REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1027 OF 2001

Maruthi Jaiwant Nakadi                                      …

Appellant

VERSUS

Eknath G. Navarekar(Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors.    ….

Respondents

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1) This  appeal  by  special  leave  arises  from  the  

judgment and order dated 4th June, 1998 passed  

by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka at  Bangalore  in  

LRRP No. 1960 of 1989, whereby the High Court  

had  allowed  the  Petition  filed  by  the  

Landlords/Respondents, under Section 121A of the  

Karnataka Land Reform Act,1961(in short ‘the Act’)  

setting aside the orders passed by the Additional  

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Land  Reforms  Appellate  Authority,  Sirsi  and  the  

Land Tribunal, Halyala.

2) The Tenant/Appellant in this appeal, claiming to be  

the tenant of Block No. 20 measuring 11 acres and  

17  guntas  of  Kumbarkoppa  Village  in  Haliyal  

Taluk (hereinafter referred to as ‘land in question’),  

filed an application in Form No. 7 before the Land  

Tribunal, Halyala claiming occupancy rights under  

the Act.  In his application it  was alleged that he  

was   cultivating  the  land  in  question  for  many  

years and was paying rent on crop share basis. It  

was  further  alleged by  the  tenant/Appellant  that  

since the Landlords/Respondents never stayed in  

the  Kumbarkoppa  Village,  the  question  of  

cultivating the land in question by them would not  

arise at all.  Accordingly,  the appellant prayed for  

an order of occupancy right in respect of the land  

in question on the aforesaid allegations.

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3) The  Landlords/Respondents  denied  the  material  

allegations  made  in  the  application  filed  by  the  

Tenant/Appellant, inter alia, alleging that the land  

in question was never leased to anybody and was  

cultivated  through  coolies,  even  the  revenue  

records from the year 1956 onwards showed the  

names of the landlords themselves and the mode of  

cultivation  as  No.2,  i.e.  through hired  labourers.  

Accordingly,  Landlords/Respondents  prayed  for  

rejection of  the application filed by the appellant  

claiming occupancy rights in respect of the land in  

question.

4)  By an order dated 6th of December,1998, the Land  

Tribunal,  Halyala  allowed  the  application  of  the  

tenant/Appellant holding that it was the appellant  

who  continued  to  cultivate  the  land  in  question  

and therefore entitled to claim occupancy rights.

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5) Feeling aggrieved, the Landlords/Respondents filed  

an  appeal  before  the  Appellate  Authority,  Sirsa  

which  dismissed  the  appeal  of  the  Landlords/  

Respondents   and  confirmed  the  grant  of  

occupancy rights relating to the land in question in  

favour  of  the  tenant/Appellant  inter  alia  holding  

that :-

1)  The  Landlords/Respondents  could  not  prove  by  

cogent  and  sufficient  evidence  that  they  were  in  

cultivation of the land in question;

2) The presumption of the entry in the record of rights  

stood  rebutted  by  the  oral  evidence  of  the  

tenant/appellant;  

3)  The  admission  of  the  Landlords/Respondents  that  

they were not staying in the Kumbarkoppa village would  

itself be sufficient to grant occupancy rights in favour of  

the appellant.  

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6) Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority,  

the Landlords/Respondents filed a revision petition  

under Section 121A of the Act which came to be  

registered  as  No.  1960  of  1989  before  the  High  

Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High Court,  

by  the  impugned  judgment,  had  set  aside  the  

concurrent findings of fact of the Tribunals below  

and  thereby  allowed  the  application  by  the  

landlords/respondents under Section 121A of the  

Act  and  rejected  the  application  of  

tenant/appellant for grant of occupancy rights  in  

respect of the land in question. It was, inter alia,  

held  in  the  impugned  order  that  the  

tenant/appellant  had  failed  to  rebut  the  

presumption of  entries in the record of  rights by  

adducing  reliable  evidence  and,  therefore,  had  

failed to prove their tenancy relating to the land in  

question.

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7) Before us, the pivotal issues raised by the learned  

counsel for the parties were as follows:

a) Whether  the  High Court,  exercising jurisdiction  

under Section 121A of the Act can re-appreciate  

the evidence and come to a contrary finding to  

that of the Tribunals below ?

b) Whether  the  High  Court,  while  exercising  

jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, could  

set aside the concurrent findings of fact recorded  

by the Tribunals below only because another view  

was possible ?

8) We  have  heard  Mr.  Chandrashekhar,  learned  

counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

tenant/appellant  and  Mr.  S.N.  Bhat,  learned  

counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

landlords/Respondents.  We  have  carefully  

examined  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  

Court as well as the orders of the Tribunals below.  

Before  proceeding  any  further  it  is  necessary  to  

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understand the scope of Section 121A of the Act.  

The power conferred on the High Court  to revise  

the order of the Tribunal below has been provided  

in Section 121A of the Act which reads thus:  

“The High Court may at any time call for the records of   any other order of  proceeding recorded by the Appellate   Authority under this Act or any other law for the purpose  of satisfying itself as to the legality of such order or as to  the  regularity  of  such  proceeding  and  may  pass  such  order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.”

9) The  scope  of  Section  121A  of  the  Act  has  been  

widely discussed in the case of Jagdeesh v. State of  

Karnataka [AIR 2008 SC 1304], in which one of us  

was a party (Chatterjee J.). In paragraphs 8 and 9  

of the said decision it has been made clear as to  

when  the  High  Court  could  interfere  with  the  

concurrent  findings  of  fact  arrived  at  by  the  

Tribunals below in exercise of its jurisdiction under  

Section  121A  of  the  Act  for  setting  aside  the  

concurrent orders of the Tribunals below. In this  

view  of  the  matter,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  

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reproduce Paragraphs 8 & 9 of the decision which  

reads as below:

“8. From a plain reading of Section 121A of the Act, under  which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised, it would be  clear that the High Court, while exercising such power is   entitled to re-appreciate  the evidence when it finds that   the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority runs  contrary to the materials on record and when it finds that   there  is  no  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion  of  the   appellate  authority  or  when  it  finds  that  the  reasons  given by the appellate authority are absolutely perverse  and cannot be supported by the  evidence on record.  It   would also be clear from a plain reading of Section 121A  of the Act that the High Court is also entitled to interfere  with the orders of the Tribunals below when the material   evidence on record was  ignored or a finding was  such  that no court would come to such conclusion or that the   decision of the Tribunals below was manifestly unjust.  

 9.   We have carefully examined the provisions under  Section  121A of  the  Act,  which  is  the  revisional  power   under the Act, and also the provisions under Section 115  of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code"). So far  as  Section  115  of  the  Code  is  concerned,  it  has  been  made clear that it is only in case of a jurisdictional error   or  when  the  courts  below  had  acted  with  material   irregularity  in  the  exercise of  their  jurisdiction  that  the   question  of  interfering  with  such  an  order  can  arise,   otherwise, the High Court is not entitled to interfere with   any other order which does not satisfy the conditions laid  down for interference under Section 115 of the Code. On  the other hand, in our view,  under Section 121A of the  Act, it would be open to the High Court to interfere with   the  orders  of  the  tribunals  below as  the  High Court  is  empowered  to  look  into  the  legality  of  the  order  or  regularity of the proceedings although, in the exercise of   

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revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, the   High Court is not entitled to look into the legality of the   order or the regularity of the proceedings but only entitled  to interfere with the orders of the Tribunals or the courts  below  when  it  finds  that  they  have  a)  exercised  a  jurisdiction  not  vested  in  them  by  law,  or  b)  failed  to  exercise  a  jurisdiction  so  vested,  or  c)  acted  in  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction  illegally  or  with  material   irregularity. Reading the aforesaid provisions viz., Section   121A of the Act and Section 115 of the Code, we have no  hesitation in our mind to hold that the revisional power   exercised by the High Court under Section  121A of the   Act is wider than the one exercised by the High Court in   its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code.  As  noted  herein  earlier,  since  Section  121A of  the  Act  clearly empowers the High Court to look into the legality   of the orders impugned, therefore, it would be open to the  High Court to consider the material  evidence on record,   when  it  finds  that  such  evidence  was  not  at  all   considered by the tribunals below or when the conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  tribunals  below run  contrary  to  the  materials  on  record  or  when  it  finds  that  there  is  no  evidence to support the conclusion of the tribunals below  or  that  the  reasons  given  by  the  tribunals  below  are  absolutely perverse or a finding was such that no court  would come to such a conclusion or that the decisions of   the tribunals below were manifestly unjust.”

10)In the present case while setting aside the findings  

of the Tribunal, the High Court made the following  

findings:  

“In  the  present  case,  except  the  oral  evidence  of  the  tenant  no  material  has  been  placed  before  the  court.   According to the tenant,  he is cultivating the land since  1962 and has been paying 40 bags of paddy per year  

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towards rent. He has stated that he has got a residential   house at Kumbarkoppa Village and also a cattle shed in  the  land.  He  has  admitted  that  he  has not  taken  any  receipt from the landlords and that on the say of Eknath  Gopal Navarekar, one of the landlords, he was coming to   Kumbarkoppa  to  cultivate  the  land  in  question.  As  against  this  evidence there  is  evidence  of  the  landlord  who has stated that, though his two brothers are staying   away from the land in question as they are in service, it   is  one of  the brothers,,  viz.,  Shankar  Gopal  Navarekar,   Petitioner 2, who is staying at Haliyal which is just 5 km  away,  is  getting  the  land  cultivated  through  hired  labourers or  coolies.  He  has also  stated  the  land was   never leased to anybody and that sometimes the tenant   was also engaged as a coolie……………………..”

“He has further stated apart from the oral evidence that   the landlords have produced the revenue records from the  year 1962 onwards which shows that it is the petitioners  who  are  in  possession  and  cultivation  of  the  land  in  question. The mode of cultivation is also shown as No. 2  which  is  through  hired  labourer  or  coolie.  There  is   absolutely  no  rebuttable  evidence  produced  or  even  suggested from him to show these entries are false and  fabricated.  As  observed  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of   Radhakrishna  Setty  v.  Land  Tribunal,  Somwarpet,  &  Another [1977(2) Kar.L.J., 281], the statutory presumption   arising  out  of  the  revenue  record  should  be  given  due  importance  and  the  mere  subjective  satisfaction  of  the  Tribunal is not enough. The tribunal has to give reasons  to discard the entries in the record of rights. Thus there is   no  rebuttal  evidence  led  by  the  tenant  to  show  that,   though he was cultivating the land in question, his name  was  not  entered  for  some reason  or  even  due  to  high  handedness  of  the  landlords.  The  only  circumstance   relied upon by the Tribunal and the Appellate authority is  the statement of the landlord that the tenant is residing  at  Kumbarkoppa  and  one  of  the  tenant  is  staying  at   

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Haliyal which is 5km away and it is not possible for him  to cultivate the land by himself or through coolie; that as   2 out of 3 Appellants are staying away on job it is not  possible for the landlords to self- cultivate the land and  that by admitting that the tenant was sometimes engaged  as coolie, the presumption arising under  Section 133 of  the Act has been rebutted”.

11)Finally, while setting aside the findings of fact, the  

High Court, came to a conclusion:

“As noted by me earlier, the discussion of the Appellate   Authority  and  the  tribunal  is  absolutely  based  on  no  material  evidence.  The  so  called  admissions  of  the   landlord are not admissions at all…………..

I find that the reasoning given by the Appellate Authority   as well  as by the Tribunal are totally baseless without   any  evidence  and  they  have  relied  upon  the  so-called   statement  and  arrived  at  the  finding  merely  on  conjectures and surmises.”   

12)From a careful examination of the findings given  

by the High Court, as quoted hereinabove, it would  

be clear that the High Court, while setting aside the  

concurrent  orders  of  the  Tribunals  below,  has  

rightly taken into consideration that although the  

tenant/Appellant was claiming to be cultivating the  

land  in  question,  he  had  failed  to  produce  any  

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receipt taken from the Landlords/Respondents in  

lieu of rent and on the other hand, the High Court  

was  fully  justified  in  holding  that  the  

Landlords/Respondents had produced the entries  

made  in  record  of  rights  relating  to  the  land  in  

question  from the year 1962 which amply proved  

that  the  landlords/respondents  were  cultivating  

the land in question and in absence of any reliable  

evidence  it  was  difficult  to   prove  that  the  

tenant/appellant was in  cultivation of the land in  

question.

13)We  are  also  in  agreement  with  the  High  Court,  

when the High Court had held that the statutory  

presumption  arising  out  of  the  revenue  record  

must be given due importance and mere subjective  

satisfaction of the tribunal was not enough. It was  

for  the  tribunal  to  give  reasons  to  discard  the  

entries  made  in  the  record  of  rights.  The  High  

Court  also,  in  our  view,  was  fully  justified  that  

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there  was absolutely  no  rebuttal  evidence  led  by  

the tenant/appellant to show that though he was  

cultivating the land in question his name had not  

been entered for some reason or even due to the  

high  handedness  of  the  landlords/respondents.  

Furthermore,  in  view  of  our  discussions  and  

findings  made  herein  above  and  considering  the  

power and scope of the High Court under Section  

121A of the Act to interfere with the findings of fact  

of the courts below and the power and scope of the  

High Court  to interfere under Section 115 of  the  

Code of Civil Procedure, we do not find any ground  

to upset the judgment of the High Court which is  

impugned before us.   

14)Accordingly,  we  do  not  find  any  infirmity  and  

illegality  in  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  

Court.  The  appeal  has  thus  no  merit  and  is,  

therefore, dismissed and there will be no order as  

to costs.

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………………………………..J.     (TARUN  

CHATTERJEE)

                                               …..…..……………………… …J.

                                                  (DALVEER BHANDARI) New Delhi; December 14, 2009.

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