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PETITIONER: MARU RAM ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF lNDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/11/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 2147            1981 SCR  (1)1196  1981 SCC  (1) 107  CITATOR INFO :  R          1982 SC1163  (1,2)  R          1982 SC1195  (1,2)  R          1982 SC1439  (2,3,6)  R          1984 SC 739  (5)  R          1985 SC 870  (14,20)  R          1985 SC1050  (10)  R          1989 SC 653  (7,11,15)  RF         1990 SC 336  (7,10,13)  E          1990 SC1396  (7)  E          1991 SC1792  (1,3,4,6,11,12,13,14,16)  R          1991 SC2296  (6,8)

ACT:      Prison Prisoner  Legislation vis-a-vis-Code of Criminal Procedure Code,  1973 (Act  II  of  1974)-Section  433A,  as Indicated with  effect from 18th December, 1978, prescribing a minimum  of 14  years of  actual imprisonment  for the two types of  lifers, vires  of-Pardon Jurisprudence-Effects  of Section 433A  on Articles  72 and 161-Whether section 433A l isolates Article  14 being  wholly arbitrary and irrational- Whether section 433A lacked legislative competency under the lists and also contravene Article 20(I) of the Constitution- Whether the  various  provisions  for  remission  under  the prison   the Prison  Act and Rules and other legislation had their full  operation not  withstanding section 433A, thanks to the  savings provision  in  section  5  of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure   Code  Constitution   of  India,  1950, Articles 14,  20(1), 72, 161, 246(1), (2) an(l 254, Entry II List  III   of  the   Seventh  Schedule,  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973,  sections 5,  432, 433,  433A-Prisons  Act, 1894 (Central  Act),  section  59  (27)  read  with  General Clauses Act.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the  writ petitions but partly allowing, the Court ^      HELD: By  Iyer, J.  (on behalf  of Y.  V.  Chandrachud, C.J., P. N. Bhagwati. J. and himself)

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    1. Section  433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code as   introduced    With   effect    from    18-12-1978    is constitutionally valid.  May be, penologically the prolonged terms prescribed by the Section is supererogative [1248 C-D]      2. Section 433A is supreme over the Remission Rules and short-sentencing, statutes made by the various States. [1248 D]      3. All  remissions and  short-sentencing  passed  under Articles 72  and 161  of  the  Constitution  are  valid  but release with follow in life sentence case only on Government making an  order en  masse or  individually, in  that behalf [124D-E]      4. Section  432 and  section 433  of the Code are not a manifestation of Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but a separate,  though similar,  power  and  section  433A,  by nullifying wholly  or partially  these prior provisions does not violate  or detract  from  the  full  operation  of  the constitutional power  to pardon, commute and the like. [1248 E-F]  5.  Section 433A  of  the  Code  does  not  contravene  the provisions of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. [1248G]      6. Imprisonment  for life  lasts until  the last breath and whatever  the length  of remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government. [1248 G]      Gopal Vinayak  Godse v.  State of  Maharashtra &  Ors., [19611 3 S.C.R. 440, reiterated . 1197      7. Section  433A, in both its limbs (i.e. both types of life  imprisonment  specified  in  it),  is  prospective  in effect.  The   mandatory  minimum   of   14   years   actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose cases were decided by  trial court  before  the  18th  December,  1978, directly or  retroactively as explained in the judgment when section 433A  came into force. All ’lifers’ whose conviction by the  court of  first instance  was entered  prior to that date-are entitled to consideration by Government for release on the  strength of earned remissions although a release can take place only it Government makes an order to that effect. It  follows   by  the   same  logic,  that  short-sentencing legislations if  any,  will  entitle  a  prisoner  to  claim release thereunder  if his  conviction by the court of first instance was  before section  433A was  brought into effect. [1248 H, 1249 A]      8.  The   power  under  Articles  72  and  161  of  the Constitution can  be exercised  by the Central and the State Governments, not  by the President or Governor on their own. The advice  of the  appropriate Government binds the Head of the State.  No separate  order for  each individual  case is necessary but any general order made must be clear enough to identify the  group of cases and indicate the application of mind to the whole group. [1249-D]      9. Considerations  for exercise of power under Articles 72/161 may  be myriad  and their  occasions protean, and are left to  the appropriate Government, by no consideration nor occasion   can    be    wholly    irrelevant,    irrational, discriminatory or  mala fide.  Only in these rare cases will the court examine the exercise. [1249 D-E]      10. Although  the remission  rules or  short-sentencing provisions proprio  vigore may  not apply as against section 433A. if  the Government, Central or State, guides itself by the self-same  rules or  schemes  in  the  exercise  of  its constitutional power.  Until fresh rules are made in keeping with experience  gathered,  current  social  conditions  and accepted penological  thinking. the  present  remission  and

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release schemes  may usefully  be taken  as guidelines under Articles 72/161  and orders  for release  passed. Government cannot  be   faulted,  if   in   some   intractably   savage delinquents, section  433A is  itself treated as a guideline for exercise of Articles 72/161. [1249E-G]      11. The  U.P. Prisoners’ Release on Probation Act, 1938 enabling limited enlargement under licence will be effective as legislatively  sanctioned imprisonment  of  a  loose  and liberal type and such licensed enlargement will toe reckoned for the  purpose of  the  14-year  duration.  Similar  other statutes and rules will enjoy similar efficacy. [1249 G-H]      12.   Penal    humanitarianism    and    rehabilitative desideratum warrant  liberal paroles.  subject  to  security safeguards, and  other humanizing  strategies for inmates so that the  dignity and  worth of  the human  person  are  not desecrated by  making  mass  jails  anthropoid  zoos.  Human rights awareness must infuse institutional reform and search for alternatives. [1250 A-B]      13. Law  in action  fulfils itself  not by  declaration alone and  needs the  wings of  communication to  the target community. So,  the whole  judgment well  translated in  the language of the State, must be kept prominently in each ward and made  available to  the inmate,  in  the  jail  library. [1250B-C]      14. Section  433A  does  not  forbid  parole  or  other release within  the 14-year  span  .  So  to  interpret  the Section  as   to   intensify   inner   tension   and   taboo intermissions of  freedom is  to do violence to language and liberty. [1250 C-D] 1198      15. Parliament  has the legislative competency to enact the provisions  in section  433A of Criminal Procedure Code. [1214F]      It is  trite law that the Lists in the Seventh Schedule broadly delineate  the rubrics  of legislation  and must  be interpreted  liberally.   Article  246(2)   gives  power  to Parliament to  make laws  with respect to any of the matters enumerate ed  in List  III. Entries  1 and  2  in  List  111 (especially Entry  2) are  abundantly comprehensive to cover legislation such  as is  contained in  section  433A,  which merely enacts  a rider, as it were, to ss. 432 and 433(a). A legislation on  the topic  of "Prisons and Prisoners" cannot be read  into section  433A. On the other hand, section 433A sets a  lower limit  to the execution of punishment provided by the Penal Code and is appropriately placed in the Chapter on "Execution and Sentences" in the Procedure Code. Once the irrefutable  position  that  the  execution,  remission  and commutation of  sentences primarily  fall, as in the earlier 1898 Code, within the 1973 Procedure Code (Chapter XXIII) is accepted, section 433A can be rightly assigned to Entry 2 in List III  as a  cognate provision  integral to remission and commutation, as it sets limits to the power conferred by ss. 432 and  433. This  limited prescription as a proviso m, the earlier prescription  relates to  execution of sentence, not conditions in  prison or  regulation of prisoner’s life. The distinction between  prisons and  prisoners on  the one hand and sentences and their execution, remission and commutation on the  other, is  fine but real. To bastardize section 433A as outside  the legitimacy  of Entry  2 in  list III  is  to breach  all   canons  of  constitutional  interpretation  of legislative list [1214B-F]      15. (i)  The power  of the  State to  enact the laws of remissions and  short sentencing under Entry 4 of List 11 is subject to  Articles 246(1)  and (2)  and  so  parliamentary legislation  prevails   over  State  legislation.  Moreover,

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Article 254 resolves the conflict in favour of parliamentary legislation. If  a State  intends to legislate under Entry 2 of list  III such law can prevail in that State as against a parliamentary legislation  only if  Presidential assent  has been obtained  in terms  of Article  254(2). In  the present case, section  433A  must  hold  its  sway  over  any  State legislation even  regarding "prisons  and prisoners", if its provisions are repugnant to the Central law. [1214G, 1215 B- C]      15 (ii).  Remission schemes do not upset sentences, but merely provide  re wards  and remissions  for in prison good conduct and  the like  If the  sentence is life imprisonment remissions, as  such cannot  help. If  the sentence is for a fixed term,  remissions may  help, but section 433A does not come in  the way.  Thus incompatibility between section 433A and remission provisions exists. [1215 C-D]      16. The  fasciculus of clauses (ss. 432, 433 and 433A), read as  a package,  makes it clear that while the Code does confer  wide   powers  of   remission  and   commutation  or sentences, it  emphatically intends  to carve out an extreme category from  the broad generosity of such executive power. The non  obtained clause, in terms, excludes section 432 and the whole  mandate cf  the rest  of the  Section necessarily subjects the  operation  of  section  433(a)  to  a  serious restriction. This  embargo directs  that commutation in such cases shall  not reduce  the actual duration of imprisonment below 14  years. Section  431 does  declare emphatically  an imperative intent  to keep  imprisoned for at least 14 years those who  fall within  the sinister categories spelt out in the operative part of section 433A. [1216 B-C] 1199      It is  elementary that  a non  obstante tail should not wag a  statutory dog.  A non  obstante Clause cannot whittle down the  wide import  of the  principal part.  The enacting part is  Clear and  the non  obstante clause cannot cut down its scope.[1217  A-B] Aswini  Kumar  Ghose  and  Another  v. Aravinda loose & Another, [1953] S.C.R. 1., followed.      To read  down section 433A to give overriding effect to the Remission Rules of the State would render the purposeful exercise a  ludicrous futility.  If "Laws  suffer  from  the disease of Language", courts must cure the patient. not kill him., "Notwithstanding  the "notwithstanding..  " in section 433A, the Remission Rules and like provisions stand excluded so  far  as  "lifers"  punished  for  capital  offences  are concerned. [1217D-E]      17. Sentencing is a judicial function but the execution of  the   sentence.  after   the  courts  pronouncement,  is ordinarily a  matter for  the Executive  under the Procedure Code, going  by Entry 2 in List 111 of the Seventh Schedule. Once a  sentence has been imposed, the only way to terminate it before the stipulated term is by action under ss. 432/433 of the  Code or  Articles 72/161.  And if  the latter  power under the  Constitution is  not invoked,  the only source of salvation is  the play  of power under ss. 432 and 433(a) so far as  a ’lifer’  is concerned.  No release by reduction or remission of  sentence is possible under the corpus juris as it stands,  in any  other way.  The legislative power of the state under  Entry 4  of List 11, even if it be stretched to snapping point,  an deal  only with  Prisons and  Prisoners, never with  truncation of  judicial sentences. Remissions by way of  reward or  otherwise cannot cut down the sentence as such and  cannot grant  final exit passport for the prisoner except by  Government action under section 432(1). The topic of Prisons  and Prisoners  does not  cover release by way of reduction of  the sentence itself. That belongs to  Criminal

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Procedure in Entry 2 c f List 111 although when the sentence is for  a fixed term and remission plus the period undergone equal that term the prisoner may win his freedom. Any amount of remission  to result in manumission requires action under section 432(1),  read with  the Remission Rules. That is why Parliament,  tracing  the  single  source  of  remission  of sentence to  Section 43’,  blocked it  by the  non  obstante clause. No  remission, however  long. can  set the  prisoner free at  the instance  of the  State,  before  the  judicial sentence  has   run  out,   save  by   action  under  r  the constitutional power  or under section 432. So read, section 433A achieves  what it  wants-arrest the  release of certain classes of  "lifers" before a certain period, by blocking of section 432. [1217 G-H, 1218 A-E]      Sentencing is  a judicial  function and whatever may be done in  the matter  of executing that sentence in the shape of  remitting.  commuting  or  otherwise  abbreviating,  the Executive cannot alter the sentence itself. Remission cannot detract from  the quantum  or quality  of  sentence  or  its direct and  side-effects except  to the  extent of entitling the prisoner to premature freedom if the deduction following upon the remission has that arithmetic effect. The nature of a life  sentence  is  incarceration  until  death,  judicial sentence of  imprisonment for  life cannot  be  in  jeopardy merely because  of long  accumulation of remissions. Release would follow  only upon  an order  under section  401 of the Criminal Procedure  Code, 1898  (corresponding to  s. 432 of the 1973  Coded  by  the  appropriate  Government  or  on  a clemency order  in exercise of power under Article 72 or 161 of the Constitution. [1218 F-&, 1219H. 1220A, E-F]      Sarat Chandra  Rabha and  Ors. v.  Khagendranath Nath & Ors. [1961]  2 S.C.R.  133; Gopal  VinayaK Godse v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1961] 3 S.C.R. 440, referred to. 1200      18. Section  433A escapes the Exclusion of section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A thing is specific if it is explicit. It  need not be "express". What is precise, exact, definite and  explicit,  is  specific.  Sometimes,  what  is specific may  also be  special but  yet they are distinct in semantics. From  this angle the Criminal Procedure Code is a general Code.  The remission  rules  are  special  laws  but section 433A  is a  specific, explicit,  definite  provision dealing with  a particular  situation  or  narrow  class  of cases. as  distinguished  from  the  general  run  of  cases covered by section 432 Crl. P.C. Section 433A picks out of a mass  of   imprisonment  cases  a  specific  class  of  life imprisonment  cases   and  subjects   it  explicitly   to  a particularised treatment. Therefore, section 433A applies in preference to  any special  or local  law because  section 5 expressly, declares that specific provisions, if any, to the contrary will  prevail over  any special or local law. [1225 G-H, 1226 A-C]      Hakim Khuda Yar v. Emperor A.I.R. 1940 Lah. ]29; Baldeo JUDGMENT:      Bikram Sardar  & Ors.  v. Emperor A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 146, dissented from.      In Re  Net Book  Agreement 1957  [1962] 3  All E.R. QBD 751, quoted with approval.      19.  It   is  trite   law   that   civilised   criminal jurisprudence  interdicts   retroactive  impost  of  heavier suffering by a later law. Ordinarily, a criminal legislation must be  so interpreted  as to  speak futuristically.  While there is  no vested right for any convict who has received a judicial sentence  to contend  that the  penalty  should  be softened and  that the  law which  compels the penalty to be

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carried out  hl full cannot apply to him, it is the function of the  court to  adopt a  liberal construction when dealing with a  criminal statute  in the  ordinary course if things. This humanely  inspired canon,  not  applicable  to  certain terribly antisocial  categories may  legitimately be applied to s.  433A. (The  sound rationale  is that  expectations of convicted citizens  of regaining  freedom on  existing legal practices should not be frustrated by subsequent legislation or practice unless the language is beyond doubt). Liberality in ascertaining  the sense may ordinarily err on the side of liberty where  the quantum  of deprivation  of freedom is in issue. In  short, the  benefit of  doubt, other things being equal, must go to the citizen in penal statute. [1236 A-D]      The plain  meaning of  ’ is" and "has been" is "is" and "has been’  only and,  therefore, these expressions refer lo "after this  Section comes  into force".  "Is" and "has" are not words  which are  weighed in the scale of grammar nicely enough in  this Section  and, therefore,  over-stress on the present tense  and the  present-perfect tense  may not  be a clear indicator.  The general rule bearing on ordinary penal statutes in their construction must govern this. case. [1236 F, G, H, 1237 A]      Boucher Pierre  Andre v.  Supdt. Central  Jail,  Tihar. [1975] I S.C.R. 192 at 1 95, followed.      20. When  a person  is convicted  in appeal, it follows that the  appellate court  has exercised  its power  in  the place of  the original  court and  the guilt, conviction and sentence must  be substituted for and shall have retroactive effect from  the date  of judgment  of the  trial court. The appellate conviction  must relate  back to  the date  of the trial court’s  verdict and substitute it. In this view, even if  the   appellate  court  reverses  an  earlier  acquittal rendered before  section 433A came into force but allows the appeal and convicts the accused after section 433A came into force, such  persons will also be entitled to the benefit of the remission system prevailing prior to section 433A on the basis 1201 which has  been explained. An appeal is a continuation of an appellate  judgment   as  a   replacement  of  the  original judgment. [1237D-F]      21. The  President is  symbolic, the Central Government is the  reality even  as the Governor is the formal head and sole repository  of the  executive power but is incapable of acting except  on, and  according  to,  the  advice  of  his council  of   ministers.  The   upshot  is  that  the  State Government, whether  the Governor.  likes  it  or  not,  can advise and  not under  Article 161, the Governor being bound by that  advice. The  action of  commutation and release can thus be  pursuant to  a governmental  decision and the order may issue  even withhold  the Governor’s  approval although, under  the   Rules  of   Business  and   as  a   matter   of constitutional courtesy, it is obligation that the signature of the  Governor should authorise the pardon, commutation or release. The  position is  substantially the  same regarding the President. It is not open either to the President or the Governor to  take independent  decision or direct release or refuse release  of any  one  of  their  own  choice.  It  is fundamental to the Westminster system that the Cabinet rules and the  Queen reigns.  The President  and the  Governor, be they ever so high in textual terminology, are but functional euphemisms promptly  acting on and only on the advice of the Council of  Ministers save  in a  narrow area  of power. So, even without reference to Article 367(1) and ss. 3(8)(b) and 3(60)(b) of  the General  Clauses Act,  1897,  that  in  the

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matter of  exercise of the powers under Articles 72 and 161, the two highest dignitaries in our constitutional scheme act and must  act not  on their  own judgment  but in accordance with the  aid and advice of the ministers. Article 74, after the  42nd   Amendment  silences  speculation  and  obligates compliance. The  Governor vis a vis his Cabinet is no higher than the  President save  and narrow  area  which  does  not include Article  161. The  constitutional conclusion is that the Governor  is but  a shorthand  expression for  the State Government and  the President  is an  abbreviation  for  the Central Government. [1239 C-H, 1240A-B]      Shamsher Singh  & Anr,  v. State  of Punjab,  [1975]  1 S.C.R. 814, applied.      22. Victimology, a burgeoning branch of humane criminal justice, must  find fulfillment,  not through  barbarity but by. compulsory  recoupment by  the wrong-doer  of the damage inflicted, not  by giving  more pain  to the offender but by lessening the loss of the forlorn. The State itself may have its strategy  of alleviating hardships of victims as part of Article 41.  So the mandatory minimum in section 433A cannot be linked up with the distress of the dependants [1251 B-C] Observations:      1. Parliamentary taciturnity does not preclude forensic examination  about   legislative  competency.  Nor  does  it relieve the  Supreme Court as sentinel on the qui vive, from defending fundamental rights against legislative aggression, if any flagrant excess were clearly made out. [1211 F-G]      2. Courts  cannot abdicate  constitutional  obligations even  if   Parliament   be   pachydermic   and   politicians indifferent, with  great respect,  ordinarily they  are not. indeed,  Judges   must  go  further,  on  account  of  their accountability to  the  Constitution  and  the  country  and clarify that  where constitutional  liberties are imperilled judges  cannot   be  non-aligned.   But  where   counterfeit constitutional I  claims are  pressed with  forensic fervour courts do  not readily oblige by consenting to be stampeded. Justice is  made of  sterner stuff,  though its core is like "the gentle  rain from  heaven" being interlaced with mercy. 11213 F-Hl 1202      Per Fazal Ali, J. (Concurring)-      1. Section  433A of  the Code is constitutionally valid Section 433A is actually a social piece of legislation which by one  stroke seeks  to prevent  dangerous  criminals  from repeating offences  and on  the other  protects the  society from harm and distress caused to innocent persons. [1256 B]      2. The  dominant purpose  and the  avowed object of the legislature in  introducing section  433A  in  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure  unmistakably seems  to be  to  secure  a deterrent punishment  for heinous  offences committed  in  a dastardly, brutal  or cruel  fashion or  offences  committed against the defence or security of the country. [1251E-F]      Section 433A  has advisedly  been enacted to apply to a very  small  sphere  and  includes  within  its  ambit  only offences under  sections 121,  132. 302., 303., 396 etc., of the Indian  Penal Code,  that is to say, only those offence, where death  or life  imprisonment  are  the  penalties  but instead of  death life  imprisonment is  given  or  where  a sentence of  death is commuted to that of life imprisonment. Section 433A  when it confines its application only to these categories of  offences which  are heinous  and amount  to a callous outrage on humanity, has taken care of the fact that a sentence  out of  proportion of  the  crime  is  extremely repugnant to  the social  sentiments of a civilized society. [1252 D-E, 1253 H, 1254 A-B]

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    3. The  deterrent  punishment  prevents  occurrence  of offences by-(i)  making it  impossible or  difficult for  an offender to  break the  law again,(ii) by deterring not only the offenders  but also others from committing offences, and (iii) punishment or for that matter a punishment in the form of a  long-term imprisonment  may be  a means  to changing a person’s character  or  personality  so  that  out  of  some motivation or  reasons of  a personal or general nature, the offender might obey the law. [1254G-H, 1255A]      The Parliament  in its  wisdom chose to act in order to prevent  criminals  committing  heinous  crimes  from  being released through  easy remissions  or  substituted  form  of punishments without  undergoing at least a minimum period of imprisonment of  fourteen years  which may  in fact act as a sufficient  deterrent   which  may  prevent  criminals  from committing offences. [1256 E-F]      4. No  doubt, the  reformative form  of  punishment  on principle, is in fact the prime need of the hour, but before it can  succeed people must be properly educated and realise the futility of committing crimes. [1255 E-F]      In the  present distressed  and disturbed atmosphere if deterrent punishment  is not  resorted  to,  there  will  be complete chaos  in the  entire country and criminals will be let loose  endangering the  lives of  thousands of  innocent people of  our country. In spite of all the resources at its commands, it  will be  difficult for the State to protect or guarantee the  life and  liberty of  all  the  citizens,  if criminals are  let loose  and deterrent punishment is either abolished or  mitigated. Secondly,  while reformation of the criminal is  only one side of the picture, rehabilitation of the victims  and  granting  relief  from  the  tortures  and suffering which  are caused  to them  as  a  result  of  the offences committed  by the criminals is a factor which seems to have been completely overlooked while defending the cause of the  criminals for abolishing deterrent sentences [1256H, 1257 A-B]      5. A  person who has deprived another person completely of his  liberty for  ever and  has endangered the liberty of his family  has no  right to  ask the  court to  uphold  his liberty. Liberty  is  not  a  one-sided  concepts  nor  does Article 21  of the  Constitution contemplate such a concept. If a person commits 1203 a criminal offence and punishment has been given to him by a procedure established  by law  which is  free and  fair  and where the  accused has  been fully  heard,  no  question  of violation  of   Article  21  arises  when  the  question  of punishment is  being considered.  Even so, the provisions of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  of  1973  do  provide  an opportunity to  the offender,  after his  guilt is proved to show circumstances under which an appropriate sentence could be imposed on him. These guarantees sufficiently comply with the provisions  of Article  21. Thus,  while considering the problem of penology courts should not overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer or are maimed at the hands of criminals. [1257C-E]      6. In  cases where section 433A applies, no question of reduction of  sentence arises at all unless the President of India or  the Governor  choose to exercise their wide powers under Article  72 or  Article 161  of the Constitution which also  have   to  be   exercised  according  to  sound  legal principles. Any  reduction or  modification in the deterrent punishment would far from reforming the criminal be counter- productive. [1257 F-G]      7. Parliament by enacting section 433A has rejected the

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reformative character  of punishment  in respect of offences contemplated by  it, for  the time  being  in  view  of  the prevailing conditions  in our  country. It  is well  settled that the  legislature understands the needs and requirements of its  people much  better  than  the  courts  because  the Parliament consists  of the  elected representatives  of the people and  if the Parliament decides to enact a legislation for the  benefit of  the people,  such a legislation must be meaningfully construed and given effect to so as to subserve the purpose for which it is meant. [1257 G-H, 1258 A-B]      8. There  is no real inconsistency between section 433A and Articles  ?2 and  161  of  the  Constitution  of  India. [1258E]      Doubtless, the  President of India under Article 72 and the State  Government under  Article 161  have absolute  and unfettered powers  to grant  pardon, reprieves,  remissions, etc.  This   power  can  neither  be  altered,  modified  or interfered with  by any  statutory provision.  But, the fact remains that  higher the  power, the  more cautious would be its exercise.  This is  particularly so  because the present enactment  has  been  passed  by  the  Parliament  on  being sponsored  by   the  Central   Government  itself.   It  is, therefore, manifest  that while  exercising the powers under the aforesaid  Articles  of  the  Constitution  neither  the President,  who  acts  on  the  advice  of  the  Council  of Ministers. nor  the State  Government is  likely to overlook the object,  spirit and  philosophy of section 433A so as to create a  conflict between  the legislative  intent and  the executive power.  It cannot  be doubted  as a proposition of law that  where a  power is vested in a very high authority, it must-  be presumed  that the  said  authority  would  act properly and  carefully after  an objective consideration of all the aspects of the matter. [1258 B-D]      Per Koshal, J. (Generally concurring)      1.  The  contention  that  the  main  object  of  every punishment must  be reformation of the offender and that the other objects-deterrence,  prevention and retribution-should be relegated to the background and be brought into play only incidentally is  not correct for three reasons: (i) There is no evidence  that all  or most  of  the  criminals  who  are punished are  amenable to re- formation. The matter has been the subject  of social  debate and  so far as one can judge, will continue  to remain  at that  level in  the foreseeable future; (ii) The question as to which of the various objects of punishment should be the basis 1204 of a  penal provision  has, in the very nature of things, to be left  to the  Legislature and it is not for the courts to say which  of them shall be given priority, preponderance or predominance. As  it is  , the  choice must  be that  of the legislature and  not that of the court and it is not for the latter to  advise the  legislature which  particular  object shall be  kept in focus in a particular situation. Nor is it open to  the courts to be persuaded by their own ideas about the propriety  of a  particular purpose  being achieved by a piece   of    penal   legislation,    while   judging    its constitutionality. A  contrary proposition  would  mean  the stepping of  the judiciary into the field of the legislature which is  not permissible.  It is  thus outside the scope of the inquiry  undertaken by  this Court into the vires of the provisions contained  in section 433A to find out the extent to which  the object of reformation is sought to be achieved thereby, the opinion of great thinkers, jurists, politicians and saints (as to what the basis of a penal provision should be) notwithstanding;  (iii) A  careful study  of  the  Penal

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Code  brings   out  clearly   that  the  severity  of  each. punishment sanctioned by the law is directly proportional to the seriousness of the offence for which it is awarded. This is strongly indicative of reformation not being the foremost object sought to be achieved by the penal provisions adopted by the legislature. A person who has committed murder in the heat of  passion may not repeat his act at all later in life and the  reformation process  in his  case need not be time- consuming. On  the other hand, a thief may take long to shed the propensity to deprive others of their good money. If the reformative aspect  of punishment  were to be given priority and predominance  in every case the murderer may deserve, in a given  set of  circumstances, no  more than  a six months’ period of incarceration while a thief may have to be trained into better  ways of life from the social point of view over a long period, and the death penalty, the vires of which has been recently  upheld by a majority of four in a five Judges Bench of  this Court  in Bachan Singh and others v. State of Punjab and  others, [1980]  2 SCC  684,  would  have  to  be exterminated from Indian criminal law. The argument based on the object  of reformation  having to be in the forefront of the legislative  purposes behind  punishment is,  therefore, fallacious. [1259B-D, G-H, 1260A-H, 1261 A]      2. The contents of section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (or  for that  matter any  other penal  provision) cannot be  attacked in  the ground  that  they  are  hit  by Article  14   of  the  Constitution  inasmuch  as  they  are arbitrary or  irrational because they ignore the reformative aspect of punishment. [1261 A-B]

&      ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Writ  Petitions  NOS.  865/79, 641/80, 409,  783, 695,  690, 747,  4346  of  1980,  147/79, 1860/80, 2389,  4115, 1365,  457,869,  4311-12,  813,  2505, 1659, 3784-94,  2602-10, 4376-91,  4392-95,  4404,  1177  of 1980.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      Dr. L.  M. Singhvi,  S. K.  Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga and Nand Lal for the Petitioners in WPs 865 and 695.      D. R.  Mridul, Nemi  Chand Chowdhary  and Sushil  Kumar Jain for the Petitioners in WP 641.      A. K. Sen, (409) & Uma Datt for the Petitioners in WPs. 409 and 1365. 1205      L. M.  Singhvi. S.  K. lain,  A. S. Sohal, Sushil Kumar and A L. K. Pandey for the Petitioners in 783. (WP)      R. K.  Garg &  Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Petitioners in WP 690.      K. B. Rohatgi and S. M. Ashri for the Petitioners in WP 747.      S. N. Kacker, R. N. Kataria, G. K. Bansal & B. S. Malik for the Petitioners in WPs. 4311-12. 4376-95, 3784-94. 1177.      P. R.  Mridul and  H. K.  Puri for the Petitioner in WP 147.      5. 5. Khanduja for the Petitioner in WP 1860.      Arun Madon for the Petitioner in WP 2389.      A. S.  Sohal, M.  C. Dhingra  and P.  N. Gupta  for the Petitioner in WP 457.      R. L.  Kohli and  R. C.  Kohli for the Petitioner in WP 869.      P. R.  Mridul, A.  S. Sohal,  M. C.  Dhingra and  Lalit Gupta for the Petitioner in WP 813.      L. N. Gupta for the Petitioners in WP 2505.

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    Srinath Singh,  Vijay K. jindal, Sarva Mitter and M. G. Gupta for the Petitioners in WP 1659.      A. P.  Mohanty &  S. K. Sabharwal, Mr. C. P. Pandey and Lalit Gupta for the Petitioners in WP 2602-10.      R. K.  Garg, V.  1. Francis  and Sunil  K. Jain for the Petitioners in WP 4404.      V. M. Tarkunde, Govind Mukhotyy and P. K. Gupta for the      Petitioner in  4346 (WP) in person      K. Parasaran,  Sol. General, M. K. Banerjee, Addl. Sol. Genl. and  N. Nettar  and Miss A. Subhashini for R. 1 in all WPs. except in 457 & 869.      Badridas Sharma for r. 2 in 865 & r. in 147.      O. P.  Rana, S. C. Maheshwari and R. K. Bhatt for State of U.P. in 865, 4392-95, 4376-91.      O. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for r. in 457 & 869.      M. C.  Bhandare, and  M. N. Shroff for r. (State) in WP 2505.      M. Veerappa for other appearing rr. in WP 2602-10.      P. Ram Reddy and G. N. Rao for r. in WP 4115.      The Judgment  of Hon’ble  C.J., Bhagwati,  and  Krishna Iyer, JJ.  was delivered  by Iyer,  J. Fazal Ali and Koshal, JJ. gave separate concurring opinions. 1206      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-A procession  of ’life convicts’ well over two  thousand strong,  with more joining the march even as the arguments were on, has vicariously mobbed this court, through  the   learned  counsel,   carrying   constitutional missiles in hand and demanding liberty beyond the bars. They challenge the  vires of  s. 433A  of the  Criminal Procedure Code (Procedure  Code, for  short) which compels ‘caging’ of two classes  of  prisoners,  atleast  for  fourteen  eternal infernal years,  regardless of  the  benign  remissions  and compassionate concessions sanctioned by prison law and human justice. Their despair is best expressed in the bitter lines of Oscar Wilde      I know not whether Laws be right,      or whether Laws be wrong,      All that we know who lie in gaol,      Is that the wall is strong;      And that each day is like a year,      A year whose days are long.                                             (Emphasis added) But broken  hearts cannot  break prison walls. Since prisons are built  with stones  of law, the key to liberation too is in law’s custody. So, counsel have piled up long and learned arguments punctuated  with evocative  rhetoric.  But  Judges themselves are prisoners of the law and are not free to free a prisoner save through the open sesame of Justice according to law.  Even so,  there is a strange message for judges too in the  rebellious  words  of  Gandhiji’s  quasi-guru  David Thoreau:           The law  will never  make men  free; it is men who      have got  to make  the law free. They are the lovers of      law and  order who  observe the law when the government      breaks it. The case  of the  petitioners is  that Parliament has broken the law of the Constitution by enacting s. 433A.      Now, the  concrete question  and the back-up facts. All the petitioners  belong to  one or  other of two categories. They are  either sentenced by court to imprisonment for life in cases where the conviction is for offences carrying death penalty as  a graver  alternative or  are persons  whom  the court has  actually sentenced  to death which has since been commuted by  the appropriate  Governments under 5. 433(a) of the Procedure Code to life imprisonment. The common

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1207 factor binding together these two categories of ’lifers’ (if we may  use A  his vogue  word, for brevity) is obvious. The offences are  so serious  that the Penal Code has prescribed ’death’ as  an alternative  punishment although,  in  actual fact, judicial  compassion or executive clemency has averted the lethal  blow-but at  a price,  viz., prison  tenancy for life. R      Before the  enactment of s. 433A in 1978 these ’lifers’ we treated,  in the  matter of  remissions and  release from jail,  like  others  sentenced  to  life  terms  for  lesser offences which  do not  carry death  penalty as an either/or possibility. There  are around  40 offences  which  carry  a maximum sentence  of life  imprisonment without  the extreme penalty of  death as  an alternative. The rules of remission and release  were common  for all prisoners, and most States had rules  under the  Prisons Act, 1894 or some had separate Acts providing  for  shortening  of  sentences  or  variants thereof, which enabled the life-sentencee, regardless of the offence which cast him into the prison, to get his exit visa long before  the full span of his life had run out- often by about eight  to ten or twelve years, sometimes even earlier. Then came,  in 1978,  despite the  strident. peals  of human rights of  that  time,  a  parliamentary  amendment  to  the procedure Code  and s.  433A was sternly woven, with virtual consensus, into  the punitive  fabric obligating  the actual detention in  prison for  full fourteen years as a mandatory minimum in  the two  classes of  cases where the court could have punished  the offender with death but did not, or where the court  did punish the culprit with death but he survived through commutation  to life  imprisonment granted  under s. 433(a) of  the Procedure  Code. All  the lifers  lugged into these two  categories- and  they  form  the  bulk  of  life- convicts in  our prisons-suddenly  found themselves  legally robbed of  their human  longing to  be set  free  under  the remission scheme.  This poignant shock is at the back of the rain of  writ petitions  under Art.  32; and  the despondent prisoners have  showered  arguments  against  the  privative provision  (s.   433A)  as   constitutional   anathema   and penological  atavism,   incompetent   for   Parliament   and violative of  fundamental rights  and reformatory goals. The single issue,  which has proliferated into many at the hands of a  plurality of advocates, is whether s. 433A is void for unconstitutionality and,  alternatively,  whether  the  said harsh provision  admits of  interpretative liberality  which enlarges the  basis of  early release  and narrow  down  the compulsive territory  of 14-year jail term. Lord Denning, in the first  Hamlyn Lectures  and Sir  Norman Anderson  in the next before last of the series, emphasised; 1208           ... the  fundamental principle  in our courts that      where there  is any conflict between the freedom of the      individual and  any other  rights or interests, then no      matter how  great or  powerful those others may be, the      freedom of the humblest citizen shall prevail. Of course,  most of  the petitioners belong to ’the poorest, the  lowliest  and  the  lost’.  For  those  who  listlessly languish waiting for their date with Freedom, the human hope of going  home holds  the lamp of life burning and a blanket ban against release before a brutal span of - full 14 years, even  if   their  habilitation   be  ever  so  complete  and convincing, benumbs the very process of restoration which is cardinal to  the rationale of penal servitude. Indeterminate sentences for  the same  reason, have  been criticised since they have

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    led  to   a  system  of  sentencing  which  has  worked      substantial  hardship   and  injustice   on   countless      inmates. Indeterminate  sentences  generally  are  much      longer and  more costly than fixed sentences and create      additional emotional  strain on both the inmate and his      family, who  are left  to  wonder  when  they  will  be      freed.(l) The imprisoned  poet, Oscar  Wilde, wrote  that courts  must know when adjudicating the arbitrariness of long-term minima implacably imposed in the name of social defence :(2)      Something was dead in each of us,      And what was dead was Hope.           xx              xx                   xx      The vilest deeds like poison weeds      Bloom well in prison-air:      It is only what is good tn Man      That wastes and withers there:      Pale Anguish keeps the heavy gate,      And the Warder is Despair. These  generalities   only  serve   as  a  backdrop  to  the consideration of the multi-pronged attack on the vires of s. 433A. For  judicial diagnosis,  we must read it whole before dissecting into parts: 1209           433A.  Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in      section 432,  where a sentence of imprisonment for life      is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for      which death  is one of the punishments provided by law,      or where  the sentence of death imposed on a person has      been  commuted   under  section   433   into   one   of      imprisonment  for   life,  such  person  shall  not  be      released from  prison unless  he had  served  at  least      fourteen years of imprisonment. Piecemeal understanding,  like a  little learning, may prove to be a dangerous thing. To get a hang of the whole subject- matter we must read s 432 ad 433 too.           432. (1)  When any  person has  been sentenced  to      punishment for  an offence,  the appropriate Government      may, at  any  time,  without  conditions  or  upon  any      conditions which  the person sentenced accepts, suspend      the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any      part of  the punishment to which he has been sentenced.      D           433. The  appropriate Government  may, without the      consent of the person sentenced, commute-           (a)  a sentence of death, for any other punishment                provided by the Indian Penal Code.           (b)   a sentence  of imprisonment  for  life,  for                imprisonment  for   a  term   not   exceeding                fourteen years or for fine;           (c)   a sentence  of  rigorous  imprisonment,  for                simple imprisonment  for any  term  to  which                that person  might have been sentenced or for                fine:           (d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine. F      The Sections  above  quoted  relate  to  remission  and commutation of  sentences. There  were similar provisions in the earlier  Code corresponding  to ss. 432 and 433 (ss. 401 and 402  of the  1898 Code),  but s. 433A is altogether new. ’Ay, there’s the rub’. It is obvious that s. 432 clothes the appropriate Government  with the power to remit the whole or part of  any sentence.  The mechanics  for  exercising  this power and the conditions subject to which the power is to be exercised are  also imprinted in the Section. This is a wide power which, in the absence of s. 433A, extends to remission

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of the  entire life sentence if Government chooses so to do. A liberal or promiscuous use of the power of remission under s. 433(a)  may mean  that many  a murderer or other offender who could  have been  given death  sentence by the court but has been  actually awarded  only life  sentence may  legally bolt away the very next morning, the very 1210 next  year,  after  a  decade  or  at  any  other  time  the appropriate Government  is in  a mood to remit his sentence. Bizarre freaks  of remissions,  - such, for instance, as the impertinent happenstance  of a  Home  Minister’s  ’hallowed’ presence on  an official  visit to  the Prison  resulting in remissions of  sentences-have been  brought to  our  notice, making  us   stagger  at   the  thought   that   even   high constitutional powers  are devalued  in  practice  by  those ’dressed in  a little  brief authority’  thereby encouraging the fallacious impression that functionaries of our Republic are re-incarnated  quasi-maharajas of  medieval vintage ! We will deal  with it  a little  later under  Art. 161  of  the Constitution but  mention it  here to  prove what,  perhaps, provoked Parliament to enact s. 433A. In many States, we are told, lifers  falling within  the  twin  tainted  categories routinely earned remissions under the extant rules resulting in  their  release  in  the  matter  of  a  few  years.  The penological sense  of Parliament  was apparently outraged by such extreme  abbreviations  of  life  sentences  where  the offence was  grave as might have invited even death penalty. The same  situation prevailed  in regard  to those  who  had actually been  subjected to  death penalty but, thanks to s. 433(a), had  a commuted  sentence of  life  ,  imprisonment. Taking cognizance of such utter punitive laxity in these two graver classes  of cases,  the Joint  Committee, which  went into the  Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, suggested that a long  enough minimum  sentence should  be suffered by both classes of  lifers. The draconian provision (as some counsel have described  it) was the product of the Joint Committee’s proposal to  add a  proviso to  s. 57 of the Penal Code. Its appropriate place  was in  the Procedure Code and so s. 433A was enacted when the Criminal Procedure Code was amended. It was a  punitive prescription  made to  parliamentary measure which prohibited premature release before the lifer suffered actual incarceration  for 14  years. No  opposition to  this clause was  voiced in Parliament (Sixth Lok Sabha) so far as our  attention   was  drawn,   although  that  was,  vocally speaking, a period of high tide of human rights (1978).      The objects  and Reasons  throw light  on the  ’why’ of this new provision:           The Code  of Criminal  Procedure, 1973  came  into      force on the 1st day of April, 1974. The working of the      new Code has been carefully watched and in the light of      the experience  it has  been found  necessary to make a      few  changes  for  removing  certain  difficulties  and      doubts. The  notes on  clauses  explain  in  brief  the      reasons for the amendments. 1211 The notes on clauses gives the further explanation:           Clause 33: Section 432 contains provision relating      to powers  of the  appropriate Government to suspend or      remit sentences.  The Joint  Committee  on  the  Indian      Penal Code  (Amendment) Bill,  1972, had  suggested the      insertion of  a proviso  to section  57 of  the  Indian      Penal Code  to the  effect that  a person  who has been      sentenced to  death and  whose death  sentence has been      commuted into that of life imprisonment and persons who      have been  sentenced to life imprisonment for a capital

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    offence should  undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years      in Jail,  since this  particular  matter  relates  more      appropriately to  the Criminal  Procedure Code,  a  new      section is being inserted to cover the proviso inserted      by the Joint Committee. This takes  us to the Joint Committee’s recommendation on s. 57 of  the Penal  Code that being the inspiration for clause 33.  For  the  sake  of  completeness,  we  may  quote  that recommendation:           Section 57  of the  Code as proposed to be amended      had provided  that in calculating fractions of terms of      punishment, imprisonment for life should be reckoned as      equivalent to  rigorous imprisonment  for twenty years.      In this  connection  attention  of  the  Committee  was      brought to  the aspect  that sometimes  due to grant of      remission even  murderers sentenced or commuted to life      imprisonment were  released at the end of 5 to 6 years.      The committee  feels that  such a convict should not be      released unless he has served atleast fourteen years of      imprisonment.      Shortly put, the parliamentary committee concerned with the amendments  to the Penal Code was seriously upset by the gross  reductions  and  remissions  resulting  in  premature releases  of  life  sentences  for  capital  offences.  This proposal was  transposed into  the Criminal  Procedure  Code (Amendment)  Bill   in  clause  33  and  eventuated  in  the incarnation of  s. 433A  with none  in Parliament shedding a human rights  tear, although  before us several counsel have turned truly  eloquent, even indignant, in the name of human rights.  Of   course,  parliamentary  taciturnity  does  not preclude forensic  examination about legislative competency. Nor does it relieve this court, as sentinel on the qui vive, from  defending   fundamental  rights   against  legislative aggression, if any flagrant excess were clearly made out.      We have  to examine  the legislative history of ss. 432 and 433  and study  the heritage  of Arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution. But  this we will undertake at the appropriate stage. Before proceeding 1212 further, we may briefly formulate the contentions which have been urged  by wave  after wave  of counsel.  The  principal challenge has  been based upon an alleged violation of Arts. 72 and  161 by the enactment of s. 433A. Sarvashri Nand Lal, R.K. Garg,  Mridul, Tarkunde  and Dr.  Singhvi, among others have argued this point with repetitive vehemence and feeling for personal  freedom. The  bar is the bastion. Indeed, Shri Garg was  shocked that  we were  not ’shocked’  by such long incarceration being  made a  statutory condition for release of a  ’lifer’ guilty of murder and was flabbergasted at even a faint  suggestion that the President or the Governor might exercise his power of commutation guided, inter alia, by the parliamentary  pointer   expressed  in  s.  433A.  The  next contention voiced  with convincing  vigour by  Shri Tarkunde was that s. 433A violated Art. 14 being wholly arbitrary and irrational. Shri  Mridul, with  persuade  flavour,  stressed that s.  433A lacked  legislative competency under the Lists and must  be  struck  down  for  the  additional  reason  of contravention of  Art. 20(1)  of the Constitution and backed his plea  with American  authorities, Shri  Kakkar  made  an independent contribution,  apart  from  endorsement  of  the earlier submissions by other counsel. The main thrust of his argument, which  was ingeniously  appealing,  was  that  the various provisions for remissions under the Prison Rules and other legislations  had their full operation notwithstanding s. 433A,  thanks to  the savings  provision in  s. 5  of the

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Procedure Code.      Dr. Singhvi,  who brought  up the  rear, belatedly  but eruditely strengthened  the arguments  of those who had gone before him  by reference  to the  abortive  history  of  the amendment of  s. 302  I.P.C. and  the necessity of having to read down the text of s. 433A in the context of the story of its birth.  Apart from  the legislative  vicissitudes in the light  of   which  he   wanted  us   to  interpret  s.  433A restrictively, Dr.  Singhvi treated  us to the provisions of the Irish  Constitution and international human rights norms by way  of contrast  and desired  us to  give effect  to the rules of  remission at  least as directives for the exercise of the high prerogative powers under Arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution. Others who appeared in the many writ petitions made  supplementary   submissions  numerically   strong  but lacking legal  muscles, some  of which  we will  refer to in passing. One  of the  lifers, having  been  an  advocate  by profession,  chose  to  appear  in  person  and  made  brief submissions in interpretation which did not impress us.      The  Union   of  India,   represented  by  the  learned Solicitor General, has repudiated the infirmities imputed to s. 433A.  We must appreciatively mention that he did tersely meet point by point, with 1213 persuasive precision,  juristic nicety,  case-law  erudition and fair  concession. His submissions have helped us see the issues in  perspective and  focus attention  on fundamentals without being side-tracked by frills and frippery.      There has  been much  over-lapping inevitable in plural orality but the impressive array of arguments on a seemingly small point  does credit  to the  expansive potential of the forensic cosmos  but brings  despair when we contemplate the utter chaos  in court  having regard to the total litigation crying for  justice. A new modus vivendi is as imperative as it is  urgent if the kismet of the court system must survive the challenge-’to be or not to be’!      A preliminary  observation may  be merited  since  much argument has  been made  on the duty of this court to uphold human rights.  Counsel for  the petitioners, who now rightly toll the  knell of  prisoners’ reformative freedom, have not shown us  any criticism in the Press-the Fourth Estate-or by any member  or Party  in Parliament  or outside,  about this allegedly obnoxious  provision repelling  rules of remission and legislations  for shortening sentences, the high tide of human rights  notwithstanding. Judge  Learned Hand’s  famous warning about  liberty lying  in the  bosoms of  the  people comes to mind. Court comes last; where is the first ?      Issues  of  liberty  are  healthy  politics  and  those sincerely committed to human rights must come to the support of poor  prisoners who  have no  votes  nor  voice  and  may perhaps  be   neglected  by   human  rights  vocalists  with electoral appetites.  It is  a little  strange that  when no dissent is  raised in  Press or Parliament and a legislation has gone through with ease there should be omnibus demand in court as  a last  refuge for  release of  prisoners detained under a  permanent legislation,  forgetting  the  functional limitations of judicial power.      Nevertheless, we  will cover  the  entire  spectrum  of submissions including  those based upon fundamental freedoms because courts  cannot abdicate  constitutional  obligations even  if   Parliament   be   pachydermic   and   politicians indifferent. (With  great respect, ordinarily they are not.) Indeed, we must go further, on account of our accountability to the  Constitution and  the country and clarify that where constitutional liberties  are imperilled  judges  cannot  be

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nonaligned.  But   we  must   remind  counsel   that   where counterfeit constitutional  claims are pressed with forensic fervour courts  do not  readily oblige  by consenting  to be stampeded. Justice is made of sterner stuff, though its core is like  ’the gentle rain from heaven’ being interlaced with mercy. We  may  now  proceed  to  deal  with  the  principal arguments and  logically we  must dispose of the question of legislative 1214 competency of  Parliament  to  enact  a  minimum  period  of detention in prison.      We may  safely assume that, but for the bar of s. 433A. The rules  of  remission  and  short-sentencing  legislation would, in  probability,  result  in  orders  of  release  by Government of  the thousands of petitioners before us. Thus, it is of central importance to decide whether Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the impugned provision.      We dismiss  the contention  of competency  as of little substance. It  is trite  law that  the Lists  in the Seventh Schedule broadly  delineate the  rubrics of  legislation and must be interpreted liberally. Article 246(2) gives power to Parliament to  make laws  with respect to any of the matters enumerated in  List  III.  Entries  1  and  2  in  List  III (especially Entry  2) are  abundantly comprehensive to cover legislation such  as is  contained in  s. 433A, which merely enacts a rider, as it were, to ss. 432 and 433(a). We cannot read into  it a  legislation on  the topic  of ’prisons  and prisoners’. On  the other hand, it sets a lower limit to the execution of  the punishment  provided by the Penal Code and is appropriately  placed in  the Chapter  on  Execution  and Sentences  in   the  Procedure  Code.  Once  we  accept  the irrefutable  position  that  the  execution,  remission  and commutation of  sentences primarily  fall, as in the earlier Code (Criminal  Procedure Code,  1898), within  the  present Procedure Code  (Chapter XXXII),  we may  rightly assign  s. 433A to  entry 2 in List III as a cognate provision integral to remission and commutation, as it sets limits to the power conferred  by  the  preceding  two  sections.  This  Limited prescription  as  a  proviso  to  the  earlier  prescription relates to  execution of  sentence, not conditions in prison or regulation  of prisoner’s  life. The  distinction between prisons and  prisoners on  the one  hand and  sentences  and their execution,  remission and commutation on the other, is fine  but  real.  To  bastardize  s.  433A  as  outside  the legitimacy of Entry 2 in List III is to breach all canons of constitutional   interpretation    of   legislative   Lists. Parliament has competency.      Let us  assume for  a moment that the laws of remission and short-sentencing  are enacted  under Entry 4 of List II. In that  event the  States’ competency  to enact  cannot  be challenged. After  all, even in prison-prisoner legislation, there  may   be  beneficient   provisions  to   promote  the habilitative potential  and reduce  warder-prisoner friction by stick-cum-carrot  strategies. Offer of remission paroles, supervised releases,  opportunities for  self-improvement by family contacts,  time in  community work  centres and  even meditational  centres,   can  properly   belong  to   prison legislation. Rewards  by  remissions,  like  punishments  by privations are permissible under Entry 4 of List II. 1215 Indeed, progressive  rehabilitatory prison laws which have a dynamic    correctional    orientation    and    reformatory destination, including  meaningful intermissions  and humane remissions  is   on  the   Indian,  agenda   of  unfulfilled legislations. Apart  from these  futurological measures,  we

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have here  an existing  Central Law,  viz. the  Prisons Act, 1894 which  in  s.  59(27)  expressly  sanctions  rules  for premature release.  Even so,  the  power  of  the  State  is subject  to   Art.  246(1)  and  (2)  and  so  parliamentary legislation prevails  over State legislation. Moreover, Art. 254  resolves   the  conflict  in  favour  of  parliamentary legislation. If  a State  intends to legislate under Entry 2 of List  III such law can prevail in that State as against a parliamentary legislation  only if  presidential assent  has been obtained  in terms of Art. 254 (2). In the present case there is  hardly any  doubt that  s. 433A must hold its sway over  any  State  legislation  even  regarding  ’prison  and prisoners’ if  its provisions  are repugnant  to the Central Law. We  may read  the Remission  Schemes not  as  upsetting sentences but as merely providing rewards and remissions for imprison good  conduct and the like. If the sentence is life imprisonment remissions,  as such  cannot help  as Godse has laid down.  If the  sentence is for a fixed term, remissions may help  but Sec.  433A does  not come in the way. Thus, no incompatibility between  Sec. 433A  and remission provisions exists.      This indubitable  constitutional position drove counsel to seek  refuge in  the limited  nature of  the non obstante clause in  s. 433A  and the savings provision in s. 5 of the Procedure Code  itself. The  contention  was  that  s.  433A allowed free  play for  the rules  of remission  and  short- sentencing legislation. The narrow scope of the non obstante clause was  the basis  of this  argument.  It  excluded  the operation of  s. 432  only and thereby implicitly sanctioned the operational  survival of  Remission Rules  made  by  the various States.  This  argument  hardly  appeals  to  reason because  it   fails  to  square  with  the  command  of  the substantive text  and virtually  stultifies  the  imperative part of the Section.      In  the   province  of   interpretation,  industry  and dexterity of  counsel can  support any  meaning,  what  with lexical plurality,  case-law prodigality  and  profusion  of canons to support any position. We had better base ourselves on the  plain purpose and obvious sense of the statute which is a  sure semantic  navigatory before  turning  to  erudite alternatives. Oliver  Wendel Holmes  has wisely said: "It is sometimes more  important to  emphasize the  obvious than to elucidate   the    obscure."   Another   sage   counsel   is Frankfurter’s three-fold advice : 1216      (1) Read the statute;      (2) read the statute,      (3) read the statute !      If we read s. 433A and emphasise the obvious, it easily discloses the dividing line between sense and non-sense. The fasciculus of  clauses (ss.  432, 433  and 433A),  read as a package, makes it clear that while the Code does confer wide powers  of  remission  and  com  mutation  of  sentences  it emphatically intends  to carve  out an extreme category from the broad  generosity  of  such  executive  power.  The  non obstante clause,  in terms,  excludes s.  432 and  the whole mandate of  the rest of the Section necessarily subjects the operation of  s.  433(a)  to  a  serious  restriction.  This embargo directs  that com  mutation in  such cases shall not reduce the  actual duration  of imprisonment below 14 years. Whether that  Section suffers  from any fatal constitutional infirmity is another matter but it does declare emphatically an imperative  intent to  keep imprisoned  for at  least  14 years those  who fall  within the  sinister categories spelt out in  the operative  part of s. 433A. The argument is that

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the non obstante clause covers only s. 432 and significantly omits the  common phraseology  ’or any  other law  in force’ and, therefore,  all other provisions of law which reduce or remit the  length of the incarceration prevail over s. 433A. In particular,  the Prison  Rules and local short-sentencing laws will  diminish the  length of prison tenancy of all the lifers, despite  the command  of s.  433A. Why ? Because the non obstante  clause is  limited in nature and excludes only s. 432.  The Prisons  Act, 1894,  is ’existing law’ saved by Art. 366(10)  and Art.  372(1). Section 59 of that Act vests rule-making power in States. Specifically s. 59(5) refers to rules regulating  "the award  of marks and the shortening of sentences". Clearly, therefore, the States have the power to make rules  on Remission  Systems and  many States have, for long, made  and worked  such rules.  They are  intra  vires, since even  new legislations  on remissions  and rewards are good under  Entry 4 of List II. These vintage schemes do not vanish with  the enactment  of the Constitution but suffer a partial eclipse  if they  conflict with and become repugnant to a  Central law  like the Procedure Code. If s. 433A, ’ by sheer repugnancy,  forces a  permanent holiday on the prison remission laws  of the  States vis  a vis certain classes of ’lifers’,  the   former  must   prevail  in   situations  of irreconcilability. Assuming that Rules under the Prisons Act are valid and cannot be dismissed as State law, a harmonious reading of s. 433A and the Prison Rules must be the way out. Otherwise, the  later law must prevail or implied repeal may be inferred. We may not be 1217 compelled to  explore these  ramifications  here  since  the Remission Rules can peacefully co-exist with s. 433A once we grasp the ratio in Godse’s case and Rabha’s case.      We cannot  agree with  counsel that  the  non  obstante provision impliedly  sustains. It  is elementary  that a non obstante tail  should not  wag  a  statutory  dog  (see  for similar  idea,   "The  Interpretation   and  Application  of Statutes by Reed Dickerson, p. 10). This court has held, way back in  1952 in  Aswini Kumar  Ghose that  a  non  obstante clause cannot  whittle down the wide import of the principal part. The  enacting part  is clear  the non  obstante clause cannot cut down its scope.      The learned Solicitor General reinforced the conclusion by pointing  out that  the whole exercise of s. 433A, as the notes on clauses revealed, was aimed at excluding the impact of Prison  Remissions which  led to  unduly early release of graver ’lifers’.  Parliament knew  the ’vice’, had before it the State Remission Systems and sought to nullify the effect in a certain class of cases by use of mandatory language. To read down s. 433A to give overriding effect to the Remission Rules of  the State  would render  the purposeful exercise a ludicrous futility.  If ’Laws  suffer from  the  disease  of Language’, courts  must cure  the patient,  not kill him. We have  no   hesitation  to   hold  that  notwithstanding  the ’notwithstanding’ in  s. 433A,  the Remission Rules and like provisions stand  excluded so  far as  ’lifers’ punished for capital offences are concerned.      The  learned   Solicitor  General   explained  why  the draftsman was content with mentioning only s. 432 in the non obstante clause. The scheme of s. 432, read with the court’s pronouncement in  Godse’s case  (supra), furnishes the clue. We will briefly indicate the argument and later expatiate on the implications  of Godse’s  case  (supra)  as  it  has  an important bearing on our decision.      Sentencing is  a judicial function but the execution of the sentence,  after the courts pronouncement, is ordinarily

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a matter  for the  Executive under the Procedure Code, going by Entry  2 in  List III  of the  Seventh Schedule.  Keeping aside the constitutional powers under Arts. 72 and 161 which are ’untouchable’ and ’unapproachable’ 1218 for any  legislature, let  us examine the law of sentencing, remission and release. Once a sentence has been imposed, the only way  to terminate  it before  the stipulated term is by action under  ss. 432/433 or Arts. 72/161. And if the latter power under the Constitution is not invoked, the only source of salvation  is the  play of power under ss. 432 and 433(a) so far as a ’lifer’ is concerned. No release by reduction or remission of  sentence is possible under the corpus juris as it stands,  in any  other way.  The legislative power of the State under  Entry 4  of List II, even if it be stretched to snapping point,  can deal  only with  Prisons and Prisoners, never with  truncation of  judicial sentences. Remissions by way of  reward or  otherwise cannot cut down the sentence as such and  cannot, let  it be unmistakably under-stood, grant final exit  passport for  the prisoner  except by Government action under  s. 432(1).  The topic of Prisons and Prisoners does not  cover release  by way of reduction of the sentence itself. That  belongs to  Criminal Procedure  in Entry  2 of List III  although when the sentence is for a fixed term and remission plus  the period  undergone equal  that  term  the prisoner may  win his  freedom. Any  amount of  remission to result in  manumission requires action under s. 432(1), read with the  Remission Rules.  That is  why Parliament, tracing the single  source of  remission  of  sentence  to  s.  432, blocked it by the non-obstante clause. No remission, however long, can  set the  prisoner free  at the  instance  of  the State, before  the judicial  sentence has  run out,  save by action under  the constitutional  power or  under s. 432. So read, the  inference is  inevitable, even  if  the  contrary argument be  ingenious, that  s. 433A achieves what it wants arrest the  release of  certain classes of ’lifers’ before a certain period, by blocking s. 432. Arts. 72 and 161 are, of course, excluded  from this  discussion as  being beyond any legislative power to curb or confine.      We are  loathe to  loading this judgment with citations but limit  it to two leading authorities in this part of the case. Two fundamental principles in sentencing jurisprudence have to  be grasped  in the  context of  the  Indian  corpus juris. The  first is  that sentencing is a judicial function and whatever  may be  done in  the matter  of executing that sentence in  the shape  of remitting, commuting or otherwise abbreviating,  the   Executive  cannot  alter  the  sentence itself. In  Rabha’s case, a Constitution Bench of this Court illumined this  branch of law. What is the jural consequence of a remission of sentence ? 1219           In the first place, an order of remission does not      wipe out  the offence,  it also  does not  wipe out the      conviction. All  that it  does is  to have an effect on      the execution  of the  sentence;  though  ordinarily  a      convicted person  would have  to  serve  out  the  full      sentence imposed  by a  court, he  need not  do so with      respect to  that part  of the  sentence which  has been      ordered to be remitted. An order of remission thus does      not in  any way  interfere with the order of the court;      it affects only the execution of the sentence passed by      the court  and frees  the  convicted  person  from  his      liability to  undergo the  full  term  of  imprisonment      inflicted by  the court, though the order of conviction      and sentence  passed by  the court  still stands  as it

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    was. The  power to  grant remission  is executive power      and cannot  have the  effect  which  the  order  of  an      appellate or  revisional court  would have  of reducing      the sentence passed by the trial court and substituting      in its  place the  reduced  sentence  adjudged  by  the      appellate or revisional court. This distinction is well      brought out  in the  following  passage  from  Weater’s      "Constitutional Law"  on the  effect of  reprieves  and      pardons vis  a vis  the judgment  passed by  the  court      imposing punishment, at p. 176, para 134:-           "A reprieve  is  a  temporary  suspension  of  the                punishment fixed  by law.  A  pardon  is  the                remission of  such punishment.  Both are  the                exercise of executive functions and should be                distinguished from  the exercise  of judicial                power over sentences. ’The judicial power and                the  executive   power  over   sentences  are                readily  distinguishable’,  observed  Justice                Sutherland,  ’To   render  a  judgment  is  a                judicial function. To carry the judgment into                effect is an executive function. To cut short                a sentence  by  an  act  of  clemency  is  an                exercise of  executive power  which  abridges                the enforcement  of the judgment but does not                alter it qua judgment."      Though, therefore,  the effect of an order of remission      is  to   wipe  out   that  part   of  the  sentence  of      imprisonment which  has not been served out and thus in      practice to  reduce the  sentence to the period already      undergone, in  law the  order of remission merely means      that the  rest of  the sentence  need not be undergone,      leaving the  order of  conviction by  the court and the      sentence passed by it untouched. The relevance of this juristic distinction is that remission cannot detract  from the  quantum or  quality of sentence or its direct and 1220 side-effects except  to the extent of entitling the prisoner to premature  freedom if  the deduction  following upon  the remission has that arithmetic effect.      Ordinarily, where  a sentence  is for  a definite team, the calculus  of remissions  may  benefit  the  prisoner  to instant release  at that point where the subtraction results in zero.  Here, we  are concerned with life imprisonment and so we come upon another concept bearing on the nature of the sentence which  has been  highlighted in Godse’s case. Where the sentence is indeterminate and of uncertain duration, the result of subtraction from an uncertain quantity is still an uncertain quantity and release of the prisoner cannot follow except of  some fiction  of quantification  of a sentence of uncertain duration.  Godse was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He had earned considerable remissions which would have rendered him  eligible for  release had  life sentence  been equated with  20 years  of imprisonment a la s. 55 I.P.C. On the basis  of a  rule which  did make  that equation,  Godse sought his  release through a writ petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution.   He  was   rebuffed  by  this  Court.  A Constitution Bench, speaking through Subba Rao, J., took the view that  a sentence  of imprisonment  for life was nothing less and nothing else than an imprisonment which lasted till the last breath. Since death was uncertain, deduction by way of remission did not yield any tangible date for release and so the  prayer of  Godse was  refused. The  nature of a life sentence is  incarceration until death, judicial sentence of imprisonment for  life cannot  be in jeopardy merely because

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of long  accumulation of  remissions. Release  would  follow only upon  an order  under s.  401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (corresponding to s. 432 of the 1973 Code) by the appropriate Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under  Arts. 72  or 161  of  the  Constitution.  Godse (supra) is  authority for the proposition that a sentence of imprisonment for  life is one of "imprisonment for the whole of the  remaining period  of the  convicted person’s natural life". The legal position has been set out in the context of remissions in life sentence cases thus:           Unless the  said sentence  is commuted or remitted      by appropriate  authority under the relevant provisions      of the  Indian Penal  Code  or  the  Code  of  Criminal      Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is      bound in  law to  serve the  life term  in prison.  The      rules framed  under  the  Prisons  Act  enable  such  a      prisoner to earn remissions-ordinary, special and State 1221      and the  said remissions  will be  given credit towards      his term   of  imprisonment. For the purpose of working      out the  remissions the  sentence of transportation for      life is  ordinarily equated with a definite period. but      it is  only for that particular purpose and not for any      other purpose.  As the  sentence of  transportation for      life or  its prison  equivalent, the life imprisonment,      is one of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned      do not  in practice  help such  a convict  as it is not      possible to  predicate the  time of  his death. That is      why the  rules provide  for a  procedure to  enable the      appropriate Government  to remit  the sentence under s.      401  of   the  Code   of  Criminal   Procedure   on   a      consideration of  the relevant  factors, including  the      period of  remissions earned. The question of remission      is exclusively  within the  province of the appropriate      Government; and  in this  case  it  is  admitted  that,      though  the   appropriate   Government   made   certain      remissions  under  s.  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal      Procedure, it  did not  remit the  entire sentence. We,      therefore,  hold   that  the  petitioner  has  not  yet      acquired any right to release.      In  Godse’s   case,  Subha   Rao,  J.,  also  drew  the conceptual  lines  of  ’remission’,  ’sentence’  and  ’life- sentence’. ’Remission’  limited in  time, helps  computation but does  not ipso  jure operate as release of the prisoner. But when  the sentence  awarded by  the judge is for a fixed term the  effect of remissions may be to scale down the term to be endured and reduce it to nil, while leaving the factum and quantum  of the  sentence in  tact. That is the ratio of Rabha (supra).  Here, again  if the sentence is to run until life lasts,  remissions, quantified  in time, cannot reach a point of  zero. This  is the  ratio of Godse. The inevitable conclusion is  that since  in s. 433A we deal only with life sentences, remissions  lead nowhere  and  cannot  entitle  a prisoner to  release. In  this view,  the remission rules do not militate  against s. 433A and the forensic fate of Godse (who was  later released  by the  State) who had stock-piled huge remissions  without acquiring  a right to release, must overtake all  the petitioners  until 14 years of actual jail life is  suffered and  further an  order of  release is made either under s. 432 or Arts. 72/161 of the Constitution.      The next  submission urged  to show that s. 433A is bad is based  on Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. It is a rule of ancient English  vintage that  export  facto  infliction  of heavier penalties  that prevailed  at the time of commission of the  offence is obnoxious. It is incarnated as Art. 20(1)

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in our  Constitution. The  short  question  is  whether  the inflexible insistence  on 14  years as  a minimum  term  for release  retroactively   enlarges  the  punishment.  Another argument addressed  to reach  the same conclusion is that if at the time of the 1222 commission  of  the  offence  a  certain  benign  scheme  of remissions ruled.  the penalty  to which  he would then have been subjected  was not  the punishment  stated in the Penal Code but  that sentence reduced or softened by the Remission Scheme or  short-sentencing provision.  On this  basis,  the lifers would  ordinarily have  been released  well before 14 years which is the harsh but mandatory minimum prescribed by s. 433A.  This indirectly  casts a  heavier punishment  than governed the Crime when it was committed.      Neither argument has force. The first one fails because s. 302  I.P.C. (or other like offence) fixes the sentence to be life  imprisonment. 14  Years’ duration  is never heavier than life  term.  The  second  submission  fails  because  a remission, in  the case  of life Imprisonment, ripens into a reduction of  sentence of  the entire  balance only  when  a final release  order is  made. Godse (supra) is too emphatic and unmincing  to  admit  of  a  different  conclusion.  The haunting distance  of death which is the terminus ad quem of life  imprisonment   makes  deduction   based  on  remission indefinite enough  not to fix the date with certitude. Thus, even if remissions are given full faith and credit, the date of release  may not  come to  pass unless all the unexpired, uncertain balance is remitted by a Government order under s. 432. If  this is  not done,  the prisoner  will continue  in custody. We  assume here  that the  constitutional power  is kept sheathed.      Let us  assume for the sake of argument that remissions have been earned by the prisoner. In Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass.  264, referred  to by  Cooley and  cited before us (infra), it has been held that earned remissions; may not be taken away  by subsequent  legislation. Maybe, direct effect of such a privative measure may well cast a heavier penalty. We need not investigate this position here.      A possible  confusion creeps  into this  discussion  by equating  life  imprisonment  with  20  years  imprisonment. Reliance is  placed for  this purpose  on s.  55 IPC  and on definitions in  various Remission  Schemes. All that we need say,  as  clearly  pointed  out  in  Godse,  is  that  these equivalents  are   meant  for   the  limited   objective  of computation to  help the  State exercise  its wide powers of total  remissions.   Even  if  the  remissions  earned  have totalled upto  20 years,  still the  State Government may or may not  release the prisoner and until such a release order remitting the remaining part of the life sentence is passed, the prisoners  cannot claim  his liberty. The reason is that life sentence  is nothing  less than life-long imprisonment. Moreover, the  penalty then  and now  is the same-life term. And remission 1223 vests  no  right  to  release  when  the  sentence  is  life imprisonment. No  greater punishment is inflicted by s. 433A than the  law annexed  originally to  the crime.  Nor is any vested right  to remission  cancelled by compulsory 14 years jail life once we realise the truism that a life sentence is a sentence  for a  whole life.  see Sambha  Ji Krishan Ji v. State of  Maharashtra, AIR  1974 SC  147 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh & ors. [1976] Supp. SCR 552.      Maybe, a  difference may  exist in  cases of fixed term sentences. Cooley lends support :

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         Privilege  existing   at  time  of  commission  of      offence (e.g.  privilege of  earning  a  shortening  of      sentence by  good behaviour)  cannot be  taken away  by      subsequent statute.      The next  submission, pressed by Shri Kakkar with great plausibility, is  that s.  5 of the Procedure Code saves all remissions, short-sentencing  schemes as  special and  local laws  and,  therefore,  they  must  prevail  over  the  Code including s. 433A. Section 5 runs thus :           5. Nothing  contained in  this Code  shall, in the      absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect      any special  or local  law for the time being in force,      or any  special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any      special form  of procedure prescribed, by any other law      for the time being in force.      The anatomy  of this  savings section  is  simple,  yet subtle. Broadly  speaking, there  are three components to be separated. Firstly,  the Procedure  Code  generally  governs matters covered  by it.  Secondly, if a special or local law exists covering the same area, this latter law will be saved and  will   prevail.  The   short-sentencing  measures   and remission schemes  promulgated by  the  various  States  are special and  local laws  and must  over-ride. Now  comes the third component  which may  be  clinching.  If  there  is  a specific provision to the contrary, then that will over-ride the special or local law. Is s. 433A a specific law contra ? If so, that will be the last word and will hold even against the special or local law.      Three rulings  were  cited  by  the  learned  Solicitor General to make out that s. 433A is a specific law. A Bombay case in  AIR 1941  Bom. 146,  he  frankly  stated,  takes  a contrary but  scrappy view. The Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayana Swamy v. The King Emperor inconclusively considered what is  a specific  law, in  a similar  setting. Two  later cases of Lahore [a full bench of five . 1224 judges] and of Allahabad [a bench of three judges] discussed almost an  identical issue  and held that some provisions of the Procedure  Code were  specific sections  to the contrary and would repeal any special law on the subject.      Section 1(2)  of the  Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, is the previous  incarnation of  s. 5  of the  Present Code and contains virtually  the  same  phraseology.  The  expression ’specific provision to the contrary’ in the Code of 1898 was considered in  the two  Full Bench  Decisions  (supra).  The setting in  which the issue was raised was precisely similar and the  meaning of ’specific provision to the contrary’ was considered by  Young, C.J.  in the  Lahore  case  where  the learned Judge observed :      The word  ’specific’  is  defined  in  Murray’s  Oxford      Dictionary  as   ’precise  or   exact  in   respect  of      fulfillment, conditions or terms; definite, explicit’.      In  a  similar  situation,  the  same  words  fell  for decision in  the Allahabad  case where Braund, J., discussed the meaning  of ’specific  provision’ in  greater detail and observed :           I have,  I confess,  entertained some  doubt as to      what exactly  the words  ’specific provisions’  mean. I      think first,  that they must denote something different      from the  words ’express provision’. For a provision of      a  statute  to  be  an  ’express’  provision  affecting      another statute  or part of it, it would have, I think,      to refer  in so  many words  to the other statute or to      the relevant  portion of  it and  also  to  the  effect      intended to  be produced  on it. Failing this, it could

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    hardly  be   aid  to  be  ’express’....  But  the  word      ’specific’ denotes, to my mind, something less exacting      than the word ’express’. It means, I think, a provision      which ’specifies’  that some  ’special law’  is  to  be      ’affected’ by  that particular  provision. A dictionary      meaning of  the very  ’to specify’ as given in Murray’s      New English  Dictionary, is  ’to mention,  speak of  or      name (something)  definitely or explicitly; to set down      or  state  categorically  or  particularly....’  and  a      meaning  of   the  adjective  ’specific’  in  the  same      dictionary is  ’precise  definite,  explicit..  exactly      named or  indicated or  capable of  being so,  precise,      particular.’  What   I  think   the   words   ’specific      provision’ really mean therefore is that the particular 1225      provision of the Criminal Procedure Code must, in order      to ’affect’  the ’special..  law,’ clearly indicate, in      itself and  not merely  by implication to be drawn from      the  statute  generally,  that  the  ’special  law’  in      question  is   to  be   affected  without   necessarily      referring to  that ’special  law’ or  the effect  on it      intended  to   be  produced   in  express  terms.  Lord      Hatherley in  (1893) 3  AC 933  at 938  has defined the      word ’specific’  in  common  parlance  of  language  as      meaning ’distinct from general’ .. ’It would, no doubt,      be possible to multiply illustrations of analogous uses      of the  words ’specify’  and ’specific’.  But this is I      think  sufficient   to  show   that,  while   requiring      something   less   than   what   is   ’express’,   they      nevertheless require  something which  is plain certain      and intelligible  and not  merely a matter of inference      or implication  to be drawn from the statute generally.      That, to  my  mind,  is  what  is  meant  by  the  word      ’specific’ in s. 1(2), Criminal P.C.      In an English case Buckley J., has interpreted the Word ’specific’ to  mean explicit  and  definable.  While  Indian usage of  English words often loses the Atlantic flavour and Indian Judges  owe  their  fidelity  to  Indian  meaning  of foreign words  and phrases,  here East  and  West  meet  and ’specific’ is  specific enough  to  avoid  being  vague  and general. Fowler  regards this  word related  to the  central notion of  species as distinguished from genus and says that it is  ’often resorted to by those who have no clear idea of their meaning  but hold  it to  diffuse an  air of  educated precision’. Stroud  says ’specifically...’  means ’as such’. Black gives  among other  things, the  following meaning for ’specific’: definite,  explicit; of  an exact  or particular nature... particular;  precise. While  legalese and  English are some times enemies we have to go by judicialese which is the draftsman’s lexical guide.      The contrary  view in the Bombay case is more assertive than explanatory,  and ipse  dixit, even if judicial, do not validate themselves.  We are  inclined  to  agree  with  the opinion expressed in the Lahore and Allahabad cases (supra). A thing  is specific  if it  is explicit.  It’ need  not  be express.  The   anti-thesis  is   between   ’specific’   and ’indefinite’  or   ’omnibus’  and   between  ’implied’   and ’express’. What  is precise,  exact definite and explicit is specific. 1226 Sometimes, what is specific may also be special but yet they are distinct  in semantics.  From this  angle, the  Criminal Procedure Code  is a  general Code.  The remission rules are special laws  but s.  433A is a specific, explicit, definite provisions dealing  with a  particular situation.  Or narrow

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class of  cases, as  distinguished from  the general  run of cases covered  by s. 432 Cr. P. C. Section 433A picks out of a mass  of imprisonment  cases  a  specific  class  of  life imprisonment  cases   and  subjects   it  explicity   to   a particularised treatment. It follows that s. 433A applies in preference  to  any  special  or  local  law  because  s.  5 expressly declares  that specific provisions, if any, to the contrary will prevail over any special or local law. We have said enough  to make  the point  that ’specific’ is specific enough and  even though  ’special’  to  ’specific’  is  near allied and  ’thin partition  do their bounds divide’ the two are different. Section 433A escapes the exclusion of s. 5.      The stage  is now  set for  considering the  contention that  S.   433A  violates   Art.  14  for  two  reasons.  It arbitrarily ignores  the unequal,  yet vital,  variations of crimes and  criminals so  relevant to punishment in. Our age of penological  enlightenment and subjects them equally to a terrible term  of 14  years in  jail as a mandatory minimum. Treating unequals equally is anathema for Art. 14. Secondly, the Section  inflicts, with  anti-reformative inhumanity and Procrustean  cruelty,  a  prolonged  minimum  of  14  years’ servitude on  every life  arbitrarily disregarding the audit report on  progressive healing registered by some as against others. The  capricious insistence on continued detention of a prisoner  long after  he has  been fully resocialised is a penological overkill, purposeless torture and constitutional blunder.  These   two  inter-twined   arguments  cannot   be appreciated without  investigating the rational penal policy of our  system  and  the  brutal  impertinence  of  rigorous incarceration beyond  the point  of habilitation,  what with Mahatma  Gandhi’s  therapeutic  approach  to  criminals  and Maneka Gandhi’s  accent on  fairness in  privative processes where personal liberty is involved.      The  larger   issues  of   sentencing  legitimacy   and constitutionality have  been examined  by this  court in the past and  throws us  well into a different level of criminal justice.  Of  course,  finer  propositions  need  a  sublime perception for  fuller appreciation as the learned Judges of this Court  have invariably shown. Here, the proposition is- Mr. Tarkunde  and Mr.  Garg, et  al, have  pressed  this  to excess the  primary purpose  of prison  sentence is hospital setting and 1227 psychic healing,  not traumatic  suffering, curative course, not  retributive   force,  presented   these   days   as   a sophisticated  variant   called  public  denunciation.  This submission  excludes   other  punitive  objectives  such  as deterrence through example of prolonged pain and retribution through  condign  infliction.  A  penological  screening  is fundamental to sentencing jurisprudence but, for our present pursuit, the  only relevant  point is whether rehabilitation is  such  a  high  component  of  punishment  as  to  render arbitrary, irrational  and therefore,  unconstitutional, any punitive technique which slurs over prisoner reformation. We feel  that  correctional  strategy  is  integral  to  social defence which  is the  final justification for punishment of the  criminal.   And  since   personal  injury   can   never psychically  heal,  it  is  obdurate  obscurantism  for  any legislative  criminologists  to  reject  the  potential  for prisoner re-socialisation  from the  calculus of reformative remission and  timely release.  The compulsive  span  of  14 years in  custody, whether  the man  within the  ’lifer’ has become an  angel by  turning a new page or remains a savage, thanks  to   jail  regimen   and  jailor  relations,  sounds insensitive. Karuna,  daya, prema and manavata, are concepts

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of  spiritualised   humanism  secularly   implicit  in   our constitutional preamble.  Alienation of  our justice  system from our  cultural quintessence,  thanks to the hang-over of the colonial past, may be the pathological root of the brute penology  which   confuses  between   crime  and   criminal. Torturing  the   latter  to  terminate  the  former  is  not promotional of human dignity and fair legal process. Be that as it may, this court in Sunil Batra, has observed :           The winds of change must blow into our carcers and      self-expression and  self-respect and  self-realization      creatively substituted  for the  dehumanising  remedies      and ’wild-life’  techniques still  current in  the jail      armoury. A  few prison  villains-they  exist-shall  not      make martyrs  of the  humane many;  and even from these      few, trust slowly begets trust. Sarvodaya and antyodaya      have criminological dimensions which our social justice      awareness must  apprehend and actualize. I justify this      observation by  reference to  the  noble  but  inchoate      experiment (or unnoticed epic) whereby Shri Jai Prakash      Narain  redemptively   brought  murderously   dangerous      dacoits  of  Chambal  Valley  into  prison  to  turn  a      responsible page  in their life in and out of jail. The      rehabilitative follow-up was, perhaps, a flop.      *           *          *           *           * 1228           Prison   laws,    now   in    bad   shape,    need      rehabilitation; prison  staff, soaked  in the Raj past,      need reorientation;  prison  houses  and  practices,  a      hangover  of   the  die-hard  retributive  ethos,  need      reconstruction; prisoners,  these noiseless,  voiceless      human heaps  or for  therapeutic technology, and prison      justice, after long jurisprudential gestation, must now      be re-born through judicial midwifery, if need be.      Again,           We share  the concern  and anxiety  of our learned      brother Krishna  Iyer,  J.  for  reorientation  of  the      outlook towards  prisoners and  the need  to take early      and effective  steps for  prison reforms.  Jail Manuals      are largely  a hangover  of the  past, still  retaining      anachronistic provisions  like whipping  and the ban on      the use  of the  Gandhi cap.  Barbaric treatment  of  a      prisoner from  the point  of view of his rehabilitation      and acceptance  and  retention  in  the  mainstream  of      social life,  becomes counter-productive  in  the  long      run. The  Model  Jail  Manual,  prepared  by  the  Indian  Prison echelons plus a leading criminologist, Dr. Panakkal, back in 1970, has  stated, right  at  the  outset,  in  its  Guiding Principles:           Social  reconstruction   and   rehabilitation   as      objectives of punishment attain paramount importance in      a Welfare  State The supreme aim of punishment shall be      the protection  of society.  through the rehabilitation      of the offender           Imprisonment and  other measures  which result  in      cutting off  an offender  from the  outside  world  are      afflictive by the very fact of taking away from him the      right  of   self-determination.  Therefore  the  prison      system should  not except  as incidental to justifiable      segregation or maintenance of discipline, aggravate the      suffering inherent in such a situation.           The institution should be a centre of correctional      treatment, where  major emphasis  shall be given on the      re-education  and  reformation  of  the  offender.  The      impacts  of  institutional  environment  and  treatment

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    shall aim  at producing  constructive  changes  in  the      offender, as  would  be  having  profound  and  lasting      effects on his habits, attitudes, approaches and on his      total value schemes of life. 1229 One of  the subjects  dealt with  in the  Manual is ’release planning’. We  need nat  tarry long  to tell  the truth that every sinner  has a  future, given  the social  chance,  and every prisoner  a finer  chapter as a free person, given the creative culturing of his psychic being. The measure of this process is  not the  mechanical turn  of the annual calendar fourteen times  over, but  the man-making methodology of the correctional campus,  together with  individual response. It follows that  an inflexible 14 year term for lifers under s. 433A eschews  chances of human change and puts all the penal eggs in  the linear  cellular basket. May be, the failure of prisons (this  is the  title of a recent book by a competent criminologist)  has  not  occurred  to  Parliament  when  it enacted s.  433A or  the Gandhian  gospel has, by 1978, lost its living impact on the parliamentary majority in the field of prison reform. We cannot speculate on these imponderables and must do our batting from within textual crease.      Surely arbitrary penal legislation will suffer a lethal blow under  Art. 14.  But the  main point here is whether s. 433A  harbours   this  extreme   vice  of  arbitrariness  or irrationality.  We   must  remember   that   Parliament   as legislative instrumentality, with the representatives of the people contributing their wisdom to its decisions, has title to an  initial presumption  of constitutionality. Unless one reaches far  beyond unwisdom  to  absurdity,  irrationality, colourability and  the like,  the court  must keep its hands off.      A Judicial journey to the penalogical beginning reveals that social defence is the objective. The triple purposes of sentencing are  retribution, draped  sometimes as  a  public denunciation, deterrence,  another  scary  variant,  with  a Pavlovian  touch,   and  in   our  era   of  human   rights, rehabilitation, founded  on  man’s  essential  divinity  and ultimate   retrievability    by   raising   the   level   of consciousness of the criminal and society. We may avoid, for the nonce,  theories like  ’society prepares  the crime, the criminal commits  its;’ or  that crime  is  the  product  of social excess’ or that ’poverty is the mother of crime’.      Judicial pronouncements are authentic guidance and so a few citations  may serve  our purpose. In Sobraj, this court observed:           It is  now well-settled, as a stream of rulings of      courts  proves,  that  deterrence,  both  specific  and      general rehabilitation  and institutional  security are      vital considerations.  Compassion wherever possible and      cruelty  only   where  inevitable,   is  the   art   of      correctional confinement.  When prison  policy advances      such  a  valid  goal,  the  court  will  not  intervene      officiously. 1230           The  overall   attitude  was   incorporated  as  a      standard by  the American  National Advisory Commission      on Crime, Justice Standards and Goals:           In a series of decisions this court has held that,      even though  the Governmental purpose be legitimate and      substantial, that  Purpose cannot  be pursued  by means      that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when      the end  can be  more narrowly achieved. The breadth of      legislative abridgment  must be  viewed in the light of      loss  drastic   means  for  achieving  the  same  basic

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    purpose. Earlier, this court in Hiralal Mullick’s case stated:           The  dignity  and  divinity,  the  self-worth  and      creative potential  of every  individual  is  a  higher      value of the Indian people, . . Again in  Mahammud  Giasuddin,  a  bench  belighted  in  the penological basics:           It is  thus plain  that crime  is  a  pathological      aberration, that  criminal can  ordinarily be redeemed,      that State  has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The      sub-culture that  leads to anti-social behaviour has to      be  countered   not  by   undue  cruelty   but  by  re-      culturisation.  Therefore  the  focus  of  interest  in      penology is  the individual,  and the goal is salvaging      him for  society. The  infliction of  harsh and  savage      punishment is  thus a  relic  of  past  and  regressive      times. The  human to  day views sentencing as a process      of  reshaping   a  person  who  has  deteriorated  into      criminality and  the modern  community  has  a  primary      stake in  the rehabilitation of the offender as a means      of  social   defence.   We,   therefore,   consider   a      therapeutic  rather  than  an  ’in  terrorem’  outlook,      should prevail  in our  criminal courts,  since  brutal      incarceration of  the person merely produces laceration      of his  mind. In  the words of George Bernard Shaw: ’if      you are  to punish a man retributively, you must injure      him. If  you are  to reform  him, you  must improve him      and, men are not improved by injuries’.      We emphasise  here that Remission Schemes offer healthy motivation  for  better  behaviour,  inner  improvement  and development  of   social  fibre.   While  eccentricities  of remission reducing a murderer’s life term to short spells of 2 or  3 years  in custody  may scandalise  penologists, such fear may not flabbergast any sociologist if by sheer 1231 good  behaviour,   educational  striving   and  correctional success, a   prisoner  earns remission  enough  for  release after serving 7 or 8 years.      It makes  us blush  to jettison  Gandhiji and genuflect before Hammurabi  abandon reformatory  humanity  and  become addicted to the ’eye for an eye’ barbarity: Said Churchill:           The mood  and temper  of the public with regard to      the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most      unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country. The  mood  and  temper  of  our  Constitution  certify  that arbitrary cruelty  to the  prisoner and negative attitude to reformation of the individual are obnoxious. Even the recent ruling in  Bachan Single  on  the  vires  of  death  penalty upholds this high stance.      Basic to the submissions of counsel for the petitioners is the  humane assumption  that the  object of sentencing is not  deterrent,   torture   simpliciter   but   mainly   the rehabilitation of the prisoner. Human dignity, emphasised in the Preamble,  compassion, implicit  in the  prescription of fair  procedure   in  Art.  21,  and  the  irrationality  of arbitrary  incarceratory  brutality  violative  of  Art.  14 invest the  demand  for  a  reformatory  component  in  jail regimen with  the status of a constitutional requirement. We need not  prolong the  judgment by  substantiation  of  this proposition because  the  learned  Solicitor  General,  with sweet reasonableness  and due  regard to  the precedents  of this court,  Has not disputed that reform of the prisoner is one of the major purpose of punishment.      The sequiter is irresistible. Any provision that wholly or substantially  discards the  relevancy of  restoration of

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the man  mired by  criminality is irrational. How is s. 433A affected by  this vice?  The argument  is that  14 years  in prison  is   an  inordinate  spell  which  is  not  only  an unrewarding torment  but a  negation of  reformation-indeed, the  promotion   of  embittered  hostility  to  society  and hardening  of,   brutality  counter-productive   of  hopeful humanization.      The argument  pressed before  us is  that s.  433A does injustice to  the imperative of reformation of the prisoner. Had his in-prison good behaviour been rewarded by reasonable remissions  linked   to  improved   social   responsibility, nurtured by familial contacts and liberal 1232 parol,  cultured  by  predictable,  premature  release,  the purpose of  habilitation would  have been  served. If law-s. 433A in  this case rudely refuses to consider the subsequent conduct of  the prisoner  and forces all convicts, good, bad and indifferent,  to serve  a fixed and arbitrary minimum it is an angry flat untouched by the proven criteria of reform. Surely, an  avant garde  penologist or  T.M. Oriented jurist would regard  enlightened  sentencing  as  abbreviated  life behind bars  coupled with rehabilitatory exposure inside and outside.  May  be,  he  may  even  criticise  the  draconian duration, blindly  running beyond  14 years,  as penological illiteracy. Criminologists  concentrate on  the activisation of the  creative intelligence  of  the  culprit  by  various procedures and  by his  release from jail at a cut-off point when  the  jural-netural  tests  of  mental-moral  normalcy, otherwise called  Rehabilitation Indices,  are satisfied. To violate these  research results  and to be addicted to a 14- year  prison  term  is  a  penal  superstition  without  any rational support  and, therefore,  is arbitrary.  Why not 20 years? or  a whole life? No material, scientific cultural or other has  been placed  for our  consumption  by  the  State indicating that  if a  murderer does  not spend  at least 14 endless years  inside jail  he will  be a social menace when released. Sadism  and impressionism even if it incarnates as legislation, cannot meet the social science content of Arts. 14 and 21 which are part of the suprema lex.      While the light of this logic is not lost on US and the non-institutional alternatives to prison as the healing hope of humane  habilitation are worthy of exploration, we are in the province  of constitutionality  where the  criteria  are different.      We have  no doubt  that reform  of the  prisoner, as  a social defence  strategy, is  high on  the agenda  of Indian penal policy  reform. The question is whether a 14-year term as a  mandatory minimum, is so extremist and arbitrary as to become unconstitutional,  even assuming  the  rehabilitatory recipe to  be on  our penological  pharmacopea. We cannot go that far  as judges,  whatever our personal dispositions may incline us were we legislators.      Two broad  grounds to  negative this  extreme  position strike us.  Deterrence, as  one valid punitive component has been accepted  in Sunil  Batra by  a five-judge  bench  (see Desai J.  supra). So,  a measure of minimum incarceration of 14 years  for the gravest class of crimes like murder cannot be considered  shocking, having  regard to the escalation of Horrendous crime in the country and the fact that this court has upheld even death penalty (limited though to ’the 1233 rarest of rare cases’. The time has not, perhaps, arrived to exclude deterrence  and even public denunciation altogether. Secondly,   even    For   correctional   therapy,   a   long ’hospitalisation’ in  prison may  sometimes  be  needed.  To

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change a  man’s mind  distorted by many baleful events, many primitive  pressures,   many   evil   companies   and   many environmental pollutions,  may not be an instant magic but a slow  process-assuming   that  correctional  strategies  are awarely available in prisons, ’a consummation devoutly to be wished’ but notoriously rather victoriously, absent.      We agree  that many  studies  by  criminologists  high- powered commissions  and court  pronouncements have  brought home the truth of the lie; once a murderer always a murderer and,  therefore,   early  release   will  spell  a  hell  of manslaughter.   Social   scientists   must   accept   Robert Ingersoll’s tart  remark: "In  the history of the world, the man who  is ahead  has always been called a heretic". We, as Judges, have  no power  to legislate but only to invigilate. In the  current state of things and ethos of society we have to  content   ourselves  with  the  thought  that,  personal opinions apart,  a very  long term  in prison for a murderer cannot be  castigated as  so outrageous  as  to  be  utterly arbitrary and  violative of  rational classification between lifers and  as so  blatantly barbarous  as to  be irrational enough to be struck down as ultra vires. Even the submission that no  penal alibi  justifies a prisoner being kept walled off from  the good  earth if, by his e. conduct, attainments and proven  normalisation, he  has become  fit to  be a free citizen, cannot  spell unconstitutionality.  And the uniform infliction of  a 14-year  minimum on the transformed and the unkept is  an unkind disregard for redemption inside prison. Even so,  to overcome  the constitutional  hurdle much  more material,  research  results  and  specialist  reports,  are needed. How  to assert who has become wholly habilitated and who not,  unless you  rely on  the  Rehabilitation  Index  ? Currently, we have theories, and experiments awaiting social scientists’ certificates of certitude.      For instance,  deep relaxation recipes and meditational techniques, researched with scientific tools, well-known and sophisticated experiments,  neurological and  psychological, claim to  have achieved  a break- through and has put across to the scientific world a Rehabilitation Index. This complex of tests  reference to  which,  culled  from  a  publication titled "Criminology and Consciousness, Series I," (developed by the Maharshi European Research University according to 1234 scientifically established  standard measures  of successful rehabilitation),  as   credentials  enough   to   be   taken cognisance of in some Indian Prisons. There are sceptics and skepticism is  good because  it  ’is  the  chastity  of  the intellect’. But  to dogmatic  disbelievers one  may only say with John  Dewey: "Every great advance in science has issued from a  new  audacity  of  imagination".  But  courts,  when assaying  constitutionality,   have   to   wait   till   the Establishment accepts it in some measure. So, we are not now in a  position to  assert, as Court, that at least a 14-year term for  a  murderer  is  arbitrary,  unusually  cruel  and unconstitutional. We  hold against  violation  of  Art.  14. Another argument  based on Art. 14 may also be briefly dealt with, although  we are  not carried away by it. In terms, S. 433A applies  only To  two classes of life-imprisonment. The true content  of the  provision is  that in the two specific categories specified  in s. 433A the prisoner shall actually suffer the  minimum jail  tenure set in it. There are around forty-one  other  offences,  including  attempt  to  murder, homicide not amounting to murder, grievous hurt, dacoity and breach of trust, where life sentence is the maximum. But the framers of  the Penal Code have classified maximum sentences principally on  the basis  of gravity  of the crime. By that

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token, where  a terrible  crime has been committed the Penal Code has prescribed death penalty as the maximum. The attack on its  constitutionality has recently been repulsed by this Court. The  main mass  of cases  where life  imprisonment is actually inflicted  by the courts belongs to the "either or" category where  the court  has the responsible discretion to impose death  penalty  or  life  imprisonment  and  actually awards only life imprisonment. Even in cases where the court sentences a  convict to  death  the  appropriate  Government often by  virtue of  s. 433(a)  reduces the lethal rigour to life term. These classes of cases are categorised separately by s.  433A. When the crime is so serious as to invite death penalty as  a possible  sentence, Parliament, in its wisdom, takes the view that ameliorative judicial award or statutory commutation by the executive should not devalue the sterness of the sentence to be equated with the life sentence awarded for the obviously less serious clauses of offences where the law itself  has fixed  a maximum  of only life imprisonment, not death  penalty as  a harsher  alternative. The  logic is lucid although  its wisdom,  in  the  light  of  penological thought, is  open to  doubt.  We  have  earlier  stated  the parameters of judicial restraint and, as at present advised, we are  not satisfied that the classification is based on an irrational differentia  unrelated to  the  punitive  end  of social defence.  Suffice it to say here, the classification, if due respect to Parliament’s choice is given, 1235 cannot be  castigated as  a capricious enough to attract the lethal consequence  of Art.  13 read  with Art.  14. Law and Life deal  in relatives,  not absolutes.  No material, apart from humane  hunches, has been placed by counsel whose focus has been  legal, not  social science-oriented,  to show that prolonged jail  life reaches  a point  of no  return and  is unreasonable. On  the materials  now before  us, we  do  not strike  down   s.  433A   on   the   score   of   capricious classification. Some  day, when human sciences have advanced far beyond  and non-institutional  alternatives  have  fully developed, parliamentary  faith in the fourteen-year therapy may well  change or  be challenged as unscientific credulity and superstitious  cruelty. But  that is  a far-away day and futurology  is  not  a  forensic  speciality.  The  womb  of tomorrow may hold, like Krishna to Kamsa, lethal omen to the faith of  to-day. We  rest content  with  Bertrand  Russel’s words of scepticism.           The essence  of the  Liberal outlook  lies not  in      what opinions  are held,  but in  how  they  are  held:      instead  of  being  held  dogmatically  they  are  held      tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence      may at  any moment  lead, to their abandonment. This is      the way opinions are held in science, as opposed to the      way in which they are held in theology.      The major  submissions which deserve high consideration may now  be taken  up. They are three and important in their outcome in  the prisoners’  freedom from  behind  bars.  The first turns  on the  ’prospectivity’ (loosely  so called) or otherwise of  s. 433A.  We have already held that Art. 20(1) is not  violated but  the present  point is  whether.  On  a correct construction. those who have been convicted prior to the coming  into force of s. 433A are bound by the mandatory limit. If  such convicts  are out  of its  coils their cases must be  considered under  the Remission Schemes and ’Short- sentencing’ laws.  The second  plea, revolves  round ’pardon jurisprudence’,  if  we  may  coarsely  call  it  that  way, enshrined impregnably  in Arts. 72 and 161 and the effect of s. 433A  thereon. The  power to  remit is  a  constitutional

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power and  any legislation  must fail which seeks to curtail its  scope   and  emasculate  its  mechanics.  Thirdly,  the exercise of  this plenary  power cannot be left to the fancy frolic or  frown of  Government, State  or Central, but must embrace reason,  relevance and  reformation, as  all  public power in  a republic  must. On  this basis;  we will have to scrutinise and  screen the  survival value  of  the  various Remission Schemes and short-sentencing projects, not to test their supremacy  over s.  433A, but  to train  the wide  and beneficient  power  to  remit  life  sentences  without  the hardship of fourteen fettered years. 1236      Now to  the first point. lt is trite law that civilised criminal  jurisprudence  interdicts  retroactive  impost  of heavier suffering  by a  later law.  Ordinarily, a  criminal legislation   must   be   so   interpreted   as   to   speak futuristically. We  do not  mean to  enter the  area of Art. 20(l) which  has already been dealt with. What we mean to do is so  to read  the predicate  used in s. 433A as to yield a natural result,  a humane  consequence, a  just  infliction. While there  is no  vested right  for any  convict  who  has received a  judicial sentence  to contend  that the  penalty should be  softened and  that  the  law  which  compels  the penalty to be carried out in full cannot apply to him, it is the function  of the  court to  adopt a liberal construction when dealing  with a criminal statute in the ordinary course of things.  This humanely  inspired canon, not applicable to certain terribly  anti-social categories may legitimately be applied  to   s.  433A.   (The  sound   rationale  is   that expectations of  convicted citizens  of regaining freedom on existing  legal   practices  should  not  be  frustrated  by subsequent legislation  or practices  unless the language is beyond doubt).  Liberality in  ascertaining  the  sense  may ordinarily err  on, the side of liberty where the quantum of deprivation of freedom is in issue. In short, the benefit of doubt, other  things being  equal, must go to the citizen in penal statute.  With this prefatory caution, we may read The Section. "Where  a sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  is imposed on  conviction of a person........ such person shall not be  released from  prison unless  he had  served atleast fourteen years  of imprisonment". Strict conformity to tense applied by  a precision  grammarian may  fault the draftsman for using  the past-perfect  tense. That  apart,  the  plain meaning  of  this  clause  is  that  "is"  means  "is"  and, therefore, if a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life after s.  433A comes  into force, such sentence shall not be released before  the 14-year  condition set-out  therein  is fulfilled. More precisely, any person who has been convicted before s.  433A comes into force goes out of the pale of the provision and  will enjoy  such benefits  as accrued  to him before s.  433A entered  Chapter XXXII.  The other clause in the provision  suggests the  application  of  the  mandatory minimum to  cases of  commutation which  have  already  been perfected, and  reads: "Where  a sentence  of death..... has been commuted  under s.  433 into  one of  imprisonment  for life, such  person shall  not be released from prison unless he had  served atleast  fourteen years of imprisonment." The draftsman, apparently,  is not  a grammarian.  He  uses  the tenses without  being finical.  We are  satisfied that  even this latter  clause merely means that if a sentence of death has been  commuted after this Section comes into force, such person shall  not be released until the condition therein is complied with. ’Is’ and ’has’ are not words which 1237 are weighed  in the  scales of grammar nicely enough in this

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Section and, therefore, over-stress on the present tense and the present-perfect  tense may not be a clear indicator. The general rule  bearing on  ordinary penal  statutes in  their construction must  govern this  case. In  another situation, interpreting the  import of  "has been sentenced" this court held that  "the language of the clause is neutral" regarding prospectivity. It  inevitably follows  that every person who has been  convicted by  the sentencing court before December 18, 1978,  shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to him from the  Remission Scheme or short-sentencing project as if s. 433A  did not stand in his way. The Section uses the word ’conviction’ of  a person  and, in the context, it must mean ’conviction’  by   the  sentencing  court;  for  that  first quantified his deprivation of personal liberty.      We are  mindful of one anomaly and must provide for its elimination. If the trial court acquits and the higher court convicts and  it so  happens that the acquittal is before S. 433-A came  into force and the conviction after it, could it be that  the convicted person would be denied the benefit of prospectivity and  consequential non-application of S. 433-A merely  because   he  had  the  bad  luck  to  be  initially acquitted? We  think not.  When a  person  is  convicted  in appeal, it  follows that  the appellate  court has exercised its power  in the place of the original court and the guilt, conviction and  sentence must  be substituted  for and shall have retroactive  effect from  the date  of judgment  of the trial court.  The appellate  conviction must  relate back to the date  of the trial court’s verdict and substitute it. In this view,  even it’ the appellate court reverses an earlier acquittal rendered  before S.  433-A  came  into  force  but allows the  appeal and  convicts the accused, after S. 433-A came into  force, such  persons will also be entitled to the benefit of the remission system prevailing prior to S. 433-A on the  basis we have explained. An appeal is a continuation of an  appellate judgment  as a  replacement of the original judgment.      We now  move on  to the  second contention  which deals with the  power of  remission under the Constitution and the fruits of  its exercise  vis a  vis S.  433-A. Nobody  has a case-indeed can be heard to contend-that Articles 72 and 161 must yield  to S.  433-A. Cooley  has rightly indicated that ’where the pardoning power is vested exclusively in the (top executive)  any   law   which   restricts   The   power   is unconstitutional’. Rules  to facilitate  the exercise of the power stand 1238 on a  different footing. The Constitution is the suprema lex and any legislation, even by Parliament must  bow-before it. It is  not necessary  to delve into the details of these two Articles; nor  even to  trace the  antiquity  of  the  royal prerogative which  has transmigrated  into India through the various Westminster  statutes, eventually  to blossom as the power of  pardon vested  in the  President or  the  Governor substantially  in   overlapping  measure   and  concurrently exercisable.      The present  provisions (ss.  432 and  433) have verbal verisimilitude and  close kinship  with the  earlier Code of 1898  (ss.   401  and  402).  Likewise,  the  Constitutional Provisions of  today were  found even  in the  Government of India Act,  1935. Of  course, in English constitutional law, the sovereign,  acting through the Home Secretary, exercises the prerogative  of mercy. While the content of the power is the  same  even  under  our  Constitution,  its  source  and strength  and,   therefore,  its   functional  features  and accountability are  different. We will examine this aspect a

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little later.  Suffice it  to say  that Arts. 72 and 161 are traceable to  s. 295  of the  Government of India Act, 1935. The Central  Law Commission  has made  certain  observations based on  Rabha’s case  to the  effect that  the  effect  of granting pardon  is  not  to  interfere  with  the  judicial sentence but  to truncate its execution. There is no dispute regarding this branch of pardon jurisprudence. What is urged is that  by the introduction of s. 433A, s. 432 is granted a permanent holiday  for certain  classes  of  lifers  and  s. 433(a) suffers  eclipse. Since  ss. 432  and  433(a)  are  a statutory   expression    and   modus    operandi   of   the constitutional power,  s. 433A  is  ineffective  because  it detracts from  the operation  of s. 432 and 433(a) which are the legislative  surrogates, as it were, of the pardon power under  the   Constitution.  We   are  unconvinced   be,  the submissions of counsel in this behalf.      It is  apparent  that  superficially  viewed,  the  two powers, one constitutional] and the other statutory, are co- extensive. But  two things  may be similar but not the same. That is  precisely the  difference. We cannot agree that the power which  is the creature of the Code can be equated with a high prerogative vested by the Constitution in the highest functionaries of  the Union  and the  States. The  source is different, the  substance  is  different,  the  strength  is different although  the stream may be flowing along the same bed. We see the two powers as far from being identical, and, obviously, the  constitutional power  is  ’untouchable’  and ’unapproachable’ and cannot suffer the 1239 vicissitudes of  simple legislative processes. Therefore, s. 433A cannot  be invalidated as indirectly violative of Arts. 72 and  161. What  the Code  gives, it  can take, and so, an embargo on  ss. 432  and 433(a)  is within  The  legislative power of Parliament.      Even so,  we must remember the constitutional status of Arts. 72  161 and  it is common ground that s. 433A does not and cannot  affect even  a wee-bit  the pardon  power of the Governor or  the President.  The necessary  sequel  to  this logic is  that notwithstanding s. 433A the President and the Governor continue  to exercise  the power of commutation and release under the aforesaid Articles.      Are we  back to Square one ? Has Parliament indulged in legislative futility  with  a  formal  victory  but  a  real defeat? The  answer is ’yes’ and ’no’ Why ’yes’? because the President is symbolic, the Central Government is the reality even as  the Governor is The formal head and sole repository of the executive power but is incapable of acting except on, and according  to, the  advice of  his council of ministers. The  upshot  is  that  the  State  Government,  whether  the Governor likes it or not, can advise and act under Art. 161, the Governor  being bound  by that  advice.  The  action  of commutation  and   release  can   thus  be   pursuant  to  a governmental decision  and the  order may issue even without the  Governor’s   approval  although,  under  the  Rules  of Business and  as a  matter of constitutional courtesy, it is obligatory  that   the  signature  of  the  Governor  should authorise the  pardon, commutation  or release. The position is substantially the same regarding the President. It is not open either  to  the  President  or  the  Governor  to  take independent decision  or direct release or refuse release of any one  of their  own choice.  It  is  fundamental  to  the Westminster system  that the  Cabinet rules  and  the  Queen reigns. Being  too deeply  rooted  as  foundational  to  our system  no  serious  encounter  was  met  from  the  learned Solicitor General  whose sure  grasp of fundamentals did not

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permit him to controvert the proposition, that the President and  the   Governor,  be   they  ever  so  high  in  textual terminology, are  but functional  euphemisms promptly acting on and  only on  the advice of the Council of Ministers save in a  narrow area  of  power.  The  subject  is  now  beyond controversy, this court having authoritatively laid down the law in  Shamsher Singh’s  case. So,  we agree,  even without reference to  Art, 367  and ss.  3(8)(b) and 3(60)(b) of the General Clauses  Act, 1897,  that, in the matter of exercise of the  powers under  Arts. 72  and  161,  the  two  highest dignitaries in  our constitutional  scheme act  and must act not on their own judgment but in accordance with the aid and advice 1240 of the  ministers. Article  74,  after  the  42nd  Amendment silences speculation  and obligates compliance. The Governor vis a  vis his  Cabinet is no higher than the President save in a  narrow area  which does  not  include  Art.  161.  The Constitutional conclusion  is that  the Governor  is  but  a shorthand  expression  for  the  State  Government  and  the President is an abbreviation for the Central Government.      An issue  of deeper import demands our consideration at this stage  of the  discussion. Wide as the power of pardon, commutation and release (Arts. 72 and 161) is, it cannot run riot; for  no legal power can run unruly like John Gilpin on the horse  but must  keep sensibly to a steady course. Here, we come  upon the  second constitutional  fundamental  which underlies the  submissions of counsel. It is that all public power,  including   constitutional  power,  shall  never  be exercisable  arbitrarily   or  mala  fide  and,  ordinarily, guidelines for  fair and  equal execution  are guarantors of the valid  play of power, We proceed on the basis that these axioms are valid in our constitutional order.      The jurisprudence  of constitutionally  canalised power as spelt  out in  the second  proposition also  did not meet with serious  resistance from  the learned Solicitor General and, if  we may  say so rightly. Article 14 is an expression of the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution and is a clear pointer that  arbitrariness is anathema under our system. It necessarily  follows   that  the   power  to  pardon,  grant remission and  commutation, being of the greatest moment for the liberty  of the citizen, cannot be a law unto itself but must be  informed by  the finer canons of constitutionalism. In the  Inter-national Airport  Authority  case  this  court stated:           "The   rule   inhibiting   arbitrary   action   by      Government which  we have  discussed above  must  apply      equally where  such corporation  is  dealing  with  the      public, whether  by way of giving jobs or entering into      contracts or  otherwise, and  it cannot act arbitrarily      and enter into relationship with any person it likes at      its sweet  will, but  its action  must be in conformity      with some  principle which meets the test of reason and      relevance.           This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of      equality embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled      as a  result of  the decisions  of this  Court in E. P.      Royappa v.  State of  Tamil Nadu  and Maneka  Gandhi v.      Union of India that Article 1241      14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures      fairness, and  equality of  treatment. It requires that      State action  must- not  be arbitrary but must be based      on some  rational and  relevant principle which is non-      discriminatory; it must not be guided by any extraneous

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    or irrelevant  considerations, because  that  would  be      denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and      rationality which is legally as well as philosophically      an essential  element of  equality or non-arbitrariness      is projected  by Article  14 and  it must  characterise      every State  action, whether  it be  under authority of      law or in exercise of executive power without making of      law." Mathew, J. In V. Punnan Thomas v. State of Kerala  observed:           "The Government,  is not and should not be as free      as an  individual in  selecting the  recipients for its      largesse. Whatever its activity the Government is still      the Government  and  will  be  subject  to  restraints,      inherent in  its position  in a  democratic society.  A      democratic Government  cannot lay  down  arbitrary  and      capricious standards  for the  choice of  persons  with      whom alone it will deal. If we excerpt again from the Airport Authority case:           Whatever be  the  concept  of  the  rule  of  law,      whether it  be the  meaning given  by Dicey in his "The      Law of  the Constitution"  or the  definition given  by      Hayek in  his "Road  to Serfdom"  and "Constitution  of      Liberty" or  the exposition set forth by Harry Jones in      his "The  Rule of  Law and the Welfare State", there is      as pointed  out by  Mathew J.,  in his  article on "The      Welfare State,  Rule of  Law and  Natural  Justice"  in      "Democracy,   Equality    and   Freedom"   "Substantial      agreement in Juristic thought that the great purpose of      the rule  of  law  notion  is  the  protection  of  the      individual  against   arbitrary  exercise   of   power,      wherever it is found". It is indeed unthinkable that in      a democracy  governed by  the rule of Law the executive      Government  or  any  or  its  officers  should  possess      arbitrary power  over the  interests of the individual.      Every  action  of  the  Executive  Government  must  be      informed  with  reason  and  should  be  free  from  ,,      arbitrariness. That  is the very essence of the rule of      law and  its  bare  minimal  requirement.  And  to  the      application of  this principle  it makes  no difference      whether the  exercise of the power involves affectation      of some right or denial of some privilege. 1242            ....  The discretion  of the  Government has been      held to  be not unlimited in that the Government cannot      give or  withhold Largesse  in its arbitrary discretion      or at its sweet will. It is insisted, as pointed out by      Prof. Reich in an specially stimulating .... article on      "The New  Property" in  73 Yale  Law Journal 733, "that      Government action  be based  on standards  that are not      arbitrary or  unauthorised." The  Government cannot  be      permitted, to  say that it will give jobs or enter into      contracts or issue quotas or licences only in favour of      those having  grey hair  or belonging  to a  particular      political party  or professing  a particular  religious      faith. The  Government is  still the Government when it      acts in , the matter of granting largesse and it cannot      act arbitrarily. It does not stand in the same position      as a private individual. It is  the pride of our constitutional order that all power, whatever its  source, must,  in its  exercise,  anathematise arbitrariness and obey standards and guidelines intelligible and intelligent  and integrated with the manifest purpose of the power. From this angle even the power to pardon, commute or remit  is subject  to the wholesome creed that guidelines should govern the exercise even of presidential power.

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    Speaking  generally,   Lord  Acton’s   dictum  deserves attention           I cannot  accept your  canon that  we are to judge      Pope and  . King  unlike other  men, with  a favourable      presumption that  the did  no wrong.  If there  is  any      presumption it is the other was, against the holders of      power, increasing as the power increases. Likewise, Edmund  Burke, the  great British  statesman  gave correct counsel when he said:           All persons possessing a portion of power ought to      be strongly  and awfully  impressed with  an idea  that      they act  in trust,  and that  they are  to account for      their conduct  in that  trust to  the one great Master,      Author, and Founder of society.      Pardon,  using   this   expression   in   the   amplest connotation, ordains  fair exercise,  as we  have  indicated above. Political vendetta or party favouratism cannot but be interlopers in  this area. The order which is the product of extraneous or mala fide factors will vitiate the exercise. . While constitutional  power is  beyond challenge, its actual exercise  may  still  be  vulnerable.  Likewise,  capricious criteria will  void the  exercise. For example, if the Chief Minister of a State releases every one m the 1243 prisons in  his State  on his  birthday or because a son has been born  to him, it will an outrage on the Constitution to let such madness survive. We make these observations because it has  been brought  to our  notice  that  a  certain  Home Minister’s  visit  to  a  Central  Jail  was  considered  so auspicious an  omen that  all the prisoners in the jail were given  substantial   remissions  solely   for  this  reason. Strangely   enough,   this   propitious   circumstance   was discovered an year later and remission order was issued long after the Minister graced the penitentiary. The actual order passed on July 18, 1978 by the Haryana Government reads thus           In exercise  of the powers conferred under Article      161 the  Constitution of India, the Governor of Haryana      grants special:  remissions on the same scale and terms      as mentioned  in  Govt.  Of  India,  Ministry  of  Home      Affairs letter No. U. 13034/59/77 dated 10th June, 1977      to Prisoners  who happened  to be  confined in  Central      Jail, Tihar,  New Delhi  on 29th May, 1977, at the time      of the  visit of  Home Minister  Govt. Of India, to the      said Jail  and who  has been  convicted  by  the  Civil      Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in Haryana State.                                          A. BANERJEE                                Secretary to Govt. of Haryana                                         Jails Department Dated: Chandigarh, the 18th July, 1978. Push this  logic a  little further and the absurdity will be obvious.  No  Constitutional  power  can  be  vulgarised  by personal  vanity  of  men  in  authority.  Likewise,  if  an opposition leader  is sentenced,  but the  circumstances cry for remission  such as  that he  is suffering from cancer or that his  wife is  terminally ill  or that he has completely reformed himself,  the power of remission under Arts. 72/161 may ordinarily  be exercised  and a  refusal may  be  wrong- headed. If,  on the  other hand,  a brutal  murderer, blood- thirsty in  his massacre, has been sentenced by a court with strong observations about his bestiality, it may be arrogant and irrelevant  abuse of  power to  remit  his  entire  life sentence the  very next  day  after  the  conviction  merely because he  has joined  the party  in power  or is  a  close relation of  a political  high-up. The  court, if  it  finds

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frequent misuse  of this  power may  have to investigate the discrimination. The  proper thing to do, if Government is to Keep faith with the founding fathers, is to make 1244 rules for  its own  guidance in  the exercise  of the pardon power keeping,  of course,  a large  residuary power to meet special situations or sudden developments. This will exclude the vice  of discrimination  such as  may  arise  where  two persons have  been convicted  and sentenced in the same case for the  same degree  of guilt  but one  is released and the other refused,  for such  irrelevant  reasons  as  religion, caste, colour or political loyalty.      Once we  accept the  basic thesis that the public power vested on  a high  pedestal has  to be  exercised justly The situation becomes simpler. The principal considerations will turn upon social good by remission or release. Here, we come back to  the  purpose  of  imprisonment  and  the  point  of counter-productivity    by     further    prolongation    of incarceration. But  when is  this  critical  point  reached? Bitter verse burns better into us this die-hard error      This too I know-and wise it were      If each could know the same-      That every prison that men build      If built with bricks of shame,      And bound with bars lost Christ should see      How men their brothers maim. President Carter when he was Governor of Georgia, addressing a Bar Association, said:           In our  prisons, which  in the  past have  been  a      disgrace to  Georgia, we’ve  tried to  make substantive      changes in the quality of those who administer them and      to put  a new  realm  of  understanding  and  hope  and      compassion into  the administration  of that portion of      the system  of justice  95 per  cent of  those who  are      presently incarcerated  in prisons  will be returned to      be our  neighbors, and  now the  thrust of  the  entire      program, as  initiated under  Ellis MacDougall  and now      continued under  Dr. Ault,  is to try to discern in the      Soul of  each convicted  and sentenced person redeeming      features that  can be  enhanced. We  plan a  career for      that person  to be  pursued while  he is  in prison.  I      believe that  the early data that we have on recidivism      rates indicate the efficacy of what we’ve done.      All these  go to  prove that the length of imprisonment is not  regenerative of the goodness within and may be proof of the reverse-a 1245 calamity which  may be  averted by  exercise of  power under Art.  161,  especially  when  the  circumstances  show  good behaviour, industrious  conduct, social  responsibility  and humane responses  which are  usually reflected  in the marks accumulated in  the shape  of remission. In short, the rules of remission may be effective guidelines of a recommendatory nature, helpful  to Government  to release  the prisoner  by remitting the remaining term.      The failure of imprisonment as a crime control tool and the search  for non-institutional  alternatives  in  a  free milieu,  gain  poignant  pertinence  while  considering  the mechanical exclusion  of  individualised  punishment  by  s. 433A, conjuring  up the  cruel magic of 14 years behind bar- where ’each  day is like a year, a year whose days are long- as a  solvent of  the psychic  crisis which  is  crimeogenic factor, blinking  at the  blunt fact  that at  least after a spell the  penitentiary remedy  aggravates the  recidivist’s malady.  In   the  "Failure   of   Imprisonment"   (a   1979

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publication) the authors start off with the statement           "The failure  of imprisonment  has been one of the      most noticeable  features  of  the  current  crisis  in      criminal justice system in advanced industrial or post-      industrial societies such as Australia, Britain, Canada      and the  United States. One justification after another      advanced in  favour of the use of imprisonment has been      shown to  be misconceived. At best, prisons are able to      provide  a   form  of   crude  retribution   to   those      unfortunate to  be apprehended.  At worst,  prisons are      brutalising, cannot  be shown  to rehabiliate  or deter      offenders  and  are  detrimental  to  the  re-entry  of      offenders into society. Furthermore, the heavy reliance      upon    prisons,    particularly    maximum    security      institutions with  their emphasis  upon costly security      procedures, has  led to  an inordinate  drain upon  the      overall  resources  devoted  to  the  criminal  justice      area." Likewise, in  many current  research publications the thesis is the  same. Unless  a tidal  wave of  transformation takes place George Ellis will be proved right:           There are  many  questions  regarding  our  prison      systems and  their  rehabilitative  quality.  Observers      from inside  the walls find prisons to be a melting pot      of tension and anxiety. Tension and 1246      anxiety  are  the  result  of  a  variety  of  abnormal      conditions.  Prisons,  including  the  so-called  model      prisons, rob  a man  of  his  individual  identity  and      dignity.           Contrary to  popular opinion, all convicts are not      rock-hard  individuals   lacking  sufficient  emotional      balance. They  are people.  with fears  and aspirations      like everyone else. Generally, they don’t want to fight      with or  kill their  neighbor any  more than the man on      the street. They want to live in peace and return to it      their loved  ones as  soon as  possible. They are not a      different breed  of human  being or  a distinct type of      mentality. They  are persons  who have  made  mistakes.      This point  is made  not to  solicit pity  but to bring      attention to  the fact  that any  individual  could  be      caught in  a similar  web and find himself inside a pit      such as Folsom Prison.      The  rule  of  law,  under  our  constitutional  order, transforms alt  public power  into responsible,  responsive, regulated exercise  informed by  high purposes and geared to people’s welfare.  But the wisdom and experience of the past have  found   expression  in   remission  rules  and  short- sentencing laws.  No new  discovery by  Parliament  in  1978 about the  futility or  folly of  these  special  and  local experiences, spread ever several decades, is discernible. No High-power    committee    report,    no    expert    body’s recommendations, no escalation in recidivism attributable to remissions and  releases, have  been brought  to our notice. Impressionistic reaction  to some cases of premature release of murderers,  without even  a follow  up study of the later life of  these quondam  convicts, has been made. We find the rise of  enlightenment in penological alternatives to closed prisons as  the current trend and failure of imprisonment as the   universal   lament.   We,   heart-warmingly,   observe experiments in open jails, filled by lifers, liberal parolee and probations,  generosity of juvenile justice and licensed release or  freedom  under  leash-a  la  The  Uttar  Pradesh Prisoners’ Release  on Probation  Act, 1978.  We cannot view without gloom  the reversion  to the  sadistic  superstition

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that the  longer a  life convict is kept in a cage the surer will be  his redemption.  It is  our considered  view. that, beyond an  optimum point  of, say,  eight years-  we mean no fixed formula-prison  detention benumbs  and  makes  nervous wreck or  unmitigated brute of a prisoner. If animal farms - are  not  reformatories,  the  Remission  Rules  and  short- sentencing schemes  are humanising  wheel of  compassion and reduction of  psychic tension.  We  have  no  hesitation  to reject the notion that 1247 Arts. 72/161  should remain  uncanalised. We  have to direct the provisional  acceptance  of  the  remission  and  short- sentencing schemes as good guidelines for exercise of pardon power-a jurisdiction  meant to  be  used  as  often  and  as systematically as possible and not to be abused, much as the temptation so to do may press upon the pen of power.      The learned Solicitor General is right that these rules are plainly  made under  the Prisons  Act and  not under the constitutional power. The former fails under the pressure of s. 433A.  But  that,  by  no  means.  precludes  the  States adopting as  working rules  the same remission schemes which seem  to   us  to  be  fairly  reasonable.  After  all,  the Government cannot  meticulously study  each prisoner and the present praxis  of marks, until a more advanced and expertly advised scheme  is evolved,  may work.  Section 433A  cannot forbid this  method because  it is immunised by Art. 161. We strongly suggest  that, without  break, the  same rules  and schemes of  remission be  continued as  a transmigration  of soul into Art. 161, as it were, and benefits extended to all who fall  within their  benign  orbit-save,  of  course,  in special   cases    which   may    require   other   relevant considerations. The  wide power of executive clemency cannot be bound down even by self-created rules.      One point  remains to be clarified. The U.P. Prisoners’ Release on Probation Act. 1938, a welcome measure, what with population pressure  on prisons  and burden  on  the  public exchequer, will  survive s.  433A for  two reasons. Firstly, Government may  resort to  the statutory scheme, not qua law but  as  guideline.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  the expression ’prison’  and ’imprisonment’ must receive a wider connotation and  include any  place  notified  as  such  for detention purposes.  ’Stone walls  and iron  bars do  not  a prison make’; nor are ’stone walls and iron bars’ a sine qua non to  make a  jail. Open  jails are capital instances. Any life under  the control  of the  State, whether  within  the high-walled world or not, may be a prison if the law regards it as  such. House  detentions, for  example. Palaces, where Gandhiji was  detained, were  prisons. Restraint  on freedom under the  prison law  is the  lest. Licensed releases where instant re-capture  is sanctioned by the law, and, likewise, parole, where  the  parole  is  no  free  agent,  and  other categories under the invisible fetters of the prison law may legitimately be  regarded as  imprisonment.  This  point  is necessary to  be cleared  even for  computation of  14 years under s.  433A. Sections  432, 433  and 433A  read together. Iead to  the inference  we have  drawn  and  liberal  though guarded, use  of this  Act may  do good. Prison reform, much bruised about  though, is more the skin than in the soul and needs a deeper stirring of 1248 consciousness than  tantrums, threats  and  legalised  third degree, if  the authentic  voice of the Father of the Nation be our  guide. To  chain the  man is  not to change him; the error is  obvious-a human is more than simian. Our reasoning upholds s.  433A of  the Procedure  Code  but  upbraids  the

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abandonment of  the healing  hope of  remissions and release betimes. To  legislate belongs  to another  branch but where justice is  the subject the court must speak. There was some argument that  s. 433A  is understood to be a ban on parole. Very  wrong.   The  Section  does  not  obligate  continuous fourteen years  in jail  and so parole is permissible. We go further  to   say  that  our  Prison  Administration  should liberalise  parole   to  prevent  pent-up  tension  and  sex perversion which are popular currency in many a penitentiary (see   Sethna,    "Society   and   the   Criminal"   Tripati publications, 4th Edn. p. 296).      We conclude by formulating our findings.      1. We  repulse all the thrusts on the vires of s. 433A. Maybe, penologically  the prolonged  terms prescribed by the Section is  supererogative. If  we had our druthers we would have negatived  the need  for a  fourteen-year gestation for reformation. But  ours is  to  construe  not  construct,  to decode, not to make a code.      2. We  affirm the current supremacy of s. 433A over the Remission Rules  and short-sentencing  statutes made  by the various States.      3. We uphold all remissions and short-sentencing passed under Articles  72 and  161 of  the Constitution but release will follow,  in life  sentence cases,  only  on  Government making an order en masse or individually, in that behalf.      4.  We   hold  that  s.  432  and  s.  433  are  not  a manifestation of Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but a  separate,   though  similar,   power,  and  s.  433A,  by nullifying wholly  or partially  these prior provisions does not violate  or detract  from  the  full  operation  of  the constitutional power to pardon, commute and the like.      5. We  negate the plea that s. 433A contravenes Article 20(1) of the Constitution.      6.  We   follow  Godse’s  case  (supra)  to  hold  that imprisonment for  life lasts  until  the  last  breath,  and whatever the  length of  remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release  only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government.      7. We  declare that  s. 433A,  in both  its limbs (i.e. ’both types  of  life  imprisonment  specified  in  it),  is prospective in  effect. To put the position beyond doubt, we direct that  the  mandatory  minimum  of  14  years’  actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose 1249 cases were  decided by  the  trial  court  before  the  18th December, 1978  (directly or  retroactively, as explained in the judgment)  when s.  433A came  into force.  All ’lifers’ whose conviction  by the court of first instance was entered prior  to   that  date  are  entitled  to  consideration  by Government for  release on the strength of earned remissions although a  release can  take place only if Government makes an order  to that  effect. To  this extent the battle of the tenses is  won by  the prisoners.  It follows,  by the  same logic, that  short-sentencing  legislations,  if  any,  will entitle a  prisoner  to  claim  release  thereunder  if  his conviction by the court of first instance was before s. 433A was brought into effect.      8.  The   power  under  Articles  72  and  161  of  the Constitution can  be exercised  by  the  Central  and  State Governments, not  by the President or Governor on their own. The advice  of the  appropriate Government binds the Head of the State.  No separate  order for  each individual  case is necessary but any general order made must be clear enough to identify the  group of cases and indicate the application of mind to. the whole group.

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    9. Considerations  for exercise of power under Articles 72/161 may  be myriad  and their  occasions protean, and are left to the appropriate Government, but no consideration nor occasion   can    be    wholly    irrelevant,    irrational, discriminatory or  mala fide.. Only in these rare cases will the court examine the exercise.      10. Although  the remission  rules or  short-sentencing provisions proprio  vigore may not apply as against s. 433A, they will  override s.  433A if  the Government,  Central or State, guides itself by the selfsame rules or schemes in the exercise of  its constitutional  power. We regard it as fair that until  fresh rules  are made in keeping with experience gathered, current social conditions and accepted penological thinking-  a   desirable  step,   in  our  view-the  present remission and  release schemes  may  usefully  be  taken  as guidelines under  Articles 72/161  and  orders  for  release passed.  We   cannot  fault   the  Government,  if  in  some intractably savage delinquents, s. 433A is itself treated as a  guideline   for  exercise   of  Articles   72/161.  These observations of  ours are  recommendatory to avoid a hiatus, but it  is for  Government,  Central  or  State,  to  decide whether and  why the  current Remission  Rules,  should  not survive until replaced by a more wholesome scheme.      11. The  U. P.  Prisoners’ Release  on  Probation  Act, 1938, enabling  limited enlargement  under licence  will  be effective as  legislatively  sanctioned  imprisonment  of  a loose and liberal type and such licensed enlargement will be reckoned for  the purpose  of the  14-year duration. Similar other statutes and rules will enjoy similar efficacy. 1250      12.   In    our   view,   penal   humanitarianism   and rehabilitative desideratum  warrant liberal paroles, subject to security  safeguards, and other humanizing strategies for inmates so  that the  dignity and  worth of the human person are not  desecrated by  making mass  jails anthropoid  zoos. Human rights  awareness must infuse institutional reform and search for alternatives.      13. We  have declared  the law  all right,  but law-in- action fulfils itself not by declaration alone and needs the wings of  communication to  the target  community.  So,  the further  direction  goes  from  this  court  that  the  last decretal part  is translated  and kept  prominently in  each ward and  the whole  judgment, in the language of the State, made available to the inmates in the jail library.      14. Section  433A  does  not  forbid  parole  or  other release within the 14-year span. So to interpret the Section as to  intensify inner  tension and  taboo intermissions  of freedom is to do violence to language and liberty.      11 The  length of  this judgment (like the length of s. 433A Cr.  P. C.) could have been obviated but the principles and pragmatics  enmeshed in  the mass of cases which are but masks for  human trials  warrant fuller  examination even of peripherals.   Moreover,   Chief   Justice   Earl   Warren’s admonition makes  us scrutinise  the basics,  undeterred  by length:           Our  judges  are  not  monks  or  scientists,  but      participants in the living stream of our national life,      steering the law between the dangers of rigidity on the      one hand  and of  formlessness on the other. Our system      faces no  theoretical dilemma  but a  single continuous      problem: how  to apply  to ever-changing conditions the      never-changing principles of freedom.                                    (Fortune, November, 1955) A Final Thought      Fidelity to  the debate  at the  bar  persuades  us  to

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remove a  misapprehension. Some  argument was  made  that  a minimum sentence  of  14  years’  imprisonment  was  merited because the  victim of the murder must be remembered and all soft justice  scuttled to  such heinous  offenders.  We  are afraid there  is a  confusion about  fundamentals mixing  up victimology with penology to warrant retributive severity by the backdoor.  If crime  claims a  victim  criminology  must include victimology  as a  major component  of its concerns. Indeed, when a murder or other grievous offence is committed the dependants  or  other  aggrieved  persons  must  receive reparation and the social 1251 responsibility of  the criminal  to restore the loss or heal the injury  is part of the punitive exercise. But the length of the  prison term  is no  reparation to  the  crippled  or bereaved and  is  futility  compounded  with  cruelty.  ’Can storied urn  or  animated  bust  call  to  its  mansion  the fleeting breath ?’ Equally, emphatically, given perspicacity and freedom  from sadism, can flogging the killer or burning his limbs  or torturing  his psychic being bring balm to the soul of  the dead by any process of thanatology or make good The terrible  loss caused  by the  homicide ? Victimology, a burgeoning branch  of humane  criminal  justice,  must  find fulfillment,  not   through  barbarity   but  by  compulsory recoupment by the wrong-doer of the damage inflicted, not by giving more  pain to  the offender but by lessening the loss of the  forlorn. The  State itself  may have its strategy of alleviating hardships  of victims  as part of Article 41. So we do not think that the mandatory minimum in s. 433A can be linked up with the distress of the dependants.      We dismiss the Writ Petition vis a vis the challenge to s. 433A  but allow  them to  the extent above indicated. The war is  not lost even if a battle be lost. Justice must win. The  authorities  concerned  will  carefully  implement  The directives given in this judgment. Since personal liberty is at stake urgent action is the desideratum.      FAZAL ALI, J.-While I concur with the judgment proposed by Brother  Krishna Iyer, J., I would like to express my own views on  certain important  features of the case and on the nature and  character of  the reformative aspect of penology as adumbrated by Brother Krishna Iyer, J.      The dominant  purpose and  the  avowed  object  of  the legislature in  introducing s.  433A in the Code of Criminal Procedure unmistakably  seems to  be to  secure a  deterrent punishment for  heinous offences  committed in  a dastardly, brutal or  cruel fashion  or offences  committed against the defence or  security of  the country.  It is true that there appears to  be a  modern trend of giving punishment a colour of reformation so that stress may be laid on the reformation of the criminal rather than his confinement in jail which is an ideal  objective. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that such  an objective cannot be achieved without mustering the necessary  facilities, the  requisite education  and the appropriate climate  which must be created to foster a sense of repentance  and penitence  in a  criminal so  that he may undergo such  a mental  or psychological  revolution that he realises the  consequences of  playing with  human lives. In the world  of today  and particularly  in our  country, this ideal is  yet to  be achieved  and, in  fact, with  all  our efforts it  will take  us a  long time  to reach this sacred goal. 1252      The process  of reasoning  that even  in spite of death sentence  murders  have  not  stopped  is  devoid  of  force because, in  the first  place, we  cannot gauge,  measure or

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collect figures or statistics as to what would have happened if capital  punishment was  abolished or  sentence  of  long imprisonment was  reduced. Secondly, various criminals react to  various  circumstances  in  different  ways  and  it  is difficult to foresee the impact of a particular circumstance on their  criminal behaviour.. The process of reformation of criminals with  an unascertained record would entail a great risk as  a sizable  number of  criminals  instead  of  being reformed may be encouraged to commit offences after offences and become a serious and horrendous hazard to the society.      The question, therefore, is-should the country take the risk of  innocent lives being lost at the hands of criminals committing heinous  crimes  in  the  holy  hope  or  wishful thinking that  one day  or the  other, a  criminal,  however dangerous  or  callous  he  may  be,  will  reform  himself. Valmikis are  not born  everyday  and  to  expect  that  our present generation,  with the prevailing social and economic environment, would produce Valmikis day after day is to hope for the impossible.      Section 433A  has advisedly  been enacted to apply to a very  small  sphere  and  includes  within  its  ambit  only offences under  sections 121,  132, 302,  303, 396, etc., of the Indian  Penal Code,  that is to say, only those offences where death  or life  imprisonment  are  the  penalties  but instead of  death life  imprisonment is  given  or  where  a sentence of death is commuted to that of life imprisonment.      The problem  of penology  is not one which admits of an easy solution.  The argument  as  to  what  benefit  can  be achieved by  detaining a  prisoner  for  fourteen  years  is really begging  the question  because a detention for such a long term  in confinement  however comfortable  it is, is by itself sufficient  to deter  every criminal or offender from committing  offences  so  as  to  incur  the  punishment  of confinement for  a good part of his life. The effect of such a punishment is to be judged not from a purely ethical point of view  but from  an angle of vision which is practical and pragmatic.      Crime has  rightly been  described as an act of warfare against the  community touching  new depths  of lawlessness. The object of imposing deterrent sentences is threefold:-      (1)  to protect the community against callous criminals           for a long time, 1253      (2)  to administer  as clearly  as possible  to  others           tempted to  follow them  into lawlessness on a war           scale  if  they  are  brought  to  and  convicted,           deterrent punishment will follow and      (3)  to deter criminals who are forced to undergo long-           term imprisonment  from repeating  their  criminal           acts in  future. Even  from the  point of  view of           reformative  form  of  punishment  "prolonged  and           indefinite detention  is justified not only in the           name of prevention but cure. The offender has been           regarded  in   one  sense   as  a  patient  to  be           discharged only  when he responds to the treatment           and can be regarded as safe’’(1) for the society.      Explaining the  material and  practical  advantages  of long-term imprisonment Sir Leon Radzinowicz in his book ’The Growth of Crime’ aptly observes as follows:      "Long  imprisonment  could  be  regarded  as  the  neat      response to  all three  requirements: it  would put the      miscreants behind  bars  for  a  long  time;  it  would      demonstrate that  the game was not wirth the candle for      others." (p. 195)      The author gives examples in support of his views thus:

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    "Two English  police officers  were sentenced  to seven      years imprisonment  for accepting bribes and conspiring      to pervert  the  courts  of  justice,  two  others  for      hounding a  vagrant. In  Turkey a  similar sentence was      passed upon a writer for translating and publishing the      works of  Marx and  Engels. In  Russia the manager of a      mechanical repair shop was sentenced to death for theft      of  state   property.  In  the  Philippines  a  Chinese      businessman was condemned to public execution by firing      squad for  trafficking in  drugs. In  Nigeria something      like eighty people suffered the same fate within a year      or two  for armed  robbery. All these sentences had, of      course, their  elements of  deterrence and retribution.      But they  have in common another element, what has been      called  denunciation,   a   powerful   reassertion   or      assertion Of the values attacked."     (p. 197)      But, at  the same  time, it  cannot be  gainsaid that a sentence  out  of  proportion  of  the  crime  is  extremely repugnant to  the social  sentiments of a civilized society. This aspect  of the matter is fully taken care of by section 433A  when   it  confines  its  application  only  to  those categories of offences which are heinous and amount to a 1254 callous outrage  on humanity. Sir Leon Radzinowicz referring to this aspect of the matter observes thus:      "Maximum penalties,  upper limits  to the  punishment a      judge may  impose  for  various  kinds  of  crime,  are      essential to  any system which upholds the rule of law.      Objections  arise   only  when   these  penalties   are      illogical, inconsistent, at odds with people’s sense of      justice ..  Thus the  problem with maximum penalties is      not whether  they should  be laid down but whether they      can  be   made  reasonably  proportionate  to  people’s      assessment of  the comparative gravity of crimes, and a      consistent guide to sentences rather than an additional      factor in discrepancies." (p. 216)      Similarly, the  same author  in Vol.  II  of  his  book ’Crime and Justice’ observes as follows:-      "the solution to which most recent efforts have come is      that the legislative function is best discharged by the      creation of  a  small  number  of  distinct  sentencing      categories ..  And it  can also  serve to emphasize the      futility  of   close  line-drawing  in  an  area  where      precision-to the  extent that it can be achieved at all      must come  from the  efforts of  those in a position to      know and to judge the particular offender." (p. 332)      The  existence  of  a  distinct  number  of  sentencing      categories and  a list  of  the  offences  within  each      should be  of great  aid in  other words,  in  assuring      consistency of  treatment for  present offences  and in      determining the  appropriate sentence  levels  for  NEW      offences." (p. 340)      This is  exactly what  s. 433A  of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks  to achieve  by  carving  out  a  small  and special field  within which  alone the  statutory provisions operate.      While I agree that the deterrent form of punishment may not be  a most  suitable or ideal form of punishment yet the fact  remains   that  the   deterrent  punishment   prevents occurrence of offences by-      (i)  making it  impossible or difficult for an offender           to break the law again,      (ii) by  deterring not  only  the  offenders  but  also           others from committing offences, and      (iii) punishment or for that matter a punishment in the

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         form of a long-term imprisonment may be a means to           changing a 1255           person’s character  or personality  so that out of           some  motivation  or  reasons  of  a  personal  or           general nature, the offender might obey the law. Ted Honderich  in his  book ’punishment’  while dealing with the deterrent form of punishment observes as follows:      "It is  also to  be noticed  that the  conditions  have      other  consequences   as  well.   Penalties   must   be      sufficiently severe to deter effectively." Bentham has also pointed out that a penalty may be justified when the  distress it  causes to the offenders and others is not greater  than the  distress that  will result  if he and others undeterred, offended in the future. Ted Honderich  after highlighting  various  aspects  of  the deterrent form of punishment concludes as follows:-      "There are classes of offenders who are not deterred by      the prospect  of punishment,  it cannot  be  acceptable      that a  society should  attempt to prevent all offences      by punishment  alone ..........  In anticipation of the      discussion  to   come  of   com  promise   theories  of      punishment, we can say that punishment may be justified      by  being   both  economically   deterrent   and   also      deserved."      I am  not  at  all  against  the  reformative  form  of punishment on  principle, which in fact is the prime need of the hour,  but this matter has been thoroughly considered by Graeme Newman  in his  book ’The  Punishment  Response’  and where he has rightly pointed out that before the reformative form of  punishment can  succeed  people  must  be  properly educated and  realise the futility of committing crimes. The author observes as below:-      "In sum,  I have  suggested that order was created by a      criminal  act,   that  order  cannot  exist  without  a      structured inequality.  order  and  authority  must  be      maintained by  punishment, other  wise there  would  be      even  more  revolutions  and  wars  than  we  have  had      throughout history.      . .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ .      People in  criminal justice know only too well that the      best  intentioned   reforms  often  turn  out  to  have      unfortunate results.      Thus, for  example, in the area of criminal sentencing,      a popular  area at  present, practical  moves to reform      should be based soundly on the historical precedents of      criminal law and not on 1256      grand schemes  that will  sweep all of what we have out      the door.  There  have  been  many  examples  of  grand      schemes that  looked great  on paper,  but by  the time      they  had  been  trans  formed  into  legislation  were      utterly unrecognizable.  It seems  to follow  from this      that sentencing  reform should  not be  achieved by new      legislation, but  by a close analysis and extrapolation      from  the  already  existing  practice  and  theory  of      criminal law:"      Having regard  to these  circumstances I  am clearly of the opinion  that s.  433A is  actually a  social  piece  of legislation which  by one  stroke seeks to prevent dangerous criminals from  repeating offences and on the other protects the society  from  harm  and  distress  caused  to  innocent persons.      Taking into account the modern trends in penology there are very  rare cases  where the  courts impose a sentence of

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death and  even if  in some  cases where  such sentences are given, by  the time  the case  reaches this  Court,  a  bare minimum of  the cases  are left  where death  sentences  are upheld. Such  cases are  only those in which imposition of a death sentence becomes an imperative necessity having regard to the nature and character of the offences, the antecedents of the  offender  and  other  factors  referred  to  in  the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the  Parliament in  its wisdom chose to act in order to prevent  criminals  committing  heinous  crimes  from  being released through  easy remissions  or  substituted  form  of punishments without  undergoing atleast  a minimum period of imprisonment of  fourteen years  which may  in fact act as a sufficient  deterrent   which  may  prevent  criminals  from committing  offences.   In  most   parts  of   our  country, particularly in the north, cases are not uncommon where even a person  sentenced to imprisonment for life and having come back after  earning a  number of  remissions  has  committed repeated offences.  The mere  fact that a long term sentence or for  that matter  a sentence  of death  has not  produced useful  results  cannot  support  the  argument  either  for abolition of  death sentence or for reducing the sentence of life imprisonment  from 14  years  to  something  less.  The question is  not what has happened because of the provisions of the  penal Code but what would have happened if deterrent punishments were  not given.  In the  present distressed and disturbed atmosphere we feel that if deterrent punishment is not resorted  to, there will be complete chaos in the entire country and criminals be let loose endangering 1257 the lives of thousands of innocent people of our country. In spite of  all  the  resources  at  its  hands,  it  will  be difficult for the State to protect or guarantee the life and liberty of  all the citizens, if criminals are let loose and deterrent  punishment  is  either  abolished  or  mitigated. Secondly, while reformation of the criminal is only one side of the  picture, rehabilitation  of the victims and granting relief from  the tortures and sufferings which are caused to them as  a result of the offences committed by the criminals is a  factor which  seems to have been completely overlooked while defending  the cause  of the  criminals for abolishing deterrent sentences.  Where one person commits three murders it is  illogical to plead for the criminal and to argue that his life  should be  spared, without at all considering what has happened  to the  victims and their family. A person who has deprived  another person  completely of  his liberty for ever and  has endangered  the liberty  of his  family has no right to ask the court to uphold his liberty. Liberty is not a one-sided  concept, nor  does Art.  21 of the Constitution contemplate such  a concept.  If a person commits a criminal offence and  punishment has been given to him by a procedure established by  law which  is free  and fair  and where  the accused has  been fully  heard, no  question of violation of Art. 21  arises when  the question  of punishment  is  being considered. Even  so, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 do provide an opportunity to the offender, after his guilt is proved, to show circumstances under which an appropriate  sentence could  be  imposed  on  him.  These guarantees sufficiently  comply with  the provisions of Art. 21. Thus,  it seems to me that while considering the problem of penology we should not overlook the plight of victimology And the  sufferings of  the people  who die,  suffer or  are maimed at the hands of criminals.      For these  reasons, I am clearly of the opinion that in

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cases where  s. 433A  applies, no  question of  reduction of sentence arises  at all unless the President of India or the Governor choose to exercise their  wide powers under Art. 72 or Art.  161 of  the Constitution  which  also  have  to  be exercised according  to sound legal principles as adumbrated by Brother  Krishna Iyer,  J. I,  therefore, think  that any reduction or  modification in the deterrent punishment would r far from reforming the criminal be counter-productive.      Thus,  on   a  consideration   of  the   circumstances, mentioned  above,   the  conclusion   is  inescapable   that parliament by  enacting s. 433A has rejected the reformative character of punishment, in respect of offences contemplated by it,  for  the  time  being  in  view  of  the  prevailing conditions in  our country.  It is  well  settled  that  the legislature understands  the needs  and requirements  of its people 1258 much better  than the courts because the Parliament consists of the  elected representatives  of the  people and  if  the Parliament decides to enact a legislation for the benefit of the  people,   such  a   legislation  must  be  meaningfully construed and  given effect to so as to subserve the purpose for which it is meant.      Doubtless, the President of India under Art. 72 and the State Government under Art. 161 have absolute and unfettered powers to  grant pardon,  reprieves, remissions,  etc.  This power can neither be altered, modified or interfered with by any statutory  provision. But,  the fact remains that higher the power,  the more cautious would be its exercise. This is particularly so  because  the  present  enactment  has  been passed by  the Parliament  on being sponsored by the Central Government itself.  It is,  therefore, manifest  that  while exercising the  powers under  the aforesaid  Articles of the Constitution neither  the President,  who acts on the advice of the  Council of  Ministers, nor  the State  Government is likely to  overlook the  object, spirit and philosophy of s. 433A so  as to  create a  conflict between  the  legislative intent and  the executive  power. It  cannot be doubted as a proposition of  law that  where a  power is vested in a very high authority,  it must be presumed that the said authority would  act   properly  and   carefully  after  an  objective consideration of all the aspects of the matter.      So viewed,  I am  unable to find any real inconsistency between s.  433A and Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India  as contended  by the petitioners. I also hold that all the  grounds on  which the constitutional validity of s. 433A has  been challenged must fail. I dismiss the petitions with  the   modification  that  s.  433A  would  apply  only prospectively as pointed out by Brother Krishna Iyer, J.      KOSHAL, J.-On  a perusal of the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Krishna Iyer, J., I agree respectfully with findings (2)  to (11), (13) and (14) enumerated by him in is concluding part  as, also  with the first sentence occurring in finding  (1), but  regret that I am unable to endorse all the views  expressed by  him on  the reformative  aspect  of penology, especially  those forming the basis of finding (1) minus the first sentence and of finding (12). In relation to those  views,  while  concurring  generally  with  the  note prepared  by  my  learned  brother,  Fazal  Ali,  J.,  I  am appending a very short note of my own.      2. That  the four  main objects  which punishment of an offender by the State is intended to achieve are deterrence, prevention, retribution  and reformation  is well recognised and does not appear to be 1259

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open to  dissent. In  its  deterrent  phase,  punishment  is calculated to  act as a warning to others against indulgence in the anti-social act for which it is visited. It acts as a preventive because  the incarceration of the offender, while it  lasts,  makes  it  impossible  for  him  to  repeat  the offending act. His transformation into a law-abiding citizen is of  course another  object of penal legislation but so is retribution which  is also  described as  a symbol of social condemnation and  a vindication  of the law. The question on which a  divergence of opinion has been expressed at the bar is the  emphasis which  the legislature is expected to place on each  of the  said four objects. It has been contended on behalf of  the petitioners  that the  main object  of  every punishment must  be reformation of the offender and that the other objects  above mentioned  must  be  relegated  to  the background and be brought into play only incidentally, if at all. I  have serious  disagreement with this proposition and that for three reasons.      3. In the first place, there is no evidence that all or most of  the criminals  who are  punished  are  amenable  to reformation. It  is true that in recent years an opinion has been strongly  expressed in  favour of reformation being the dominant object  of punishment  but then an opposite opinion has not  been lacking in expression. Champions of the former view cry  from housetops  that punishment  must have  as its target the crime and not the criminal. Others, however, have been equally  vocal in  bringing  into  focus  the  mischief flowing from  what the  criminal has  done to his victim and those near  and dear  to him  and have  insisted on  greater attention being  paid to  victimology and  therefore to  the retributive aspect of punishment. They assert:      "Neither  reformers  nor  psychologists  have,  by  and      large,  succeeded   in  reducing   recidivism  by   the      convicted criminals.  Neither harshness  nor laxity has      succeeded in discouraging repeaters .... Criminality is      not a  disease admitting  of cure  through quick social      therapy .. " The matter has been the subject of social debate and, so far as one  can judge,  will continue to remain at that level in the foreseeable future.      4. Secondly,  the question  as to  which of the various objects of  punishment  should  be  the  basis  of  a  penal provision has,  in the  very nature of things, to be left to the legislature and it is not for the courts to say which of them shall be given priority, preponderance 1260 or predominance.  It may well in fact be that a punitive law may be  intended to achieve only one of the four objects but that is  something which  must be decided by the legislature in its  own wisdom.  An offence  calculated  to  thwart  the security of  the State  may be  considered so  serious as to demand the  death  penalty  and  nothing  else,  both  as  a preventive  and   a  deterrent,   and  without   regard   to retribution and  reformation. On  the other  hand,  offences involving moral  turpitude may  call for  reformation as the chief objective  to be  achieved by  the legislature.  In  a third case all the four objects may have to be borne in mind in choosing  the punishment.  As it  is, the  choice must be that of the legislature and not that of the courts and it is not  for   the  latter   to  advise  the  legislature  which particular object  shall be  kept in  focus in  a particular situation. Nor  is it  open to the courts to be persuaded by their own  ideas about the propriety of a particular purpose being achieved  by  a  piece  of  penal  legislation,  while judging its  constitutionality. A contrary proposition would

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mean the  stepping of  the judiciary  into the  field of the legislature which, I need hardly say, is not permissible. It is thus  outside the scope of the inquiry undertaken by this Court into  the vires of the provisions contained in section 433A  to  find  out  the  extent  to  which  the  object  of reformation is  sought to  be achieved thereby, the opinions of great  thinkers, jurists,  politicians and  saints (as to what  the   basis  of   a   penal   provision   should   be) notwithstanding.      5. The  third reason  flows from a careful study of the penal  law   prevalent  in   the  country,  especially  that contained in  the Indian Penal Code which brings out clearly that the  severity of  each punishment sanctioned by the law is directly  proportional to  the seriousness of the offence for which  it is  awarded. This,  to my  mind,  is  strongly indicative of  reformation not  being  the  foremost  object sought to be achieved by the penal provisions adopted by the legislature. A  person who  has committed murder in the heat of passion  may not  repeat his act at all later in life and the reformation  process in  his  case  need  not  be  time- consuming. On  the other hand, a thief may take long to shed the propensity to deprive others of their good money. If the reformative aspect  of punishment  were to be given priority and predominance  in every case the murderer may deserve, in a given  set of  circumstances, no  more than  a six months’ period of incarceration while a thief may have to be trained into better  ways of life from the social point of view over a long period, and the death penalty, the vires of which has been recently  upheld by  a majority of four in a five Judge Bench of  this Court  in Bachan Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others would have to be 1261 exterminated from Indian criminal law. The argument based on the object  of reformation  having to be in the forefront of the legislative  purposes behind punishment must, therefore, held to be fallacious.      6. I  conclude that the contents of section 433A of the Code of  Criminal Procedure  (or, for  that matter any other penal provision)  cannot be attacked on the ground that they are hit  by article  14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they are  arbitrary   or  irrational   because  they  ignore  the reformative aspect of punishment. S.R.                                    Petitions dismissed. 1262