Court by its detailed judgment and order dated 9th July  1993,  allowed the said Revision Petitions by  holding that  there  were sufficient grounds on record to  establish prima facie case against the accused for framing the charges and  Additional Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction  in law  as  well  as  totally  overlooked  the  material  facts available  on record by discharging the appellants.  Despite the  aforesaid order and by suppressing the same, appellants filed  petition under Section 482 before the High Court  for quashing   the  charges  framed   against  them.   In   such circumstances, Court has imposed the costs to be paid to the wife  of accused No.1 to prevent abuse of the process of the Court  and  to secure the ends of justice.  The question  is whether  the Court had such jurisdiction?  For deciding  it, we  would  first  refer  to the  relevant  sections  of  the Criminal Procedure Code upon which reliance is placed by the learned  counsel for the appellants which empowers the Court to  impose  costs.   Section 148(3) provides that  when  any costs  have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section  145,  Section  146 or Section 147,  the  Magistrate passing  a  decision may direct by whom such costs shall  be paid,  whether  by such party or by any other party  to  the proceeding,  and  whether in whole or in part or  proportion and  such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of  witnesses  and  of pleaders’ fees, which the  Court  may consider  reasonable.   Section 342 provides that any  Court dealing  with  an  application  made  to  it  for  filing  a complaint  under Section 340 or an appeal under Section 341, shall  have  power to make such order as to costs as may  be just.   Further,  Section  359 empowers the Court  to  order payment  of cost to the complainant in non cognizable  case, if  it convicts the accused and in such case, the Court  can

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pass  an  order  for  payment  of  costs  incurred  by   the complainant  in  the prosecution of the case and such  costs may  include  any  expenses incurred in respect  of  process fees,  witnesses and pleaders fees which the Court considers reasonable.   This  power  can  also  be  exercised  by  the Appellate  Court  or by the High Court or Court of  Sessions exercising  its  power  deciding  the  appeal  or  revision. Section  357  provides  for payment of compensation  to  the victim  for  any loss or injury caused by the offence or  in case  of  death to the heirs of the victims out of the  fine imposed  and  while awarding compensation court has to  take into  consideration,  inter  alia,   the  expenses  properly incurred  in  the  prosecution;  Section  358  provides  for payment  of  compensation where any person causes  a  police officer  to arrest another person, without sufficient ground for causing such arrest, then compensation can be awarded by the  Magistrate not exceeding Rs.  100/-.  It is, therefore, submitted that Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of costs  de  hors the aforesaid statutory provisions.  In  our view, Section 482 Cr.  P.C.  stands independently from other provisions  of  the  Code and it  expressly  saves  inherent powers  of the High Court by providing that "nothing in this Code  shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of  the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of  justice".  Therefore, to prevent abuse of the process of the  Court  or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,  the High  Court  is  empowered to pass such  order  which  may include  order  to pay costs to the informant  (complainant) and  the language of the section does not in terms place any fetter.   This power is not conditioned or controlled by any other  section  nor  is curtailed by  any  provisions  which empower   the  court  to  award   costs.   No  doubt,   this jurisdiction is of exceptional nature and is to be exercised in  exceptional  cases for achieving the purposes stated  in the  section.   Secondly,  costs  could be  either  for  the purpose  of meeting the expenses of the litigation as it can be  exemplary  to  prevent the abuse of the process  of  the court  or to secure ends of justice or giving effect to  any order  passed  under  the  Code.  Learned  counsel  for  the appellants  relied upon the decision of this Court in  State of  Orissa  vs.   Ram Chander Aggarwal Etc 1979  (1)  S.C.R. 1114  and  submitted that inherent powers of the High  Court could  not  be  exercised for awarding costs  when  Criminal Procedure  Code  provides for awarding of costs  in  limited cases.   In  the aforesaid case, Court was dealing with  the contention  whether the High Court could review its Judgment and  Order despite the specific bar under Section 369 of the Criminal  Procedure Code except to correct a clerical error. The  Court held that in view of Section 369 Cr.  P.C.  which prohibits  all  courts  when it has signed its  judgment  to alter  or review the same except to correct a clerical error and  that  in the case of a High Court, the prohibition  was subject   to   the  Letters   patent  or  other   instrument constituting  such High Court.  In similar provision section 362  under the new Code, subsequent part is omitted.  Hence, the Court held that giving the plain meaning of Section 369, it was clear that no Court, subject to exception made in the section,  shall  alter  or review  its  judgment;   inherent powers  of  the High Court were meant to give effect to  any order  under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process  of any  court  or  otherwise  to secure the  ends  of  justice. Hence,  such  powers  cannot  be  invoked  as  it  would  be inconsistent  with the specific provisions of the Code.  The

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Court  further held that Section 561(A) of the Code  confers no new powers, it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed  by a High Court necessary (among other  purposes) to  secure  the ends of justice and "by the introduction  of the  section, it was made clear that the inherent powers  of the  Court, for the purposes mentioned in the section, shall not be deemed to be limited or affected by the provisions of the  Criminal  Procedure  Code.  Further, in  the  case  of Pampathy  Vs.  State of Mysore [1966 (Suppl.) SCR 477], this Court  dealt with the contention that the High Court  cannot exercise  inherent jurisdiction under Section 561(A) of  Cr. P.C.,  1898  of  cancelling  bail  when  the  appellant  was released  on bail by the High Court under Section 426 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code  pending disposal of  the  appeal. Negativing  the said contention, the Court held that it  was true that in Section 498 and Section 497(5), the Legislature had  made express provision for cancellation of bail bond in the  case  of  accused persons released on bail  during  the course  of trial but no such express provision has been made by  the  Legislature in the case of a convicted  person  and whose  sentence  has been suspended under Section  426,  yet there  is  no  bar  for  exercise  of  inherent  powers  for cancellation  of  bail pending appeal.  The Court  observed, there  is  obviously  a  lacuna but  the  omission  of  the legislature  to make a specific provision in that behalf  is clearly  due  to  oversight or inadvertence  and  cannot  be regarded as deliberate. The Court held that inherent powers of  the High Court could be exercised only for either of the three  purposes  specifically mentioned in the Section;   it cannot  be  invoked in respect of any matter covered by  the specific  provisions of the Code;  it cannot also be invoked if  its  exercise  would  be inconsistent with  any  of  the specific  provisions of the Code;  if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code, power would  come into operation.  The Court pertinently  observed "no legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for  all  cases  that  can  possibly  arise  and  it  is  an established  principle  that the Court should have  inherent powers,  apart from the express provision of law, which  are necessary to their existence for the proper discharge of the duties  imposed  upon them by law." Next, we would refer  to the decision in Dr.  Raghubir Sharan vs.  The State of Bihar (1964) 2 S.C.R.  336 wherein this Court considered the power of  the High Court to expunge remarks made against a medical practitioner  who submitted his opinion on the health of the accused  pending  the proceedings before magistrate.   While considering  the  scope  of inherent  powers  under  section 561(A)  of  the  Code,  the Court  succinctly  analysed  the jurisdiction  which could be exercised by the High Court  in the  following words :- When we speak of inherent powers of the  High Court of a State we mean the powers which must, by reason  of  its being the highest court in the State  having general  jurisdiction over civil and criminal courts in  the State,  inhere in that court.  The powers in a sense are  an inalienable  attribute of the position it holds with respect to  the  courts subordinate to it.  These powers are  partly administrative  and  partly judicial.  They are  necessarily judicial  when  they  are  exercisable  with  respect  to  a judicial  order and for securing the ends of justice.   When we  speak of ends of justice we do not use the expression to comprise within it any vague or nebulous concept of justice, nor  even  justice  in the philosophical sense  but  justice according  to  law,  the  statute law and  the  common  law. Again,  this  power is not exercisable every time  the  High Court  finds  that there has been a miscarriage of  justice.

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For, the procedural laws of the State provide for correction of  most of the errors of subordinate courts which may  have resulted  in  miscarriage of justice.  These errors  can  be corrected  only by resorting to the procedure prescribed  by law and not otherwise.  Inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary  powers available only where no express  power is  available to the High Court to do a particular thing and where  its  express power do not negative the  existence  of such   inherent  power.   The   further  condition  for  its exercise,  in so far as cases arising out of the exercise by the  subordinate  courts of their criminal jurisdiction  are concerned,  is that it must be necessary to resort to it for giving  effect  to  an  order under  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  or for preventing an abuse of the process of  the court or for otherwise securing the ends of justice.

     The   power  to  expunge  remarks   is  no  doubt   an extraordinary  power  but  nevertheless it  does  exist  for redressing  a  kind  of  grievance  for  which  the  statute provides  no  remedy  in express terms.  The fact  that  the statute  recognizes that the High Courts are not confined to the  exercise  of powers expressly conferred by it  and  may continue  to  exercise  their inherent  powers  makes  three things  clear.  One, that extraordinary situations may  call for  the exercise of extraordinary powers.  Second, that the High  Courts  have  inherent  power to secure  the  ends  of justice.   Third, that the express provisions of the Code do not  affect that power.  The precise powers which inhere  in the  High Court are deliberately not defined by s.561-A  for good  reason.   It is obviously not possible to  attempt  to define  the  variety  of circumstances which will  call  for their exercise.  No doubt, this section confers no new power but  it does recognize the general power to do that which is necessary  to give effect to any order under this Code,  or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure  the ends of justice. But then, the statute does not say  that the inherent power recognized is only such as  has been exercised in the past either.  What it says is that the High  Courts  always had such inherent power and  that  this power  has  not  been taken away.  Whenever  in  a  criminal matter  a  question  arises  for  consideration  whether  in particular  circumstances the High Court has power to make a particular kind of order in the absence of express provision in the Code or other statute the test to be applied would be whether  it is necessary to do so to give effect to an order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court  or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.(Emphasis added)

     From  the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that  if there  is  an  express provision  governing  the  particular subject  matter  then  there  is no scope  for  invoking  or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because Court is required  to  apply, in the manner and mode prescribed,  the provisions  of  the  statute which are made  to  govern  the particular  subject-matter.   But the Highest Court  in  the State  could  exercise  inherent powers  for  doing  justice according to law where no express power is available to do a particular  thing  and  express power do  not  negative  the existence of such power.  It is true that under the Criminal Procedure  Code, specific provisions for awarding costs  are only  those as stated above.  At the same time, there is  no specific  bar that in no other case, costs could be awarded. Further,  in non- cognizable cases, Section 359 empowers the

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Courts  including Appellate Court or High Court or Court  of Sessions  while  exercising its powers of revision to  order the convicted accused to pay to the complainant, in whole or in  part,  the  cost  incurred by  him  in  the  prosecution including  the expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses  and  pleaders fees which the Court may  consider reasonable.   Hence, it may be inferred that in a cognizable case  and in appeal or revision arising therefrom, the  High Court  cannot exercise inherent power for awarding costs  de hors  the  said  provisions.   But  such  inference  is  not possible  in  cases where Court is exercising  powers  under Section  482.   It is to be stated that in cognizable  cases also  under  Section 357 while awarding compensation out  of the  fine  imposed on the accused, inter alia, the Court  is required  to  take  into   consideration  expenses  properly incurred  in the prosecution.  Hence, exercise of such power would, on the contrary, be in conformity and not in conflict with the powers conferred under Sections 148(3), 342 and 357 or  359  of the Cr.P.C.  In appropriate cases, where  it  is necessary  to pass such order, Court may award costs for the purposes,  namely,  (i) to give effect to any  order  passed under  the Court (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and (iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no (i) negative provision for exercise of such power and (ii) inconsistency  with the other provisions.  Further, awarding of  costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting   the  litigation  expenses   and,   secondly,   for preventing  the  abuse  of  the process of Court  or  to  do justice  in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary.   It  is  true that this jurisdiction  is  to  be exercised  sparingly  for  the aforesaid  purposes  in  most appropriate  cases  and  is  not  limitless  but  is  to  be exercised judiciously.  Now, we would refer to the decisions relied  upon  by the learned Counsel for the  appellants  to contend  that  costs  cannot  be  awarded  while  exercising jurisdiction  under  Section 482 of the  Criminal  Procedure Code.  Reliance is placed on the decision of Lasu Janu Pawar and  Ors.   Vs.  Emperor (1948) AIR Bombay 169  wherein  the Court  has held that  where a complaint and the proceedings resulting  therefrom are quashed by the High Court as  being both frivolous and vexatious, it has no power to award costs against  the complainant.  For that purpose, Court  referred to  sections  under  the   Code  which  specifically  confer jurisdiction/power in certain types of cases, to award costs or  compensation and held that it negatives the existence of any  general  power or jurisdiction so to do in other  cases unless  such general power or jurisdiction is to result from Section  561(A) of the Code.  The Court thereafter held that all  that  section do is to preserve the inherent powers  of the  High Court without conferring any additional power  and relied  upon the decision rendered by the Full Bench of  the Madras  High  Court  in  A.T.  Sankara  Linga  Mudaliar  vs. Narayana Mudaliar and Ors.  (1922) AIR Madras 502 by holding that  reasoning in the said case was sound.  Before  parting with  the  judgment the Court observed that it was  for  the legislature  to  consider  that  in  a  criminal   complaint launched  by private prosecutors wider powers with regard to awarding  costs  should  be conferred on the High  Court  in cases where a complaint was frivolous or vexatious or was in abuse  of the process of the Court.  The Full Bench decision of  the Madras High Court in the case of A.T.  Sankara Linga Mudaliar  (supra) dealt with the question whether there  was power  in  the  High  Court to grant  costs  on  a  revision petition  brought  not  by  the   Crown  but  by  a  private prosecutor  against an acquittal, which petition has failed.

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Delivering the judgment Schwabe CJ observed that if there is power  it  is a case in which he would gladly  grant  costs. Court  thereafter observed that as the Court was  exercising revisional  power  in  a  criminal case and  the  Code  does provide  in  several instances for payment of costs  and  as there  is no provision for granting costs in such case maxim expressio  unius est exclusio alterius [Expression of  one thing  is  the exclusion of another] applies and  held  that costs  cannot  be  awarded by  exercising  inherent  powers. Before  holding  that  Court has no  jurisdiction  to  grant costs,  the  Court  observed as under:  A  Court  may  have inherent  power  to  grant  costs.  That  is  clear  from  a judgment  in  the  House of Lords in Guardians of  West  Ham Union  vs.   Churchwardens, etc.  of St.   Matthew,  Bethral Green  (1896) App.  Cas.  477) where the House of Lords held that  they  had inherent power to grant costs, and in In  re Bombay  Civil  Fund  Act, 1882:  Pringle vs.   Secretary  of State  for  India(5)  where  Cotton and  Bower,  L.JJ  state clearly their view that they have an inherent power to grant costs  in the matter which came before them, although  there was  no  statutory provision enabling them to  grant  costs. But, in my view, the exercise of that inherent power must be always  restricted and limited to this that if the power  of granting  costs by the Court in that kind of proceedings  is provided  for  in some way by statute, the Court cannot,  by invoking  its  inherent powers, extend the powers which  had been granted to it by the statute.

     In  concurring  judgment, Coutts trotter  J,  observed that  Courts  of  Equity in England  always  asserted  their possession of such jurisdiction and constantly used it as is pointed  out  in various judgments that it can award  costs. The  learned Judge also referred to the decision of House of Lords  in  Guardians of Westham Union (supra)  and  observed that  in the said case, it was undoubtedly laid down that as and  by  virtue of its position as the highest Court in  the land  and not by any devolution of powers from the Courts of Equity  it  held  jurisdiction  to   deal  with  the  costs. However,  the  learned  Judge thereafter observed:   But  I think  that the main reason why it is not possible for  this Court  to adopt that line of reasoning and take upon  itself the  awarding of costs in criminal cases is this:   Revision is  not  an inherent power of this or any other Court:   the whole machinery of revision is a creature of statute and has to  be  found within the four walls of the Code of  Criminal Procedure  and, so far as criminal cases are concerned, I do not  see how we can posit an inherent power in ourselves  to supplement  that  purely statutory machinery by assuming  to ourselves  the  inherent  power of supplementing it  by  the awarding of costs.

     The  aforesaid decision was again followed by the full bench  of  the  Madras  High   Court  in  P.   Veerappa  vs. Avudayammal  and  Anr.   (AIR 1925 Madras 438)  wherein  the Court  observed  that High Court has no power to invoke  its inherent  powers  on  the  hearing of  a  criminal  revision against  an  order passed under Sections 145 and 148 of  the Criminal Procedure Code.  From the aforesaid decision of the Full  Bench,  it is apparent that the Court  recorded  three reasons  for not awarding the costs.  Firstly, the Court was exercising  revisionary  jurisdiction   under  the  Criminal Procedure  Code.   Secondly,  the Court  cannot  extend  the jurisdiction  by invoking its inherent powers.  Thirdly, the Court  relied  upon the maxim expressio unius est  exclusio alterius  and  held that as there are  specific  provisions

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empowering  the Court to grant costs, it excludes any  other power of granting costs.  In our view, the aforesaid reasons would  not  stand  scrutiny;    firstly,  because  there  is negative provision that except the cases for which the costs could  be awarded under different sections of the Code, High Court  shall  not  exercise  its  inherent  jurisdiction  of granting  costs.  In cases where for preventing abuse of the process  of law or for securing justice, Court may find that order  for costs including exemplary costs is required to be passed,  then the phrase such order would include the same and  there is no reason to restrict the ambit of the  phrase such  power.   Secondly,  with   regard  to  the  inherent jurisdiction  in  the  case of Dr.  Raghuvir  Saran  (supra) learned  judges observed that the Statute does not say that inherent power recognized is only such as has been exercised in the past either. It is further observed that High Courts have  inherent power to secure the ends of justice which are in the nature of extraordinary powers where no express power is  available to the High Court to do a particular thing and when its express power do not negative the existence of such inherent  power.   This  would  be further  clear  from  the English  decisions  referred  to by the Full  Bench  of  the Madras  High  Court.   In re Bombay Civil  Fund  act,  1882: Pringle  Vs.  Secretary of State for India ( 1889)  Chancery Division  288  the  Court of appeals held that  even  though there  is  no  provision  in  the Act to  give  costs  of  a successful  claim,  the Court had inherent  jurisdiction  to order  him to pay the costs of wrongly putting the court  in motion,  and  there was nothing in the Act to show that  the Legislature   intended   the   Court   not  to   have   such jurisdiction.   In  case  of a fruitless  and  unjustifiable application  made  to the Court, the Court should  have  its ordinary  power of saying that such an application should be dismissed  with costs.  In the case of the Guardians of West Ham Union Vs.  The Church Wardens and Overseas and Guardians of  the  Poor  of the Parish of St.  Mathew,  Bethnal  Green (1896)  Law  reports 477 (489), the House of Lords  held  as under:   The truth is, as it seems to me, that the House of Lords,  as the highest Court of appeal, has and  necessarily must  have an inherent jurisdiction as regards costs.   That this  inherent  jurisdiction is the sole authority  for  the action  of  the House of Lords in dealing with the costs  of appeals  is,  I  think,  shewn very plainly  by  the  latest alteration  which  this House has made in its practice  with regard  to  that matter.  For a very long period it was  the practice  of the House of Lords never to give costs against a party coming to defend and sustain a decree in his favour :   Mackersy  Vs.   Ramsays.   (1) That was said  to  be  an inflexible  rule.  But that rule was altered in 1877,  after the  Judicature  Act was passed.  And it was altered by  the House  of  Lords  of its own motion, without  any  statutory authority,  simply  on  the principle which  then  commended itself  to  this  House,  that a  successful  appellant  was entitled  to  indemnity:   Bowes Vs.  Shand  (2),  per  Lord Cairns  L.C.  and Lord Blackburn. There is no reason not to follow the aforesaid principle.

     Thirdly,  the  maxim  expressio  unius  est  exclusio alterius has its limited operation.  Its operation is to be restricted  with  regard to the sections which  empower  the Court  to  grant costs in certain cases by holding that  for the cases mentioned in those sections, Court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction of granting costs or pass an order of  granting costs in a method and mode different from  what is provided by the said sections.  Application of this maxim

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would  lead to inconsistency and injustice because in  cases where  Court  finds that a petition under Section 482 is  an abuse  of  the process of law and an unjustifiable  petition for   some  ulterior  motive   including  dragging  of   the proceedings  of Court, it can pass any other order, but  not the order for costs.

     Further,  for the rule of interpretation on the  basis of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it has been  considered  in  the decision rendered by  the  Queens Bench in the case of Dean Vs.  Wiesengrund 1955 (2) QBD 120. The  Court considered the said maxim and held that after all it is no more than an aid to construction and has little, if any,  weight  where  it  is possible,  to  account  for  the inclusio  unius on grounds other than intention to  effect the  exclusio alterius.  Thereafter, the Court referred to the  following passage from the case of Colquhoon Vs  Brooks 1887  (19)  QBD 400 at 406 wherein the Court called for  its approval     the  maxim   expressio  unius  est  exclusio alterius  has  been pressed upon us.  I agree with what  is said  in the Court below by Wills J.  about this maxim.   It is  often  a  valuable servant, but a  dangerous  master  to follow  in  the construction of statutes of documents.   The exclusio  is  often the result of inadvertence or  accident, and  the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application having  regard  to the subject matter to which it is  to  be applied,  leads  to  inconsistency  or  injustice.   In   my opinion,  the  application of the maxim here would  lead  to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the  Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its operation. The  aforesaid  maxim was referred to by this Court  in  the case  of  Asstt.   Collector, Central Excise  Vs.   National Tobacco  Co.   1972(2) S.C.C.  560, the Court in  that  case considered  the  question  whether there was or was  not  an implied power to hold an inquiry in the circumstances of the case  in  view  of the provisions of the Section  4  of  the Central  Excise  Act  read with Rule 10(A)  of  the  Central Excise  Rules  and  referred to the aforesaid  passage  the maxim  is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous  master ...  and  held  that the rule is subservient to  the  basic principle  that  Courts  must  endeavour  to  ascertain  the legislative  intent  and purpose, and then adopt a  rule  of construction  which  effectuates  rather than one  that  may defeat   these.   Moreover,  the   rule  of  prohibition  by necessary   implication  could  be   applied  only  where  a specified  procedure  is laid down for the performance of  a duty.   In the case of Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. Vs.   R.T.A.  Aurangabad [1960 (3) S.C.R.  177], this  Court observed  that maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and  where  the statutory language is plain and the  meaning clear,  there is no scope for applying.  Further, in  Harish Chander  Vajpai  Vs.  Triloki Singh 1957 S.C.R.  371  (389), the Court referred to the following passage from the Maxwell on  Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 316-317: -   Provisions  sometimes  found   in  statutes,   enacting imperfectly  or  for  particular cases only that  which  was already and more widely the law, have occasionally furnished ground  for  the contention that an intention to  alter  the general  law was to be inferred from the partial or  limited enactment,  resting  on the maxim expressio unius,  exclusio alterius.   But  that maxim is inapplicable in  such  cases. The  only  inference  which  a  court  can  draw  from  such superfluous provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to  meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is that  the

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Legislature  was  either ignorant or unmindful of  the  real state  of  the law, or that it acted under the influence  of excessive caution.

     Lastly,  we  would state that in the case of  Pampathy vs.   State  of Mysore (supra), the Court  has  specifically observed  that  no  legislative enactment dealing  with  the procedure  can  provide for all cases and that Court  should have  inherent  powers apart from the express provisions  of law  which are necessary for the proper discharge of duties. In  our  view,  application  of   the  aforesaid  maxim  for interpreting  Section 482 would have only limited  operation as  stated  above.   In  the  result,  we  hold  that  while exercising  inherent  jurisdiction under Section 482,  Court has  power to pass such orders (not inconsistent with  any provision  of  the  Code) including the order for  costs  in appropriate  cases,  (i) to give effect to any order  passed under  the  Code or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process  of any  Court or (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As  stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used  in extrao      rdinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs  may be to meet the litigation expenses or purpos  es. can  be  exemplary to achieve the aforesaid In view  of  the aforesaid findings, this appeal is dismissed.